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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is in the broadest terms an anthropological exploration of 
intercommunication; it concerns concepts and practices of speech and 
hearing among a Lowland Amazonian people, the Pa'ikwene, concentrating 
particularly on the community of Deuxieme Village Esperance in southern 
Guyane (French Guiana). A significant aspect of the subject is the 
axiological one, i. e., the moral and aesthetic values attaching to proper 
dialogic, and consequently social, relations - or what Ingold describes 
(1986: 141) as the "conversation that is social life". 
Revealing the speech of ordinary people to be as `powerful' in its way as that 
of chiefs, the study addresses the instrumentality of speaking and hearing in 
the creation and maintenance of sociality. Essentially, I argue that 
intersubjective communication does not so much `imply' Pa'ikwene society 
(Levi-Strauss 1973: 390) as construct it as a sociable, pleasurable and 
egalitarian entity; that it is, in short, one of the fundamental `tools for 
conviviality' (Illich 1973). 
While the role of language in the process of society has long been 
recognised by anthropology, and comprehensively investigated, tht of 
listening to it seems, perhaps because of the more `private' nature of the act, 
not to have enjoyed the same level of sociological interest. Given this 
imbalance, special emphasis is laid on native audition as embodied by the 
cultural phenomenon of "Tchimap", "to hear-listen-understand", and its use 
in three key spheres, the political, economic and magico-religious. 
One central issue deals with the agency and perceived value of "good 
hearing" in the generation of good relations between humans, and of 
productive ones between humans and non-humans. Another major theme, 
of relevance to the ongoing theoretical debate on 'individualism- 
collectivism', involves the efficacy of "Tchimap" as a performative means of 
personal autonomy, within and as part of, rather than in opposition to, the 
group. 
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Preface 
This thesis is about the Pa'ikwene, more usually known in the literature as the 
Palikur, a native American people of North Brazil and French Guiana, which I shall 
hereafter call Guyane. My time in the `field' amounted to fourteen months 
(November 1993-mid August 1994, November 1994-mid February 1995), of which 
eleven were spent with the Pa'ikwene. The bulk of my work was carried out in 
Village Esperance Deux, an indigenous community of at that time some one 
hundred and sixty people situated just off the river Oyapock, by the small Creole 
frontier-town of St Georges in south Guyane. I also conducted research in Premier 
Village Esperance and Gabaret, and in the Pa'ikwene `homeland' in Brazil. It 
should be borne in mind that my findings relate not only mainly to one community 
(at a particular period of its history), but to a limited number of individuals within it, 
and to particular classes among them at that: old and middle generation people 
and children and youths up to fifteen; contact with males from fifteen to twenty-five 
was scarce, with females of that age even rarer. 
Acknowledgements. 
In Esperance Deux I lived in the home of Susana and Karinai Labonte and their 
children, Wahtchit, Virsen, Edison, Lennie, Annie and Soline, to each of whom my 
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yet frequently felt no older or more knowledgeable than Soline - or Sohol, "a little 
bird" (? ), to give her her Pa'ikwene name, the baby daughter and my companion in 
learning to "hear-understand". Other Pa'ikwene owed a debt of thanks are 
Alphonse Yoyo, Elsa Baptiste, Kayüt Baptiste, Ivayüt Yoyo, Abilio Labonte, Olav 
and Tavesü Guillaumet. My appreciation also to "Capitaine" Louis Norino of 
Premier Village Esperance, a caring, committed man; and Nenel, Meoka and 
Shoni Baptiste, Joao Felicio, and chief Tchikoi, all of Kümene village in Brazil. 
Acknowledgements are due also to: in St Georges, Dr. Brigitte Vumbi 
(Borne) whose friendship and medical care both kept me going, and Franck 
Compper. In Cayenne, Mlle Michele Fontaine, Mr James, and Emmanuel Montout 
(Groupe d'Etude et de Recherche en Espace Creolophone), for generously sharing 
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some of his findings and thoughts about the Pa'ikwene; my thanks too to Renee 
Civalero who arranged for me to stay at the Residence des Magistrats during my 
`furloughs'. In Brazil, Diana and Harold Green who facilitated my entry into Village 
Esperance Deux. In Paris, the anthropologists Frangoise and Pierre Grenand and 
Simone Dreyfus, for their kind advice. In Britain, Dr David McKnight and my fellow 
students at the LSE, where I was initially registered, and St Andrews, in particular 
my co-Americanists: Rebecca Ellis, Karen Jacobs, Stephen Kidd, Gisela Pauli, 
Elsje Lagrou, Gonzalo Araöz, Carlos Londono-Sulkin, Guilherme Werlang; also 
Mark Jamieson and Marco Antonio Gonsalves. 
Especial thanks go to my supervisor Joanna Overing, as well as my respect 
and admiration for her many qualities, not the least of which is generosity. 
I wish also to express my heartfelt appreciation of the encouragement and interest 
of my family: my wife Jane, my children Emmanuelle and Daniel, and my father; 
and of the support of my friend Jill Cripps. 
Lastly, I gratefully acknowledge funding from the Economic & Social Research 
Council, the Emslie Horniman Scholarship Fund (RAI), St Andrews University 
(post-graduate scholarship), and the Central Research Fund, University of London. 
Pronunciation and orthography. 
Unlike Summer Institute of Linguistics' spellings of Pa'ikwene words (D. and H. 
Green 1993), which cater to a Brazilian-Portuguese ear, I have tried throughout to 
render them phonologically accessible to the `Anglo-Saxon' one, even if having 
occasionally to borrow foreign accentuation to do it. 
Table of Pa'ikwene vowel types, pure and gliding: 
a approximately as in "hat" 
ah as in French "ma". 
ai as in "buy". 
al as in "buying". 
ao as in "Mao", "how". 
e as in "bet". 
e accented as in French. 
ei as in "they". 
i as in "bit". 
i as in "key". 
o in most cases as in "oh" 
of as in "boy". 
u as in "bun". 
ü as in Spanish "una". 
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A number of conjoined strong vowels should be pronounced as distinct syllables: 
ae as in French "aero". 
aü as in "ha-oo". 
eo approximately as in "hey-oh". 
61: 1 as in "hey-oo". 
is as in "mama mia". 
ie as in "eee-yay". 
io as in "eee-oh". 
iü as in "eee-you". 
üa approximately as in "oo-ah". 
The phonetic values of the Pa'ikwene consonants `b', `d', `g', `h', `j', `k', `I', `m', `n', 
`p', 't' are much like English ones; `s' is voiceless, `y' and `w' constitute semivowels. 
In many words `t' is also randomly pronounced as `tch' or `ts': for example, most 
people, both in `my' community and elsewhere, said "Tchino" and "Eptchi" (woman 
and seat); some "Tsino" and "Eptsi"; yet others "Tino" and "Epti", the form favoured 
by SIL. Other cases of free variation are `k/g', `g/h', `b/v', `r/g' and `r/I'. In some 
instances the latter tends to be so unstressed as to turn into a glottal stop, indicated 
as ', which is why I write "Pa'ikwene" not "Parikwene" or "Palikwene" (For why I 
choose to call them them that in the first place rather than the `official' appellation 
"Palikur", see chapter 1). Variation seemed a matter of personal idiosyncrasy 
rather than prescription' or regional determination, with phonemic differences 
occurring among individuals in the same household and age group2, let alone 
community. 3 
The thesis contains Creole, French and Brazilian-Portuguese as well as Pa'ikwene 
words and expressions. They all take double quotation marks, as do translations of 
recorded verbatim speech and direct quotes from written sources. Glosses of 
published material have single ones. Italics will be used for Latin locutions (e. g. 
per se) and scientific terminology (e. g. Manicaria saccifera). 
1 With one exception it seemed: the rule whereby the 'p' in some words converts to 'v' when placed 
between two vowels, e. g. "Ki[p=v]ün" ("Full"). 
2 Cf. Nimuendaju's ascription (1971 [1926]: 82) of the phonetic discrepancy between the speech of 
older and younger Pa'ikwene to cultural influence (i. e., increased contact with Creoles). 
3 Not to mention also among observers. To give but one example, compare my "Wavitche", the name 
of a spirit, with Nimuendaju's "Wapetpiye" (ibid.: 61). Phonological and morphological disagreements 
in what different people record are probably unavoidable and due in part to diachronicity and the 
flexibility of the language itself, which the present SIL move to standardise its written form must surely 
run the risk of damaging. 
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A note on writing. 
For reasons of narration and readability the text contains sections written in the 
present tense and others in the past one (and some indeed in both). There are 
plainly drawbacks to either; each is in its own way capable of distorting our 
perspective on, and thoughts about, events and peoples. The first not only denies 
the time lag between fieldwork and writing up, and reading; it also, as Fabian 
points out (1983), establishes a (false) premise of atemporality and stasis by 
relocating situations from their historical context to a make-believe `never never 
land'. In addition to this, it can pass off given happenings as norms when in fact 
they may not be. However, may not the past tense freeze time just as effectively as 
the immutable `ethnographic present'? It too can notionally foreclose the possibility, 
and actuality, of the evolution and change of the world one is writing about, and the 
creativity, choices and innovativeness of its members (Seeger 1987: 86); or else 
give the impression that described behaviours, concepts and beliefs no longer 
exist when in reality they still do. If I seesaw between the two tenses, then, it is 
because despite the pitfalls I find them equally useful. Like Seeger (ibid.: xvi-xvii), I 
value the present one's ability to express and stylistically underline the particularity 
of certain actions as autonomous and creative, as opposed to mechanical and 
normative, acts. And I see the past one as a device for describing not something 
that is gone for ever but, rather, something that at a given moment in time was a 
part, a phase, of a yet unfolding process of social, cultural, and individual self- 
transformation. 
Chapter breakdown. 
Chapter 1 establishes people and place. Chapter 2 gives a subjective account of 
my entry into and initial exploration of the Pa'ikwene world. Chapter 3 deals with 
various aspects of the Pa'ikwene language and speaking; chapter 4 with the no 
less important issue of audition insofar as, in the conceptual form of 'hearing- 
understanding', it occupies a vital place in Pa'ikwene social life. Chapter 5 
describes and investigates different facets of political communication as it relates 
to leadership and the social practice of non-leaders. Chapter 6 returns by way of a 
divertissement to the subject of hearing, exploring Pa'ikwene so-called "bad 
hearing". Chapter 7 combines and considers the possible interrelationship 
between two themes: gifting and `hearing-understanding'. Chapter 8 concentrates 
on native work and productivity, and the role of speech therein. Chapter 9 looks at 
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traditional and modern aspects of Pa'ikwene religion, and chapter 10 is the 
conclusion. 
Methodology. 
Above all I relied on `participant observation', though my observation was 
effectively only as participatory as the Pa'ikwene allowed it to be. It was also, on 
the other hand, a fulltime and dynamic (thus occasionally tiring)4 activity, requiring 
openness but not passivity. 
Informal - daily, natural, spontaneous - conversation provided the 
overwhelming bulk of information; however, I did when possible plant specific 
topics I wanted data on and then wait to see what the event produced. It is in 
passing extraordinary what divergences, of opinion, knowledge, `hard facts', there 
can be on a single subject on the part of the various collocutors. I also conducted 
structured interviews with chief Tchikoi in Kümene and "Capitaine" Louis Nerino of 
Premier Village Esperance; used a recorder for collecting myths and stories and in 
my session with the shamans (chapter 9; the only payment requested was a copy 
of the tape, duly supplied); and did a census in Deuxieme Village Esperance. 
Throughout I tried to maintain, practically, mentally, emotionally and morally, an 
engagement not just with the subject of my research but the subjects whose lives I 
sought to witness and understand. To this end, hearing was as important as 
seeing and speaking. I practised, I like to think, the "active and methodical 
listening" recommended by Bourdieu (1996: 16) as part of the process of osmosis in 
regard to the worlds one studies, which entails that our approach to their 
inhabitants be jointly objective and subjective, giving as well as acquisitive 
(ibid.: 17-37). 
Personal note. 
I found conditions hard. I caught malaria, and pleasurable periods of intense 
activity alternated with exacting ones of boredom and depression. In great measure 
the latter was induced by the antipathy of a large Brazilian Protestant 
fundamentalist (Assembleia de Deus) colony in `my' community, led by a Pastor 
who tried continuously, though thankfully not that successfully, to incite my 
converted Pa'ikwene hosts against me. Another particularly trying aspect was the 
4 As the diarist Ernst Jünger puts it, "[O]bservation represents one of the highest and wildest 
processes of movement" (quoted in Karcher 1992: 32) 
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sect's music, with cassettes of Brazilian religious lyrics backed by North American 
music of the schlockiest kind being played day in day out throughout the village at 
the highest volume. It took a long while, and several necessary breaks in 
Cayenne, before I acquired the wherewithal to cope with these two things at the 
minimum of personal cost. 
However, while village life was often, from my perspective, monotonous, this 
was compensated by events such as canoe journeys, particularly the passage 
through the turbulent and dangerous Bay of Oyapock, and hunts (not that I went on 
many). This is no doubt a common experience if probably one not that `politically 
correct' to stress. But these occasions allowed a fifty year old to test personal 
resources and fulfil drives and emotions never explored when younger; for which 
my gratitude. 
Above all, what I remember, with affection, is affection. The constant, overall 
warmth and closeness between the Labonte family, and them and their fellows (kin, 
neighbours, friends); their frequent joking and laughing; their pleasure in talking, 
working, eating, being loud together. And the affection, the love, care and concern 
they extended to me. As of mine for them, this thesis is written partly with the 
intention of expressing and sustaining it. 
1 
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INTRODUCTION: The people `of the middle' and at the margin. 
After lunch, tortoise and manioc, and I lie drowsy in a hammock, miles, subjectively, 
`from nowhere', on an island in a marsh in the Pa'ikwene homeland, in remotest 
northern Amapa state, Brazil. My companions, two men, two women, three 
adolescents, two children, have, more energetic, gone foraging. I am alone, or so I 
think. For suddenly a face, streaked in awkward crimson patterns of juice, thrusts 
itself into mine. Five year old Maknayan, known as Annie, has crept up on me 
unheard. "Look! ", she cries, "Indian! Pa'ikwene Indian! " And laughingly lets off a 
make-believe arrow, little Amerindian girl playing at "Indians" , her grin in part self- 
parody, delighted and knowing, in part cognizance and mockery of the Whiteman's 
image of Indians'. But not only. While they may take Christian names and no 
longer decorate their faces with the traditional designs, and seem no longer to 
know their meaning, she and her people still know, and deeply, who they are. 
The material below, the impressions, the speculations, the objective data, is 
offered in the hope of formulating, for myself no less than others, an insight into 
aspects of that knowledge, and feeling, of being Pa'ikwene, in the last decade of 
the twentieth century. 
Although I did not undertake a specific investigation into the effects of 
contact, the subject of `change' - the transformation and constant regeneration 
through time of a people who sit astride not only two nation states, Brazil and 
France, but, as will be seen, several cultures - is of necessity implicit in every 
chapter. Another underlying and mainly unstressed theme concerns axiology; that 
is, the moral and aesthetic values which fill, inform and give meaning to Pa'ikwene 
life, some of whose key features (a number of which will be examined further in due 
course) I now move on to outline. 
appellation. 
I call the Pa'ikwene by that name, rather than the common alternative Palikur, 
because they themselves do, the latter being regarded as a denotative term mostly 
1 Word having a positive rather than negative connotation for the Pa'ikwene. They distinguish 
between native American "Indians" and Asian Indians, of whom there are some number in Guyane, 
calling these by the local term "Coolie Indians". 
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used by others. Before standardisation fixed on this appellation and spelling, they 
were known in 16th, 17th and 18th century documents as, variously, the Paricura, 
Paricuria, Paricores, Palicur, Palicour(s), Palikurene (Nimuendaju 1971[1926]: l, 4- 
5,10-1); more recently Fernandes calls them Parikur (1950) and Parincur Jene 
(1963). Dreyfus suggests (1988) they were dubbed the Palikur by fellow 
Amerindians; and indeed to their former foe the Galibi they are the Palikura. 
Many informants distinguished between the two terms Palikur and 
Pa'ikwene in another sense: using (and translating) the first as a synonym for 
generic Indian and reserving the second for a specific type, themselves. More 
than once I was told that while they were Palikur so were the other tribes insofar as 
all were Indians, whereas they alone were Pa'ikwene. As one explained: "All 
Indians are Palikur. The Yanomamo, the Arawete, the Wayapi, Emerillon, Wayana, 
even the Galibi2 are Palikur - but we Pa'ikwene are the most Palikur. " 
According to informants, `Pa'ik' comes from `pakwa' which "is the same" as `aükwa', 
meaning middle: a highly significant word since it is by this that they designate the 
river and by extension the region around it which constitutes their heartland in 
north Amapa (Brazil). Thus, calling themselves Pa'ikwene or, less commonly, 
Aükwa-yene (Dreyfus 1981), they are through the addition of the self-explanatory 
suffix `[y]ene', the People of the middle (cf. F. and P. Grenand 1987: 22 fn. 22, 
Montout 1994: 26, Arnaud 1984). 
The Aükwa or Middle river, called Urucauä in Brazilian and cosmologically 
held to be the centre of the world, is so named because it lies between two others, 
the Kwip (Braz. Curipi), "on the right", and the Wassa (Braz. Ua9d), "on the left", 
homes to the Karipün, Galibi and so-called "false" Galibi, a mixture of Arüa and 
others. Dreyfus argues (op. cit.: 302) that the Aükwa cannot really be the middle 
river for rather than having the Uacä to its left it is the latter's tributary (map 3). 
Whether one fact need exclude the other, which to my mind it does not, should not 
detract from the Pa'ikwene's own topography; nor compromise the deep affective 
relationship to their territory inherent in such "aukwa-centrism" (Dreyfus ibid. ). 
Accordingly, they may also be said to be people-of-the-middle in a further 
way: their strong sense of uniqueness and exclusivity seems to allow each 
individual one of them a feeling of importance and worth - of being, as a Pa'ikwene, 
right at the hub of things. (Collectively a disposition well catered for by their 
grammar, which possesses three forms of the pronoun `we': "Wis" meaning me and 
2 Their traditional enemy are said to be descended from a Pa'ikwene woman (Appendix A, story 5). 
3 
you but not them; "Wishwi", all of us including you; and "Üsü", me and him-her-them 
but not you. The latter sums up the Pa'ikwene's sense of exclusiveness succinctly. ) 
Paradoxically, the awareness of their difference to others arising from this 
self-confidence also induces a general sense of apartness, of marginality in the 
non-indigenous world which, in Guyane especially, they inhabit along with their 
own. 3 As one of them, Jean Narcissio, an Indian rights activist, put it, his people 
are pulled both ways, painfully stuck in the middle between "le monde civilise", i. e., 
the `White' world, and the ancestral one. 
language. 
(i) The Pa'ikwene speak Pa'ikwaki, a member of the Arawak language family (de 
Goeje 1928, Mason 1950, Noble 1965, Matteson 1972: 234-8, Derbyshire and 
Pullum 1986: 481-4, Payne 1986, F. and P. Grenand 1987). There is some debate 
over whether to classify it with the pre-Andean Arawakan languages (Rivet 1924), 
the `Northern' ones (Loukotka 1968: 145-7), those spoken in the Xingu (Noble op. 
cit. ) or, finally, the Rio Negro (Matteson op. cit. ). 
Pa'ikwaki contains many loan-words from Karib and French Creole as well 
as a smaller but growing number of Portuguese and `French' French ones. The 
Pa'ikwene also have a ceremonial language, "Kiaptünka", at present moribund. 
Both matters are dealt with more fully later. 
(ii) Like many Amerindian languages Pa'ikwaki is agglutinative, e. g. "ah" (tree, 
timber); "ahavwi" (forest); "ahav'iküyene" (wildness); "ahtamni" (branch); "ahamna" 
(leaf); "ahariü" (fruit); "ahmütri" (plant); "ahmütiwi" (garden); "ahgebdji" (small bit of 
wood); "idahaptchi" (block of wood). Grammatically, the basic word order is SVO: 
Nah auna Pa'ikwaki: I speak Pa'ikwaki. There are three noun genders: masculine, 
feminine and neutral. Adjectives commonly follow the noun: Eg tchino kabaino, 
she's a good/fine woman (see H. and D. Green 1972, Dooley and Green 1977). 
geography and history. 
Aükwa, the Pa'ikwene territory in north Amapa, lies inland from Cape Orange along 
the river Urucauä, which is off the river Uaca whose estuary merges with that of the 
river Oyapock, the border between Guyane and Brazil (maps 1,3). The latter's 
banks are home to a handful of `French' Pa'ikwene settlements, chief among them 
the neighbouring villages of Esperance 1 and 2 near St Georges. There are also 
3 Story 2 Appendix A conveys well this mixture of national self-centredness and alienation. 
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other communities further north, outside of Macouria and Regina and at Roura 
(map 2). 
It has been said that "it is difficult to set out their [the Pa'ikwene's] history, even their 
most recent history, with precision" (Dreyfus 1988: 21, my translation). And this 
about a nation of which the `West' has been aware from as early as 1500 c. E. when 
their then territory was sighted by the navigator Vicente Yanez Pinzön, who 
recorded it in 1513 as Paricura, a coastal province on the northern bank of the 
Amazon (Nimuendaju op. cit.: 1). 4 For the next century and a half and spreading 
ever northward, the Pa'ikwene, designated by a variety of approximate names (see 
above) and often mistaken for other peoples5, notably the Maraön and Arikare 
(Nimuendaju op. cit.: 1-4,11-12; F. and P. Grenand 1987: 21-2,43-4), remained an 
unknown quantity. Then in 1653 the first `hard' contact was made by Fr. Antoine 
Biet, who set out from Cayenne expressly to search for the tribe by now dubbed the 
Palicours and installed in northern Amapa (Biet 1664). 
Increasing European encroachment in Amapa, involving the French, Portuguese, 
British and Dutch, did more than induce migrations among the indigenous peoples. 
It also coincided with, and probably contributed to (P. and F. Grenand 1988a), a 
period of inter-Amerindian conflict. A long and bitter war, remembered still today, 
occurred between the (Karib) Galibi and the Arawakan groups, particularly the 
Pa'ikwene. In about 1590 the latter joined forces with the Yayo (P. Grenand 1979), 
then some sixty years later with the Maraön (Nimuendaju op. cit.: 4); the Galibi 
eventually removed themselves to Guyane. 6 
From the 1650's to well into the 18th century the Pa'ikwene and other native 
groups (among them the Maraön, Arikare, Arüa, Maye, Tokoyen)7 were embroiled 
in the struggle between France and Portugal for control of Amapa. In 1722, under 
4 They originated either further south (Central Amazonia) or southwest (Rio Negro region), according 
to P. Grenand (1979; see also Meggers & Evans 1957 and section on language above). Their oral 
history disproves Dreyfus' claim (1981: 304) that they retain no memory of the migration to Aükwa. 
5 By Keymis (1596), Raleigh (1590's), d'Avity (1604), Harcourt (1613), de Forest (1625), de Laet 
(1633), Dudley (1646). 
6 Some of their descendants have since resettled in north Amapa. 
7 For a comprehensive list see F. & P. Grenand 1987: 33ff. 
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the pretext that the French were inciting the Indians, especially the Arüa, against 
them, the Portuguese slaughtered or deported to Para the indigenous communities 
that had not managed to flee (Hurault 1989). 
By the mid-18th century the Pa'ikwene are known to inhabit either bank of 
the Ua9d. During this period, with North Amapa and the Lower Oyapock 
constituting a zone of safety for the different indigenous groups seeking refuge from 
European impingement and enslavement, there developed what P. and F. 
Grenand describe (1990) as a `process of inter-tribal fusion' out of which evolved 
three distinct ethnic entities: the Pa'ikwene, the Karipün, and the "false" Galibi. 
They propose (F. and P. Grenand 1987: 17-29) that the former grew out of a corpus 
of nine original clans (six inner, three peripheral) which in response to Portuguese 
geopolitical pressure coalesced under a `super-chief' with nine non-Pa'ikwene 
groups in Amapa, palikurised over time as clans also. 
Throughout this period, too, the Indians were targeted, with variable success, by 
the Jesuits (1680's, 1720's, 1735-62,1780's-94; see Nimuendaju op. cit.: 5-8). 
Between the late 1720's and 1780's the Pa'ikwene were effectively caught 
between the French Catholics, out to convert and missionise them, and Portuguese 
slavers often acting in alliance with other Indians such as the Wayapi from the 
Upper Oyapock (P. Grenand 1979: 4). By the 1790's, under the cumulative effects 
(fighting, deportation, flight) of the colonialist presence, the Pa'ikwene were 
demographically depleted, their population numbering no more than one thousand 
(P. Grenand ibid. ) 
It would seem that for the next century or so, the Pa'ikwene, now firmly established 
in their heartland of Aükwa (Rio Urucauä) and ignored by the French authorities 
wielding de facto power in Amapa, led a relatively untroubled existence. Catholic 
missionary activity slackened, although a `push' in the 1890's netted some 
converts; the territory abounded in game, fish and manatee; and relations of trade 
with the Creoles, whose influence on the Pa'ikwene was already strong, provided a 
ready market for horticultural surpluses. In due course, the Pa'ikwene emerged as 
a powerful entity, economically and politically; indeed, according to P. Grenand 
(ibid. ), as the sole indigenous group of any importance in the region. 
When, in 1900, Swiss arbitration ended the protracted dispute over the 
possession of Amapa and France ceded the territory to Brazil, most Pa'ikwene 
chose to cross the Oyapock into Guyane. It could be argued that this was less of an 
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immigration than a return to a territory which historically, according to informants, 
had long harboured Pa'ikwene communities, certainly as far back as the early 16th 
century (P. & F. Grenand 1988a). Decimated by malaria and influenza in the first 
decade then by a measles epidemic in 1914, the bulk of the survivors returned to 
Aükwa. Since then the Pa'ikwene nation has consisted of two groups dependent 
on two remote yet influential political overlords, France and Brazil. 
For P. Grenand (1987: 76) the relationship between the two groups is "more 
or less complementary"; for Montout (1994: 12 and throughout), culturally weighted 
in favour of the more traditionalist `Brazilian' Pa'ikwene. Personally, I balk at 
drawing too definite a distinction between them and the `French' ones. There is an 
incessant and dynamic flow of people between the two communities (see chapter 9 
fn. 5, also P. and F. Grenand 1990: 32), and with it a seepage of `modern' beliefs 
and artifacts into Aükwa and in return a (re)infusion of `old' beliefs and ways into 
Guyane. As will be discussed below, any rift among today's Pa'ikwene is less 
likely to do with country of residence than religion, in the form of antagonisms 
between Christians and non-Christians on the one hand, and, especially, converts 
to the different Protestant sects on the other. 
Later waves of migration began in the early 1960's. There were two triggers for this. 
The first was the split in the Aükwa community due to the hostility between two 
shamans leading to the murder of one of them, and the flight of the other with a 
number of his kin and supporters into Guyane, where they settled at Gabaret, 
downstream from St Georges de I'Oyapock (Arnaud 1970: 14-5,1984: 46; Dreyfus 
op. cit.: 306-8; Ricardo 1983: 23). 
The second cause was the impact of Protestant fundamentalism. Briefly (the 
subject is addressed more fully later), as the result of sustained efforts by 
missionaries in the mid sixties most of the community at Aükwa adopted 
Evangelical Pentecostalism (Assembleia de Deus). Others, converts to Adventism, 
went to live in Premier Village Esperance, known also as La Savane, by St. 
Georges. This community was at the time largely inhabited by creolised Pa'ikwene 
who had remained, or descended from people who had remained, after the 
general return to Aükwa in the 1910's. The departure to Guyane of an Assembleia 
de Deus leader and his followers around 1980 constituted another migration. At 
this time too, a separate small party was motivated to found Deuxieme Village 
Esperance, alternatively called Perseverance. Its population, like that of the other 
Pa'ikwene communities in Guyane, continues to this day to be replenished by a 
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steady stream of Aükwan incomers, though I met a small number of people who 
decided to resettle in Aükwa, the pull of the heartland, both emotionally and in 
terms of lifestyle, apparently proving stronger in the end. 
environment and economy. 
Like much of Amapa, Aükwa is `flooded savanna' country, consisting of mangrove 
swamps, rivers and lakes and dotted with hilly outcrops of woodland; so the 
`Brazilian' Pa'ikwene are as much if not more marsh Indians as rainforest ones, 
and also to some extent coastal. Factors which necessarily impact on their 
economy, still overwhelmingly a `subsistence' one: hunting, fishing (though seldom 
now for manatee), gathering, horticulture. 
The recently established Guyanese communities, in Lower Oyapock as 
elsewhere, tend to be situated near larger non-indigenous ones, in an increasingly 
perl-urban environment. Here, sustaining a traditional economy is proving 
progressively harder. This is mainly due to a the growing scarcity of game and the 
remoteness of communities from good hunting and fishing sites; a compensatory 
intensification of agricultural activity threatened by a rising demographic density in 
relation to the amount of land, and the lack of access to good land. In the Oyapock 
region for example the authorities grant the Pa'ikwene land poor both in size and 
quality and save the best, lying nearer to their villages, for non-indigenous agro- 
pastoral outfits, which also seize profitable sites previously worked by Pa'ikwene. 
These conditions, highlighted a decade ago by Dreyfus (1988) and P. and F. 
Grenand (1988b), continued substantially unchanged in the mid-nineties (cf. 
Montout op. cit.: 30-1,102). As Dreyfus observed, if the Pa'ikwene remain in these 
ecologically and economically disadvantaged areas it is basically, in the St. 
Georges area, because of the accessibility of better (Western) health services and 
schools than in Brazil. This, and the availability of social benefits for those with 
French papers, has tended to inculcate a certain `culture of dependency'. 
demography. 
In 1925 the combined `French' and `Brazilian' Pa'ikwene population was 
calculated as 238 (Nimuendaju op. cit.: 15), and 1026 sixty-five years later (P. and 
F. Grenand 1990: 44-5), the `French' group representing 45% of the total. Today 
the gap between them is closing further. 
Computing let alone fixing the numbers of inhabitants per community proved 
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problematic, given the mobility of the population, their constant round between 
Guyane and Aükwa and between the different villages in Guyane itself; it was not 
uncommon for individuals to claim residence in two places. Notwithstanding this, 
my own research gave the following: 
(table 1) 
AUKWA (January 1994): Households People 
Kümene .......................... 94 544 Yakot ............................... 15 94 Imoni ................................ 5 33 Pwaichiket 
...................... 
14 48 
Kamü'iwa 
......................... 
9 37 
Süvinwa 
........................... 
4 32 
788 
GUYANE: 
Village Esperance 2 (my own census February 1994)... 27 households: 163 people 
Village Esperance 1 (guestimate) 
........................................................ 
200 ---- 
Gabaret (December 1993) 
................................................................... 
17 ---- 
Trois Paletuviers (down from 1980's figures) 
.............................. 
(approx. ) 25 ---- 
Couman-Couman 
.................................................................... 
(approx. ) 20 ---- 
Bambou (down from 1980's figures) 
......................................... 
(approx. ) 15 ---- 
Roze (down from 1980's figures) 
........................................................... 
2---- 
Macouria (both villages, according to informants August 1994). (approx. ) 200 ---- 
Regina (according to Em. Montout pers. com. April 1994) ....................... 
45 ---- 
Roura (according to informants) 
............................................... 
(approx. ) 35 ---- 
722 
Despite my own `head-counts' in Esperance 2 and Gabaret and the tally for Aükwa, 
supplied by chief Tchikoi, these statistics cannot be guaranteed. Also, I have no 
figures for Pa'ikwene living elsewhere, such as people who have married out. 
social organisation. 
The Pa'ikwene are a clan society. 8 Nimuendaju gives (op. cit.: 15-6) a figure of 
seven extant clans and four extinct ones for 1925; Arnaud (1984: 31-2), six extant 
and five extinct; and F. and P. Grenand (1987), seven extant and twelve extinct. I 
came up with eight surviving ones, seven rated "real" by informants and one "false": 
(1) Kawakükyene, People of the pineapple (Labonte9 ); (2) Wakavünyene, People 
of the `Wakap' tree ant (Baptiste); (3) Waivayene, People of the `walking' caterpillar 
8 With 'dual organisation' (Levi-Strauss 1986: 108,133-63). 
9 Words in brackets are contemporary family names; cf. F. Grenand & Renault-Lescure 1990: 28. 
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(Yoyo, Norino, Michel); (4) Paimione, People of the catfish (Guillaumet, Martin); (5) 
Wahshyene, People of the (is)land (Auguste, Felicio); (6) Wadayene, People of the 
gecko (Yapara); (7) Pa'üyene, People of the wild cotton bush (Orlando); (8) "False" 
clan Auniyene, People-who-speak-on-the-move aka Nasisyene, a palikurisation of 
their Brazilian surname Narcissio (the Mauricio family are also members). 
Originally, according to informants, a mixture of Pa'ikwene and non-Pa'ikweneio, 
they are accepted as a fully-fledged and legitimate clan despite the "false" tag. 
Clan membership is patrilineal. While taking the name of her husband's clan, a 
woman also retains her native one. Marriage is inter-clan exogamic11 with much 
intra-community endogamy (Dreyfus 1981: 309), especially now that villages are 
structurally multi-clan and relatively large-scale. Traditionally, each clan had its 
own territory (Nimuendaju op. cit. ) and villages consisted of some three or four kin- 
related households (Dreyfus 1988). Another difference is that communities were 
mobile, changing sites in function of the group dynamic or the ecology (Dreyfus 
ibid. ), whereas today they tend to stay put. 
At marriage, spouses live with the bride's parents. The chief marriage rule 
entails not only a ban on marrying into the father's, i. e., one's own, clan (Dreyfus 
1981: 309), but also, I learnt, into the mother's (cf. Mattioni 1975: 45). 12 
Contravention seemed to elicit no sanctions13 and, though it is ill regarded, 
culpable couples may continue residing in the community. 
The Pa'ikwene showed themselves highly egalitarian in regard to gender (there 
are for example women chiefs and shamans, as we will see) and the generations, 
though there was a degree of bossing of children by older siblings. This, however, 
was counterweighed by the former's undeniable 'power' over their elders, 
10 Probably the western branch of the Arüa (Dreyfus 1981: 304). 
11 A historical (probably 17c or 18c) development for F. & P. Grenand (1987: 17), replacing a prior 
endogamy due to the aforementioned unification of diverse ethnically distinct peoples into a single 
Pa'ikwene nation. 
12 Dreyfus says (op. cit.: 309-10) cross-cousin marriage is not unknown if rare, but that according to 
informants there was a "liking" for it in the past. 
13 Nor apparently did non-marital sex between adolescent cross-cousins, which to my certain 
knowledge also occurs. 
10 
exercised typically through `relations of demand. '14 
In respect of its internal affairs, Village Esperance Deux was acephalous; on 
wider issues, including (formal) relations with the non-indigenous world, it took 
counsel from and deferred to the authority of the two "Capitaines" in Esperance Un, 
Auguste Baptiste and Louis Norino. 
* 
Since much of my thesis relates to communication a foreword about language is 
appropriate. Of principal and fundamental concern is the notion not only that 
language "implies society" (Levi-Strauss 1973: 390) but is productive of it, a 
premise shared by the Pa'ikwene and various theorists alike. Charles Taylor, for 
instance, holds (1985: 234) that "it is not just the speech community which shapes 
and creates language, but language which constitutes and sustains the speech 
community" by means of the interpersonal dialogues comprising that community. 
Likewise, Volosinov posits (1986) the interdependence and interconstitutivity of 
language and society through a historical process wherein the new meanings, or 
`ideologies', continuously formed by the new utterances of intercommunicating 
creative speaker-hearers, generate a constant transformation of the social contexts 
in which verbal interaction, i. e., social relations, takes place. And for Ingold (1986), 
in the "intersubjective life... [which] consists of people speaking' (p. 144)... the 
conversation that is social life, is creative, and what is created is a relationship" (p. 
141, his stress). As will be seen, the assumption expressed by these and other 
such views is one I endorse. 
Sherzer and Urban have established (1986) that in native South America the 
customary, and highly regarded and practised, aesthetic and dramatic dimensions 
of language are not divorced from the other facets of daily life. Rather, they are all 
of a piece with the various aspects of discourse and wider action, ritualistic, 
political, economic, technical, `magical'... Moreover, the poetic-dramatic features of 
verbal performance are understood as an intrinsic constituent of such aspects. 
While Sherzer and Urban stress the performative in respect of formal or `special' 
styles of speech (oratory, ceremonial dialogue, curing chants, myth telling), they 
14 Of the social hierarchy based on 'birth order' purportedly characteristic of Lowland dual organisation 
(Hornborg 1988), 1 found no sign. 
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also recognise its presence in `informal', conversational speech. It is the latter - the 
way that the aesthetic, presentational and, also, moral qualities, jointly fill and 
resonate through the everyday and mostly commonplace talk of ordinary 
Pa'ikwene - which particularly interests me, as revealed in the second part of the 
chapter on `political communication' and, more generally, throughout. 
Sherzer and Urban, urging like others the study of Amerindian discourses in view 
of their fragility and increasing demise in the face of external pressures, argue also 
(ibid. ) that they are worth recording not so much as abstract objects by which, as 
through an invisible glass, the native world may be viewed, but as the symbolic and 
semantic process whereby knowledge pertaining to the process of social relations, 
practice and belief is "produced, conceived, transmitted and acquired - by 
members of societies and by researchers" (pp. 1-2). Accordingly, though 
presenting few verbatim texts, my aim has been to convey an overall Pa'ikwene 
style of dialoguing and relating; and through that to illuminate, and celebrate, a 
particular sociality and culture, at once unique and sharing various traits and 
values with other Lowland peoples. In describing the manner in which that world is 
not only spoken but (equally vitally) perceived, I have sought to demonstrate the 
extent to which these activities are both instrumental in and necessary for its 
(re)production and continuation. As will be seen, particular attention is paid to the 
part played in the process by the second one, hearing-and-understanding. 
Finally, the reader will not find below long transcriptions followed by 
technical analyses for which I was neither suited nor motivated. There will however 
be examples of utterances and dialogues and various speech contexts, and also 
several Pa'ikwene myths and stories in Appendix A. 
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PART ONE 
"PIS AUNA, NAH TCHIMAP": "YOU SPEAK, I HEAR- 
LISTEN-UNDERSTAND". 
KARINAI (to his adult son): Wahtchit. 
WAHTCH IT: 
KARINAI (same tone): Wahtchit. 
WAHTCHIT: 
KARINAI (same tone): Wahtchit. 
WAHTCHIT: IN ("Yes")? 
What follows is an explorative ethnography of the sociocultural and, as far as 
is possible, phenomenological world of the speakers and `hearer-listener- 
understanders' of a particular language called Pa'ikwaki: a description of a 
way of life expressed and sustained by that language, as translated and 
experienced by a visitor who, throughout his stay and after, tried hard and 
perhaps not that successfully to `hear, listen to and understand' it as well as 
possible. 
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chapter two 
THE TEXTURE NOT THE TEXT (a way in). 
gadji beri bimba glandridi laula lonni cadori 
gadjama gramma berida bimbala glandri galassassa laulitalomini 
gadji beri bin blassa glassala laula lonni cadorsu sassala bim 
gadjama tuffm i zamzalla binban gligla wowolimai bin beri ban 
o katalominai rhinozerossola hopsamen laulitalomini hooo... 
(from a Hugo Ball sound poem, in Cardinal 1981: 61) 
This is an account of my initial reaction to, and attempts to enter into, the oral-aural 
universe of the Paikwene. For all the near referential quality of some of its 
neologisms, Ball's Dadaist poem conveys something of how I perceived their 
speech when I first arrived among them: sounds arbitrarily combined and without 
denotative use, sounds without meaning. But I knew this could not be true: for one 
thing all the Pa'ikwene from adults to small children not only spoke Pa'ikwaki to 
each other but also patently understood it. And in due course it gradually, and 
naturally, became less and less unintelligible to me too, although never completely. 
This it did not only in semantic terms, but in non-semantic ones as well. Cardinal 
writes (1981: 100) about Ball's poem, which was devised to be spoken, that "almost 
totally innocent of semantic reference though the text is, it does make some form of 
`sense' by virtue of its rhythms and repetitions of sounds, and thereby bears 
comparison with a musical composition". Leaving aside the question of whether 
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music refers to anything outside itself', I consider below some of the non- or extra- 
semantic meanings of the Pa'ikwene language. In chapters five and seven I report 
on and examine how the Pa'ikwene themselves "hear-listen to-understand" - 
"tchimap" - this other sort of meaning which fills their utterances, and in chapters 
four and six I explore the social and cultural phenomenon of "Tchimap" itself. In the 
present one, I choose to focus on the way in which I myself reacted to and engaged 
with the preterlinguistic significations of indigenous words, and through them 
endeavoured to `make' sense of Pa'ikwene speaking; and through that, of their 
world insofar as I had become, however superficially and temporarily, immersed in 
it. Whereas, for them, its meanings were grounded in sociopragmatics, morality, 
aesthetics and affectivity, mine were more functions (and fictions) of my 
imagination, and of the senses and emotion too. I stress, though, that to the extent 
that my responses were voluntary, the intention behind them was not to remove or 
cushion me from an alien society but, on the contrary, to permit me to dwell in, and 
delve deeper into, it. 
Rosaldo cites (1980: 20) the received wisdom that "anthropology is, at least in part, 
an exercise in translation" and that understanding another culture is similar to 
learning a foreign language. Struggling to comprehend the Ilongots' world view, 
she records her frustration at her inability to seize the transcendent meaning of 
their discourse: "I was distressed by the great gap between my superficial 
1 For Cardinal it does not. Seeger, for one, differs, as is shown by his demonstration (1987) of how 
the music and singing of the Suyä not only refer to but regenerate their social and cosmological 
worlds: "Singing was part of social reproduction... [Song] Ceremonies ordered production and 
through their performative nature were a way the Suyä created and recreated their village and 
themselves [p. 130]... "[The] Suyä created space, time, and the person, as well as introduced and 
controlled the power of transformations through their singing... Singing and ceremonies brought 
many aspects of the cosmos into direct personal experience. Songs attested to the continued 
interaction of humans and animals... " (p. 132; see also 50-87). 
Ingold provides (1993a: 449-58) a forceful critique of the 'Western' assumption that spoken 
language representationally transmits meanings (seen to preexist in the mind, and in a context-free 
relationship between word and context, rather that in the external world) while song, and music as 
song without the linguistic component, supposedly "do not have meaning, they are meaning, 
standing for nothing other than themselves. " (p. 451, his emphasis). Ingold's thesis is that language 
has its origins in vocal music and, consequently, meaning inheres just as much in it as in song when it, 
language, is deployed in the 'lived-in' world, i. e., the practical dialectic between socially interrelating 
subjects. He does not address the issue of whether the theoretical source of language, song, might 
not itself also convey meaning 'beyond' itself, sociologically speaking. Regarding the probable 
common history of language and music/song, see Williams 1971: 120-1. Alejo Carpentier, however, 
suggests in his novel "The Lost Steps" (1956: 198-9,211-5) that music did not give rise to language 
but historically arose instead from it, through the repetition of single syllables and words in alternately 
different pitches by shamans performing in a magical context, particularly that of a threnody (lament). 
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understanding of their words and the significance their simplest phrases seemed to 
convey" (ibid.: 33). In the Amazonianist context, similar feelings of linguistic 
inadequacy and disconnection have been expressed by, among others, Descola 
(1996: 39-40) and, in an intense and moving way, Campbell (1989: 14-21). Wagley 
writes (1977: 20) that between the Tapirape and himself there always hung a 
"linguistic haze"; and Viveiros de Castro (1992: 8), that between him and the 
Arawete and their language lay "something thicker". I for my part, struggling forever 
to master some minimal proficiency in Pa'ikwaki, clutched in gratitude and hope at 
whatever linguistic and semantic perceptions fell into my ken, aware that although 
they could never dispel the fog completely they might at the very least help like a 
thread to lead me partway through the cultural maze of Pa'ikwene life; and in the 
process perhaps to some relatively less misty corners of it. 
After about a week in Deuxieme Village Esperance my linguistic comprehension 
had progressed to comprise the following Pa'ikwene words and expressions: 
Mwok, Ba'ita ash, Batnaba, Kainsima, Wag, Tchino, Awaig, Kibeine, Bakimni, 
Nigü(r), Nahgü(r), Ig mwaka, Ihm, Ihi, Nah ka tchimap, Kamü, Yüma, Himac, Kawa, 
Kit kap, Kamash, Kadash, Ba pi ai? Mah pikabayan? Kadahan, Oon, Bügüt, Yeye, 
Nah ka auna Pa'ikwaki, Pisemni seyne, Nah mativwe, Magüye, Mahgü, Mahgiü. 
(Rain, 2 Come [and] eat, Sit down, Much/many, Mosquito, Woman, Man, 
Good/thanks, Baby, My father/FB, My mother/MZ, He wants, Fish, Yes, I cannot/do 
not hear-understand, Sun, None, To sleep, No, Where [are] you going?, 
Take/catch!, Do not touch!, Greetings! [literally: Are you here? ], How are you?, 
There is, Water, Bread, Older Sibling/FB older Son and Daughter/MZ older Son 
and Daughter [vocative], I cannot speak Pa'ikwaki, Your hair [is] white, I [am] 
hungry, It's good/Delicious!, What is her name? What is his name? )3 
Yet I found that even these examples of basic everyday language were not always 
semantically as unambiguous as they at first appeared. For instance, "Ihm" literally 
21 arrived during the so-called 'light' rainy season, in November 1993. It is interesting how many 
Pa'ikwene started off conversations with me through reference to the weather, like so many English 
people waiting at a bus stop in a shower. That and food were the two topics they most often resorted 
to, in my first weeks with them, as a way both of introducing me to their language and breaking the ice 
socially. 
3I wish to record my thanks to Diana and Harold Green of the Summer Institute of Linguistics for the 
use of their Pa'ikwaki lexicon, a draft of which was kindly left for me in Village Esperance 2. It was to 
prove of invaluable and indispensable help. As explained in the preface, however, I have not always 
followed SIL orthography. 
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means fish, and is one of three classes of non-vegetable foods (see Appendix B). 
At the same time, however, Pa'ikwene people also use it to stand for food 
generally, be it fish, meat, manioc, fruit or a bar of chocolate. What the native 
symbology involved in this was I never managed to find out. I was forever on guard 
lest the most apparently unequivocal of words, such as "canoe" or "night" say, turn 
out in reality to possess not only several meanings4, but, like an emotionally 
packed Russian grandma doll, polyvalent versions of each single one. Thus, for 
example, while it may not be as exciting and dense as the Ilongots' "Heart" 
(Rosaldo op. cit.: 39-44 and throughout) and the Ndembu's "Milk Tree" or red 
"Mukula Tree" (Turner 1986), the Pa'ikwene's word for, and concept of, their own 
language, "Pa'ikwaki", is replete with implicit, mutually reinforcing meanings 
beyond the literal one, being an affective and moral symbol of Pa'ikwene-hood 
itself, of personal identity and group exclusivity, and of their Indianness. Similarly, 
"Kiaptünka", the ceremonial language, had acquired for today's generation the 
power, numen, and representational force of a sacred object. Mere mention of it 
prompted strong feelings of awe and respect for a thing seen to be at once so 
(grammatically and as if morally) pure and intrinsically, completely Pa'ikwene (see 
item iv chapter 5). Turner says (ibid.: 50) that "a few symbols have to represent a 
whole culture and its material environment. " I found it both very logical and 
expressive of the Pa'ikwene's high valuation of speech and words, that they should 
choose these two particular terms to symbolise themselves as a society. 
Exegesis, then, was never to be a simple affair, as Rosaldo points out (op. cit.: 21) 
in her criticism of the idea that "ordinary language is... straightforward, and as such, 
does not require a special effort of interpretive reflection" (see pp. 20-30 for her 
thesis that linguistic interpretation is not a matter of literalism but of seeking to 
grasp a society's world view through the utterances of its members; cf. Overing 
1985a: 1-28,153-179,1987,1997; Firth 1985; Salmond 1985; Asad 1986. 
Moreover, like some of Ball's non-semantic contrivances (e. g. "rhinocerossola"), a 
number of the fully semantic Pa'ikwene items carried for me references beyond 
their customary intentions and contexts: "Mahgü" ("What is her name? "), for 
instance, often brought to mind an image of the bumbling, near-blind cartoon 
character Mr Magoo. Whether uttered separately or, even more suggestibly, 
4 For instance "KaTg" variously means moon, month and sweet potato. 
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conjoined in my head, "Kamash" ("Take hold of this! ") and "Kadash" ("Don't 
touch/Let go! ") evoked the Jewish prayer for the dead (the Kaddish). The 
automatically (to my ear) chant-like sound of either of the two imperatives invoked 
at the level of the `unconscious' a far deeper and more powerful response than the 
one solicited by a Pa'ikwene's insistence that something be picked up or that 
something else be left alone. 5 
As for the rest of the Pa'ikwene's language, or more precisely of their speaking, it 
was then still wholly incomprehensible to me. I tried instinctively to divine the 
sense of words and, when I could guess where they began and stopped, 
sentences6 in as many of the prosodic and paralingual signs of the speakers' 
voices as I could detect let alone attempt to decipher (see Lyons 1977, chapter 3), 
and looked for clues in their facial 'microsignals' and 'proxemic signals' (e. g. 
muscle contractions and direction of gaze, see Ekman and Friesen 1969), and in 
the kinesic expressions of their bodies. While this may have been unsatisfactory as 
a means of arriving at purely semantic meanings, it was a useful procedure 
nevertheless. However feebly, it illuminated for me the first patches of Pa'ikwene 
culture: for example, how people conventionally acted when they spoke to each 
other, how they held themselves, and what they did with their faces when listening 
(see section ii chapter 4); and the link between the typical vocal loudness of the 
children and their freedom and self-autonomy (see chapter 3). It also allowed me 
access very early on to that extra-dialogic point in social relations where I and 
some of the most patient and tolerant of my interlocutors could begin to lay down 
foundations for a mutual understanding7 and eventual friendship (It is true that a 
number of villagers, and especially most of the children, had some knowledge of 
French and that we could therefore communicate that way). 
5 Ethnocentrically, I found this Pa'ikwene-Jewish association arose in other ways too: a similar deft 
manipulation of alien languages and the incorporation of bits of them into Pa'ikwaki and Yiddish, and 
the loudness of conversational speech; the fact that the toxin present in the manioc plant was also the 
one used in the Nazi gas chambers (Campbell 1995: 49-50); that genocide was a process 
experienced by both races; that the Pa'ikwene Evangelical and Seventh Day Adventist converts saw 
in my Jewishness some kind of a connection with their newfound faiths (they 'knew' for instance that 
Jesus' biblical ancestor King David had been chief of my own ancestors). 
6 On the theoretical issue of whether, and when and in what way, utterances constitute actual 
sentences, and the differences between the two, see Lyons 1981: 23-30,195-8. 
7 See Laurence Sterne 1977 [1768]: 78-80,101 for a masterful literary account of the crucial part 
played in communication between strangers by `body language' and the other extra-lingual elements. 
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During my early days in Village Esperance 2, I shared to some extent Geertz and 
his wife's experience of being treated as if they were non-existent and invisible 
(1993: 412). However, my overwhelming feeling was not so much of being unseen8 
as unseeing, and unthinking. My eyes, my brain, my capacity to observe, were 
stunned into vagueness and inefficiency by the shock of the new and the as yet 
indistinguishable, ungrasped and un-understood. I was, in short, in a sensory and 
emotional daze. The only sense which still operated `normally' was my audition. 
Despite the strangeness of the language (its utter differentness, the high agglutivity, 
the difficulty of pronunciation, and also its then seemingly mocking character as 
expressed through the use of recognisable and comprehensible loan words from 
the French and [or by way of] Creole)9, my ears not only heard but went into 
overdrive as, taking over from my eyes, they sought to open up the closed world to 
which I wanted entrance. 
Lying in the dark at night, listening to the Pa'ikwene speaking to each other around 
me, I would try to absorblO their words, their world, the sound of them talking, the 
sounds they made moving, them. I often imagined their utterances as a physical 
substance. 1" Were I to reach out my hand, I could touch it: concrete yet, 
miraculously, flowing as well, and as unseizable as water. Just as speech, which 
8 This wore off rapidly except, disconcertingly, in respect of one class of Pa'ikwene, young women 
between the ages of fifteen to around twenty-five, for whom my invisibility was a permanent fixture. 
This was due, I was told, to my 'old' age and their feelings of "shame". Cf. Nimuendaju 1971: 55 who 
was "ostentatiously cold shouldered" by the Pa'ikwene young women because he refused to submit 
to what he describes as their haughty and domineering ways. For more on this supposed female 
bossiness, and also on Nimuendaju's thoroughgoingly jaundiced view of Pa'ikwene women in 
general, see chapter 5 item (vi). 
9 See chapter 3 part 2 for examples. 
10 Willson proposes (1995: 251-9) that anthropologists tend to view the `field' in sexual metaphoric 
terms as something either to be penetrated or penetrative, permeating and fertilising, and to which 
one should be open. See Kulick 1995 for an exposition and critique of the first conception and Altork 
1995 on the second. My own position, no pun intended, is a synthesis of the two. 
11 Regarding the idea that the spoken word is a concrete object, as opposed to the structuralist one 
of both Langue and Parole as abstract things, see e. g. Leenhardt (1947: 172-3) on the Melanesian 
Houailou's notion that words constitute tangible manifestations of the human in all its different aspects 
from the manual to the intellectual to the spiritual. The poet and anthropologist Michel Leiris held 
words to be so physical as to possess a taste reminiscent of that of fruits (1966: 219). See also 
Cardinal (op. cit. ) on the various ways in which different types of Western poets (Romantics, 
Symbolists, Surrealists, Expressionists, Dadaists) have all concretised language. 
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after all is made to be heard, becomes visible both to Barthes (1977: 161) and, 
through the shaman's actions, the Piaroa (Overing Kaplan 1982: 30), so for me did 
it transform, rather, into something to be felt and palpated, as if my eyes like a 
blindman's were in my fingers, and my ears in my palms. Before I could 
understand the Pa'ikwene's spoken texts (let alone their culture as a Geertzian or 
Levi-Straussian text), I tried to apprehend them first as texture. An entry in my 
diary, written three weeks into my fieldwork, records that a side effect, and benefit, 
of not understanding Pa'ikwaki was that I as a consequence grew both more 
conscious of the act of listening and sensitive to the corporeality of language: 
speech as a virtually material ribbon, or, rather, ribbons, of pure sound: non- 
lexemic, unsemiotic. In the conversations of others, these ribbons unfurled, though 
not necessarily in a single or same direction, at some points meeting and at some 
diverging, while at others yet, merging; or abruptly transforming into knots, as it 
were, of grunts or laughter, or, sometimes, strands of silence. In the state of 
linguistic ignorance, I found that by means of compensatory intuitive understanding 
one could become acutely adept at deciphering through aural, mental and 
emotional `touch' the various verbal textures as well as the vocal ones of a 
person's speech. It was a sort of hearing, a sniffing out, a making sense, through 
braille. 12 One learnt to recognise and appreciate the unique feel of each speaker's 
individual speech fabric, as personal and inimitable as a fingerprint: Karinai's 
deep-chested resonance, precise diction, and occasional granularity of voice; his 
sister-in-law Meoka's tired and, for a Pa'ikwene of either sex, uncharacteristically 
soft tones; her nephew Lennie's young boy's smooth joyous shrillness and 
precipitation of delivery. Through these seemingly incarnate marks I would gain an 
impression of his or her personality and emotional state; of their intentionality at a 
given moment in a dialogue with another, and, perhaps, of the constant, underlying 
dialectic between them. The few odd words that I managed to distinguish in the 
process, and whose semantic meaning I did recognise, served to reassure me that 
I was on, or at least not too far off, the right track. And it was with gratitude and 
12 Cf. Ong (1991: 25): "[S]ound, both in speaking and in hearing, is closely linked with touch... our 
hearing is partly feeling". For Ackerman, who stresses (1990: 175) the key role of hearing in the 
process of interpreting, communicating with, and expressing our surroundings, such a disordering of 
the senses, or `synesthesia', acts not to confuse our perception of the world about us but enhance 
and deepen it (p. 290-1). Synesthesia seems to be a common phenomenon in Amazonian cultures 
(see Levi-Strauss 1964: 155-171, Classen 1991: 252). Maybe, however, my sensory response to the 
Pa'ikwene world was ultimately more like that of the Hausa who, apart from sight, apparently recognise 
only one other category in their sensorium: "ji", a fusion of hearing-tasting-smelling-touching (Ritchie 
1991). 
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relief that I discovered the compass-like value of onomatopoeia: "Taka'ahk" 
(Chicken), "Küsküs" (cat), "Digiki" (Diarrhoea), "Tchehep" (To cry)... 
This phenomenological activity (in which my sight, having eventually recovered 
from its trauma, played its full part) constituted the translation, then, of the sounds of 
alien words and voices into intuited, sensory comprehensions and thence into all 
but tangible mind images. These were not semantic ones, such as Wittgenstein's 
depicted propositions (1974,1981: `remarks' 519-20), or the mental snapshots 
connected with some of the "Fixed Word Meaning" theories described by Aitchison 
(1987: 39-45), or any other type of picture arising from a perception of a language I 
could speak and therefore understand. They could not, therefore, be a 
consequence of syntax and (except for the onomatopoeia) the morphology of the 
words I heard. Rather, they had to evolve out of the ancillary verbal and vocal 
phenomena: intonation, stress, volume, pitch, musicality etc., and also from things 
like the speaker's stance, attitude and gestures. 
Yet on reflection it is not entirely inconceivable that, as my interrelationship with 
Pa'ikwaki grew, the words did themselves, in time, cede their semantic meanings to 
me through their own internal `gesticulations'. Merleau-Ponty, for example, making 
(1945: 203-37) the connection between intelligibility and gesture, and in the 
process linking (to the point almost of conflation) meaning and emotion, posits that 
speaking a word "projects" (pp. 229-30) and actualises its `gestural meaning' in the 
same way as a physical gesture is the very act and expression of an emotion, 
rather than merely its evocation. Because, he explains, we do not perceive the 
world intellectually but through our body so do we with our body perceive, and 
understand, its `gestural' meanings; and in our interaction with the world we 
characterise it in such a manner that our view of it is partly formed by our affective 
response to its offering itself to us in the first place, and by the way in which that 
emotion fills our act of perceiving. Meaning is inducible from spoken words since, 
in that a gesture presents perceivable pieces of the external world to our 
perception which we perceive to be that gesture's meaning/emotion, the linguistic 
one, like all meanings, reveals or depicts ("dessine", literally "draws", p. 217) its 
own meaning (Thus "words, vowels, phonemes, are so many ways of singing the 
world, being fated to represent objects not because of any objective resemblance 
to them, as the naive theory about onomatopoeia holds, but because they extract 
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and, in the literal sense of the term, express the[ir] emotional essence. " (p. 218, my 
translation). 
In the flows of speech, whether directed at me or away (in the continual 
conversations the Pa'ikwene had with each other), the speakers' breathing, 
pauses, moods and phonetic constructs were themselves textural elements. They 
did not refer to and represent like signs the alien world about me; rather, they 
constituted embodiments of its reality. For the inventor Edison, part Hegelian 
engineer and part Faustian wizard as remade by Villiers de ('Isle-Adam in his novel 
"L'Eve future" (1992, originally 1885), the `essential condition of all reality is true 
reciprocity of action' (p. 113); thus in any given speaker-hearer situation, proper 
exchange depends on the power of the auditive act to capture and comprehend the 
subjective, inner, `spiritual' vibration which "penetrates a word the instant one 
pronounces it" (p. 111); the listener alone can subjectively create the "true reality" 
(p. 112, my translations, his emphasis) of the spoken; and only that listener, 
furthermore, who inhabits the same world as the speaker, socially and historically: 
Edison ("Phonograph's papa" [sic], "Magician of the ear... Beethoven of Science") 
contends that had he been able to record the great sounds and statements of the 
past, today's auditors would not be capable of genuinely understanding them, for 
the reasons given above, and they would in a sense still remain unheard (pp. 103- 
7,110-14). According to Villiers/Edison, then, correct aural and cognitive 
perception cannot exist across time. Could I, I continually asked myself in the field, 
and still do, achieve it across the span of cultures? 
Whereas, too, Edison's listener is to be confronted with the "dead sounds" (p. 113) 
of a single recorded voice (one example Villiers proposes is Pontius Pilate's), I had 
to handle a never-ending, polyphonic, multivocal and, above all, living sound track: 
a process of countless diverse and confusing conversations within which lay, 
hidden like a needle in a haystack, the inner, animating `vibration' of not just one 
speaker's words, but that of a whole community's. As Rapport stresses (1997), a 
society's conversations are multiple not only in terms of numbers and subjects but 
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their epistemic contents also, and the various interpretations of these. 13 Rapport 
draws on Rorty's postmodernist thesis (1980: 357-72) which opposes and favours 
the "edifying" accounts of society to the "systematic" account in the singular. That is 
to say, those interpretations which on the one hand are based on, and engage in 
conversations between, the various ways of seeing and living a multiform reality, 
and, on the other hand, the monologic argument that seeks `authoritatively' to 
establish an objectivist, universalist explanation of a fallaciously absolute reality. 14 
Standing (reduced to virtual silence), then, both in the midst of this intense, 
seamless lexical and dialogic activity occurring all around me, and outside, like a 
newborn child, the `adult' world of closed and finished sentences15 and Pa'ikwene 
knowledges and meanings, I turned, in my desire to understand not so much the 
language per se as those speaking it, to phonetics: the voice sounds which are 
supposedly both arbitrary and without intrinsic meaning in themselves (see 
Hawkes 1977: 23-4). 
I suggest, however, that for their hearer, these products of respiration, lungs, 
larynx, tongue, palate and lips may pertinently signify `something' about their 
maker (his or her affective state and intentionality) at the pre-phonemic stage, if we 
accept Barthes' definition of significance (1976: 61), that "It is meaning, insofar as it 
13 According to Rapport, actors possess and express a plurality of different and at times contradictory 
epistemes depending on context, strategy and mood; and it is both legitimate and truthful for 
anthropological observers themselves not just to hold different views one from the other, but to 
present mutually exclusive ones in their own work. His argument, then, is twofold: against the notion 
of a single consensual knowledge of society by all its members, and against representations and 
explanations of society by a single perspective or theory. In opposition to the latter, an "eclecticism of 
narrational style" emphasises and indeed demands that the "text [be] constructed out of a 
conversation between different epistemic realities" (pp. 183-4). 
This very footnote could itself be seen, of course, as one more 
voice in my own epistemically multivocal dialogue with you, with 
the Pa'ikwene, and with myself. Cf. Wagner's disqualification of 
footnotes (1991: 46) on the I feel uncharitable grounds that they are 
but the "heritage of a failed attempt at textual polyphony". 
14 It should be noted that some proto-modernists were just as strongly against the monologos as are 
the post-modernists. Robert Boyle, the pioneer experimental scientist, for example, argued in his 
book `The Sceptical Chymist' (1661) that "it is not necessary that all the things a Sceptick proposes, 
should be consonant... It is allowable for him to propose two or more several Hypotheses about the 
same thing... " (cited in Firth 1972: 4). 
15 Cf. Barthes (1976: 49-51) on the phenomenon of the Sentence which while infinitely renewable is 
yet structurally unfree, belongs to the hierarchical world, and is an "artifact created by rhetors, 
grammarians, linguists, teachers, writers, parents... " (p. 51). 
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is sensually produced " (his emphasis). For as he imaginatively proposes (p. 66-7) 
in his description of "writing aloud", a phenomenon which "is not phonological but 
phonetic", speech can of itself contain significance when considered as the "geno- 
text" rather than the "pheno-text", which is concerned with meaning. This 
significance is not to be located in the paralingual and prosodic spheres, but in the 
as it were physical "grain of the voice... [and] the patina of consonants, the 
voluptuousness of vowels, a whole carnal stereophony: the articulation of the body, 
of the tongue, not that of meaning, of language" (his emphasis). In short, as if in an 
aural cinematic close-up, specifies Barthes, this joint materiality and sensuality of 
the sound of speech works in such a way as "to succeed in shifting the signified a 
great distance and in throwing, so to speak, the... body of the actor into my ear... " (p. 
67). 
For Merleau-Ponty (op. cit.: 220-1), "All is fabricated and all is natural in man... in the 
sense that there is not one word or one behaviour which does not owe something 
to man as a purely biological being, and which at the same time does not evade 
the simplicity of animal life" (my translation). To this should be added the phonetic 
sound itself. 16 I am thus tempted to go further than Barthes and suggest that not 
only are non-phonological sounds a cultural product as well as a natural, 
physiological one, but their intrinsic, intentional meaningfulness can extend extend, 
therefore, beyond the single individual to all the members of a community or 
subgroup. A number of Pa'ikwene for instance used to make a distinctive bilabial, 
and quasi-lexical, exclamation to signal a `put down': scepticism, scorn, derision, 
dismissal, belittlement. This sound, "Pol-pof-po'i! ", was unequivocal and very well 
understood by all who heard it, especially the unfortunate person at the receiving 
16 Merleau-Ponty holds (ibid.: 225-6) that the "phonetic gesture brings about for the speaking subject 
and those listening to him a certain structuring of experience and modulation of existence, in the 
same way as my body invests, for me and others, the objects which surround me with a certain 
`signification'... The human body is defined by its appropriation, in an indefinite series of 
discontinuous acts, of signifying nuclei which go beyond and transcend its natural powers... For 
example, to knit one's brows... or narrow one's eyes... become components of the human act of 
meditation, and signify it as such to the onlooker... The problem is no different for language: a 
contraction of the throat, a hissing exhalation of the breath between the tongue and the teeth, and a 
certain way of using one's body, are suddenly invested with a figurative meaning and signify it from 
within ourselves... In order for th[is]... to happen, the phonetic gesticulation has to use an alphabet of 
pre-acquired significations, and the verbal gesture has to occur in a certain field common to all the 
interlocutors... " (my translation). 
Cf. Burke 1941: 8-18 on how in the "poetics of [vocal] sound", the relationship between a speaker's 
phonetic expression, bodily gesture, and selection of words on the basis of tonality works in such a 
way that a word's meaning is made manifest through its very sound. 
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end; e. g.: 
A: I caught a very big fish today, but it fell back into the water and I lost it. 
B: Po'i-poi-po'i-pO1. 
Often too, a vowel or consonant sound would be extended in order to express an 
emphasis: of time, say, or feeling. Thus "Minikwak" ("in the past") or "Kabuntchüa" 
("nice", "great! ") could become "Mmiiiniiikwakk" and "Kabuuuuntchüa". This type of 
sliding action did not reinforce the speaker's meaning so much as recognisably 
embody it. 17 For Seeger (1987: 30-1 with reference to Suyä myth telling), such 
glissandi are "a clear example of iconic speech: where the speech sounds 
themselves carry semantic meaning. The traditional separation of phonology and 
semantics cannot be maintained in a case like this. The actual sounds of the 
performance carried meaning in themselves. "18 
The Pa'ikwene describe an utterance they are pleased with as "pretty". `Prettiness' 
relates to a combination of aspects: correct grammatical usage, 19 pragmatic 
appositeness, and attractive and seductive semantic contents. People are also 
expressing their real emotional and aesthetic pleasure in the words as words, in 
their speaker's performative delivery and in the sonic one: the very sound of the 
spoken, and the very fact of speaking, both as connotation and manifestness of 
communality. Hearing voices and words means that one is filled with the sound, 
and therefore the process and actuality, of social relations; and answering them, 
17 For more on the meaningfulness of Pa'ikwene phonetics, see next chapter. 
18 For another example of the intelligibility of apparently meaningless sounds in an Amerindian 
context, see Chaumeil 1993: 415-6 on the "semantic value" of the esoteric "acoustic... meta- 
language" used by Yagua shamans for communicating with plants. Of interest too is Kallir's thesis 
(1961) that speech sounds are inherently and specifically meaningful, being gendered like nouns in 
that they psychogenetically convey our ancestors' epistemological perception of procreation. He 
argues that the beginning sound of a word originally marked its gender in the same way that, in Latin 
languages for instance, the end sound does today: a fact reproduced in the sound's graphic 
representation. Thus A (sound and letter) initially and universally stood for the male, B the female; and 
so on through the alphabet. 
19 I was once reprimanded, for example, when, referring to a group of people that consisted of more 
men than women, I automatically transposed French grammatical usage into Pa'ikwaki and gave the 
word for the male plural 'they' ("lgkis") instead of the more correct female one ("Egkis"). The use of the 
former in such circumstances was not only wrong but, I was told, "ugly", which in Pa'ikwene terms 
amounts to a tautology. 
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interacting with them, means that one can continue to produce and maintain the 
relations and, concurrently, the moral and affective substance immanent in them -- 
and it is that which is beautiful for the Pa'ikwene (the issue is dealt with in more 
detail in other chapters). 
It took me a long time to even begin to become part of these social relations, 
let alone to start to comprehend them, through my own eventual ability to speak 
and "hear-understand", albeit but partially, what was said to me. As regards the 
former, the Pa'ikwene do not assess verbal prowess quantitatively but qualitatively; 
I describe in chapter 3 how the `way' in which an individual speaks is valued more 
highly that the amount of lexical knowledge he or she may possess. 20 I once told 
Susana, in whose house I lived, that I could never hope to speak Pa'ikwaki as well 
as a certain Brazilian, who to my ears appeared to be expert in the language. He 
knows many words, she said, but he doesn't say them properly or "prettily"; you 
have fewer, but speak well and strong. Her (probable) flattery aside, she was 
praising me for the fact that I made a conscious effort always to meet the Pa'ikwene 
norms of diction, loudness, pitch and delivery. I scrupulously practised my phonetic 
enunciation. I strove and in some small measure succeeded to abide by the 
pragmatic and aesthetic canons of Pa'ikwene conversation; and consequently 
grew to be "heard-understood" as a reciprocating and significant speaking other in 
the household and, to a slighter extent, beyond. I like to think that I even, in time, 
achieved the status of a textural, if temporary, component in the weave of village 
life in my own right; and that I was appreciated as such by my fellow components, 
although surely not to the degree that they were by me. 
20 This is not to say that most Pa'ikwene do not set great store by their language in terms, among 
others, of the size and health of its lexicon. On the contrary, they are deeply proud of it, but many 
people expressed anxiety for its future (see chapter 3). 
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chapter three 
"AUNA KABAI" - "TO SPEAK WELL" 
1. The socialisation, standards, everyday styles and aesthetics 
of speaking Pa'ikwaki. 
"If you have your own language, you're Indian. The Pa'ikwene 
do, but the Karipün don't. They speak Creole and Portuguese, 
so they're not real Indians! I speak Pa'ikwaki - and I am! " 
(Alfred Norino, informant at Aükwa, the Pa'ikwene homeland) 
Pa'ikwaki, the Pa'ikwene's own name for their language, possesses immense 
affective value for its speakers. It is also known as Kamüyüne, in that it was initially 
the language of the Kamüyene, "People of the Sun", one of the original clans 
comprising the Pa'ikwene nation but now extinct. It was not at all uncommon for 
people proudly, and quite without prompting, to sing its praises to me. They held it 
a special, precious, and unique part of their community's goods, as something to 
be cherished; and also defended, for many in the present generation fear for the 
preservation of its integrity in the face of the deep inroads made by Creole, and to a 
lesser but steadily increasing extent, Portuguese and French. They named 
Pa'ikwaki as one of the markers and indeed determiners of their identity as Indians 
on the one hand, and as an exclusive people on the other. Similar examples of the 
ascription of such status, or power, to language exist elsewhere in Amazonia (it 
could even be called a worldwide phenomenon). Santos-Granero, for instance, 
speaks of it (1991: 87-8) in respect of the Amuesha. The Pemon, too, according to 
Thomas (1982: 19), consider their own tongue to be the "major identifying emblem 
of their ethnic identity". There would seem however to be an interesting difference 
in this connection between them and the Pa'ikwene. In order to indicate their 
exclusiveness, the latter point not only to their language but also to two other 
cultural features known by them to be shared by, or significantly to resemble those 
of, other `Indian' peoples: the cultivation and eating of manioc and their `work' (see 
chapter 8). The Pemon, on the other hand, apparently single out their language 
above any other feature, as distinctly and peculiarly able to impart identity, so as to 
distinguish themselves from their indigenous neighbours precisely because, says 
Thomas (ibid. ), "of the degree of technological and cultural similarity" existing 
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between them. 
(For me, this capacity to confer identity meant that a Pa'ikwene person regarded 
their language not only as a defining badge of the group but, somehow, an 
expression of individual personhood. Thus my informant Alfred's assertion, cited 
above, according to which he was a real Indian because he spoke his own distinct 
tongue, seemed simultaneously, polyvalently, a statement about his specific 
human and social existence. In a manner reminiscent of Descartes' use of the 
famous "I think therefore I am", he, and the many others whom I heard echo the 
same sentiment in the same words, seemed to be saying: "I speak Pa'ikwaki, 
therefore / am. " I was often struck by the `performative' power that the phrase "We 
speak/I speak Pa'ikwaki" had for, and on, those who uttered it. Both for me and for 
them it seemed to embody and confirm who and what they were. It also revealed 
the intimacy (in the dual sense of the subjective and the shared) inherent in a 
`cultural fact', the way in which one's language is clearly experienced as more than 
just an external, acquired object, but also something as integrally belonging to the 
self as one's hands, and as emotionally charged and communicable as the heart. 
The connection between language and identity at the jointly ethnical and private, 
existential, quasi anatomical level is well illustrated by Barthes 1977: 115-6). 
Every Pa'ikwene person is required to "speak well", "Auna kabai", and to "hear- 
listen-understand well", "Tchimap kabai" (of which more in chapter 4). `Speaking 
well' is at once a matter of grammatical correction and more than it. It is seen not 
so much as an effect of sociable living as an intrinsic and creative agent of social 
life itself (cf. Belaunde 1992: 48 regarding the Airo-Pai). All `good speakers' are 
greatly appreciated and admired, their voices and words giving their listeners a 
pleasure at once emotional and axiological (i. e., combining ethical and aesthetic 
values). Exceptionally fine talk will be called pretty ("bareüyo") for the quality of the 
way people utter their words just as much as for that of their content. Not 
unnaturally, talk which is ugly ("ka bareüyo" or "mbayavyo") is displeasing and 
offensive to one's "hearing-listening-understanding" on the same grounds. 
Socially as well as technically, and for women just as much as men, `speaking well' 
involves the use of strong tones and volume, a matter described below. 
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Socialisation and speech. 
Investigating the differences between Native American (Navajo) and White 
schoolchildren, Philips reported (1972) that the former were held by their non- 
Amerindian teachers to be stupid because of their silences, and the latter to be 
bright because of their greater verbal input. ' Philips interprets this as an 
ethnocentric misapprehension stemming from the fact that Anglo-American culture 
prioritises children's verbal skills over their non-verbal ones, and that the teaching 
process largely relies on verbal interaction between teacher and taught. Navajo 
learning, on the other hand, is more visual and tactile and apparently uses fewer 
words. Like the Navajo, the Pa'ikwene also acquire and deploy extensive skill in 
using their visual, tactile and other senses in their own `traditional' education; it 
does not follow that they morally prioritise such dexterity over the verbal one. If 
anything, the situation appears to be the reverse. For, again similarly to the Navajo 
(Witherspoon 1977), the Pa'ikwene rate speaking (and, as seen in chapter 4, 
hearing) very highly. However, I found no evidence of them classifying other 
faculties pejoratively as some other Lowland peoples do. For example, the Suyä 
categorise sight as less moral than ('good') speaking and hearing, and olfaction as 
amoral and asocial (Seeger 1981: 83-4,89-91. For a more general view, see Levi- 
Strauss' sensory analysis of Amazonian myths 1964: 155-71). 
But when speaking of education one must also have regard for context, and 
in practice all these skills were inevitably complementary to one another. If one 
was more foregrounded than others in a given learning situation, it was not 
because the Pa'ikwene saw it as superior but more apt and necessary at a certain 
point in the process. In gaining knowledge of hunting in the forest, for instance, the 
individual develops his auditory and olfactory faculties since he needs to rely on 
them for obvious pragmatic and economic reasons, but this does not mean that his 
verbal and oral skills are not called upon and consequently relegated to a lesser 
status. They are in fact vital in communicating, and establishing a relationship, with 
one's prey, as I discuss in the next chapter (section iii). 
I also show, in chapter 6, that silence, insofar as it is an aspect of their "bad 
1 viz. the common and pejorative use in English of the word "dumbness" to denote stupidity (cf. 
Devereux 1991. See Enninger 1987 and Jaworski 1993: 23,48 on the general European and Anglo- 
American bias in favour of speech and against silence. Gilmore however shows [1985] the latter to be 
positively valued in some Western contexts, notably the classroom). By contrast, the Pa'ikwene like 
many other Amerindians relate stupidity and intelligence not to oral but aural behaviour (see chapter 
4). 
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hearing", plays as large a role in Pa'ikwene social life as it does for the 
aforementioned Navajo. For the present, however, I wish instead to consider its 
opposite, `speech'; or more precisely, proper speech - and, as a chief qualifier of 
this condition, loud speech. To start with, I shall return to the subject of children 
and their upbringing as it relates to the matter. 
Those of my village were not debarred from, or reprimanded for, speaking when 
adults were doing so (outside, revealingly, of the context of a church service). On 
the contrary, they were from the youngest age actively encouraged and expected to 
participate and, more to the point, interact verbally both in public and in the home. 
For not only was to speak considered to be social, as noted, but talking together 
was explicitly held to constitute society itself in that such interpersonal 
communication embodied social relations, which were themselves thought of in 
terms of solidarity, sociability, emotional well-being and morality (cf. E. Basso 
1986: 134-6 on Kalapalo concepts about dialogue). 
It was my experience that, irrespective of sex, Pa'ikwene children tended to 
be listened to with as much respect and seriousness as older people; and their 
words, for all that they might not contain as much knowledge as a man's or 
woman's, were no less valued. Be the speaker a child or an adult, an important 
characteristic of their ability to "speak well", and one I will now focus on, is that of 
loudness. 
"Auna kihao" 
This, the Pa'ikwene's conventional conversational style of communication, means 
"to speak (loud and) strong". It is not to be confused with the `powerful' way of 
talking used in the formal so-called ceremonial dialogues engaged in by some 
other Lowland groups such as the Trio (Riviere 1971). Nor, while it is certainly 
required of them, is it the duty or privilege of the chiefs alone, as also occurs 
elsewhere, e. g. among the Nambikuara, Akwe-Shavante, Amuesha or Wayapi (see 
respectively Levi-Strauss 1967, Maybury-Lewis 1967, Santos-Granero 1991: 301- 
2, Campbell 1995: 115, and also Clastres 1987: 27-47,152-5). Rather, it is both the 
ideally correct and proper method of everyday discourse, in terms both of vocal 
technique and aesthetics, and the common practical norm. It is also ungendered. 
As a woman informant proudly put it: "We Pa'ikwene, we speak strong. " 
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Among themselves and, again, be they male or female, children were very much 
given to speaking in shouts. This they did all day long and, to my ears, piercingly, 
and not just when playing. Rather than ethnocentrically assessing such conduct to 
be anarchic `natural' high spirits, or simply the symptom of childish unruliness, I 
suggest we should see it as a legitimate, culturally endorsed one. Pa'ikwene 
parents never, as far as I could see, explicitly exhorted children to be loud. But 
certainly neither they nor any other adults did anything to subdue or prevent what 
in effect amounted to a norm which they themselves fulfilled, though generally in a 
more self-disciplined way. It constituted proper behaviour, and one that was 
pleasurable both to do and to hear (albeit admittedly not always for me). The 
Pa'ikwene child's speaking in a shouting and screaming manner seemed to be a 
form of training by which it was intended that he or she master the typical cultural 
trait of "auna kihao", the loud-and-strong speaking described more fully below, 
which is itself a component of "auna kabai" (speaking well). 
Basically, then, what might look to us like utter permissiveness and unrestrained 
vocal self-expression could perhaps be a socialising technique for incubating in 
the young individual the Pa'ikwene ethos of personal autonomy and assertiveness 
within, and as a necessary instrumental aspect of, the group (see F. Grenand and 
Renault-Lescure 1990: 24-6 on the socialisation of Pa'ikwene children and [p. 31] 
the equality and freedom of Pa'ikwene girls). Various aspects of Pa'ikwene 
`individualism' are discussed in chapters 5,6,7 and 8. 
Along with learning the vocally technical aspect of `speaking well', the 
Pa'ikwene child becomes familiar with the rules of grammar (which I shall not be 
dealing with) and those applying to the social pragmatics of language usage. 
There are, for instance, categories of people with whom one may talk to and others 
with whom one may not. 2 
2 Although I found no prohibitions relating specifically to children, there were a number of cases more 
generally, e. g. mother-in-law/son-in-law and father-in-law/daughter-in-law avoidance, a rule followed 
less and less in present day practice (cf. Arnaud 1968: 10). Another (and still extant) convention 
requires that a couple that has broken an agreement to marry must no longer talk together directly. 
The underlying notion that talking together creates marital relations would seem to exist elsewhere 
in Amazonia. According to Isacsson (1993: 365-6), the Embera conceptualise words and speaking in 
terms of an alliance marriage system - and also of war. See too Belaunde (1992: 43,50-4) on the 
formal dialogue of Airo-Pai 'conversation partners' leading to their children's eventual marriage. Thus, 
presumably, broken potential relations = no talking together = no marital and social relations. Cf. Levi- 
Strauss' (1969: 493-6,1986: 61-2) on the perceived analogy of words and women as the means 
whereby social communication, and therefore society itself, is established and maintained. 
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While the term "auna kihao" adequately describes the broad condition of this type 
of speech style (i. e., loud-and-strong), in reality there were, both quantitively and 
qualitatively, various degrees and nuances of loudness and strength. A speaker's 
tone could be anything from deeply resonant to stentorian, the voice having at 
different times recourse to all the conceivable permutations of hardness, 
sharpness, stridency and thunderousness. A chat about their gardens or a 
discussion over whether to take the canoe out or not might often in Village 
Esperance 2 attain in terms of decibel output the level of a shouting match. I 
exaggerate but slightly; being with the Pa'ikwene was frequently for me like living 
in a small room with the radio blasting out at full volume. 
"To speak loud-and-strong" also entails talking distinctly. This last consists in 
making each syllable count, giving equal delineation, stress and weight to every 
word, and "speaking with the front of the mouth. " One reason I was given by an 
informant for the origin of this way of speaking was the necessity to be heard over 
distance in a terrain where visibility is impeded by such natural features as trees 
and marsh vegetation, as the Pa'ikwene habitat (flooded savanna) traditionally 
was, and still is in the Aükwa homeland but much less so if at all around St 
Georges de I'Oyapock. This ecological aspect, while probably not totally 
explaining the reason for the Pa'ikwene's booming oral style, indicates the part the 
natural environment may play not just in sensory perception but also in the socio- 
moral and aesthetic dimensions of spoken language (cf. Gell 1995). 
A further crucial component of their `good speaking' and `loud and strong talking' 
was pitch. In the case of men, it should be low, and in that of women, somewhat 
higher - but with both apparently being required to maintain it at the same level 
throughout. The elements of tone and pitch should not be dismissed as 
meaningless technique or style, `mere' aesthetic dressing. In Pa'ikwene society, 
pitching your speech right is to be taken both literally and figuratively if the listener 
is to find your words agreeable, that is pleasing and acceptable, and they cannot 
be one without the other. For, pragmatically, correct vocal pitch makes manifest the 
moral and thought content of the spoken. Speaking loudly and strongly is not for 
the Pa'ikwene a sign of blind, mindless emotion; the use of the right tone and pitch 
predicates a mastery of knowledge seen as a matter of morality and proper social 
conduct. 
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Ideally, then, and, I found, to a consistently high degree in practice, Pa'ikwene 
discourse, whether chiefly rhetoric or the everyday talk of ordinary villagers, was 
nothing if not characteristically robust and, by definition, powerful vocally and, as I 
intend showing in the chapter on `political communication', in other ways also. 
"Loud and strong" talk, and indeed loudness in general, struck me as a mark of 
Pa'ikwene sociality. It is, I believe, revealing of them that while, like other 
Amerindians, they prize the peaceable and tranquil life, its very condition appears 
to depend on the existence of a (to my mind) less than peaceful level of sound. To 
quote from my fieldnotes (25th February 1994): 
"Except for hunting and sleeping, no-one seems capable of doing 
anything (conversing, cooking, playing, working, laughing, eating... ) in 
a silent or even a muted way. Connected with this, a Pa'ikwene 
individual, young or old, while very much their `own person', does not 
seem happy if alone. He/she is forever seeking out, and 
experiencing-enjoying to the full, contact with another or others. It's 
as if human noise (loudness of talking, working, laughing, eating, 
sniffling coughing and hawking3 etc.: loudness of co-existing) marks 
out this contact as more social, enhances its reality, makes it more 
valuable... somehow paradoxically permits the `Quiet Life' and makes 
it manifesto and meaningful. " (For more on this see next chapter). 
"Auna kihao", however, was not the only speaking style in use; and literally (from 
my point of view) reasonable sounding dialogues, not to mention `quiet natters' 
and, especially at night, hushed tete-ä-tetes, did take place. Also, apart from the 
low tones of hunters in the forest, described in chapter 4 section iii, `private' 
conversation between men could sometimes be as subdued as that of upper class 
Englishmen in the leather armchair'd intimacy of their club as portrayed in 
Edwardian fiction. Conversations between women, on the other hand, were apt to 
be consistently loud and strong, and as of a piece with their characteristic 
assertiveness and generally powerful station in Pa'ikwene society (see the 
sequence on female `scolding', item vi chapter 5). 
Although, then, not every utterance was "loud-and-strong", the general tone of 
3 The Village Esperance Deux Pa'ikwene were constantly getting colds and influenza (see item on 
healing in chapter 9 part 2 ). 
4 See Seeger 1987: 65-9,74-81 on how human noise and voices (speech and singing) recreate and 
embody the Suyä community. 
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Pa'ikwene speech at conversational and not just declamatory level was at least a 
half shout. Whether hurriedly running their words together, or more commonly 
speaking at the proper, slower, and more measured pace, people sought to give 
each syllable identical importance, clarity and, as it were, sonic mass. This tended 
to make for discourse which consisted of undeviating chords of meaningful sound, 
as equal in tone, pitch, volume and emphasis at the beginning as at the end, 
though subjacent emotion or laughter would not infrequently cause a swell along 
the line (see below for more on this aspect). 
Often people talked to each other in tones of what I perceived, until I learned 
otherwise, to be anger. Of course, this emotion existed in the community like 
anywhere else, but it was seen as a morally unacceptable state and unfavourably 
valued. Genuinely angry speech was feared as an expression of uncontrolled 
violence. For the Evangelical Pa'ikwene, it was like all other emotions classed as 
negative a symptom of ungodliness, a product of "Wavitche", the Devil (see 
chapter 9). The tone which I mistook for anger, on the other hand, was valued as a 
conventional, proper, legitimate, and mastered form of `loud and strong' talking 
which seemed to be used for stressing matters felt to be particularly salient, 
important, or grave. Indeed, its use manifested and contributed, I would say, to a 
person's dignity and gravitas. In descriptive terms, it consisted in the speaker 
attaining a certain booming quality by audibly inflating the ends of words with his or 
her breath and thus vibrating them as if simultaneously to demonstrate the intensity 
of his or her thoughts and intentions, and to accord more power to them. 
Other speaking styles and paralinguistic expression. 
The above example aside, I have indicated that a distinctive feature of the 
Pa'ikwene way of speaking was that, regardless of volume, delivery tended to be 
even, with the voice maintaining the same tone, timbre and pitch throughout. I 
would not, though, like to give the impression that their speech was vocally flat and 
stylistically unemotive, for the reverse was true. Nor, as I have already said, was 
there merely one type of style, or standard, of everyday speaking. 
(a) There existed a number of culturally constructed strategies by which the 
speaker's emotions were not just made transparent but concretely embodied and 
specifically projected. They formed part of a sort of communal crypto-language 
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which a Pa'ikwene individual could draw on in order explicitly and meaningfully to 
articulate an attitude or an intensity of feeling. Perhaps the most typical example 
was the phonetic sound "Ong" which one affixed or infixed like an extra syllable to 
a word as if to invest it with greater expressivity. Thus, for instance, I once heard a 
person, who noticed another carelessly leaving the lid off a baby's supply of 
drinking water, exclaim angrily: 
"Ig wONGka On! " 
in lieu of "Ig woka On" ("He opens the water"). The insertion of this high-pitched, 
partly nasal, slightly strangulated, and elongated sound, which an informant 
described to me as a "nearly word" (i. e., it was held virtually to constitute a 
legitimate lexical item), acted, then, as an oral, and aural, punctuation for making 
and emphasising points, and giving direct voice to affective states. 
Sometimes, when placed paragoge5-like at the end of a word, the "Ong" converted 
into "Bong". For example: 
"Nah ka mwaka-BBBONG! "6 ("Nah ka mwaka" = "I don't want! ") 
(b) Another method, resorted to both in ordinary conversation and story telling, and 
which relied on duplication, was the use of stretched or sliding vowel and 
consonant sounds. This too was done in order to express and stress an emotion. 
For example: 
"Kabuntchüa", meaning `wonderful', becoming "Kabbuuuuntchüa! " 
"Magüye", meaning "that's good/delicious", becoming "Mmmaggüyeee! " 
"Henewa", meaning "it is true", becoming "Hennneewwaaa! " 
These glissandi also served to indicate, and acoustically `illustrate', the dimension 
of a given object or circumstance. Thus: 
"Ka'insima", meaning "much/many", becoming "Kkka'aaai'innsima! " 
"Minikwak", meaning "in the past/a long time ago" becoming "Mmiiniiikwakk! " 
5 Technical term meaning the addition of a syllable or sound to the end of a word. 
6 According to Kallir (1961: 85-125), the elemental primary sound "B" possesses homoeopathic 
magical force and its reduplication induces power. 
35 
(c) Such features not only contributed to the musicality of Pa'ikwene speech, but to 
that of their social life more generally. In spite of the demise of traditional singing in 
Village Esperance Deux, due to the influence of the Assembleia de Deus church 
(see chapter 9), everyday verbal communication was nevertheless musical in its 
own right.? For me, the most musical of all their speaking actions, and in its way 
their most quintessentially expressive act of social (re)production, was the loud, 
cheerful, and indeed frequently joyous, yodelled greeting call with which 
individuals hailed, responded to, and `confirmed' each other: 
Bai-aheeeeEE? 
IheeeeeeEE! 
This being the sung rendition of the convention: 
-- "Ba pi ai? " ("Are you here? ") 
-- "Ihi, nah ai" ( "Yes, I am here. ") 
A salient aspect of this performance was the way in which the two parties 
concerned very often not only invested a standard formula with their emotion, but 
also employed it as a means of giving vent to their artistic expressivity (cf. Crocker 
1977: 44 on how the use of formulaic and traditional rhetorical norms need not for 
all that be without creative and poetic qualities). 
In interesting and, for the anthropologist, paradoxical contrast to this, 
particularly emotionally charged greetings between intimates could customarily 
display an air of decided coolness. Thus the closer the relationship between 
individuals and the longer, or more intensely felt, the separation, the less verbally 
and gesturally effusive and marked their eventual re-encounter seemed to be. For 
example, Susana, acutely worried on one occasion by the failure of her husband 
and eldest son to return from the hunt, all but wordlessly, and as if indifferently, 
acknowledged them when they finally turned up some two days late, and just as a 
search party was about to set out to look for them. Conceivably her attitude might 
be attributed to `psychological' factors; however, it was conventional behaviour. 
For Susana to have acted other than with such flatness and verbal restraint would 
7See Ingold's argument (1993a: 449-58) that the distinction between music/song (and 
emotion/expressivity) and language (and thought/volition) is not a universal dichotomy but a culturally 
constructed 'Western' one; and that, on the contrary, the two terms form a natural continuum in reality. 
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have been deemed improper. 8 
There were also a number of other greetings and salutations, ranging from the 
more formal to the very casual and `pally': 
-- "Aitne, Kiavye/Kiavüno", the conventional formula of respect for hailing an 
older man/woman. 
-- "Mmah pikabayan? " ("How are you? ) 
-- "Nah kabai (or, very often, kabai nah), ya pis? " ("I'm fine, and yourself? "). 
-- "Mah pisneba? " (literally: "Is it you? " and meaning "Glad to see/meet you) 
-- "Ahadje", or "ihe/Ye", or "ihi" ("Yes" meaning "Likewise", and said by a 
male and female responder respectively). 
-- "Ai kam" (to a single person) or "Ai ka" (to a group). 
-- "Ahadje" or "ihi" (The response for a man or a woman respectively). 
-- "Yaba? " (" How's it going? ", "Hi") 
-- "Koh" ("Fine") 
As Goffman notes (1972: 4), "there is an etiquette for initiating an encounter and 
bringing it to an end. " In respect of the latter function among the Pa'ikwene, the 
norm was for farewells to be all equally unstressed, and sometimes even barely 
marked, speech events. They were flat tonally and also emotionally (in the sense 
of the interlocutors not letting their feelings show in their voices), with the leaver 
merely and very matter of factually announcing: 
-- "Nah metchwik" ("I'm going") 
to which the addressee either laconically gives the unconcerned-seeming and 
identically matter of fact conventional response: 
-- "Ahadje" ("Yes/okay/fine/right") 
or else, frequently, says nothing at all. 
According to Goffman (ibid.: 79-80), such behaviour is characteristic of "passing 
greetings" (i. e., those in which the parties involved swiftly proceed on their separate 
8 Cf. the description in K. Basso (1969) of a similar avoidance of speech by affectively close Apache 
when remaking contact after a long absence. 
37 
ways) where "Hellos are exchanged, but goodbyes are often dispensed with, as if 
the end of not being in touch was being marked but the beginning of being in touch 
not realised and therefore its termination unneedful of ritual comment. " (my 
emphasis). It was my observation that the Pa'ikwene's low-key or even non 
marking of the farewell salutation seemed generally to apply to longer contacts as 
well as fleeting ones, irrespective of the social or affective closeness of the actors 
(See Goffman ibid.: 73-91 on greetings and leave-takings which he terms "access 
rituals"). 
(d) Men and women belonging to the same generation and who were not only 
socially but emotionally close would sometimes speak to one another in soft, 
sugary tones which can best be described as a `sweet talking' voice. While 
generally occurring among spouses, I did see examples of this speech style 
between brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law. Expressing affection, it was not 
exclusively reserved for private intimate moments as its equivalent tends to be 
among Europeans, and people resorted to it publicly and unselfconsciously. 
A nasal and even more saccharine variation of this was in use among many of the 
men. It was an ` 'ikkle baby '-type voice which a man would adopt with close male 
kin and friends of the same generation (though I have observed it between fathers 
and adult or near adult sons) as a style for joking, mutual teasing, ridiculing and 
lampooning third parties, and general playfulness. In putting it on, a person's 
mouth sagged, his entire face assumed what the English call a `soppy' expression, 
and he exuded a visible sense of fun. Individuals vied with each other over who 
could produce the silliest, most babyish voice; their efforts invariably ended in fits of 
giggling and laughter. 
Karinai, in whose house I resided, and who frequently indulged in this vocal 
play with his cronies, told me that the behaviour arose in his circle as the result of 
mimicking a fellow villager, now dead, whose normal speaking voice it apparently 
was. Assuming this to be true, and given that I heard this style in different 
Pa'ikwene communities, might not the phenomenon have some bearing on the 
process whereby impromptu and innovative actions become established in small- 
scale societies as widespread and customary cultural traits? 
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have talked so far of volume, pitch, tone, and some of the other meaningful sonic 
components of a discourse which comprise its 'prosodic' (intonation, stress pattern) 
and 'paralingual' (vocal tone, loudness, cadence etc. ) aspects (see Lyons 
1981: 26). As noted in the previous chapter, a hearer will also take into account the 
communicative value of the speaker's kinesic (movements, gestures) and proxemic 
(muscular, facial, ocular and other somatic signals) qualities when responding to 
utterances. Similarly, the personal and socio-cultural situation (see Hymes 1971) 
within which any given discourse is embedded and, also, the speaker's emotional 
and physical attitudes, can add meaning to utterances beyond the semantic (sign- 
referential) level of the words and the propositional content level of the sentences. 
Furthermore, both context9 and stance may `describe' a verbal action as more than 
just sociopragmatic behaviour. Accordingly, I now turn my attention to the 
aesthetic and, in more detail than before, affective dimensions of the oral-aural 
process, in so far as both are indispensable elements of Pa'ikwene intelligibility. 
Some aesthetical and affective aspects of Pa'ikwene speech. 
Sherzer and Urban, noting (1986: 3) the high value Amerindians place on the 
aesthetics of speech, suggest that its poetic and dramatic features are no more 
divorced from the other characteristics of daily social life than they are from those of 
discourse proper. They claim, I believe rightly, that rather than merely coexisting 
with these other elements, 'performance' is in fact a constituent of them. I propose 
that this is as true of the Pa'ikwene's informal types of speaking as their more 
formal ones. 
A Pa'ikwene will not only "hear-understand" and assess the semantic meaning of a 
speaker's words but also the style, and its own perceived meaning, 10 in which he 
or she delivered them: the tone, pitch, enunciation, vocal timbre; and the sum of the 
non-oral facets of his or her "presentation of self" (Goffman 1980). That is, all the 
performance qualities, both denotative and suggestive, and conventional and 
9 For a good general discussion on context with reference to linguistic analysis, and the need to 
rethink the very notion, see Goodwin & Duranti 1992 
10 As will be seen my use of "meaning" is broad, but I find it neither necessary nor helpful here to 
oppose it to the linguistics term "implicature" (see Lyons 1981: 206-17) or any other. On the multiple 
meanings of "meaning" see Lyons (ibid: 13-15) and Sperber (1979: 8-16). 
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private, as far as these can be distinguished, which add up to more than technique; 
and which the speaker's audience perceives - and judges. While 'ordinary' 
Pa'ikwene dialogic relations are notably informal, as are the great majority of their 
social ones in general, they nevertheless possess commonly understood criteria 
(verbal, presentational, and social). These should be followed and speech kept 
"appropriate" (Hymes op. cit.: 56) in terms other than the purely linguistic. Failure to 
do so will be interpreted, and a meaning drawn. According to Hymes, 
'appropriateness' pertains to what one is able culturally to say in any given 
situation; I extend the term to cover the way in which one says it. 
I reported above that 'good speaking', i. e., to speak loudly, strongly and confidently, 
and to articulate deliberately and clearly, signifies social as well as discursive 
correctness for a Pa'ikwene. Not to speak that way, therefore, patently implies the 
opposite. It also, at the same time, means ugliness and, by extension, antisocial- 
ness and immorality, for 'good speaking' is valued in aesthetic terms too. The 
Pa'ikwene are particularly attentive to this aspect of it. As mentioned earlier too, 
they will often praise an example of fine delivery, calling it "bareüyo" ("pretty", 
"beautiful", and also "clean" and "proper"11). And a hearer will cut his or her cloth 
accordingly: it is one of the factors instrumentally at work in the choice of response 
to a speaker; it influences the suitable volitional and social 'hearing-understanding' 
action, as opposed to the neurophysiological reflexive one, to take. 
Like Overing with regard to the Piaroa (1989), I found that the Pa'ikwene did not 
disassociate the aesthetic from the ethical and the sociopolitical. For them too, it 
seemed, "beauty' is seen as an expression of moral and political value" (p. 159). 
And 'good speaking', as a behaviour at once cultural, sociopolitical, moral and 
beautiful, and thereby pleasing, "fits their aesthetic of community life" (p. 172). 
Thus, to give one example, when a Pa'ikwene parent, surveying the rounded head 
of his or her baby, loudly, strongly and confidently announces "nah batek", which 
simultaneously means "I like/love" and "I (am) happy", he or she is expressing more 
than a 'purely personal' pride and joy. For typical in Pa'ikwene babies as it is 
among other Amerindian peoples, 12 that "most beautiful" of shapes, which is at 
11 A similar concept exists elsewhere in Amazonia, e. g. the Shipibo-Conibo term "Quiquin" jointly 
signifies 'aesthetic' and 'appropriate' (Gebhardt-Sayer cited in Howes 1991: 6). 
12 Cf. Clastres 1988: 15-6 apropos the Guayaki. 
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once natural and enhanced by daily massaging in infancy, elicits approval as a 
socio-cultural norm. Simultaneously, it is also the object of an appreciation both 
coolly critical and intensely heartfelt as a (fulfilled) aesthetic ideal. As such, people 
both comprehend and value it as another (beautiful and meaningful) marker of their 
Indian-ness; of the (beautiful and thus satisfying) state of being Pa'ikwene. In my 
discussion on Pa'ikwene work and productivity (chapter 8), I will describe in more 
detail the procedure entailed in realising this ideal head shape and, through it, the 
construction of beautiful and proper social beings. 
"Kabai" ("good"), "ka kabai" ("not good"), "bareüye" ["-yo, feminine] ("beautiful"), 
"mbayavye ["-yo", feminine] ("ugly", "not nice", "improper"): expressed in respect of 
speech actions, and their actors, these terms are at one and the same time moral 
judgments, sensory and affective evaluations, aesthetic assessments, and 
statements about meaningfulness (see chapters 4,6 and 7 for other aspects of the 
Pa'ikwene's response to speakers, speaking and speech situations). 
The Pa'ikwene's manifest soul-pleasure, then, in round-headedness and 'good 
speaking' and all the other signs and behaviours which both represented the 'good 
life' and were conducive to, and necessary for, its reproduction (such as, say, 
joking and laughing, or the making of extra beautifully decorated artifacts 
specifically intended as gifts), would seem to confirm the thesis that aesthetic 
notions are not just learnt normative conventions and intellectual criteria. They are 
also very much a question of sensory perception and emotional 'feel'. 
Similarly, 'feel' was just as instrumental, I believe, as lexical knowledge, linguistic 
and pragmatic analysis and logical deduction, in enabling a person to work out the 
jointly verbal and extra-verbal sense of any given speech situation. For a linguist, 
'sense' tends to be specifically a matter of semantic relations between a word and 
others substitutionally or combinatorially linked to it (Lyons op. cit.: 58,91). This 
concept notably underpins Saussure's structure-dependent theory of meaning 
(1965) with its twin bases of the 'paradigmatic' and 'syntagmatic'. 13 As will have 
been understood from the above, my own notion, informed by Pa'ikwene relations 
between speakers and the "hearer-listener-understander's" engagement with the 
verbal performance, combining semantic, pragmatic, aesthetic, moral, sensory and 
13 For a cogent critique of the abstract notions of linguists, see Ingold 1993a. 
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emotional action, is laxer and wider (cf. Burke 1941: 8-18, Merleau-Ponty 1945: 204- 
37). 
As this issue is explored further in both chapters on `hearing-listening- 
understanding', I move on now to discuss some of the effects and implications of 
the encounter between the Pa'ikwene's native language and those spoken by the 
various (non-Amerindian) peoples with whom they are in contact. 
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"AUNA KABAI" - "TO SPEAK WELL" 
2. Pa'ikwaki and other languages. 
Relations between Pa'ikwaki and non-indigenous languages. 
I briefly noted earlier the influence of Creole (and also Portuguese and French) on 
Pa'ikwaki, and the fears of virtually all the Pa'ikwene I met in regards to its future. I 
would like now to look at this issue a little more closely. Such invasiveness is not a 
new phenomenon. Contact with the non-Amerindian universe and, it follows, a 
certain absorption of its traits, has been occurring to a lesser or greater degree for 
well nigh half a millennium (see chapter 1). In the 1920's Nimuendaju had already 
observed (1971: 82) the "degeneration" of the indigenous canons of pronunciation, 
and blamed it on the effects of Creole. There is no doubting the particularly 
unrelenting impact of that outside world, in terms of persistence and concentration, 
on the life of today's Pa'ikwene, both linguistically and in many of the other vital 
cultural spheres. Furthermore, this influence does not stem from a single alien 
culture only. Apart from the inevitable consequences of their longterm relations, 
principally of trade, with Creole society among which, in Guyane, they are enclaved 
(and which is itself undergoing considerable cultural change), the Pa'ikwene are 
also subjected, and open, to the diverse and not infrequently contrasting influences 
deriving from their joint incorporation in both the Brazilian state and the French 
one. 
On top of this, as a number of the chapters below will reveal, they prove not 
immune to, and indeed are, so many of them, seduced by, the radically 
transformational capacities of a general and modernist `Western' culture, especially 
in the areas of the economy, religion, education, and even medicine - each of 
which may be said to affect the native ways of seeing the world and, ultimately, 
speaking Pa'ikwaki. This should not be taken as meaning that the imported 
vocabulary necessarily imposes or brings into being new and alien concepts and 
destroys the previous ones. For as the subsequent chapters will also show, the 
Pa'ikwene, like other Lowland peoples (see for example McCallum 1990 apropos 
the Cashinahua), seemed perfectly able to reconcile the new language to the 
views, expectations and requirement of the `old' system of values and meanings. 
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The use of Creole, or Creole derived, and so French based, words peppered 
Pa'ikwene discourse, notably in the areas of practical life. Thus, for example: 
"Kwiyeg" ("cuillere": spoon), "Simis" ("chemise": shirt), "Alimet" ("allumettes": 
matches), "Katüsh" ("cartouches": cartridges), "Büwet" ("boite": box). I found some 
of these terms slightly disorientating. This was not just due to the, for me, unfamiliar 
accents in which they were uttered, but also because they were as if a bit off-key or 
no longer content to stay in their original French French place; thus, for instance, 
"Triko": a tee-shirt for the Pa'ikwene but, as "tricot", a knitted jumper in France (what 
the English call a "woolly"). This slippage, though, seemed less the Pa'ikwene's 
own doing than the prior effect of creolisation. 
A further feature of Creole appropriated by the Pa'ikwene was the 
agglutination of the French definite article ("le", "la") and partitive article ("de", "du" = 
`some [of the]') into the substantive; thus: "Lesens" ("L'essence": petrol), "Dilüi" ("De 
Thuile": oil) and "Dilet" ("Du lait": milk). 
Although they realised that some of their words were also used by Creoles, and 
were interested to hear (from me) of the French connection, some Pa'ikwene 
seemed not to know that they were in fact loan words. Rather, they thought of them 
as wholly and inherently their own. To give an example, I once asked a woman 
how to say "mango", and was told: 
"Mangue". 
"No, not in French, in Pa'ikwaki, " I said. 
"That... " she insisted, looking at me as if I were stupid, "is Pa'ikwaki! " 
There is, of course, a `purely' Pa'ikwaki word for mango (although I cannot recall it), 
just as there is for not a few other items which people now tend more and more to 
call by their non-Pa'ikwaki Pa'ikwene terms instead: e. g. "Kwak" (manioc flour; in 
Pa'ikwaki: "Püpeye"); "Mamai/Papai" (Vocative: Mum/Dad, borrowed from the 
Portuguese). Other things were referred to alternately by their Pa'ikwaki and non- 
Pa'ikwaki names, such as an owl: "Shüwet" (French/Creole "Chouette") and 
"Püküpkü" (indigenous); or the manioc-and-water drink rendered both as "Chibe" 
(Creole) and "Bügühat" (indigenous). 
Some expressions deftly incorporate two or even three languages, as in 
"Paiva (Pa'ikwaki) ler (Creole)? " ("What is the hour [time]? ") which has replaced the 
traditional "Kinei kamü? " ("Where is the sun? "). Indeed it was not uncommon for 
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people to mix three languages in one and the same sentence, as in "Kadahan dois 
kilos encore" ("there are still two kilos"), which is how I once heard someone 
describe the current state of his sugar supply to a Brazilian visitor. 
With Pa'ikwene children now attending the state schools on the French side of the 
Oyapock river, and being taught by Brazilian teachers in the Aükwa homeland, the 
community's fluency in these two languages will, I estimate, soon match their 
knowledge of Creole, which has historically been the practical lingua franca for all 
the peoples of the region. For Jean Narcissio, the president of the Association 
d'Amerindiens Palikurs at Macouria (some 25 km outside Cayenne), there is a 
pressing need for the Pa'ikwene in Guyane to acquire more proficiency in French 
in order precisely to circumvent and combat a certain hegemonic expansion on the 
part of the creolophone world. He told me of his deep fear concerning the, for him, 
pernicious cultural and political implications of the invasive influence of Creole, 
and the growing tendency of, or pressure on, some individuals, especially among 
the younger generation, to discard Pa'ikwaki in its favour. This contrasts rather 
starkly with the claim by F. and P. Grenand who reported [1979: 5], admittedly 
nearly twenty years ago, that in Guyane the "Palikur language seems to be 
successfully holding its own against the Creole influence"; a view they maintain in 
P. and F. Grenand 1990: 33, and at odds with Nimuendaju's historically earlier 
perception, referred to above. 
But perhaps what is at issue now is not the inroads of Creole (and Portuguese and 
French) as such. After all they have been occurring for several centuries and, no 
less than Karib linguistic imports (see F. and P. Grenand 1987: 30 fn. 25), are an 
inevitable contributory factor in the diachronic growth of (Arawakan) Pa'ikwaki. 
Rather, the problem seems to be one of attitude: the choice and behaviour of a 
certain section of today's `acculturated' youth who hold it more `modern' to speak 
Creole than their own language (and to adopt Creole and `Western' ways in 
preference to ancestral ones). This has resulted in a situation which is both deeply 
disturbing to and condemned by most of their elders; and also by some of their 
peers. During my fieldwork, the youngsters of my village swapped punches on a 
number of occasions with those from the neighbouring one (Esperance 1) over this 
question: the former retained a fundamentally 'traditionalist' stance in respect of 
Pa'ikwaki (though not towards all `old time' Pa'ikwene cultural features), while 
many of the latter were assertively and, it was felt, tauntingly dropping it in favour of 
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Creole. 
According to Virsen, one of the Esperance 2 youths, even those younger 
people who, like himself, have made it a point of ethnic integrity and honour to 
retain Pa'ikwaki, do not know how to speak it properly. Describing the language 
spoken nowadays as "New Pa'ikwaki", i. e., Pa'ikwaki with a heavy foreign 
admixture, he stated: "We don't speak `real' Pa'ikwaki anymore. " This assumption, 
held by many of his generation, seemed to pose their language in terms of a 
historical succession of progressively deteriorating stages. Each of these, as it 
travels further and further away from some purportedly ideal matrix of purity, 
correctness and authenticity, is inferior in relation to the last; with "New Pa'ikwaki" 
grammatically and, somehow, ethically and aesthetically near to utter degeneracy. 
* 
Hagege, considering the disappearance of so many `minority languages', writes 
(1991: 56-7) that their death, which he stresses is a cultural and not a "biological", 
i. e., natural, one, is due to the "irresistible diffusion of [alien] languages which bring 
in their wake [Western] money, technology and ideology" (my translation). He 
concludes that those languages in which these three `values' are not spoken are 
fated to disappear one by one. Such appears to be the present plight of the 
Pa'ikwene's highly prized yet moribund ceremonial language, Kiaptünka (item iv 
chapter 5). What though of the vernacular and, in its own way, no less valued 
Pa'ikwaki, given the profound, long-standing impact of Creole and the steadily 
growing one of French and Portuguese, the decision by some people to opt for 
them at the expense of their own tongue, and also the irreversible absorption and 
grip of outsider economic, technological, philosophical and other cultural 
influences? It seems to me that in spite of these factors (and Virsen's misgivings) 
Pa'ikwaki remains sufficiently resilient to survive, at least in the foreseeable future. 
I suggest that it might even continue to grow and prosper thanks to its speakers' 
adroit and discerning flair for appropriating and adapting some of the perceivably 
advantageous features of the foreign languages; to the extent that, as reported, 
they are regarded as being, and thus to all intents and purposes `really' are, 
indigenous ones. I have presented above some examples of non-native lexical 
items which have been reinvented and naturalised. In item vii of the chapter on 
`political communication' we will note too how a certain discourse of power felt to 
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be inherent in the French language is borrowed by the Pa'ikwene for use within the 
family. 
Some might see in this the sign of an unconscious, unbuckable 
acculturation. Could it not be instead evidence of synergy? I join with F. and P. 
Grenand (1987: 54-6) in thinking that the Pa'ikwene like other Lowland 
Amerindians relate not only interactively but dynamically with alien cultures. That 
in the sphere of language as in the others of their life, far from being passive victims 
they are a society the majority of whose members possess robust and effective 
agency, which allows them to confront change through a "series of successive 
readjustments... around a central framework of inherent values" (F. and P. Grenand 
ibid.: 56, my translation). 14 
In view of Pa'ikwaki's vigour and regenerative force, as well as the Pa'ikwene's 
intense and near mystical attachment to it as an essential and defining part of their 
personhood and identity, and, too, the depth of axiological and affective feeling for, 
and perceived socially productive nature not to mention characteristic loudness of, 
speaking, it might be worthwhile resurrecting Marcel Cohen's term of "puissances" 
- that is to say, potencies/strengths/powers - which he coined for his typology of 
speech (1971: 5-37). 15 To my mind this is preferable to the notion of 'function' 
propounded by Malinowski (1930) in respect of language in so-called 'primitive 
societies', where its "essentially pragmatic character" (p. 316) means that it is a 
"mode of action, [but purportedly] not an instrument of reflection" (p. 312). For, as 
have tried to describe, and as I believe the material suggests, the Pa'ikwene 
themselves see speaking in terms not just of utilitarian purpose but also of social 
and moral efficacy. 
14 Cf. among others Campbell 1989: 55-8 on the Wayapi, Gow 1991: 274-98 on the Piro; also more 
generally Ramos 1991, Campbell 1995: 218-9. 
15 I borrow Cohen's terminology, not his Marxist approach. His work relates to different types of 
"specialised uses of language in the framework of the superstructure [which] can often be regarded 
as fragments of institutions... or the means of actualising institutions" (ibid.: 5, my translation). These 
types are: (1) The word and extra-human forces" - e. g. language used in religion, magic, human-spirit 
communication; (2) "Effective formulae used in interpersonal relations" - e. g. meetings and partings, 
inductions and expulsions, vows, codified prescriptions; (3) "Persuasion and instruction" - e. g. pleas, 
propaganda, reasoning and analysis; and (4) "Entertainment" - e. g. literature, theatre, word games. 
47 
chapter four 
"TCHIMAP", "TO HEAR-LISTEN-UNDERSTAND"1: THE SOCIO- 
CULTURAL DYNAMICS OF PA'IKWENE AUDITION. 
"I knew I had difficulty understanding others... " 
(Felisberto Hernandez, 1990 [1960]: 359, my translation) 
"You wish to see, listen; hearing is a step toward vision. " 
(St Bernard de Clairvaux) 
While speaking occupies an important place as a subject of anthropological study, 
the same cannot be said of its twin social action, hearing. Relatively little research 
has been carried out on the topic, some of which I shall be referring to in due 
course. In the main, however, despite its validation as a cultural construct and 
'social fact' (Mauss 1979: 111), hearing is still thought of, it seems to me, as having 
a lesser role sociologically in the process of discourse and relations with others: 
something so taken for granted perhaps that its contribution and, indeed, the 
hearer's agency, tend to become eclipsed. I offer the present discussion in the 
hope of redressing the balance. 
A structuralist notion proposes that language is an abstract social phenomenon, 
and speech its unconscious adjunct (Levi-Strauss 1986: 56-7). 1 for my part share 
with others2 the assumption that speaking sets up and maintains relations which 
are not only dialogic but thereby necessarily and concretely social. In Amazonia, 
where its societal nature is culturally highly aspected and valued, oral expression 
is typically perceived also to generate and maintain relations between human 
1 As will be seen, the conceptual linking of hearing and understanding is not rare in Amazonia. Apart 
from "Tchimap" there exists an alternative Pa'ikwaki word for to understand': "Püküha", which also 
signifies 'to count'. 
2 E. g. Malinowski 1930; Burke 1941; Hymes 1971; Ducrot 1972: 423-31; Freire 1977; Ch. Taylor 
1985; Ingold 1986; Sherzer & Urban 1986; Volosinov 1986; Hagege 1991. 
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beings and non-human ones, such as animals, spirits and gods3 (a notion, need it 
be said, also found elsewhere). It is my thesis, based on observation of the 
Pa'ikwene's discursive practices and beliefs, that in this region hearing can also 
act - and act instrumentally - to the same ends; and substantially in the same 
manner. That is to say, relations between people, and between people and other 
categories of beings, are established, kept alive over time, and can be brought to 
an end, by the willed, intentional, purposive and thought-full aural action of the 
individual social actor. 
The topic will be presented in two detached parts, the present chapter and a later 
one, spatially but not thematically separate. The former is divided into three 
sections: an introduction giving a basic outline of the subject, my reasons for 
addressing it, and the theoretical and other notional perspectives involved; a 
description of some pragmatic aspects of Pa'ikwene aural behaviour; and an 
examination of "Tchimap kabai", which means 'to hear-listen-understand well' and 
which I have glossed as "Good Hearing", with particular regard to its role in the 
actualisation of productive relations. The second and deferred part (chapter 6) is a 
discussion in the form of a 'philosophical dialogue' on the complementary 
phenomenon of "Tchimap ka kabai", meaning 'to hear-listen-understand badly' and 
glossed as "Bad Hearing". 
(i) Introduction: Why hearing? 
The decision to highlight the subject was primarily influenced by the fact - and 
memory - that in the strange and alien environment of the 'field' which at first 
overwhelms the senses, the fledgling anthropologist can only, like any newborn 
child, hear before he or she can speak. 
My choice was also prompted in large part by the high incidence of, and 
great tolerance for, bad hearing which is so noticeable in the community where I 
was based. Whereas for much of the time I saw the Pa'ikwene world as through a 
mosquito net, unclearly, I had the feeling that I, and everyone else in Village 
Esperance Deux, was being heard as through a receiver which only worked one 
time out of five or six. In due course, for reasons which will be made clear, I put this 
3See interalia Metraux 1967; Crocker 1985; Seeger 1987; Santos-Granero 1991; Viveiros de Castro 
1992. 
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down to cultural rather than congenital deafness. It was rare, for instance, outside 
of the ritual duet of the Pa'ikwene formal greeting with its typically prompt yodelled 
reply, described in the previous chapter, that an individual would immediately 
acknowledge that he or she was being addressed. More often than not, the stock 
response would be silence, which only ceased after a number of (generally) 
undaunted and patient reprises by the speaker. Sometimes an inordinate number 
of them was required to unblock the muteness which the addressee frequently 
upheld for elaborate and even, in my view, farcical lengths. It was just as rare for 
the addressor to take offence at this. Certainly, it was not a behaviour they found 
strange or eccentric among themselves. Openly acknowledged, it was referred to 
as "hearing badly" - "tchimap ka kabai" - and contrasted with "hearing well" - 
"tchimap kabai". Not to be confused with the transient non-communicativeness 
which often exists among adolescents in our own cultures, it occurred just as much 
between adults as youths and children, and between adults and non-adults. 
It soon became apparent that the Pa'ikwene's "Bad Hearing" was not due to 
neurophysiological dysfunction. In the majority of cases, their apparent failure to 
hear on being spoken to turned out to be a social custom, not a natural act; and, 
too, very much an intentional and conscious one. 4 Somewhat confusingly from my 
point of view (as will be seen), it is a class of action subdivided into two types: an 
unacceptable, illegitimate, antisocial behaviour, and an acceptable, legitimate and 
social one, on which I shall be concentrating. I would distinguish at this point 
between the silence associated with the latter kind, i. e., the tendency on the part of 
an addressed person to delay giving a verbal response, and normatively 
prescribed avoidance behaviour like the traditional 'no talking' rule, which forbids 
direct communication between members of certain Pa'ikwene categories of social 
beings such as mothers-in-law and sons-in-law. Furthermore, while these 
4 While I define such auditory behaviour as conscious, obviously not all Pa'ikwene are cognizant of 
this (or indeed any other) action each and every time they engage in it. It might be more correct and 
convenient to regard it as a cultural trait that has become so internalised as to be 'second nature'. This 
by itself should not preclude it from also being conscious to some degree. So even if, at one level, it 
is a collective habit performed (seemingly) without self-reflectiveness most of the time by most 
people, I would be chary of calling it an unconscious act. I find Ingold's concept (1986: 300-4) of 
'practical consciousness', i. e., embedded in spontaneous practical action, a serviceable one for 
describing such behaviour. Inasmuch as hearing is, wholly or qualifiably, a conscious act, I think about 
it as Volosinov does about speaking (1986: 85), that the actor's consciousness is both subjective and, 
being shaped by the collective consciousness, objective. 
Various informants knowledgeably, and knowingly, described in their metadiscourse the fact of 
'bad' and 'good' hearing and their uses, both social and, as will be seen in the case of the latter kind, 
magical. 
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proscriptions are followed less and less, to the point of being virtually defunct 
among the younger generation, 'non hearing' is, as I have intimated, a widespread 
and thriving practice. 
The first point I am making, then, is that in Pa'ikwene society bad hearing (of the 
positive type) and the silence accompanying it are a convention. 
I am however running a little ahead of myself, so will put off a fuller description of 
this phenomenon till later (chapter 6). In the meantime, I broach some of the 
theoretical aspects, both indigenous and non-indigenous, of hearing. 
Variable sense data. 
As stated above, in comparison with other topics there does not exist much 
ethnographic material on hearing both generally and where Amazonian societies 
are concerned; and what there is tends, barring some notable exceptions (to which 
I shall be paying due attention), to be both incidental and slight. There would seem 
to be two reasons for this. The first is that for the Western or Western-trained 
observer hearing-listening is clearly not as 'visible' a trait as speaking. Not as 
objectively seizable and recordable, seemingly a less concrete social fact, 
morphologically less easy to describe, overall it is a far less juicy topic. 
Secondly, and underlying this, we tend culturally to favour sight and speech 
over hearing anyway. However, as Seeger (1987), Stoller (1989), Howes (1991 
and 1991 a), Classen (1991), Howes and Classen (1991), and others have shown, 
the classification of the senses varies from culture to culture. 5 Ong explains (1969 
and 1991) that while in 'Western' thinking sight is 'seen' as superior to hearing and 
the other faculties this may not necessarily be true of non-Western sensoria6; and 
Gell for one has pleaded (1995: 236) for anthropologists to beware the 
disadvantages of this visual bias and adopt a more multi-sensorial approach to 
their field work. The perceived dominance of sight is premised on the Ancient 
5 It will be objected that speaking does not constitute a sense. However, some cultures do consider it 
one, e. g. the Javanese (Dundes 1980) and Wolof (Rabain cited in Howes 1991a: 182-5). Like sight, it 
is judged in the 'West' to possess a higher status and greater value than hearing (Ong 1991) and, 
commonly, to be a sign of intelligence in its own right (Philips 1972). It is also held a more active action 
than hearing, something I shall be returning to throughout the chapter. 
6 See too Foucault 1979a, Summers 1987, Tyler 1984, Synnott 1991, Burnett, Fend & Gouk 1991. 
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Greek notion relating it to knowledge and truth and their acquisition (Wilden 
1975: 175, Sorabji 1987, Synnott 1991). Plato, for instance, posits the primacy of 
sight on the grounds that it leads to God and Truth. According to Aristotle it is the 
most developed and morally superior sense (and touch the most inferior and 
'animal' one), being directly linked to knowledge. The Ancient Greeks conceived of 
understanding itself as a kind of sight, in contrast to the Ancient Hebrews' notion of 
it as a kind of hearing (Ong 1991: 27). 
The Pa'ikwene philosophy of the senses is (perhaps) less unilateral in this respect. 
Although, as already noted, they too couple understanding with hearing, 
knowledge might rather, as with the Hellenes, be associated with vision by virtue of 
the (it seems to me) probable relationship between the Pa'ikwene words "Hiyap", to 
see, and "Hiyak", to know. As to the connection between sight and thought there 
can be no doubt, given that their term for'to think' is formed by the union of the verb 
"Iveg" (to look) with the morpheme "-min" (meaning very far, beyond). 
The tendency conceptually and verbally to combine all or some of these 
actions, hearing, listening, understanding, knowing, in a single act and word seems 
a not uncommon Amerindian trait. Joanna Overing, Anne-Christine Taylor, 
Rebecca Ellis, and Karen Jacobs have told me that it is also to be found among the 
Piaroa, Achuar, Tsimanes and Ashinenka respectively. See also Reichel- 
Dolmatoff (1981) on the Desana, Seeger (1981: 83-4,1987: 79) on the Suyä, 
Rosengren (1996: 7) on the Matsigenka, and Isacsson (1993) on the Embera. The 
link exists, too, of course, in some European languages, e. g. French, and as 
already stated in Ancient Hebrew. Examples of other non-Amerindian 
epistemologies in which the ear is similarly the seat of intelligence are the 
Melanesian Ommura (Mayer 1982) and the Indochinese Sedang (mentioned in 
Devereux 1991). 
Notwithstanding the Greek privileging of sight, Aristotle regarded hearing as a 
prime sense also (Towey 1991 and Frangenberg 1991). He considered it the 
medium whereby the totally empty mind with which the human being is supposedly 
born becomes filled with the (vocal) teaching of a 'knowledge master'; thus 
conceptually it was the faculty which contributed most to the gaining of knowledge 
and growth of intelligence. Building on this, early Christian ideology stressed the 
moral and sacred role of human hearing in relation to an omniscient divinity: the 
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ears as the express means of receiving and following God's wisdom in the 
metaphorically perceptible form of his Word (Sears 1991: 19-29). 
Despite the attempts to endow hearing with a greater value, 7 'Western' 
culture continues to favour vision and the visible8 (and as an aspect of this, the 
written word rather than the spoken and heard one). There are others, though, who 
accord sight a lesser position in their own sensorium. The Weweya of Eastern 
Indonesian, for example, privilege taste (Kuipers 1991), the Wolof touch (Rabain 
cited in Howes 1991a: 182-5), and the Batek smell (Howes and Classen op. 
cit.: 283). As for hearing itself, a considerable number of societies would appear 
morally and symbolically to prioritise it over sight (prized more for its practical 
usefulness): among them the Songhay (Stoller 1989), the Inuit (mentioned in 
Howes and Classen op. cit. ) and the Moroccans (Griffin 1991). 
This faculty can be said to play a similarly major role in not a few Amerindian 
typologies of the senses, and also in their ethics of sensory perception - and in a 
manner consistent with Howes' point (op. cit.: 186) that it would more correct to 
consider the senses in terms of their relationship instead of in the characteristic 
'Western' way of breaking them down individually. In particular, Levi-Strauss' 
sensory analysis of Amazonian mythology (1964: 155-71) demonstrates the 
metaphysical agency of all the faculties, but perhaps most significantly sight and 
hearing (see myths 1,9,10,12,69,70,81 and 85 in respect of the latter). 
We may note too that hearing can acquire a social salience among certain 
peoples for whom it may not have one symbolically. For example, because of its 
perceived link with comprehension, the Desana apparently value it as the 'most 
cultural' of the senses, whereas sight's instrumentality in the creation of the world 
makes it the most important cosmologically (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1981, see also 
Classen op. cit. ). 
Like some of the other peoples referred to, but unlike the general run of 
'Western' cultures, the Pa'ikwene do not seem to classify sight over hearing and 
the other senses. Nor, moreover, do they distinguish between hearing and 
listening, as their single term for both actions, "Tchimap", indicates. Does this imply 
7 Other than Aristotle's, we can note those of St Augustine (Sears ibid.: 27-8), Galen, Francis Bacon 
and Helkiah Cooke (Gouk 1991), and Ficino and Charles de Bovelles (Frangenberg 1991); see too 
Voltaire 1979 [1764]: 344. 
8 See e. g. Schor 1987 and Synnott 1989/90 on Western aesthetics. Conversely, emphasis is laid on 
the connection between acoustic action and the passions (Gouk 1991: 100-13; Burnett, Fend & Gouk 
1991). 
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that they hold the first just as volitional and intentional as we do the second? The 
question brings us to another pertinent issue relating to audition: the nature of the 
action itself. Voluntary and autonomous on the part of the actor, or merely 
automatic sensory-motor skill? 
Hearing and Listening. 
In English as in French, though not in the Pa'ikwene language, a conceptual 
distinction is made between hearing and listening; the first tends to be thought of as 
passive, the second recognised as active - and a matter of subjective choice. A 
religious (Christian) rationale proposed in the early Middle Ages that while a 
person's hearing was created by God, in that he or she was also imbued with Free 
Will the option of whether to listen or not (to his 'Word') was basically their own 
decision (Sears op. cit.: 35). But listening is not only a question of epistemology 
and ethics; research in experimental psychology (see inter alia Moray 1969a: 88- 
92 and 1969b: 25-6,41; Treisman 1960; Swets 1963) validates the listener's 
autonomy as objective fact. Moreover, the same data appears to show that hearing 
entails purposive action as well, involving both the subject's biological and 
psychological conscious volition to a lesser or greater degree. So-called 
'shadowing experiments' reveal that an important element of such behaviour is the 
individual's ability not only to choose to listen but indeed to, in Moray's words 
(1969a: 88), "exercise considerable voluntary control over what he will hear" (my 
stress). This is done by, among other things, filtering out unwanted signals and in 
particular favouring emotionally valuable ones (See too Koestler 1964: 513-17 on 
the role of 'selective hearing' in the process of human creativity). 9 
Perhaps, as far as the Pa'ikwene are concerned, the perception that hearing 
is no less a function of the actor's will and purpose than listening might be summed 
up in the phrase of a friend of mine who, when I asked him why he ignored a 
Brazilian woman's repeated attempts to engage him in conversation, bluntly 
replied: "Nah ka mwaka10 tchimap" - "I don't want to hear-understand [her]. " 
9 Sändor Hervey has pointed out (personal communication) that rather than occurring at the level of 
motor processing of auditory stimuli, bad hearing, in the sense of 'turning a deaf ear', happens before 
the point of response to speech, but after the act of comprehension. 
10 "Nah mwaka" and "Nah ka mwaka" (I want/do not want) are very common Pa'ikwene terms, applied 
(loudly and virtually emblematically) to all and any action that a person wishes or is disinclined to 
undertake. For me they performatively express the autonomy of the individual and its high profile in 
and value for that society. 
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The relationship between hearing and speaking. 
The interdependence, complementarity, and indeed cooperativeness of speaker- 
hearers in the technical process of verbal interaction has been studied and 
confirmed by among others Grice (1975), Hancher (1979), Stiles (1981), and 
Schlegoff (1981). There is material showing the inherent instrumentality of hearing 
with respect to speaking in the processing and creation of meaning (e. g. Grice 
op. cit., Hymes 1986, Sperber and Wilson 1986). It has been claimed, too, that for 
ego the two actions are symbiotic to the point of consubstantiality: "Hearing oneself 
speak combines the physiologically separate organs of hearing and speech into a 
unique sense that speaks one's hearing...; that is, it receives as well as transmits. 
Speech in this sense is a form of otorrhea. " (Kahn 1992: 103 fn. 57). 
Yet, for all that we are bound to recognise their mutuality, we ethnocentrically still 
tend, as mentioned earlier, to privilege speaking over hearing. If only implicitly, the 
two are viewed hierarchically, with the former as active and determining, and the 
latter as passive and determined, operating reflexively rather than instrumentally. 
Thus, for example, the universalist claim advanced by Malinowski (1930: 314) that 
the "bonds.... between speaker and hearer [in a generalised 'primitive society'] are 
not quite symmetrical", being weighted in favour of the "man linguistically active" 
and, it is implied, against the aurally passive one. 
That hearing is in reality just as active a process as speaking would seem to 
have been corroborated by research in phonetics (Sändor Hervey personal 
communication): the so-called 'monitoring' and 'feedback' processes have 
invalidated the methodological separation between speakers and hearers, given 
that the former are the hearers of their own utterances anyway (which is basically 
Kahn's point above). 
Some Amazonianists have already reached a conclusion about the above two 
questions: does the subject have the choice of whether and what to hear, and is 
'hearing-listening' merely a passive action? F. Grenand reports (1982: 24) in 
connection with the Wayapi that the decision to be part of a myth-teller's audience 
is purely the individual actor's alone, and no less so than it is the myth-teller's to 
choose whom to tell his story to (let alone presumably whether to tell it in the first 
place). Overing writes (1986: 140) that the part played by the (female) audience in 
similar Piaroa events is every bit as active as the (male) performance, not just 
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complementary with but equal to it to the extent of constituting a performance in its 
own right. 11 
For the Suyä, on the other hand, while "strong" (i. e., 'good') speaking is male 
and active, "strong" ('good') hearing is both male and female and passive (Seeger 
1981: 85-91), a notion which concurs with the European one. The Pa'ikwene 
however consider the two activities to be just as female as male; and each, we 
have already noted, as equally 'active'. As will be seen, one example given below 
crucially involves the dynamic and productive hearing of a baby girl. 
The Suyä also grade speaking and hearing morally (Seeger 1981: 83-4,89-91, 
1987: 79). "Strong" speech and hearing are categorised as social and 'good' 
behaviours; 'bad' speech and hearing as antisocial ones along with "strong" vision 
and "strong" smelling (both in the sense of having a keen sense of smell and a 
powerful odour), which are also classed as 'natural'. While, as far as I was able to 
discover, the Pa'ikwene do not also explicitly rank the senses in a hierarchical 
moral league table, a positive status and value are associated with 'hearing- 
listening-understanding well', equal and complementary with those given to 
'speaking well'. As already stated, and as we shall explore in more detail in 
chapter 6, they also, paradoxically perhaps, attribute a positive one to 'hearing- 
listening-understanding badly', though not unreservedly nor in every case. 
Although seldom expressed in metadiscourse, this attribution was visible in the 
behaviour of individuals, the way in which they personally used, or reacted to 
someone else using, 'bad hearing'. While positive 'bad hearing' would be 
implicitly recognised, and allowed, the practice of negative 'bad hearing' 
(sociomorally improper, i. e., rude, uptight, 'aggressive') was explicitly named, 
criticised and rebuked. 
Furthermore, as will also be discussed more fully in due course, positive 'bad 
hearing' not only coexists with 'good hearing'. It also does so, revealingly and 
harmoniously, with 'good (i. e., loud and strong) speaking'. Metadiscursively, such 
speech is at all times singled out as the positive ideal mode of communication, 
technically, aesthetically, and in terms of social correctness. While hearing, 'good' 
or 'bad', is less often referred to, there is a definitely stated recognition of this 
11 See too E. Basso 1985: 15-8,1986,1995: 29-32 on the important dialogical role of Kalapalo 
"listener-responders" in myth narration; and Sherzer & Urban 1986: 8-11 on the active contribution of 
auditors and their interdynamic relations with speakers in native South American discourse generally. 
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faculty's sociomoral importance and motivational power; this last being figuratively 
formulated and perceived within a world view which unitarily incorporates humans 
and non-human species and involves communication between them, a process 
described in section iii and also chapter 9. 
While it seems to be the practice cross-culturally to ascribe good moral qualities to 
speaking and hearing-listening, the ethical status of silence tends to be more 
ambiguous. The Airo-Pai, for instance, associate it with treachery, enmity and evil 
intentions (Belaunde 1992: 48,145). For the Pa'ikwene, on the other hand, silence, 
in particular when resulting from "Bad Hearing", can possess a positive as well as a 
negative value (cf. Seeger 1987: 68-9 on the Suyä). Again, this is something I 
intend to enlarge on in chapter 6. 
Having established the Pa'ikwene duality of 'good' and 'bad' hearing, and its 
connection with understanding, I now proceed to a closer inspection of the topic. 
*** 
(ii) The basic pragmatics of Pa'ikwene hearing. 
I will lay the aural scene by getting you to imagine the so-called background noise 
of Village Esperance Deux, the daily human 'hum and murmur' which as far as the 
Pa'ikwene were concerned could never be, it seemed, loud enough. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter a Pa'ikwene person tends constantly not only to 
seek out the company of his or her fellows, but the sound which in all its varied 
aspects, from talking to laughing to eating to working, characterises such contact, 
and effectively acts to enhance it. For the Pa'ikwene the louder this noise the 
better, for the contact is then "heard-listened to-understood" as that much more 
'real' and social, thus more valuable and meaningful. 12 
From around seven in the morning, then, till quite late at night, with a slowing down, 
a slight dropping off, in the hottest, middle hours of the day, there was as part of the 
global texture of sound a flow of loud and voluble speech in all its varied and 
multiple forms, from conversations to rows and reprimands, and from joking to the 
12 Cf. de Saussure for whom, according to Culler 1982: 19, noise is, in contrast, merely unsignifying 
sound unless it serves the specifically linguistic function of expressing or communicating ideas. 
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typical shriek-talking of the children (see chapter 3): an intense, usually orderly 
multi-vocal process which I would qualify not so much as an accompaniment to 
sociable community life than a generative constituent of its very existence. 
Overlaying this was the ever insistent voice of the Protestant fundamentalist song 
repertoire which, with musical backing and the choral contributions of all and 
sundry, resonated virtually non-stop, and at the fullest volume, from the Assembleia 
de Deus church's sound system and a score of privately owned ghetto-blasters (for 
other aspects of the Pa'ikwene converts' existence see chapter 9 part 3). This 
inescapable, monolithic presence induced, it must be said in passing, acute bouts 
of depression in me; so much so, that, fearing for my health, I was obliged at one 
point to leave the village for a month. Given the small size of the place, the 
flimsiness of the houses, and the general open air lifestyle, the composite sound 
was both essentially and unavoidably public; 13 and its apparent seamlessness 
only relieved, and underscored, by an irregular punctuation of silences. Some of 
these were undoubtably natural hiatuses; others wilfully manufactured, a process 
examined in chapter 6. It will be obvious that such vocal and sonic activity called 
for an equally intensive counterpart in the sphere of audition; and with it too, one 
relating to the process of understanding, as defined by the term "Tchimap". My 
immediate aim in this chapter is to describe as many of the latter's properties as I 
could locate, and to suggest a broad explication of some of the effects and 
underlying principles of its application not only in Pa'ikwene discourse but the 
wider process of social relations. 
Basically, and in general, "Tchimap kabai", "to hear well", is the same as the 'good 
hearing' of other Amazonian Amerindians: an instrument of socialisation and 
instruction (Seeger 1981: 84-5,1987: 79-80) which together with 'good speaking' 
works to (re)create and maintain the 'good life' (Belaunde 1992: 48). That is, one 
that is sociable, peaceful, congenial, satisfying, pleasing. In this use, 'good 
hearing', like 'good speaking', is primarily to be seen as a productive agent. 
The next important point to establish is that, from my point of view, it was in one 
sense often difficult to differentiate between 'good' and 'bad' hearing despite their 
explicit demarcation. The problem, which is gone into more fully in chapter 6, lay 
13 For a good account of the typical "acoustically transparent" quality of Lowland village life, see 
Seeger 1987: 65-8. 
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basically in the fact that Pa'ikwene people can listen badly in the Western sense of 
failing to pay full attention14 yet in reality 'hear-understand' perfectly well; they are 
masters in the art. It seemed to be a cultural trait of theirs that listening should so 
often appear on the surface as if it were its opposite. There was a tendency not to 
acknowledge and respond to an interlocutor directly but, as it were, away from 
them, by keeping your eyes, and sometimes even face and body, averted, while 
typically at the same time carrying on with whatever you were engaged on before 
being addressed. Outside of the most formal occasions, such as attending church, 
a Pa'ikwene does not usually stop whatever he or she may be in the middle of 
doing in order to listen to someone speak. While I am not suggesting this is unique 
to the Pa'ikwene, it did seem to be particularly marked among them, to the extent of 
constituting a sort of informal convention. Neither would it be correct, however, to 
say that all Pa'ikwene automatically adopted it at each and every communication. 
For there were people who did look speakers in the face, and who did not 
particularly indulge in the silent response associated with `bad hearing' (described 
below). It was, I suppose, a question of individual choice and temperament. 
Nevertheless, I found this kind of listening sufficiently widespread to be described 
as a 'behavioural genre', and to warrant being labelled a learned 'body technique' 
(Mauss 1979: 111). 
Nor does such conduct mean that listeners are thereby expressing 
disrespect for the speaker, or ignoring or showing an indifference to what is being 
said. Rather, such apparent inattentiveness should, again, be understood as a 
socially constructed behaviour which can mask from the non-indigenous observer 
the hearer's engagement with the discourse in question and their acquaintance 
with its meanings, semantic and otherwise (see chapter 3), that are shared with the 
14 See e. g. Roget's Thesaurus (edited by Lloyd 1984, items 415,416) where 'attention' is given as an 
analogous term for 'hearing', and 'inattentive' as one for 'deaf'. Moray's psychological research 
(1 969a) conflates attention and 'selective listening', while also taking into account factors such as the 
subject's mental concentration and "state of arousal" (e. g. whether drowsy or alert). The issue of the 
Pa'ikwene's apparently inattentive but actually engaged listening in the context of political speech is 
expanded on in chapter 7. 
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speaker. 15 
The listener's averted stance aside, the pragmatics of Pa'ikwene audition proved 
difficult to ascertain. The indigenous metadiscourse and (observable) behaviour 
and attitudes in regard to it seemed ambiguous. People would joke to me about 
"Pa'ikwene `bad' listening" as if it were a notorious and peculiarly `national' trait, 
something almost to be proud of. At the same time, `good' listening was constantly 
stressed as important for the promotion and maintenance of good social relations. 
There turned out to be no real contradiction here. For, as already mooted, although 
called bad, such (seemingly) negligent listening was not necessarily deemed 
negative and improper. Depending on context and the speaker's reading of the 
addressee's intentionality and mood, `bad' listening would be evaluated as to its 
legitimacy and acceptability. Following the same sort of reverse logic which in 
certain situations converts the French "terrible" and nowadays the English "wicked" 
into their semantic opposites, legitimate `bad listening' might paradoxically be said 
to constitute de facto `good listening' for the Pa'ikwene, in that it is not indicative of 
bad social relations but, as will be more amply discussed in chapter 6, quite the 
opposite. 
There was, too, the added factor that 'good hearing' and socially permissible 'bad 
hearing' are complementary. So much so that to the observer they can sometimes 
confusingly appear to be one and the same; for the norm is that a Pa'ikwene who 
engages, or is engaged in, a discourse should hear-listen-understand without 
interruption. One's response should be just as considered and deliberate, whether 
physical, taking the form of silence, or (eventually) verbal. In effect, as I will be 
exploring later, the silence offered by the hearer in return for the speaker's 
15 This is not to attribute a homogeneity to commonly owned meanings; nor to deny the agency of 
each individual speaker-hearer in the processing of meanings, and the frequent divergences 
between them. As Siran warns (1993: 241): "What one person has stored in memory is never exactly 
what another may have. One consequence of this is [to quote von Humboldt]... 'Nobody means by a 
word precisely and exactly what his neighbour does... Thus all understanding is always at the same 
time a non-understanding'... This is the ultimate and inescapable reason why meaning has to be 
`negotiated'; and the job of the anthropologist and other social scientists is not to deny it, but to 
describe it. " See too Jankelevitch (1964: 42-4): given that "equivocality is the very law of expression", 
there is no guarantee that another person will be able to understand us, let alone wish to, in spite of all 
our efforts to make ourselves understood. Cf. Derrida 1967. 
For more on the ambiguity and changeability of meaning refer inter alia to Lyons (1977,1981), 
Wittgenstein (1981), Weber (1 978: Vol. 1: 26-8), Sperber (1979: 8-16), Aitchison (1987: 39-50). 
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utterances amounts to words held provisionally in abeyance. 16 The above 
behaviour was less marked in some circumstances than others, such as the 
(relatively) formal situation, described in chapter 5, of a visit from a "capitaine". 
However, while spontaneously occurring interruptions, interjections and cross- 
talking were not unknown in everyday informal discourse, people nevertheless did 
on the whole listen to one another for much longer silent and 'unresponsive' 
periods than we tend to do in that context. 17 
In contrast to the ambivalence of 'Bad Hearing', 'Good hearing' is unequivocally 
social, and moral, in that it is not only a proper but also, almost by definition, an 
eminently sociable behaviour. I now examine some of the aspects of this quality in 
respect of a specific field of social activity, namely hunting. In particular I will look at 
the productive, as seen by the Pa'ikwene, nature of audition. I shall begin by 
recounting my experience and perception of the indigenous use of hearing in that 
connection, and then present a native view. As will be seen, it illustrates the 
interactivity, and possibly interconstitutivity, of the spheres of economics, social 
relations and relations between people and natural species; and their mediation by 
language, audition, and magic. 
*** 
(iii) (S)talking and listening in the forest: human-nature intercommunication and 
the productivity of "Good Hearing". 
The first time I was allowed to accompany some Pa'ikwene on a hunt, one 
impression I had, among the overwhelming ones caused by the forest and the 
moment itself, was of the quality of the men's silence. I was indelibly struck by its 
attentiveness, its intensity and its intent. Also, it came as a welcome relief. It meant 
a respite from the aforementioned and virtually non-stop loud talking and general 
loud noise of village life. In the forest, though, even when not hunting, voices were 
relatively muted, conversations toned down. And when hunting, both were put on 
'hold' for long periods of time. Speaking did not cease completely, however, as it 
was necessary for three reasons: 
16 Cf. Goffman (1972: xiii) on "public order": the ground rules and patterning of face-to-face social 
intercourse; and also (p. 3 fn. 1) on 'turn taking' in conversation and (pp. 35-8) more generally. 
17 For more on the sociopragmatics of Pa'ikwene hearing see chapter 7. 
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People hunting in pairs (that is, covering together, though at a distance apart, a 
relatively wide territory) have verbally to communicate information, advice and 
intentions to one another when lack of visibility rules out hand signals, or as an 
alternative to blazing. Next, two or more hunters may meet up at a prearranged site 
for a shared meal-break and 'chin wag'. My feeling is that in like manner to the 
food, which replenishes their energy, the chats, consisting typically of gossip, 
hunters' yarns and jokes, regenerate and strengthen their affective sense, and 
state, of communitas. Lastly, hunters talk to - or, in Pa'ikwene terms, with - the 
game that they are hunting. This speech is one of the main means at their 
disposal, should they wish to use it, for locating and establishing a relationship with 
their prey. 
At one point during my first hunt, Karinai, whom I was accompanying, suddenly 
stopped and signalled to me not to say anything. He cocked an ear in one 
direction, wafted the air towards him with his hand to sniff the wind then, lifting his 
fingers to his mouth, whistle-called towards the undergrowth on one side of us. 
Almost instantaneously, a dark shape appeared in profile in the trees ahead. As 
soon as it saw us, it turned and retreated. Karinai had not aimed his gun let alone 
fired it. What we had seen was a jaguar, a non-edible animal for the Pa'ikwene 
(see Appendix B for probable reasons and taxonomy of animals). What we had not 
seen, and what Karinai had hoped to call up, was an agouti. Later, in reply to my 
questions, he revealed the following: his call was not a whistle, which is how I 
referred to it, but a blowing ("punka"), and what I had observed was, in his words, "a 
blowing of breath in the animal's own language" - known in Pa'ikwaki as 
"ka'insapka". Each "Puigne" (animal) and "Kohivra" (bird) speaks a different 
language, thus there are specific kinds of "ka'insapka", which a hunter uses 
variously according to his intended prey. Whereas the verb 'to speak' is generally 
"auna", that for speaking to an animal in its own language is "kainsene". 
In a hunting situation, then, one speaks to animals in order to make contact 
with them and ask them to come and be killed. As Karinai put it, "I kaInsene'd (as it 
were) to call the agouti to die. " A summoned animal will hear and often comply, 
sometimes 'speaking' in its turn to the hunter; though apparently not every species 
is caught this way, deer being one example (reason unstated). Karinai told me that 
he had learned "ka'insapka" from other hunters when younger, and that all 
Pa'ikwene hunters know and resort to it . 
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Ingold, who argues strongly (1993b: 441-2) against the 'Western' concept of 
humankind's relationship with nature as one of struggle and dominion rather than 
dialogue, points out (p. 433) that our practical engagement with it is in effect partly 
a verbal and aural one: 
"There are techniques of speech just as there are techniques of 
hunting and gathering; through speaking and listening... one 
gains a perceptual knowledge of the human environment, as 
through hunting and gathering... one gains a perceptual 
knowledge of the environment of animals and plants - 
although... one may also speak [and listen] to animals and 
plants and use tools on other humans. " (my stress) 
Paradoxically, however, he seems to regard the dialogue as a one-way exercise, 
for he contests (1994: 6-8) the very notion of 'animal language' on the grounds that 
it lacks ideational content, purportedly the one quality which makes of Language 
something more than speech and more than a means of communication. So while 
animals communicate with each other, he writes, the fact that their communication 
is non-ideational means that they "do not converse" (my stress). 18 But is not the 
anthropological point, rather, that many peoples, including the Pa'ikwene, believe 
they do? 
Karinai put the jaguar's appearance down to its appetite: having 'heard-listened 
(to)-understood' his call, it knew an agouti would respond and turned up intending 
to nab it before he himself did. He put the agouti's non-appearance down to the 
jaguar's interruption of the discourse before it could get properly underway, and to 
the former's fear of the latter. 
Thus, in this instance, the 'conversation' between human and animal was 
broken off, and contact unconsummated. Karinai was not to get any agouti that day 
at all. 
18 Ingold further muses (ibid.: 3) that if humanity were defined not as 'homo sapiens ' but '"homo 
loquens', a natural kind including all animals with language and speech", we might have to accept the 
possibility of including some non-human animals in it, on the grounds that the eventual realisation of a 
linguistic capacity in animalkind equal to the one in humankind cannot theoretically be ruled out. Cf. 
Nollman's proposal (cited in Masson & McCarthy 1995: 218-9) that the vocal communication of whales 
shows evidence of development over time and thus of an "oral tradition"; and Masson & McCarthy's 
question (ibid.: 215-9) as to whether animals might not possess a realisable "narrative urge". 
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Speech, then, is not absent during a Pa'ikwene hunt, but very much a component 
of it. In one sense, it is part of the hunters' technical and communicative panoply, 
utilised in conjunction with their sight, smell and, especially, audition. I wish now to 
concentrate on the latter item. 
Hearing, in Pa'ikwene hunting, operates on two levels. Firstly, in the 
rainforest habitat where long-range visibility is impeded, 'good' ears become as 
pragmatically vital as good eyes. An animal deposits acoustic as well as other 
spoor, and the Pa'ikwene hunter is expert not only in tracking olfactory and visible 
signs but audible ones also. As Gell has proposed (1995: 235-8,245)19, the 
tendency to organise the sensory modalities in a manner which privileges audition 
might be typical of forest dwellers in general. Where the Pa'ikwene are concerned, 
high aural skills and powers are also required in the 'flooded savanna' 
environment which, especially in the Aükwa river (N. Brazil) 'homeland', constitutes 
their territory to a perhaps even greater degree than the rainforest. While open in 
contrast to the forest, it is covered in tall dense reeds and other vegetation which 
are an obstacle to clear sight. 
Secondly, and ethically, not only is hearing necessary in order to permit 
communication between human/hunter and animal/hunted, 'good hearing' is vital if 
it is to be a successful one; that is to say, fruitful (to the former) and, I would 
suggest, 'social' -a factor I will return to later. 
The hearer, the hunter, and the agouti head. 
Some ten months after my first hunt, the conceptual mechanics behind the 
Pa'ikwene hunters' use of "kainsapka" became clearer to me almost by accident. I 
will now try to reveal how. In order to do so, I need to present to you the moment 
when understanding began first to dawn. 
From my fieldnotes: 
17th January 1995. Baby-sat S. this morning. She's very 
responsive, reacting immediately when spoken to. When 
commenting on this later to her mother, was told of a 
correspondence between 'good hearing' and the situation where a 
hunter 'whistles' (or as the Pa'ikwene say 'blows') into the forest 
around him in the not infrequently realised expectation of making 
19 Deriving from research on the Umeda, his ecological-cum-phenomenological theory posits the 
determining action of hearing in the phonological process of word construction for tropical forest 
dwellers whose chief sensory modality for coding the environment is auditive rather than visual (see 
also Feld 1982, Weiner 1991). 
contact with an animal. Often a "bügütrü" (agouti) will respond and 
show itself, conveniently making itself a target in the process. My 
informant explained that humans who answer promptly to being 
called, like S., should be given the head of an agouti to eat as this 
will bring success in the hunt to those they live with. Also, hunters 
should always seek to stand beside them, but avoid 'bad hearers', 
i. e., people who respond slowly or reluctantly. These must not be 
given agouti head to eat as this will result in an unsuccessful hunt. I 
suggested that if they were given it, then perhaps they might 
eventually also become good hearers/quick responders, but was 
told this wasn't the case. 
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(I still do not know, in passing, what was wrong with my logic. And certainly the 
Pa'ikwene do believe in the effectiveness of direct contagion between humans and 
other animals, as opposed to it being at one remove in the case of a hunter and a 
cooked agouti. For example, it was said that "red fish" gives a person energy, and 
that a pregnant woman who eats sloth will have a slow and painful labour and a 
lazy child. Other Amazonian peoples apparently share such notions. Viveiros de 
Castro reports (1992: 48) the Arawete consider that consuming the throat fat of a 
male howler monkey makes a man a good singer. ) 
In my analysis of this example I will investigate the following contextual issues: 
Pa'ikwene hearing-listening as a dual natural and social action; magic and 
causality; and the intercommunication between society, nature, and supernature. 
It is necessary first of all to distinguish between 'good hearing' and 'good listening'. 
My informant did so herself. As previously noted, the Pa'ikwaki term "tchimap" 
incorporates both the concept of hearing and listening (as well as that of 
understanding). But this is not say that these acts are necessarily undifferentiated 
or conflated by the Pa'ikwene. When I tried to clarify in French whether what was 
being discussed was a case of "Entendre" (to hear) or "Scouter" (to listen), the 
woman replied, also in French, that it was definitely the former. Semantically, 
though not syntactically, because of the shared appellation, a Pa'ikwene person 
may (just like an English- or French-speaking one) listen to an utterance well yet 
hear (i. e., understand) it badly. They also explicitly recognise, to a greater degree 
than English and French speakers, that they can understand it perfectly yet at the 
same time hear it 'badly' in the sense of turning a deaf ear. The Pa'ikwene, so it 
seems to me, see "tchimap" as a dual action; one that is both natural and cultural. 
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And depending on context, it can be one or the other, or one more than the other. 
Thus an individual can simultaneously hear at one level, the 'purely' sensory, and 
not hear at another, the social (and accordingly be judged to 'hear badly'). To 
repeat what I said earlier, the second behaviour is (qualifiably) conscious, volitional 
and active. 
Language, magic and causality. 
The configuration of language, magic and productivity is not a new one in Western 
academic thinking. As Mauss writes (1972: 141): "Magic is the domain of pure 
production, ex nihilo. With words and gestures it does what techniques achieve by 
labour". He and Malinowski (1954: 73-6,1965) have described how in "mouth 
magic" oral expression effects a desired material end (see too Tambiah 1968: 185- 
203). With or without the accompaniment of non-oral acts, the uttered or silent 
words, or the breath, of a magical practitioner produce, or induce, what is wished 
for (and did not exist prior to the words or breathing) by action which, operating 
under the 'laws' of contiguity, similarity and opposition (Mauss op. cit.: 64-79), may 
be called tropic. In the Pa'ikwene instance referred to above, which incidentally 
bears out Mauss' claim (p. 25) that a magical 'specialist' is not always required for 
magic to happen, metaphoric causation is extended. Here the sympathetic 
association and mutual transference of human and animal faculties or powers 
bring about a practical result (the getting of game) through a process which 
unitarily involves four separate acts of magic: two relating to the mouth (speaking 
and eating) and two to the ear (human hearing and animal hearing). 
My intention here is not to re-debate theoretically the issue of magic (profane 
and technical action or sacred, metaphysical one? Proto-science or aspect of 
religion? ) nor to examine the notion of causality. Mauss (ibid. ) and Malinowski 
(op. cit.: 17-92) deal comprehensively with the first. For a relativist and an emic 
Lowlands Amerindian perspective of the second, I would refer you to Campbell 
1989: 61-93 and passim). 
As regards the Pa'ikwene, magic is considered to be of practical usefulness, 
and there is the belief that certain things can come about through substitution and 
transference. To give but one example, their ascription of particular afflictions or 
cures to the oral actions, in the form mainly of magical utterances and the blowing 
of tobacco smoke, of both the "ihamwi" (healer/shaman) and "aviri" (a sort of 
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wizard-cantor), would seem to indicate that they share the probably universal 
notion that the mouth, the voice and words possess, or are the conduit for, causal 
cosmic power. 20 
Auditive interaction between humans and the 'supernatural world'. 
What I think is exciting, and relatively rarer (in terms of ethnographic data), is the 
Pa'ikwene's parallel belief in the causal power of hearing. 
I must distinguish at this juncture between sound, the heard, and to hear. 
The Iroquois believe that some natural sounds of themselves contain latently 
causal mystical power (Mauss ibid.: 113; cf. Witherspoon 1977 on the Navajo and 
Stoller 1984,1989 on the Songhay of Niger). According to Campbell (op. cit.: 68, 
76), Wayapi logic holds that certain 'natural' sounds, heard in specific contexts by 
humans, will make certain determined things come about. It is the sound itself, 
rather than its auditory perception, which is the causal agent. This motivational 
capacity is to be found in humans as well as in nature. For example, human noise 
is said to arouse the anger of a particular supernatural entity which manifests itself 
in the form of a rainstorm (p. 84). For Francis Bacon such an correlation could be 
explained by the theory of 'natural magic', according to which sound and hearing 
operate on a principle of 'sympathy' (Gouk 1991: 98-9). 
would argue that, given the obvious: if a noise can be heard, it follows that 
someone can hear it, we have moved from passive to active. This crucial shift 
characterises, to my mind, the Pa'ikwen6 conception of hearing. For them, as the 
example of the agouti head would seem to indicate, it is the subjective action 'to 
hear' (and in this context 'to hear well' especially) which, instead of the object 
which is heard or the sound itself, carries effective force. 
The idea of audition as a creative (and destructive) agent is to be found in various 
cosmogonies. In Jewish Kabbalistic tradition, for example, there exists a pre- 
'Genesis Adam' known as Adam Kadmon ("Primordial Man") whose body, the 
prototype of several human manifestations of God's image, comprises the different 
stages (Sefirot) of godly attributes, i. e., powers and instrumentality, by which the 
divine will, thought, emotion and action are realised. The attribute of knowledge, 
20 See inter alia Cassirer 1953: 44-83; Tambiah op. cit.; Mauss op. cit.: 113-4; Goldman 1975; 
Witherspoon op. cit.; Stoller 1984; Ch. Taylor 1985: 223; Isacsson op. cit. For more on this topic in 
relation to the Pa'ikwene see chapter 9 (part 2); see too in Appendix A their creation myth which tells 
how the spirit founder KaümaIiye sung (and danced) them into existence. 
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located in the seat of the Holy Spirit, the face and throat, and distinct from 
understanding and wisdom which are housed in the head, is made up of sight, 
speech, smell - and hearing; it is through them that God intervenes concretely and 
causally in existence (Halevi 1995: 5-18; cf. Encyclopaedia Judaica 1971: 250-1). 
In their turn, data such as Isacsson's (1993: 346-73) on the Embera notion of the 
divine procreative power not only of speaking and the mouth but of hearing and the 
ears, and Levi-Strauss' (1964) on the instrumentality of hearing as portrayed in the 
origin myths of the Bororo (myth 1), Apinaye (myth 9), Timbira (myth 10), Sherente 
(myth 12), Taurepan (myth 69), Caraja (myths 70 + 85) and Tukuna (myth 81)21, 
have pointed to the important position active audition can occupy in the 
metaphysics of the native peoples of Amazonia and the Guianas. 
Santos-Granero's material (1991: 124-31) on the "acoustic quest" for divine 
revelation of Amuesha priests, and the shamans' "audio-visual" relations with the 
supernatural sphere, and Chaumeil's (1993) on the Yagua shamans' arcane 
knowledge enabling them to hear and communicate in the "invisible language" of 
the spirit masters of plants who are the owners of the shamanic songs and powers, 
would seem to establish an indigenous belief in the effectiveness of audition yet 
further. As does A-C. Taylor's work (1993) in respect of the Achuar, for whom 
hearing is part, with speech, sight and touch, of a variety of 'species-specific' 
modes of communication operative in contacts between humans and different 
types of spirits. 
As this research clearly demonstrates, then, aural action is 'traditionally' 
seen by some Lowland peoples as a key mode of access to and exchange with the 
non-human world; and a powerful cosmic agent. 
Due, however, to the radically transformational effects on the ancestral Pa'ikwene 
culture of Protestant fundamentalism, there seemed on the ground to be a dearth of 
data pertaining to their pre-Christian religion; and consequently on the part hearing 
might, correspondingly, have played in it. The overwhelming majority of Pa'ikwene 
that I met, either Evangelical of Adventist converts, appeared, or declared 
themselves to be, ignorant of its philosophy in the sense of it constituting a 
comprehensive (cosmo)logical system. Some would still know bits of it, tantalising 
21 Myths 1,10,85 relate to the hearing of natural and supernatural entities; 9,12,69,70,81 to that of 
humans. 
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yet (to my mind) disconnected shards, seemingly meaningless shreds. And I could 
detect, or would be offered glimpses of, it 'concealed' in their daily behaviours and 
talk. But, frustratingly, no overall meaningful pattern ever emerged; no clearly 
visible model. All these aspects are discussed in chapter 9, where I show that 
elements of the old cosmology not only survive, co-existing with the new one, but 
indeed underlie and to some extent infuse some of the Christian beliefs and 
practices. 
Nevertheless, through an elderly couple, Waptchi and Ovayan, reputedly the 
"last two" Pa'ikwene shamans, I managed to obtain enough basic if fragmentary 
information to piece together something of the role of hearing in 'traditional' 
Pa'ikwene intercourse with the supernatural world. 
During our meeting, described more amply in chapter 9 part 2, Waptchi told me that 
audition between him and the spirits was a two-way affair. He can hear inside him 
the invoked spirit which enters the "house" in his head. He also hears it 'outside' 
him, since, he explained, the words and chants coming from his mouth in a 
shamanic session are the spirit's own. It uses his, Waptchi's, human voice to 
transmit its own utterances and, through that voice, its powers, which are said to 
reside within the utterances. 22 A Pa'ikwene "ihamwi" (or "paje", regional term) can 
also hear a spirit in 'natural' sounds: e. g. the song of a bird, the rustle or creak of a 
particular tree. Conversely, as was demonstrated to me during a shamanic 
performance put on for my benefit, the spirits hear the "ihamwi". One told Waptchi, 
"I have come to listen to your song"; and another that it was responding to his 
request for help for a (putatively) sick person. 
In the contemporary context of the Village Esperance Deux Pa'ikwene's adoption 
of evangelicalism, explicit stress is placed on verbal intercommunication between 
humans and "Ohokri" (God) and Jesus Christ, and hearing-listening-understanding 
considered an equally important aspect of the process (cf. Sears 1991: 19-29 on 
the phenomenology of the human audition of God, and pp. 29-35 on his audition of 
us). In the village (Assembleia de Deus) church, Portuguese tends to be the public 
and audible language in which one discourses with the divine pair; and Pa'ikwaki 
the private and silent one. The latter is also the tongue in which one prays aloud in 
22 Cf. Viveiros de Castro op. cit.: 65-6 on the Arawete who hear the "music of the gods" in the 
shaman's trances and songs, and hold divine potency to be concretely present in his rattle. 
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one's own home. In church, "Ohokri" and Jesus Christ, through the mediumship of 
the Brazilian pastor (and his permanent fifth limb of a microphone, of which more in 
Appendix C), communicate in Portuguese. However, they are also said to speak 
and hear-listen (to)-understand Pa'ikwaki, and all the other languages in the world, 
since "Ohokri" made each and every one. Furthermore, in heaven, I was told, the 
righteous Pa'ikwene dead will be able to speak and "hear-understand" the 
"Language of Angels" in which God, Jesus and the other spirits converse among 
themselves. "Tchimap", then, is not limited to life - cf. the Guarani's resurrectionist 
attempt to "make the bones continue to listen" (Clastres cited in Viveiros de Castro 
op. cit.: 213). 
For the reasons given earlier, I cannot claim categorically that the important role of 
hearing in the present day Evangelical Pa'ikwene cosmos was carried over from a 
previously non-Christian one; although my intuition is that such a thing did occur. 
There is possible 'evidence' for this offered by Butt Colson's data (1985: 111) 
relating to prophets among another people of the Guianas, the Akawaio. These 
individuals, who are Christian, attain revelation of God acoustically in dreams, and 
she thinks (personal communication) it very probable that indigenous pre-Christian 
notions have been woven into their contemporary Christian(ised) world-view. 
Oral and auditive interaction between humans and the 'natural world'. 23 
The Pa'ikwene belief, shared with many other peoples in Amazonia (and 
elsewhere), that animals, whether in their spirit or 'natural' forms, can speak both 
human and animal languages and, it follows, hear-listen (to)-understand them, is 
attested to in a number of their myths. In them we see that this verbal and aural 
activity is important for the well-being and very survival of society, in that it can 
intercede on its behalf in times of crises and at other key moments. One story, for 
example, tells how Süyen and Kaü, two half-spirit bird brothers, warn their human 
father of a plan to exterminate the Pa'ikwene. This protective mediation works in 
the other direction too, as in the case of Mainai, a man who dissuades the son of 
two watersnake spirits from wreaking vengeance on the villagers who have slain 
23 In effect, the separation I assume between 'supernatural' and 'natural' worlds is, like that between 
humanity and nature, a false one from a Pa'ikwene perspective since, like many other indigenous 
peoples in Amazonia (and elsewhere), they regard them as connected, interpenetrative, and to some 
extent fused, a view expanded on in chapter 9. 
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his parents, and then helps him get to safety (respectively stories 3 and 4 in 
Appendix A). 24 
We noted earlier that Ingold qualified his conviction that the relations between 
humans and nature constitute a "dialogue" with the claim that animals do not 
actually possess a bona fide Language (since although they may be said to 
'speak', their communication is bereft of ideational substance). Kenneth Burke, on 
the other hand, is someone for whom the very notion of humans engaging with 
nature in a verbal interaction, of whatever type and outside of fables presumably, 
would appear to be a patent impossibility. His cosmology, the antithesis of an 
Amerindian one, posits (1969, and in Rueckert 1982: 247-40) a universe divided 
into four hierarchical stages, the lowest being the empirical, natural, and non/pre- 
verbal one: what our own world would be if the word was absent. The other three 
stages depend on words (language) and are added to this wordless nature by 
man, the word-user, standing Cartesian-like outside of and distinct from it. They 
are in ascending order the 'sociopolitical'; the 'purely verbal', wherein occurs the 
'cult of language'; and the 'supernatural', which is the extra-verbal; i. e., what divine 
and/or authoritative Word there is in it is in reality made and placed there by man. 25 
While animals do speak (according to the Pa'ikwene and other Amazonians), or 
speak but do not have real Language (Ingold), or do not speak (Descartes and 
Burke), what of plants? 
The Pa'ikwene world-view proposes that as the spirit masters reside not only in 
fauna but flora, and other natural phenomena too, then their breath and voice can 
be heard to emanate from the latter two just as much as from the former. Thus for 
example the music that a shaman produces on his bamboo flute is perceived as 
the song of "lwiv(r)ayene", the bamboo spirit; and the sound of water the voice of 
"Marivoka", the Master and Mother of water, or "Konopo", a lake spirit (for more on 
this topic see chapter 9 part 2). 
24 The latter story also provides an example of the symbolic role of hearing among animals/spirits. 
Setting off to attack the Pa'ikwene, Wamwi the watersnake spirit tells his wife to listen out for thunder. 
If she hears it coming from the left it will mean that he has killed the humans; from the right, that they 
have killed him. 
25 Cf. Masson & McCarthy 1995: 7-9 on Descartes' endorsement and Voltaire's rejection of the 
assumption that because animals do not possess language they are consequently automata without 
thoughts and emotions. 
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These 'things' are not only held to speak but also to hear(-understand). Aristotle, in 
regard to plants, held the distinctly opposite idea (in Towey op. cit.: 8-9): though, like 
animals, they are imbued with souls, unlike them they are unable to perceive, 
lacking the means of receiving "perceptibles". The Yagua on the other hand 
(Chaumeil op. cit.: 415-6), label the vegetable world as "dumb" because plants do 
not emit any perceptible sound; yet as mentioned earlier they nevertheless also 
believe that plants' spirit masters speak a so-called invisible language audible to 
shamans, who can converse back to them in it - and be heard. 
For Eliade (1972: 93), "'animal language' is only a variant of 'spirit language', the 
secret shamanic tongue". Among the Pa'ikwene, however, the ability to speak and 
hear-listen-understand animal language (or more precisely, animal languages, 
since each species is said to have its own) is not an esoteric knowledge limited to 
shamans. Some 'ordinary' hunters possess it, as I saw for myself when in the 
forest with Karinai. I should make it clear that while not a shaman, and indeed as 
an Evangelical strongly opposed to shamanism, he was a shaman's son, though 
shamanic skills are not held to be inheritable. This tallies with the Maussian 
observation, referred to earlier, that the so-called arcane skills and powers are not 
the preserve of a magic 'specialist' class. Campbell makes the even more 
pertinent point with regard to Amazonian Amerindians when he suggests 
(op. cit.: 104-6) that "it might be useful to regard the notion of 'paye' [Wayapi 
shaman] not primarily as a role or an office, but as a quality" latently present in 
natural objects and humans, whether 'officially' shamans or not (see too Overing 
1988 on the accessibility of supernatural powers for all Piaroa). 
Specialist skill or not, I would be chary of describing Karinai and the other 
Pa'ikwene's ability to dialogue with nature as no more than a ploy in a strategy of 
domination. While at the practical level the ultimate intention behind it was 
explicitly to obtain food, it seems more likely that, as Taussig suggests (1993: 104- 
5), the purpose of conversing with animals through what he calls the "magic of 
mimesis" is not so much to gain control over them as, principally, to give their spirit 
tangible form in the physical world. 
* 
Such, then, is the framework within which I shall now analyse the example 
presented in my fieldnotes. Structurally, and objectively, none of the four 
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unofficial26 magical acts - two oral, two aural - can be said to have sole direct 
causal effect, since they all work through one another. Singly, each has a 
participatory causality; together, they possess joint, and direct, causality. Namely, 
that of bringing about a successful hunt. For the causal effect to occur, these acts 
must not only coexist but interrelate. None of the four terms of the relationship 
(human hearing, animal hearing, human speaking, human eating) can, in the 
combined magical action, occur without the other. Thus, for a person's 'good 
hearing' to exist it must have sympathetic access to an animal's, which can only 
happen by means of the metaphoric - and real - act of eating its head; which latter 
act can itself only exist thanks to the magical act of the hunter's 'good speaking' to 
the animal and its 'good hearing' of him. (Why the agouti was singled out as a 
particularly good hearer I forgot to ask. ) 
The quadruple relationship exists as one aspect of a dual process of reciprocity 
and predation27 seemingly typical of human-nature interaction in Amazonia; and 
dynamically comprises a continuous, continually flowing loop. Each act operates 
as a conduit through which their joint orbit must travel. Each is fixed in terms of its 
place in the orbit. That is to say, each act of one type (oral or aural) is set between 
two acts of the other type, and in a specific order. This order is only apparently one 
of priority. It seems that the human 'good hearing' should come first, for it looks as 
though it is the act which initiates the process, that sets off the chain of other acts. 
However, it itself cannot exist as a constituent of the unitary magical act without the 
prior existence not only of the eating act but also of both the speaking act and the 
other (animal) hearing one. Since each of these is, at any given stage of the 
process, prior in time to the one immediately following it, none may be called 
absolutely prior. They are all prior turn and turn about. 
For the magic to achieve its purpose, the interdependence of the four acts is 
a requisite: the effectiveness of each, and its maintenance within the magic circle, 
depend on those of its three partners (In fact, two other acts are also implicitly part 
of the process: the hunter's own 'hearing' and the animal's 'speaking'). 
Not coincidentally, I believe, the above scheme, which is one of 'magical 
26 Because carried out not by a shaman but an 'ordinary' person. 
27 I apologise for virtually ignoring this side of the issue. This is due to a lack of data, not because I do 
not reckon it as vital a component as reciprocity in the overall relations between the Pa'ikwene and 
nature. For some accounts of the subject as it relates to Amazonia see Reichel-Dolmatoff 1971, 
Crocker 1985, Descola 1986, Viveiros de Castro 1992, Overing 1993a, Isacsson 1993. 
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economics', echoes virtually all Pa'ikwene work activity of a traditional nature. As 
described elsewhere in the thesis, this is typically a group process, involving the 
participatory input of two or more individuals, whether simultaneously or serially. 
The productivity (labour) of each contributes to the product which is produced by 
the co-productivity of all. But the scheme does more than just reflect. The activity it 
describes is an integral part of work. Having witnessed, as related, the occurrence 
of some, though not all, of the above-mentioned magical acts in a hunting situation, 
I wonder if it is too far-fetched to ask whether all traditional "anivit" (work) might not 
once have contained, for the Pa'ikwene, a 'magical' aspect? 
However, despite my demonstrating the equality of all the interrelating terms of the 
four part magical act, the fact remains that the Pa'ikwene appear to see things 
differently. From their point of view, as put by my informant, of all the crucial causal 
agents involved, it was audition which was the most crucial, the most causal. For 
them, it clearly acts as the arc between the two conductors, 'desirer' and 'desired'. 
Conceptually, each of these subsumes a range of further oppositions: 
DESIRER 
... human hunter 
speaker 
killer 
(hearer-)eater... 
DESIRED 
... animal hunted 
spoken to 
food 
(hearer-)eaten... 
In the resolving of these oppositions, the hunter's 'good hearing', not explicitly 
mentioned by my informant but observable on the ground, is no less crucial and 
causal than that of the non-hunting human and the hunted animal. As explained 
above, in the forest, his personal auditory skill comes necessarily to the fore. The 
catching of game is as much if not more dependent on the efficacy of the pursuer's 
ears as that of his eyes. So much for practice. Conceptually, however, it would 
seem that the Pa'ikwene hunter appropriates, or shares in, the animal's 'good 
hearing' through contact with it at one, or possibly two, removes. He must seek 
physical closeness to, and 'contagion' from, someone whose own 'good hearing' 
will have been (re)generated, maintained and enhanced by the consumption of the 
animal's head; and the incorporation thereby of the auditory powers - which might 
perhaps, I tentatively suggest, be an aspect of productive spirit powers - present in 
it. As corroborative data for this notion, I offer Waptchi the shaman's statement, 
74 
cited earlier, that invoked spirits and the powers connected with them lodged in the 
"house" inside a person's head. I feel that such beliefs, as well as the beliefs and 
behaviours of the people with whom I lived, and which I have tried to describe both 
here, in relation to Karinai, and in the chapter on religion, point to the probability of 
there being a 'traditional' Pa'ikwene philosophy in which humans and natural and 
supernatural species do not merely interrelate but dialogue and, therefore, 
socialise together for productive ends. 28 
It is individual hearing, then, that of humans and that of animals, which in the above 
case reconciles the opposites in the relations between (Pa'ikwene) humans and 
animals. And ensures that the group is fed. 
As regards the hunter's vocal contribution, I would stress again that it is the action 
of an 'ordinary' person which is at issue here. Ellis also describes (1997: 127-8) the 
communication with potential animal victims and their 'guardians' which is carried 
out by Tsimanes hunters, as well as by shamans. Both instances, the Pa'ikwene 
and the Tsimanq,, would seem to confirm that success in the hunt is not necessarily 
dependent on the magico-religious activity of the 'titular' shaman alone; indeed in 
this Pa'ikwene case it was not dependent on it at all, given that, to my certain 
knowledge, none took place. 29 There is too the fact that the Village Esperance 
Deux hunters often offered (Christian) prayers before setting off, which could 
conceivably constitute a transformation or extension of pre-Christian hunting 
rituals. 
It would seem, then, that despite the difference of degree in their respective 
knowledge and skills, non-shamans can be just as active and capable as shamans 
in the 'cosmonomic' task (Arhem 1996: 197) of ensuring the well-being of their 
community through an interlocutive engagement with nature. 
Lastly, the 'magic' used in the collective work-communication event involving the 
La On whether human relations with nature and supernature in Amazonia might be social ones, see 
Descola 1986, Belaunde 1992: 162-4,193-4, Arhem 1996, Ellis 1997: 117-37. For some other views 
on human-nature relatedness see in Descola & Pälsson 1996, the ecological perspectives of Reichel- 
Dolmatoff 1975 and Rappaport 1979, and the Marxist one of Tapper 1994; refer also to interalia Willis 
1990, Ingold 1993b, 1994. Finally, Eiseley 1969 provides a good historical overview of the evolution 
of Western thinking on 'man and nature'. 
29 On the decline of Pa'ikwene shamanism in terms of numbers and practice, though not necessarily 
of belief, see chapter 9 part 2. 
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hearer, the hunter and the agouti head is to be seen as an instrument not an agent. 
It does not of itself 'cause' a successful hunt but serves as the means of assisting 
'good hearing', as an expressive30 feature of fruitful communicative and social 
relations, to effect that desired end. 
30 By which is meant that it does not just represent or convey but actualises. This, I suggest, would 
also make "Tchimap" expressive in the manner proposed by Herder and other 18c German "Sturm 
und Drang" Romantics (see Ch. Taylor 1975: 13-29), for whom all human activities, and human life 
itself, are subjective expressions in the sense in which we speak of expression as giving vent to, a 
realising in external reality of something we feel or desire" (p. 14). 
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chapter five 
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
Power and the politics of Pa'ikwene speaking 
Introduction. 
This chapter describes and examines a number of types, or modes, of Pa'ikwene 
speaking which, together with their associated contexts, I shall characterise as 
political because they relate to the regulation and maintenance of the 
interpersonal, and dialogic, relationships constituting their society. This speech is 
not just to do with its control and protection but, vitally, its very generation. Living in 
Village Esperance 2 led me time and again to the conclusion that where the 
Pa'ikwene were concerned, the social and the political were interconstitutive. In 
the words of Clastres, who has convincingly refuted (1987: 7-47) the supposed 
apoliticalness of stateless egalitarian societies without coercive `Power', as typified 
by those of Lowland Amazonia: "[Whereas] the political can be conceived apart 
from violence, the social cannot be conceived without the political" (p. 23). What 
was social in Pa'ikwene life entailed the political; the political was, in the end, 
social. 
As will be seen, some of the types of speech described belong to the category 
of `leadership talk', while others are fundamentally demotic. My aim as regards 
Pa'ikwene political speaking is to show among other things that this activity is not 
the monopoly of chiefs. 
According to Riviere's comparative study of Amerindian social organisation in the 
Guianas (1984), the fundamental factor underlying the political structure and, 
indeed, permitting the very condition of indigenous community life, is the "vital 
relationship... between the leader and his settlement... [which] latter depends for its 
survival on the existence of the former... " (p. 72). Village Esperance 2 did not meet 
these criteria, however, for the simple reason that it had no leader, a matter to 
which I return in fuller detail shortly; nevertheless there is no gainsaying the validity 
of its own continuing existence, anomaly or not. (Admittedly, the Pa'ikwene, an 
Arawakan society, are not included in Riviere's book which concentrates mainly on 
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Carib ones). Concerning a further point he makes (ibid. ), that "successful 
leadership derives from an ability to handle the social network that constitutes the 
settlement and the community", I found such adroitness to be the possession and 
prerogative of any and every fellow villager. Without this effective manipulatory 
skill he or she could not exist and survive as a successful co-member and co- 
producer of the community, which is to say one whose several relationships, be 
they with kin, affines or others, are "kabai", "good"; that is, proper, peaceful, 
sociable, congenial and productive in one form or another. 
Some of the `political', and necessarily social, means he or she might employ to 
this end are working together; playing together; sharing and gifting (subjects 
discussed in chapter 7 and increasingly replaced nowadays by lending and 
borrowing, which carry the very real danger of causing rifts); marriage; and speech. 
I believe this last the most basic and, possibly, the most important. It is certainly the 
most resorted to in that it figures complementarily with, and instrumentally in, all the 
others. In speech I include, though will not necessarily give examples of each 
specific type, both directly political discourses, such as public exhortations (a rarity 
in Village Esperance 2 outside of church services) and homilies (by no means an 
exclusively chiefly device), and indirect or `secondary' ones like ordinary 
conversations, greetings, joking, teknonymic usage, and gossip, and the Pa'ikwene 
`institution' of scolding (item [vi] below). 
I report in chapter 4 that Pa'ikwene (`good') hearing was not a male activity solely. 
Neither, observation revealed, was ('good') speaking. In some Amazonian 
societies, an opposition between the two behaviours seems to be made along 
gender and `power' lines. The Suyä apparently regard speaking as male and 
active, and listening, classed as both male and female, as "largely passive" 
(Seeger 1981: 84-6,89-91). The polarity is particularly marked in ceremonial and 
ritual situations. Although Suyä women do perform in some song events, in others 
their role tends to be more important as an audience for the men (1987: 76). 1 And 
in political and religious rhetorical events, the chief or the shaman is the doer, and 
everyone else, whether male or female, those that are done to (ibid.: 50). However, 
I would suggest that the notion of `performer/active : audience/passive' in these 
contexts might be suspect and misleading. I agree with Soyinka (1976: 33-44) that 
II would dispute Howes' reading [1991: 178] that this is indicative of Suyä male hegemony. 
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it forms part of a certain Eurocentric premise about performance and drama which 
denies, or at the most downgrades, the audience's participation as an integral, 
creative, and in essence protagonistic element of the experience. 2 
For Overing (1986: 140), also, the role of women as audience in indigenous 
myth-telling and ritual events is as active and public as that of men as performers. 
She judges the former activity not only complementary with but, as it were, so equal 
to the latter as to constitute "female performance" in its own right. 
If, in accord with this, Pa'ikwene women's public hearing is an active performative 
conduct, as social practice shows it to be, it should not then be assumed that as a 
corollary their speaking is, in contrast, constrained to the supposedly private 
sphere. I not only saw no evidence in Pa'ikwene social life of a hierarchical 
`male/active/public: female/passive/private' dichotomy, such as can exist elsewhere 
(see e. g. Friedl 1967 on Greek peasant society), but their private-public divide was 
by no means an unambiguous and impermeable one anyway. In linguistic 
communication, then, the public action of Pa'ikwene women is not confined to 
listening; they also speak publicly, and just as "well" and "strongly" as the men. 
I have claimed that for the Pa'ikwene, speaking and hearing are each as active as 
the other, and that in public the two acts are ungendered. Before proceeding, 
however, I should admit that while I not unnaturally observed much everyday 
discourse and performance, my access to the `grand occasions' was in contrast 
very limited. The `traditional' rituals I saw were virtually all informal and mainly 
domestic, but not for all that necessarily private; and there seemed to be a male- 
female parity in respect of the participants' verbal contributions. At the only 
(loosely) formal political meeting I attended, there were no women present, though 
they did have the right, I was told by informants of both sexes, to participate, to 
speak, and even to officiate (The Pa'ikwene do in fact have female leaders; that is, 
women, like Mauricienne the head of the settlement at Macouria, who are sole 
chiefs of an entire community, as distinct from women who share the chieftaincy 
with men, usually their spouses, such as exists among the Cashinahua [McCallum 
1989: 223ff., 247-8 and 1990], the Piaroa [Overing Kaplan 1975: 51] and the 
2 Cf. Brecht's equation (1969: 15,26-7,37-8,140) of the passivity of modern Western audiences with 
emotion, which he strove to combat through the creation of the "scientific audience", characterised by 
an objective yet actively engaged reason. 
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Arawete [Viveiros de Castro 1992: 111-6]). 3 
My inability to witness at first hand much ceremonial and formal politics was 
due to the following. Firstly, as already stated, 'my' community was itself literally 
acephalous in respect of all practical and `everyday' sociopolitical affairs. 4 
Secondly, despite my warm and mutually trustworthy relations with some of my 
fellow villagers, and cordial and respectful ones with "Capitaine" Louis of 
Esperance 1, the bulk of the villagers for reasons ranging from shyness to, on the 
part of some of them, intractable suspicion, were none too keen on my presence as 
an outsider at their discussions of their internal affairs; and I generally only got to 
find out about them after the event. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, political 
activity was typically informal and uninstitutionalised anyway. Overall, it tended to 
occur in terms of domestic self-governance and ever readjustable, self-regulating 
relations between the individual members of a family, a kin unit or neighbouring 
households. Formal political, as distinct from religious, meetings which involved 
the wider community were very few and far between. 
Nevertheless, my one solitary instance of personal observation of a `formal' moot 
and, above all, the recording of their daily informal self-rule, provided me with 
insights into the role of speaking and listening in the Pa'ikwene political process. 
The latter behaviour is addressed in chapter 7. As regards the former, my 
emphasis will not be on political rhetoric as such, if by this is understood only a 
special public oratory performed either by leaders (see e. g. Steward 1946-59: Vol. 
V, p. 343; F. Huxley 1963: 88; Seeger 1981: 85,1987: 27,38; Gow 1991: 221-8) or 
others (see e. g. Riviere 1971). Rather, I shall consider political speaking as the 
process wherein individuals, whether chiefs or not, through the use of various types 
of public and private verbal interaction, do some or all of the following: 
communicate, instil and actualise norms and values as desirable things; induce, 
enable and accompany pragmatic acts favourable to the maintenance of the well- 
being of the group; foster and sustain emotional ties of union (cf. Malinowski 
1930: 315); perpetuate and indeed (re)create the social field in which the political 
3 For Viveiros de Castro (op. cit.: 260), female leaders are a "logical step in uxorilocal societies [such as 
the Pa'ikwene), where the sociopolitical world falls in general under the aegis of the feminine". 
4 On 'big issues', particularly those involving political relations with the non-Pa'ikwene world, people 
tended to seek guidance and representation from a "Capitaine" in the next-door village. They also 
recognised the Pa'ikwene `superchief', Tchikoi, who lived in Aükwa (North Brazil) and on whom more 
later. 
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process occurs. 
Amerindian power, politics, society and speech -a framework. 
Before presenting the data, I find it necessary to situate the issue of Pa'ikwene 
political speech within a broad theoretical and cultural context. Invited once by a 
Pa'ikwene to a festive communal meal, I was asked to contribute towards it. This 
was phrased (in French) as "Alain, you give a little present to buy some food". Not 
so much a statement, let alone a question, as an injunction. Or so it felt. This was 
probably because I was an outsider, for the Pa'ikwene will tell you that among 
themselves there is neither an obligation to make a gift to anyone nor to offer one in 
return; and if you did choose to do so, the counter-prestation need not be of the 
same kind as the one offered to you, though should ideally be of the same value 
(for more on this see chapter 7). My money, I suggest, was not only seen to be a 
gift (which may explain why I was not asked for it explicitly by name), but one 
evaluated as equal to my inviter's gift to me: her invitation. Let me try and explain. 
The Pa'ikwene verb "aunasa", which translates as "to invite", comes from that for "to 
speak" ("auna"), and pragmatically, it seemed to me, its use, even in translation, 
clearly means more than the recognition that functionally one resorts to words in 
order to effect the request that someone be your guest. It indicates too that the 
invitation is not only for the purpose of eating and drinking but also of speaking 
together. It is as if the inviter's words to the invited were in themselves a 
performative act constituting an initial gift-giving, and food and words each 
somehow as valued as the other (see Lacan's thesis [1975: 35,118-22 note 80] that 
words are gifts, indeed the original gift). 
There seemed, then, to be a rationale at work behind the act of inviting which held 
speaking and eating together to be equally powerful actions for (re)producing good 
social relations. Talk was not something taken for granted by the Pa'ikwene as the 
automatic and incidental accompaniment to feasting and any other social activity. 
Nor, I judged, did they just see it in terms of a behaviour necessary for the upkeep 
of sociability. For them, rather, it appeared to be an act which one undertook in 
common with others so that together they could realise and perpetuate sociality 
itself, as Kaüma'iye, the creator spirit, did when, sad in his solitude, he danced and 
sang and through words brought his people into existence (see Appendix A, myth 
1). From my point of view, that verbal communication had the power to create 
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society, as told in indigenous myth, was not only an ideological principle. It also 
constituted practical and, intrinsically, political actuality. 
Clastres argues (op. cit.: 27-47) that Lowland Amerindians hold that whatever 
power exists in a community is not the property of an individual or of the group but 
rightfully belongs to an extra-social sphere. According to him, this power comes 
from nature. For others, such as Overing (1982,1983-4: 338-40) and Santos- 
Granero (1991), it derives from supernature as the property of the gods and spirits. 
In either case, the presence of power in society presents a great risk to one and all 
for power is by nature violent and coercive, and can only be subdued by various 
cultural means, including, centrally, language, which for the Amerindian, says 
Clastres, is the "very opposite of violence" (op. cit.: 46). The Pa'ikwene proved 
broadly true to this model. Their shamanic beliefs and practices, for all that they 
seemed on their last legs, showed that society was seen as the place into which, by 
the use of ritual means, humans brought non-human power from outside (I 
describe in chapters 4 and 9 how oral expression is one of the main agents by 
which this power is expressed). Once inside, its true locus becomes not the chief 
or shaman but society as a whole (Clastres op. cit.: 154). And as with the Pemon, 
Pa'ikwene society was also in practice the "meaningful... moral order... by which 
power is mediated " (Thomas 1982: 9). 
On the other hand, though I saw no particular evidence of it, could it truly be said 
that there was no human proclivity for personal political power on the part of some 
members of Village Esperance 2? For Levi-Strauss this tendency, a purportedly 
universal and natural given expressed through the taking and exercise of unilateral 
leadership, is a "prerequisite for the existence of human society" (1967: 46) - the 
leader's primary power being as it were the power of attraction and agglomeration 
(see Overing Kaplan 1975: 65 and J-P. Dumont 1978: 129 concerning Piaroa and 
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Panare leaders respectively); 5 and without this purely political impulse of the single 
power-seeking individual, no society, it is claimed, could exist. Yet, in the event, 
the very real and concrete existence of `my' village surely invalidated this premise 
in that, as I have already said, it did not possess a leader of this kind, or any other. 
Nor had it by all accounts ever done so. 
The settlement was pioneered in 1980 by three women and three men: two 
sisters, their parents, and their spouses. They were motivated, one of the founders 
told me, by economic reasons and the hope of obtaining better medical care in 
"France" than in Brazil and a Western education for their children (at that time two 
small boys and two babies). Crossing into Guyane from the Aükwa homeland, they 
were given land near to the town of St Georges de I'Oyapock, in an insalubrious 
area of what was then still rank jungle next door to the already long established 
Pa'ikwene community of Premier Village Esperance. Here they hacked out a living 
space and laid the foundation for a community of (according to the census I did in 
February 1994) about one hundred and sixty persons, many of whom, now 
belonging to the middle and older generations, joined them from Aükwa. 
While it may be said that some of the original group, who provided the 
nucleus around which the others aggregated, clearly possessed the skills and 
qualities of leadership, none of them was thought to stand out above his or her 
fellows in such a way as to constitute `the' leader of the village. This position had 
never been foisted onto any of the six, neither did a single one of them ever seek it 
(Nor, indeed, was any other member of the community its leader). Now five in 
number, the oldest woman having died in the meantime, and respected by their co- 
villagers, they occupied the status of elders, though were in this no different from 
any other similarly endowed individual in their generational peer group. This 
conflicts with Riviere's assumption (1984: 72) that the founder (in the singular and 
5 The ability to attract a following is not always conjoined with the desire for personal power. In the 
Pa'ikwene context, and in Amazonia more generally, the former factor does not necessarily imply (let 
alone result in the fulfilment of) the latter, and `charismatic' but non-power seeking individuals are 
sometimes reluctant to accede to the post of chief which in a good many Lowland societies is typically 
both bereft of personal power and burdensome (see below apropos chief Tchikoi). Thus I believe 
that, while seemingly self-evident, the claim that the tP(e chief has to preexist as someone bent on 
leading and unifying in order for there to be a group (Levi-Strauss op. cit.: 52; cf. Gow 1991: 226) 
assumes a one-way process rather than the more likely dialectical one. For it could be argued that the 
group already exists latently and with a predisposition for unity in the shape of heterogeneous 
individuals who actively decide that a given person should lead them; and that it is his/her acceptance 
of that decision which empowers them to become an actual cohesive group. Nor can I accept that the 
group's needs are for nothing in the process, as Levi-Strauss also insists (ibid). I prefer to think of 
both preexistent parties interactively and complementarily calling each other into being rather than a 
chief unilaterally conjuring up a group as from out of nowhere, or a group somehow one-sidedly 
throwing up a chief. 
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male) of a settlement is explicitly recognised by its inhabitants as its chief and 
owner, for both historically and according to the villagers, Esperance 2 was neither 
the creation of one person, let alone a man, nor anybody's exclusive possession. 
However, despite this noticeable absence of leadership, which tends in 
'Western' eyes to be considered a negative condition equated with apoliticalness 
or anarchy (Clastres op. cit.: 27-47), Village Esperance 2 nevertheless existed in 
practice as both an authentic and cohesive entity. And one in which politics were 
patently not missing since they were empirically to be observed at play every day in 
the different activities fashioning and sustaining the community as an enduring, 
self-perpetuating and orderly social entity. 6 
Central among these activities, and on a par perhaps with marriage, was that of 
speaking. The inextricable and universal link between it and politics (power) is 
well established; and like other Lowland groups, the Pa'ikwene bore out Clastres' 
claim (ibid. ) that unlike `Power' in the State (i. e., a society with coercive authority 
and a structure of subordination), which possesses the right to speak, leaders in 
non-coercive "stateless' societies, have, by contrast, the duty, placed upon them by 
the collectivity, to do so. Nevertheless, as far as the Pa'ikwene specifically are 
concerned, their belief that the speaking action incumbent on their leaders was 
necessary for the maintenance and well-being of the community did not preclude 
them from simultaneously and empirically perceiving that their own discourse also 
counted for something in the process; that it too on a daily basis exerted 
pragmatically instrumental effect on the constant creation and recreation of the 
good relations which comprise society. 
On speech and Pa'ikwene chiefs and chieflessness. 
The Pa'ikwene in common with other Amerindians demand that their leaders 
`speak well' (see among others Levi-Strauss 1967, Maybury-Lewis 1967, Clastres 
op. cit.: 31,41,152-5, Santos-Granero op. cit.: 301-2); a skill not possessed, 
however, solely by the chief for in practice every Pa'ikwene is supposed to acquire 
it. As noted in chapter 3, by "auna kabai" ('good speaking') is meant not only 
linguistic and grammatical correctness and the positive affective and aesthetic 
aspects of the oral performance, on both of which the Pa'ikwene place great value. 
6 The case of Esperance 2 shows that while there might be no chief without a group, there most 
definitely can be, pace Levi-Strauss, a viable and united group without a chief. 
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It refers also to the ability typically to use words in a manner strong in knowledge, 
morality, persuasion, and care and concern. We saw too that in the Pa'ikwene 
context `good' further signifies strong in tone and volume, and the term "auna 
kihao" is used to describe this technically correct and socially proper way of talking, 
which, again, is not the chief's alone. 
`Strong talk' would seem to be a common feature of many Lowland groups. 
As a defining characteristic of `speaking well', it is among the Pa'ikwene the 
requisite, though not the only, vocal style of everyday verbal communication and, 
again as noted above, is not limited to chiefs as it can be elsewhere (see Campbell 
1995: 115-6 on the "hard talking" of Wayapi leaders, and Santos-Granero op. 
cit.: 301-2 on Amuesha ones). Nor is it reserved for ceremonial occasions (see 
Riviere 1969: 236-9 on the Trio's ranking of ceremonial dialogue according to 
intensity, length and strength). 
The aforementioned chief Tchikoi conformed to the rule whereby "to speak well" is 
a leader's first and main obligation. According to both him and my informants it 
constituted too the prime prerequisite for his position, the sine qua non.. Like 
chiefs, the "capitaines" also had "the duty to speak" (see Clastres op. cit: 153) and, 
therefore, the need to possess particularly good verbal skills. Among these is 
included the ability to communicate well in the languages of the two states, Brazil 
and France, in which the Pa'ikwene nation has been incorporated. Tchikoi spoke 
fluent Portuguese; and that "Capitaine" Louis, for instance, one of the two headmen 
at Village Esperance 1, was markedly more proficient in French than the general 
run of the St Georges Pa'ikwene, was a vital factor in his having been elected to 
the post. In connection with this, Jean Narcissio of the Association d'Amerindiens 
Palikur de Macouria stated the need for the Pa'ikwene living in Guyane to learn 
French if they were successfully to engage in the wider political process of that 
country and assert Indian rights through the courts. 
Jean was neither a chief nor a "capitaine", and his attitude, I submit, reveals 
and reflects more than the `militant' Indian's desire for and claim to redress. It is, I 
believe, grounded in a traditional core belief that speech and power are 
interlocked and that to `speak well' is not just a matter for chiefs alone but a 
behaviour required of, and a power attainable by, all the members of the 
community. 
While qualifiably true as regards "formal' verbal communication with outsiders, 
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Clastres' contention that the Amerindian chief exercises a "near monopoly over 
language" (op. cit.: 41), holds no water where the Pa'ikwene are concerned. The 
notion of exclusive access to, and ownership and control of, any resource by a 
single human individual is not consistent with their social ethos. What is more 
likely to be the case is that the ability to handle through speaking the power 
perceived to be embodied in their language, a skill belonging in varying degrees to 
everyone in the community, is judged to be possessed to the greatest degree by 
the one whom the others select as their leader. Given that every Pa'ikwene is 
required to `speak well', and that `good speaking' is so valued aesthetically and 
morally, it will be appreciated just how important it is that their chiefs speak that 
much better. 
Socialised from infancy into `speaking well' and in the ways of hearing, as reported 
earlier, the Pa'ikwene seemed to "hear-understand" ("tchimap") that there is a link 
between words and the potency attaching to them, intrinsically and in their 
performative effect. Whatever the full indigenous hermeneutic explanation for it, 
and I regret that I did not obtain as much data in this respect as I hoped, this verbal 
and vocal power was overtly perceived by my informants to have causality. This 
power, which I talk about in greater detail in chapter 4 section iii, made things 
happen, be it a cure, a kill, or the state of sociality. Previous ethnolinguistic studies 
tend perhaps to focus on this type of power as it relates to the realm of religious 
activity. My aim here is to try to describe and, if possible, to explain in some 
measure how it also operated in the `profane' everyday life of the Pa'ikwene 
community in as much as the first penetrated the second. In being brought up to 
`speak well', Pa'ikwene individuals gain access to the power of, and in, words. For 
speech seems to be understood not so much as the instrument of power as its 
agent, the active medium through which it is effectable in all its different and 
various forms. 
What is my basis for claiming that words are charged with, and infuse power into, 
the Pa'ikwene's social world? While I was told that there was a word for power 
("Hiya"), I never encountered it in action, so to speak, and cannot say in what 
context(s) it is used; nor can I be certain that it really was the right term. 
Metadiscursively, power tended to be seen in terms of its attributes, effects and 
source. The converted inhabitants of Village Esperance 2 held, and stated firmly, 
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in line with Christian teaching, that power is not singular but dual and that in effect 
there existed two powers: the one to do all things good was attributed to God, or in 
Pa'ikwaki, "Ohokri"; that of doing all things bad, to Satan, whose name was 
"Wavitche". Yet their notions about this latter entity, whose very name was likely to 
provoke nervous smiles and joking, and whom they alternately referred to in 
translation by the Creole term "Le Diab"' ("Devil") or simply and less specifically as 
"a spirit", revealed a deeper, more ambivalent layer of conceptualisation and belief. 
It appeared that "Wavitche", while greatly feared as a begetter of affliction and 
instigator of mischief and evil, was also to be credited with positive acts. His power, 
it turned out, was indeed singular, but not as unilateral in its function and 
application as the orthodox Evangelical view would have it; he could be benign as 
well as malign (cf. Arnaud 1970: 20-1 who explicitly names Protestantism as the 
cause of the Pa'ikwene's modern belief that shamanic acts effect only malefic 
ends). Nimuendaju's claim (op. cit.: 61) that "Wavitche" is a Christian construct 
having nothing to do with the prior religion, was contradicted by my Christian and 
non-Christian informants alike. 
According to the shamans (and non-Christians) Waptchi and Ovayan, who 
dwelt in the neighbouring village, "Wavitche" was not the satanic anti-God but one 
of several superspirits in the Pa'ikwene pantheon, who is neither good nor bad in 
essence and whose unitary `amoral' power may be tapped by, and transmitted 
through, humans for either moral or immoral, social or anti-social, ends. For 
example, to cure a sick person, or to cause a well one to fall ill and die. 
Furthermore, and germanely, this ambiguous power can be incarnated orally, by 
an individual's breath, and verbally, by his or her words, as occurs during the 
shamanic process, discussed more fully in chapters 4 (section iii) and 9. 
As far as belief in "Wavitche" was concerned, it became clear that despite the 
overlay of their acquired Christian notion of the moral heterogeneousness and 
inimical opposition of powers (divine/good, satanic/bad), the Pa'ikwene of 
Esperance 2 tended to continue to behave as if they were one and the same at 
root. Value, both positive and negative, was given not to different powers as such 
but to the various and multiple uses and ends of the sole power. 
Integral to this was the concept, apparent in myth and the practices of shamans 
and, it seemed to me, in the pre-Christian credence of my converted fellow 
villagers, that oral expression - speech, song, and breath - was one of the guises of 
this spiritual power. 
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In chiefless, shamanless Village Esperance 2, this idea, often reported as 
supporting and legitimising the special speech behaviours of the `powerful', 
manifestly also underpinned the speaking of the general populace regardless of 
age, gender, status or material wealth. Items (i), (ii) and (iii) below will deal with the 
specific issue of the talk of Pa'ikwene leaders; item (iv) describes an esoteric type 
of language called "Kiaptünka", which possesses unique political and religious 
significance for all Pa'ikwene; and (v), (vi) and (vii) relate to the everyday political 
speech of the leaderless inhabitants of my community. 
* 
On the Speech of Pa'ikwene Leaders, and on Speaking and Listening to Them. 
(i) An interview with chief Tchikoi. 
Tchikoi is not only the head of Kümene (Aükwa, Brazil) but also the overall chief of 
the Pa'ikwene nation, according to my informants.? F. and P. Grenand report 
(1987: 18) that according to theirs, each clan did not historically possess its own 
leader but recognised a single chief, or "king", who was resident in Aükwa and had 
authority over all the clans comprising the Pa'ikwene federation; they seem to 
suggest, however, that the position of super-chief no longer exists today. 8 
Tchikoi was a well-liked, gracious, and somewhat shy individual in his thirties, 
possessed of a natural gravitas. I was told that he had been elected to the 
leadership as a replacement for his own father, Paulo Orlando, from whom the 
/ It should be borne in mind, however, that they were Evangelical-Pentecostalist converts, as was 
Tchikoi. Thus the situation could possibly be otherwise for the following reasons: the fact that today 
the Pa'ikwene world is subdivided along general religious lines (Christian and non-Christian; Catholic 
and Protestant) and sectarian ones (Adventist and Evangelical-Pentecostalist), a situation described 
in chapter 9, so it is not inconceivable that an Evangelical-Pentecostalist leader might not be 
recognised by non-Evangelical-Pentecostalists. Secondly, I did not think to crosscheck what my 
informants' told me in this respect with any non-Evangelical-Pentecostalists. It is noteworthy, though, 
that despite a certain tension between the Adventists of Esperance 1 and the Evangelical- 
Pentecostalists of Esperance 2, the latter deferred to the former community's "Capitaines" on some 
issues, as reported above. 
8 The rationale behind this, the Grenands propose (ibid. ), was to prevent any one clan leader from 
dominating the others, thereby rendering interclan and/or inter-ethnic union impossible. 
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community, finding his qualities and conduct wanting, had withdrawn its support. 9 
Nimuendaju reports (op. cit: 74) that while Pa'ikwene chieftaincy is not inheritablelO, 
chiefs name and in effect appoint their own successors. This was not the case with 
Tchikoi. Nor did it coincide with what my informants told me, that leaders can only 
accede to their post thanks to the universal support, and at the demand, of their co- 
villagers, and on the basis of their perceived and recognised attributes (see 
Grenands op. cit. ) and popularity (Nimuendaju op. cit. ). 
Tchikoi, whom I later met several times much more informally, received me in the 
`community office'. Against a continuous background crackle from the two-way 
radio transmitter in the corner which linked the settlement to FUNAI regional 
headquarters in the town of Oiapoque, our interview was carried out in a mixture of 
Pa'ikwaki, Creole, French, and Portuguese, and with the help of Karinai, with whom 
I resided in Village Esperance 2, and his bother-in-law, Nenel, my host in Kümene. 
As generally with the Pa'ikwene, this occasion, the most formal that I ever 
encountered, was by no means a one-way affair. I was asked as many questions 
by Tchikoi as I put to him; and if anything his were more `personal' than I allowed 
mine to be. I was aware throughout that my listening was being judged. While my 
two `escorts', Karinai and Nenel, were most attentive to what was being said, and 
how I "heard-understood" it, the other Pa'ikwene present paid more or less 
attention for various lengths of time, some people coming or going at will, others 
turning away to chat and joke among themselves. I, however, was allowed no such 
respite but subjected to a steady pressure from them to pay not merely courteous 
but unwavering attention to Tchikoi's words. Our dialogue was more than once 
interrupted by some anxious and even stern bystander or other seeking 
reassurance that I had fully grasped this or that point. It should be borne in mind 
that Tchikoi was not so much speaking for himself as for the group. Whenever a 
Pa'ikwene bystander did choose to speak his own mind, it was always done with 
regard for proper etiquette. Accordingly `turn taking' was more formal, and its rules 
9 For more on this individual, the charismatic founder and leader of the Assembleia de Deus 
community in Aükwa, see chapter 9. Ricardo assumes (1983: 28) the Orlando family corresponds to 
the Wawayene clan and cites an informant's claim that it is mostly to members of this group that the 
Pa'ikwene assign the leadership. But my own informants said that this clan, an 'inner core' one, covers 
the Yoyo, Norino and Michel families but not the Orlandos, who are of the peripheral Pa(r)üriene clan; 
and that it is anyway untrue that any one clan has a monopoly on the chieftaincy. 
10 According to Fernandes (1948: 219), it used to be hereditary until the combined influence of the 
French authorities and Catholic missionaries put paid to the practice in the 18c. 
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more diligently followed, than customarily occurred in ordinary conversations (see 
chapter 4). 
According to informants, the position of chief falls to the man or woman (such as the 
aforementioned Mauricienne)11 who, regardless of age, 12 is recognised by his or 
her peers as possessing the necessary qualities and skills for fulfilling a certain 
number of criteria. Bearing in mind the exigencies of present day macro-political 
reality and the cultural invasiveness of the non-indigenous world on that of the 
Pa'ikwene, it will be seen that while they do not agree on all points, these 
conditions tally in a general way with those pertaining to chieftainship in other 
Amazonian societies (Levi-Strauss op. cit., Clastres op. cit.: 29-31, Riviere 1984: 73). 
Briefly, Tchikoi, who referred to himself explicitly as the people's guardian, 
described his duties as follows: To talk ( that is, primarily, to be their spokesman in 
dealings with the outside world, and internally to have the final word in settling 
disputes where all other measures, including action by a "capitaine", have proven 
unsatisfactory. Thus as a peacemaker, and needing to be as good a `hearer- 
understander' as he is a speaker, he is called upon to make King Solomon-like 
pronouncements in cases which are otherwise unresolvable or where an 
aggrieved party has not chosen the option of fission). To allocate community tasks 
in conjunction with the "capitaine". To be generous not so much with his 
possessions as his time, energy, care, and knowledge; he also had to think more 
on behalf of the others than himself in the sense of unstintingly using his mental 
powers to find solutions to collective concerns, to display in other words that 
ingenuity which is the "intellectual form of generosity" (Levi-Strauss op. cit.: 55). To 
protect land rights and combat the incursion of unwanted outsiders, such as 
"garimpeiros" (gold prospectors), into the Pa'ikwene homeland. To ensure the 
procurement of certain essential imported goods such as salt, ammunition, oil, rice, 
and, very importantly, medical supplies. Tchikoi had received training as a 
paramedic, as had "Capitaine" Louis in Village Esperance 1, and was at pains to 
>> In their material on Pa'ikwene chieftainship no mention of female leaders is made by Nimuendaju 
(op. cit. ), F. & P. Grenand (1987), Fernandes (1948) or Arnaud (1984). 
12 Nimuendaju asserts (op. cit.: 60) that the chief is always an old man (see too Ricardo 1983: 28); the 
basis for this claim being perhaps that, as he writes on p. 74, both the chief whom he interviewed in 
1925 and the one the French Jesuit missionary Fauque reported having met some two hundred years 
earlier were the eldest members of their community. While this could suggest old age is a determining 
factor in the accession to Pa'ikwene leadership, Tchikoi's incumbency, and Mauricienne's in Macouria, 
shows this is not so in practice. Or if it once was, is no longer so today. 
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stress his responsibility to maintain the health of his people. 13 I asked him if he 
liked being chief. 
"Not much. Only a little", he answered. 
"Why? " 
"Because it's a lot of work. " 
"You could quit. " 
"Yes. " 
"But you don't. " 
"No. " And he laughed, then paused, then said as if this explained 
everything: "I have to watch over the Pa'ikwene. " 
Being chief was clearly an onerous task, then. I feel that Tchikoi's last phrase sums 
up how both he and his followers conceive of it less in terms of personal power 
than of guardianship. That great store was placed on looking after their people's 
physical health, and the basic (Western) medical training undertaken by some 
leaders, might indicate a possible modern extension or variation of their ancestral 
function of (re-)generating the community's vitality and welfare: what Hocart 
describes (1970: 32ff. ) as the necessarily ritualistic "life giving" aspect present in all 
government whether it be authoritarian and by the state or non-coercive and 
stateless. 
Writing about the Pa'ikwene's supernatural sphere, Arnaud cites (1984: 44, 
1970: 3) the word "Hiyepuene" as meaning a shaman (see too Nimuendaju op. 
cit.: 65 who says it is a sorcerer). Although my informants knew it they invariably 
resorted instead to the term "lhamwi", translating it as "healer". I suggest a 
(possible) connection between the former word and the one for chief, "Hiyaptihi"; 
and that it is not inconceivable that at some time in the past Pa'ikwene chiefs and 
shamans were seen to possess overlapping qualities and fulfil correlative duties in 
the different yet interconnected spheres of the social and the supernatural. 
In this regard, Montout proposes (op. cit.: 87-8) that before the recent decline 
of shamanism, Pa'ikwene chiefs and shamans historically embodied the two 
aspects, at once oppositional and complementary, of a single power, the one 
operating in the spiritual world, the other in the temporal. However, the perception 
that the former intruded at all times into the latter resulted in a "certain supremacy of 
the shaman's role over that of the "capitaine" in respect of decision-making" (p. 87, 
13 See in chapter 9 part 2 regarding the indigenous system of medicine and its relationship with the 
Western one. 
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my translation). In effect, he concludes, the temporal leader was just left to 
technically and strategically organise and administer various activities like hunting, 
fishing and warring, 14 which necessitated orational and man-management talents. 
Similarly, Arnaud declares (1984: 44) the Pa'ikwene shaman's function to be 
"compatible" with the duties of the chief" and mentions the existence in the 1950's 
of an individual in Aükwa whom Fernandes reported to be both a "capitäo" and a 
shaman. 15 
I suspect that "Chief" ("Hiyaptihi") might be etymologically (and, I think, 
conceptually) associated not only with the the verb "to see" ("Hiyap"), but perhaps 
also with the term I collected for "power": "Hiya". A derivative of the former is the 
word "Hiyapkis", which means "to show", "to demonstrate" and "to punish", and 
which I personally further interpret as "to guide". I incline, too, to the possibility that 
there is a relationship between "to see" ("Hiyap"), and therefore "chief" ("Hiyaptihi"), 
and "to know" ("Hiyak") ["Hiyakinimiye"= knowledge/intelligence/wisdom; 
"Hiyaknimiki"= "group of wise well-doers]. Lastly, and I would say not merely 
coincidentally, there may also be a link with "to laugh" and "to smile": "Hiyar" and 
"Hiyara". As elsewhere in the region, Pa'ikwene leaders are expected to be of 
good humour themselves and to instil and maintain it in the community. 
(ii) A public meeting. In Kümene I had my sole experience of a collective political 
assembly. It was convened in order to discuss the current state of negotiations 
then underway with the Brazilian authorities over the protection of Pa'ikwene 
territory from interlopers. The participants sat in a loose circle; some choosing to 
stand when feeling the need to speak, others doing so while remaining seated. 
There were no women present, though, as stated earlier, they had the right to 
attend. When asked why she had not come, one informant (Susana) told me that 
she had other things to do at the time. She would have gone, she said, had she 
considered the situation urgent, but she thought that Tchikoi was handling the 
issue (a long-standing one) satisfactorily and therefore her own presence was not 
necessary that particular afternoon. 
14 The Pa'ikwene used historically to appoint provisional war chiefs as and when necessary (see F. & 
P. Grenand op. cit.: 18; Boyer 1654). 
15 See too Ricardo 1983: 28. On the issue of the 'political' power of shamans in Amerindian societies 
see Chaumeil 1983, Descola 1988. 
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Basically, the chief's contribution amounted to a report back to the community on 
the latest round of talks (a summary of his presentation of its grievances, demands, 
and defence of its rights; and of the Brazilian authorities' response). Other than that 
it seemed to me that his role was just as much that of a listener as anyone else 
there. After his report, which was heard without interruption, various individuals 
asked questions of him or otherwise had their say. There was no hierarchic order 
to this that I could see. No permission was sought to speak, and, discounting 
myself, all present had the right to, including several Brazilians who had taken 
Pa'ikwene wives and lived in the village. People awaited their turn in a way which, 
while seemingly unregulated, was more orderly than what obtained in ordinary 
everyday conversation. Voices were not that much louder though, and there was 
an absence of what we would call 'dramatic' rhetorical effects, no oratorical 
flourishes, and no haranguing. Some men spoke earnestly, some passionately, 
some flatly; and others, for all that the overall ambiance was sober, joked. A 
number came and sat in on the proceedings for a short period only, leaving as the 
mood took them, some out of boredom perhaps, or because they had, like Susana, 
something else to do (a cluster of "young adults" rose en bloc to go and play 
football). No one appeared to take exception to this incessant coming and going. If 
the meeting was formal it was so in the sense of following custom and established 
convention, rather than that of the participants' behaviour being in any way 
constrained and stiff. Overall, the event was characterised by a mixture of 
casualness and a discipline which was self-imposed by the group rather than 
being imposed by the chief. Once he had delivered his report, his subsequent 
contributions to the discussion were listened to more or less silently and with more 
or less attention -- but no more so, and no more respectfully, than those of any 
other speaker. 
(iii) The "Capitaines"' rounds. From time to time, one or other of the two 
"capitaines" of Village Esperance 1 (Louis Norino and Auguste Labonte), would 
walk across to Village Esperance 2 and visit each household in turn in order to 
check on things generally. This was done with a mixture, again, of the formal and 
the relaxed. People tended to put their polite face on and behave with reserve and 
decorum; at the same time they could not quite hide the spontaneous emotion 
prompted by their personal feelings for either of the two men. (On the whole there 
was more affection for "Capitaine" Louis. Auguste was regarded with distaste by 
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many villagers for having allowed himself to be seduced some years back into 
standing as a candidate for Le Pen's Front National party in the regional elections: 
a situation which had caused a deal of friction between the Pa'ikwene and the 
Creole inhabitants of St Georges. ) One factor shaping a person's response would 
be the degree of kinship he or she might share with one or the other "capitaine", 
and beyond that, the affective and/or political desire to profit, or distance him- or 
herself, from it. The inhabitants of the two neighbouring communities necessarily 
had diverse common clan and kin links. Everyone appeared to be related to the 
two "capitaines", by blood or classification and affinal circumstances. Once 
greetings were exchanged, and the "capitaine" had had his `official' say, which was 
listened to in silence, people felt free to engage in dialogue with him, and the more 
formal mood thawed considerably. At length, the "capitaine" would take his leave 
and move on to the next house, where the whole process started all over again. 
I now wish to look at a particular type of speech which while included under 
the rubric of `leader's talk' in effect transcends it. 
(iv) "Kiaptünka", a 'grammagical' language. This particular type of language, 
which means the "speech of respect", traditionally constitutes the idiom of formal 
political exchanges, diplomacy and ceremonial, and possesses virtual numinous 
force in its own right for today's Pa'ikwene. It is distinct from Pa'ikwaki, the 
vernacular language, also known as "Kamüyüne", the "language of the sun clan" 
which came historically to supplant the languages of all the other clans comprising 
the Pa'ikwene nation (see Arnaud 1968: 7,1984: 23-33). "Kiaptünka" was in the 
past employed for contacts between clan chiefs and in relations between the 
Pa'ikwene and other Amerindian peoples of the region, some of whom became 
incorporated over time as clans in the Pa'ikwene federation (F. and P. Grenand 
(1987: 31). 
The Grenands report (ibid.: 31-33) that they recorded songs in "Kiaptünka" which 
were connected with the cycle of ceremonial dances, but that otherwise the 
language was nearly extinct. It had been one of my aims when starting fieldwork to 
find evidence for disproving this. In the event, although I too managed to record a 
few examples of the language, I was obliged to reach the same conclusion. The 
use of "Kiaptünka" still lingers on in certain songs performed at dance and cashiri- 
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drinking events, themselves increasingly on the wane. Although it continued to be 
spoken and sung in rituals in the small settlement of Gabaret, downriver from 
Esperance 2, which I visited in December 1993 and was abandoned in 1994, it had 
all but met its total demise in Village Esperance 2 itself. This was due, I would say, 
to the same two factors cited by the Grenands (pp. 31-2): the rising death rate of 
those people of the middle and older generations who still knew it, however 
patchily, and the anti-traditionalist influence of the Protestant church. 
Despite this, however, while people in Esperance 2 no longer appear to sing 
in "Kiaptünka", or hold dance ceremonies, a few, mostly older, individuals did 
"know' it in the sense of being able to speak some words but not being able 
necessarily to understand them all. At best, comprehension proved hazy. 
According to the Grenands (p. 32), what is remembered might not be "Kiaptünka" at 
all but a old clan dialect, though my informants disagreed with this claim strongly. 
Also, and as further demonstration of the close connection between the 
`political' and the `religious' in Amerindian life, Waptchi and Ovayan, the two 
shamans in Village Esperance 1, resorted to "Kiaptünka" when in a state of trance 
in some of their communications with diverse supernatural entities during the 
session which I attended. I asked them whether it was a 'spirit language' and 
learnt that this was not the case, being informed that it was, rather, "the language of 
the old ones" and that the spirits were able to speak it and often chose to express 
themselves in it, although they themselves, Ovayan and Waptchi, did not always 
understand what was being said. 16 In regards to this stated connection between 
the shamans' "language of the old ones" and "speech of respect", the etymological 
meaning of "Kiaptünka", it is worth noticing that "kia(p)vie", translatable as "old 
man", "sir", and the one to whom you pay respect, is also the term of address for 
God used by converted Pa'ikwene when communicating with the Christian 
supernatural sphere. 
Effectively, then, apart from these few instances of its survival, "Kiaptünka" has 
entered into a probably terminal phase of entropy. Paradoxically, and as good as 
posthumously, what seems originally to have been a practical vehicular and 
political tool has come to acquire a sacred status (cf. Grenands ibid.: 32) which 
seems to grow in direct proportion to its progressive disappearance. People, 
16 See chapter 9 part 2 and also in section iii chapter 4. For Tambiah (1968: 177-81), unintelligibility is 
a factor of a religious language's power, while its archaism contributes to its sacredness, gives it its 
authority, and is itself empowering. 
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including youths who knew not one word of it, categorised it in Creole as "langue 
grammaticale"; that is, for them, the purest and most correct form of language (cf. 
Grenands p. 32 fn. 32). This term, invariably and automatically appended by them 
to the word "Kiaptünka" whenever I raised the subject, seemed to fulfil a diacritical 
function in that it stressed the mixture of awe and reverence, somewhat tinged by 
sadness, with which the inhabitants of Village Esperance 2 thought about their 
dying esoteric language. So high was its affective value, and acute the sense of 
loss for something felt to be so precious and so intrinsically, essentially Pa'ikwene, 
that the more the knowledge of how to speak it dwindles, the more the word itself 
seems to approach the condition of a holy object with a near talismanic force all its 
own. So much so, indeed, that the very utterance of the term "grammatical 
language", carrying with it a feeling at once ritualistic and full of nostalgic yearning, 
came in my head increasingly to sound like "grammagical language" instead. 17 
I now move on to describe some different aspects of `everyday' political speaking. 
* 
The Political Speech of Ordinary Pa'ikwene People. 
(v) A dispute settlement. Sherzer, ascertaining (1990: 82) that the oratory of a Kuna 
chief is "creative, adaptable, [and] flexible", concludes that the nature of the political 
discourse of societies with "egalitarian ideologies and the desire to avoid 
confrontation, particularly in... Lowland South America and the Pacific" contradicts 
Bloch's well-known claim (1975) concerning the supposed constraint and rigidity of 
political ritual and speech in traditional societies. I would like to extend Sherzer's 
proposition to cover the non-ritualistic practice of everyday political verbalisation by 
Amerindians who, while not chiefs, share both their expertise and, just as 
17 Cf. Sherzer (1987) on how in speech, through the use of "optional grammatical categories" (which 
enable speakers to choose different ways to express and actualise meaning in discourse, p. 296-7) 
and the "poeticization of grammar" (where the grammatical function combines with the poetic one, 
p. 299), there occur the following things (among others): discourse, especially the artistic and ritual 
sort, is revealed as the "expression of the essence of the relationship... between language and 
culture" (p. 299); and "by the packing of a maximum of meaning into a minimum of form, grammar 
becomes poetry and poetry becomes magic" (ibid. my emphases). Both of these seem to apply to 
Pa'ikwene interaction with their moribund "speech of respect": the first in connection with how they 
talk about it; the second in connection with its very appellation. Here the form in question would 
appear to be a single expressive term: a language's name. "Kiaptünka", a specific "optional 
grammatical category", has historically evolved through social and discursive practice into a reified yet 
sacralised and (as if) magically potent concept: GRAMMAR. 
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germanely, their objectives. He refers to the use by leaders of "artistic and indirect 
and often allusive speech" as the means of channelling, and preempting potentially 
physical, conflict and competition. I wish, through the example below, to look at the 
situation where an `ordinary' Pa'ikwene villager similarly, and I would say 
spontaneously, resorted to a certain form (or more truthfully mixture of forms) of 
speech in order to put a stop to a conflict already underway; and in the process 
showed as much skill and creativity as Sherzer's Kuna chief. At the same time, 
given that Esperance 2 did not necessarily as a large community uphold the fiction 
of a solidary consanguineal group, the event may also be said to compromise the 
claim made by Riviere (1984: 74) that outside of the extended family unit there is 
among Amerindians in the Guianas a "lack of any mechanisms for settling 
disputes", and that those within it are mediated through the chief. 
From my field notes, 16th March 1994: 
"An argument between two women this morning: loud irate shouting 
across the wide public space between the houses. Notable features: 
neither tried physically to approach the other in order to assert herself 
and squash the other bodily. It was as though an invisible but 
tangibly felt, and respected, line kept them apart. Everything was 
done in and through the voice alone. The dispute `technique' 
involved very marked and scrupulously adhered to `turn taking', unlike 
the fuzzier demarcations of ordinary conversation, and also 
surprisingly in view of the anger and other emotions flying around: 
neither participant sought to interrupt or invade the the verbal territory 
of the other by violating her `blocks' of utterances. However, if they 
didn't talk over them, each definitely tried to top the other's in terms of 
volume, quality of insult, and depth of invective and accusation (I 
thought at first that since the women were carrying buckets the fight 
arose over access to the stand-pipe in the square. In fact it started 
when one of them criticised the other's daughter whose intended 
marriage had recently been cancelled due to the husband-to-be 
pulling out at last moment ). The event was only finally resolved by a 
third party (also a woman: Yvette Narcissio) thrusting her face out of 
one of the houses and forcefully calling on them in Jesus' name to 
stop, and making derisive and comic remarks at the same time about 
their behaviour. She also laid it on thick with some pithy moralistic 
sermonising for good measure. The gist of her homily being how the 
antics of a few "bad and angry people" permitted the Devil to take 
roost in a whole village. Playing it for the gallery, her eyes gleaming 
with a mixture of righteousness and fun, she produced widespread 
hilarity and enjoyment among the onlookers. Her action, half 
exhortation and half mocking broadside delivered in even louder 
tones than the disputants', succeeded in evoking such a sense of 
shame in them that in the end they had no other recourse than to 
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break off their fight. At which Yvette withdrew back inside with the air 
of someone having done a good job. " 
So, public ridicule, the appeal to proper standards, the charge (more via 
insinuation and homiletic analogy than direct accusation) of antisocial and sinful 
behaviour, and consequent shame on the part of the two women involved: such 
were the methods used for bringing about a "dispute settlement". It was as if 
Yvette's action not only served to make the disputants aware of their disruption of 
the social order. It seemed to me that, through it, they also, and just as importantly, 
became conscious that they had infringed their own usual self-restraint. I suggest 
that seeing her words as a chastising or sanctioning device alone might be to miss 
the point. For could they not just as well have constituted the catalytic means 
whereby the pair were encouraged and enabled each freely to retrieve and 
reintegrate the norms of self-containment and self-control which both characterise 
personal autonomy for the Pa'ikwene, as elsewhere in Amazonia, 18 and exist in 
practice within the person rather than being imposed upon them from without as an 
objective or disembodied Law? In all events, a verbal fight between two `ordinary' 
individuals was ended by a peer, an `ordinary' fellow member of their community, 
through a forceful and successfully persuasive verbal act which carried, and in view 
of the outcome was acknowledged as carrying, the full moral weight of that 
community. And just as much so as if it had been carried out by a leader. It will be 
allowed, I hope, that Yvette's action was nothing if not political in effect. 
It was also, I would maintain, artistic in character. While just as much a convention 
as a chief's harangue, her discourse, with its combination of homily and humour, 
morality and mockery, displayed an inventiveness and even a playfulness, a sort of 
virtuoso serio-comic performance within the given parameters of the genre, which 
elicited not only compliance in the wrong-doers but also much pleasure and 
approbation in the spectators, and a visible satisfaction in herself. Crocker, 
stressing the importance of context in respect both of the speaker's performance 
and the addressee's perception of it, holds (1977: 44) that the use of standard 
rhetorical devices drawn from the social repertory can be as apt, spontaneous and 
imaginative as the coining of a new phrase: "[Being] formulaic and traditional... 
does not diminish their creative or poetic quality in terms of the circumstances of 
usage"; and when the addressee takes into consideration not only how well the 
18 See e. g. Overing 1988 or McCallum 1989: 239,395 note 22, apropos the Piaroa and Cashinahua. 
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speaker says what he or she says but also its appositeness to the given social 
situation, then the "distinctions between creative and formulaic tend to break 
down". 
A small number of similar incidents occurred during my fieldwork. One concerned 
the very public rebuking by her sister and brother of a woman for ill treating her 
child. The most serious was a fight one night involving a drunken "Awaig takwie" 
(young man) and the husband and daughter of a woman he had physically 
assaulted. It ended up by drawing in the entire community and causing an intense 
outpouring of emotion. People were aghast to see this very real and brutal rent 
made to the social web by one of their own number. It was as if each person felt 
the violation inside his or her own being, and adults and children alike publicly and 
concertedly shed tears of fear, shock, and grief, an experience I found deeply 
moving. 19 Yet even in this case, which was perceived as an outrage, and 
notwithstanding the eventual recourse to fists on the part of some people present, 
speech was the first and most instrumental means resorted to for the purpose of 
regenerating social harmony. There was no turning to a `higher' political authority, 
although it must be said that in the latter incident the passions of the husband of the 
attacked woman became so inflamed that it was only with the greatest difficulty that 
he could be dissuaded from sending for the French Gendarmerie, who have a post 
in St Georges, to deal with the assailant. In the event, punched and sermonised, 
the culprit fell into a drunken sleep then took himself off next day to stay with his 
sister in another community. 
That daily life was acephalous and informal to the highest degree in Village 
Esperance 2 did not mean that it was without `rules'. And ethical standards and 
criteria of social propriety existed as communicated and actualised deeds in the 
speech of those ordinary members of the community who were impelled to re- 
establish harmony in circumstances of disharmony. The examples I have given, 
and most particularly that involving Yvette, show to what extent their words were 
19 Like Hill (1990: 34-5), I consider that while the feelings involved in crying may validly be said to 
possess a "universal biological foundation", sadness itself is a "highly social emotion" with an intrinsic 
infectious capacity. It is moreover not so much a cultural construction as what Eitchinger Ferro-Luzzi 
calls (1995: 185) "culture-free, i. e., not bound to any specific culture. " Unlike Frijda (1986: 2), I would 
argue that the performance of sadness, as well as that of other emotions, is not necessarily centred 
more inwardly upon the subject than outwardly; and that (as the above case shows) "affective 
interaction" between the subject and his or her social environment does in fact occur. 
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necessarily full of all the moral authority and force required to stop or divert a 
divisive action, and the effective power to repair, or limit, a breech in the social 
fabric. 
(vi) `Scolding': women, politics and talk. `Scolding' is a type of speaking style 
affected by Pa'ikwene women specifically. I use the word "affected" advisedly for, 
as will become clear, this kind of speech entails a large measure of contrivance, 
appearance, and intrinsic theatricality. While loud and strong, indeed very loud 
and strong, it needs to be distinguished from "auna kihao" (discussed in chapter 3). 
From my field notes again: "Early morning. Ossi's mother at it again: 
screaming at him to either go hunting or earn some more money (he 
has a part-time job helping in the bakery in town): they need food and 
his father is absent. Ossi's standing there sheepishly taking it while 
she goes on and on, arms raised and throat tilted backwards as if 
addressing the entire village and calling on the very sky itself as 
witness. " 
Quite often in Village Esperance 2 the general hubbub would be pierced in this 
way by the shouts of a woman directed at some young or fully adult man. It was, in 
part, the irritated and frustrated cry of someone aggrieved or deprived, or feeling 
themselves so to be; and to that extent perfectly normal and legitimate conduct in a 
society where `relations of demand' were a cultural feature. As such it was also a 
learnt behaviour. For instance, acquiring the manner from her mother and aunts, 
five years old Annie already `scolded' her older brothers and other male children, 
secure in the knowledge that they would not by and large permit themselves to stop 
her. (This was not, I hasten to add, a case of boys submitting to the imperious but 
engaging ways of a younger sister or female cousin; her `scolding' quite lacked 
charm, at least in my eyes, but that was neither its intended character nor purpose. ) 
Even more than this, inasmuch as it was a learnt and proper social behaviour, 
'scolding' constituted a mode of speech which transcended not only the gripe and 
dissatisfaction of the individual female speaker but also the `relations of demand' in 
order to express and embody a certain political statement having regard to 
`relations of equality'. 
It is this statement that I wish to consider. First, I have to situate `scolding' within the 
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framework of the relations between the sexes in Village Esperance 2. The very first 
sentence of the section devoted to women in Nimuendaju's study of the Pa'ikwene 
declares (op. cit.: 54-6) that of all the social phenomena connected with their life, 
the one "which strikes the observer most is assuredly that of woman's dominant 
position in relation to man" (p. 54). This perception seems not so much to strike as 
shock and horrify him as he proceeds to cite at length the ways in which, according 
to him, this dominance asserted itself. Until aged ten or twelve, says he, Pa'ikwene 
little girls are as "friendly and sociable as the little boys", after which time they look 
down on the younger members of the male sex and act highhandedly with men in 
general, strangers included. Once she takes a husband, his "fate is sealed" from 
that moment on and she has him fully in her thrall: "The wife tells him when he must 
hunt, when he must fish, and when he must go and work in the garden... [and] 
decides what goods he must purchase on the Oyapock... If he resides uxorilocally, 
his mother-in-law also bosses him around via her daughter... The woman 
commands.. . the man but obeys" (p. 55, my translations). All in all, for these and 
other given reasons, such as the spendthriftness, graspingness and vanity of 
younger women, the prevailing situation was one of "female tyranny" (p. 56), 
against which men but seldom revolted (see too Fernandes 1948: 203, who 
concurs but sees the wife as the medium of her father's, rather than her mother's, 
domination over the husband). 
For my part, I saw no evidence of any systematic female domination or male 
subjugation among the Pa'ikwene with whom I lived, nor among those I visited in 
other communities. 20 To the extent that a woman ever planned and directed the 
day's economic activities of a household, I believe that she tended to do so in 
consultation and partnership with her husband, and generally as an equal2l co- 
member of the domestic work team (see chapter 8 regarding the distribution of 
labour). I personally never encountered an instance where the woman unilaterally 
decided for, and issued orders to, the man. On the contrary, while it is true that 
20 For all his stress on the (purported) domination of husbands by wives, Nimuendaju somewhat 
surprisingly characterises Pa'ikwene marital relations as "very good" (op. cit: 57). This is rejected by 
Arnaud who, citing instances of wife beating, claims (1968: 11,1984: 35) that in general they are quite 
the opposite. 
21 Similarly to Viveiros de Castro's material on the Arawete (1992: 45), this contradicts the common 
belief that Amerindian women carry the economic burden in relation to their men. If anything the 
Arawete's average work load seems to be weighed in favour of the former who, like Pa'ikwene women, 
"show a great deal of assertiveness, independence, and extroversion" both in the work sphere and 
the wider sociopolitical one. 
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women `controlled' the family purse-strings22 and the distributive end of a large 
portion of both the men's hunting products and the family's horticultural products, I 
found that each gender seemed broadly both in principle and in practice to enjoy 
as much economic power as the other. There was also the same equivalence of 
power politically and where knowledge was concerned (I have already reported 
the existence of women chiefs and shamans). When I wondered whether the 
Church might not be affecting things through its injunction to women to respect and 
obey their husbands. I was told by Susana: "Of course we do that, but so do our 
men respect and obey us. That is the Pa'ikwene way: wives and husbands respect 
and obey each other. " 
For Nimuendaju, the high rate of female power was a significant marker of 
Pa'ikwene life, and a disturbing but rare or even perhaps unique phenomenon in 
the wider context of Amerindian cultures. Writing (op. cit.: 92) about the Pa'ikwene's 
neighbours, the "Wassa people"23, he states that the women there "also have a 
strong influence [in society] but not in the exaggerated manner which we observed 
among the Palikur" (my translation and emphasis). As I have made clear, my own 
view is in contrast to this: among the latter, woman's power is not `over the top' but 
on a par with man's. 
However, while I stress the existence in Pa'ikwene society of a very real and 
visible gender equality in daily operation at the level of attitude and practical 
existence (notwithstanding a small number of households with clearly `dominated' 
spouses, both male and female), there sometimes also appeared to be a tendency 
among women toward a certain type of socially permitted aggression beyond their 
customary assertiveness. It seemed not so much a natural fact as a culturally 
constructed one, which I am chary of describing as domination, or domination- 
seeking, mainly because Pa'ikwene men did not see it like that. While 
acknowledging women's strength, they never told me, or in any other way 
indicated, they felt themselves to be oppressed by it. No less than the man's, the 
Pa'ikwene woman's social persona is comprised of self-confidence, self-assertion, 
and robustness. (Sometimes, and in some individuals more than others, these 
22 F. & P. Grenand on the other hand specifically point (1979: 1) to this control of the finances as 
evidence that Pa'ikwene social relations "are distinguished by the wife's ascendancy over the 
husband". In direct contrast to both the Grenands and me, Arnaud finds (1968: 10-11) that it is the 
male spouse who is in charge of ("determines") the domestic unit and the disposal of its products. 
23 A gloss term for the Arüa, Galibi, Itütan and others. 
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features can make for a distinct overbearingness - or for a type of conduct 
perceived as such by me, and doubtlessly by other outsiders as well, which could 
account for Nimuendaju's perception of Pa'ikwene womanhood as bullying, pushy 
and domineering. ) In addition to this, women possessed, and were at liberty to 
resort to, the gender-specific aggressive behaviour characterised by the vocal and 
verbal manner of expressing oneself which I call `scolding'. This was basically a 
device or technique for maintaining and affirming their power, though not, I insist, 
their supposed domination. 
The tone assumed for `scolding' was louder and stronger than that for ordinary 
speech, and charged with a combination of crossness, impatience, asperity and 
self-righteousness. A woman would deploy it in order to complain, demand, 
berate, recriminate, accuse (laziness seemed to be the most common charge), 
sermonise, and vent grievances. Her voice, in short, expressed the very model of 
shrewishness, both very real yet at the same time sounding, in my opinion, 
somewhat artificial. To my ears, displays of `scolding' always possessed the 
quality of exemplar; of serving as a sort of dramatic vocal presentation of 
`something', some implicit meta-point woven into Pa'ikwene culture perhaps; some 
ideological but, for me, elusive subtext. Adding to this impression of as it were 
aural spectacle was the fact that `scolding' was very much a public event. It more 
often than not involved a lone woman holding intensely and unstoppably forth in 
this or that part of the communal space, often outside her own house, and 
inveighing against some failing or failure or other of her husband or son (who might 
or might not be present). At other times, one could hear a kind of `scolding' round 
robin when two or more women, a woman and her sister and her sister-in-law, say, 
joined in to emit the same diatribe or command, pitching it at the poor improper 
soul who was the object of their collective disfavour and, so it seemed, further 
outwards yet, as if aiming for the community in its entirety, and beyond. 
It is as though `scolding' were at one and the same time a spontaneous outburst 
deliberately acted out and meant. There was, as I have said, a noticeable 
theatrical aspect to it. While not a formal set-piece, it did have ritualistic elements. 
But to my eyes it was singularly different from the typically loose and desultory- 
seeming character of the general run of informal domestic rites which I observed, in 
that the performance itself had a strong static quality, and the performers a 
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purposeful air. Standing with legs firmly planted, her body taut and concentrated, 
and face held at a stiff, resolute, and businesslike angle, a scolder exuded intent; 
her very stance had, unambiguously, its own semantic value for others. Her 
behaviour seemed integrally to entail the striking of a tableau-like pose in, and 
through, which she projected a given role ('The Aggrieved and Long-Suffering 
Woman'; `The Ill-Provided For Wife'). In dramatic terms, this physical stance 
together with the voice perfectly constituted a form of "actio", which in antiquity, as 
Barthes informs us (1976: 66), was a section of rhetoric consisting of a "group of 
formulae designed to allow for the corporeal exteriorisation of discourse: it dealt 
with a theatre of expression, the actor-orator `expressing' his indignation, his 
compassion, etc. " 24 
Whether a monologue or, less often, a group action, `scolding' was the means 
whereby the scolder-actor called on her audience, in effect society at large, to see 
and "hear-understand" her ire and its cause; and accordingly judge, and in their 
own hearts condemn, the anti-socialness of the scolded. `Scolding' therefore 
perhaps works somewhat like negative gossip in that by focussing the group's 
attention on the offender in their midst, the latter will be led, it is hoped, to (decide 
to) comply not so much with his wife or mother's demands as such but with group 
norms of behaviour, under the weight of the publicly enacted presentation of his 
shortcomings. It is therefore a corrective, a means of social control; to that extent it 
can be said to have a moral and political purpose. 
On the other hand, though, scolded men did not, as far as I could see, fall into line 
as automatically and submissively as Nimuendaju describes. Rather, they seemed 
to continue to act as individualistically as they ever did, while at the same time 
having regard for the group ethos (allowing for occasional lapses perhaps in their 
adherence to it). Despite the conclusions above I remain puzzled about the full 
role, and `reason', for `scolding'. Was my observation faulty and the Pa'ikwene 
woman truly the unmitigated nag, tartar and despot that Nimuendaju claims, and 
the man hen-pecked and tongue-lashed? I admit that on the surface the practice of 
`scolding' makes this appear to be the case at least to some extent. Yet while the 
vehement and even violent female public rebuking of males is an observable fact 
of Pa'ikwene life, it is also utterly at odds with that society's prevailing gender 
equality and the similarly visible and, in all other respects, non harridan-like 
24 Cf. Schnechner 1988 on the dramatic dimension of everyday social actions. 
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conduct of the women. Many entries in my diary attest to this paradox. For 
example: 
6th January 1994, "As often, there's a tone in S. 's voice which to my 
non-Pa'ikwene ear sounds like one of grievance, complaint, 
recrimination... I can hear it in the speech of other women too... but 
maybe among the Pa'ikwene the tone expresses something else?... 
For all her 'sweet' side, S. does also definitely have, as do a lot of 
other Pa'ikwene women (though I haven't seen it in the men), a tart, 
tetchy, harsh one... She... and many of the other women... have this 
scolding air in a lot of what they say... " 
and: 
15th January 1994, " There is a lot of female shouting in Esperance, 
scolding, berating, voicing of demands, grievances and self- 
righteousness... not so much directed at men as being about 
men... one facet of Pa'ikwene social life, and of otherwise un-harpy 
female behaviour, is a very observable tendency of the women to 
loudly and publicly and crossly give voice... What is the reason? The 
weather? The drift away from the ancestral lifestyle? The fact that 
Pa'ikwene women may be, as Nimuendaju asserted, shrews and 
tyrants?... " 
and: 
19th January 1994, Kümene (Aükwa). Mid afternoon. Raining very 
hard. As at Esperance a feeling of desolation over the village... As 
at Esperance too, the sound of scolding women... 
and again: 
8th March 1994, "... an important thing to bear in mind (in regard to 
women's scolding) is that Pa'ikwene men do not seem to be or act as 
oppressed, henpecked, castrated etc... " 
The reality of `relations of equality' between men and women makes it unlikely in 
my mind that this particularly female type of speech is some kind of functionalist 
counterbalancing act. It seems both illogical and unnecessary to compensate 
women, through the use however legitimate of verbal bossing, for the absence of 
something which in that society they plainly in practice possessed already, namely 
power. I do not know whether the `true' nature and purpose of `scolding' can be 
determined. The Pa'ikwene themselves used either to laugh it off or, when I tried 
too persistently to ask about it, deny that it ever happened. I am however 
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convinced that it is neither a completely natural act nor a psychological symptom 
ascribable to so-called female neurosis, though it surely possesses a psycho- 
social connection. 
But if not deriving from hysteria, the phenomenon patently has a histrionic aspect, 
as I have described. It pertained not just to the style of the performance but, I 
suggest, to its subliminal message: that which was transcendently being said by 
the scolding voice. I cannot pretend to understand the actual nature of this 
`institution'. However, given both the theatricality of the act and the mundaneness 
for the Pa'ikwene of their sociosexual egalitarianism (its `taken for granted-ness'), I 
wonder if, apart from all its possible other reasons and functions, Pa'ikwene female 
`scolding' might perhaps be a sort of dramatic mnemonic technique. Could not its 
public use recall to the mind of not just one specific husband or son or even of all 
the men in the community, but, rather, of all its members, both male and female, the 
existence and necessity of female, and not just male, power within that community? 
And might not the rhetorical and theatrical reminder, the `scolding', itself not merely 
symbolise but actually constitute that very fact, performatively, demonstrably, and 
politically? 
(vii) Power and the domestication of borrowed language. Daily life in the village 
would often be filled with abrupt and startling cries and ejaculations in French. 
"Arrete! " ("Stop! ") 
"Non! ". 
"Assez! " ("Enough! ") 
Wiens! " ("Come! ") 
"Qa suff it maintenant! " ("That's enough now! ") 
"Donne! " ("Hand it over! ") 
Cutting through the Pa'ikwaki, giving staccato emphasis and a foreign turn to native 
family discourse, these borrowed words and expressions, and others like them, 
supplied a punctuation of insistence and irritation, of disapproval, displeasure, and 
demand. Although delivered in the no-nonsense tones of harsh authority they 
nevertheless not infrequently had a touch of self-mockery on the part of their 
enunciator, who would give them a certain knowing spin. The tendency of 
Amerindians to imitate the linguistic and other behaviour of White people has been 
106 
reported elsewhere (e. g. McCallum 1989: 245-6,1990; F. Grenand 1982: 20; 
Darwin cited in Taussig 1993: 92-3, and Taussig himself, ibid. See too Hymes 
1971: 63-7 on the alternate use of one's own language and that of an alien 
dominant group as a type of "code switching"). Such mimicry, Taussig tells us, is a 
necessary factor both of the process of knowing and the construction of identity, 
and is thus an integral part of the dialectic between self and other. It entails 
explorative and, more radically, creative essays in power at a number of levels: 
"The power of mimesis [itself] lies in the copy drawing on the character and power 
of the original, to the point whereby representation may even assume that 
character and that power" (Taussig op. cit.: xiii-xiv). 25 
Someone who believes that the mimic's actions result not in acquiring real 
power but, rather, solely in identifying with it, and thereby reinforcing and 
reproducing their own powerlessness, is Hagen (1971). Drawing on the theories of 
Anna Freud (1937), he argues (pp. 264-70) that the imitation of the powerful 
coloniser by the powerless colonised is but an expression of paranoia and 
ritualism (in the psychological sense of compulsive `defensive' behaviour) in which 
only the outward, behavioural aspects of power but not its effective substance are 
attained (cf. Fanon 1952). 
For my part, I propose that such appropriation of non-Indian terms as I encountered 
(Creole and Brazilian-Portuguese were indigenised in like manner to French) 
constituted the innovative, and conscious, use for political ends of a certain 
vocabulary of command and control in the context of the markedly egalitarian 
relations of the Pa'ikwene household, which either lacked its own autochtonous 
rhetoric of coercion or possessed but a weak one. This is not to say there are no 
Pa'ikwaki command words. But imperatives of the order of "Tchinahao! " (Shut up! ), 
"Karisao" (Cool it! ), "Ka dash! " (Hands off! ) or "lwohö! " (Hurry! ) seemed more like 
grammatical expressions of emotional demand than `authoritarian' orders as such. 
Borrowers perceived, so it seemed to me, that the French expressions had coercive 
force and to resort to them was to profit from its contagion. 
By employing this language of the `other', a person appropriated more than 
its immanent potency. He or she was ultimately plugging into that of the 
25 Taussig further argues (ibid.: 13) that the `sympathetic magic' of mimesis is not just to do with the 
appropriation of the power of the other but with obtaining power over them. Situating his analysis in a 
historico-cultural context, (Western) colonialism and post-colonialism, he also shows imitation to be a 
two-way process: not only does the (colonised) other ape us, so too do we ape them. 
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language's owners, the `others' who politically and economically have power over 
the Pa'ikwene (the French being commonly classified as having more power not 
only than the Pa'ikwene but the Creoles and Brazilians as well). Thus in speaking 
their words one became to a degree empowered oneself. Their observable 
effective use in situations where it was judged pragmatically appropriate or 
personally advantageous, such as for example a father straining to impose his will 
on a child torn between his respect for elders and a tenacious and equally 
customary sense of self-autonomy, tended to clinch matters. A well-delivered 
Gallic command-word would generally produce the desired effect, and appeared to 
validate the extra layer of discipline and authority required (cf. McCallum 1989 on 
the appropriation and political application of non-indigenous language by 
Cashinahua chiefs). 
* 
Conclusion. 
1. In this chapter I have shown the several ways in which Pa'ikwene speech, and 
notably the phenomenon of "speaking well", is a powerful action, and an effective 
political one. 
This runs counter to Clastres who postulates the powerlessness both of 
political speech and the political institution in Amerindian societies. He has argued 
(op. cit.: 7-47,152-5,189-218) that although Amerindian `stateless' societies which 
exist without the presence of coercive power should not be termed apolitical or 
embryonically political, their chiefs have no political power personally. This is 
because power is seen by Amerindians as being extra-socially derived, and on 
entry into the social environment its locus becomes not the chief or any other 
individual but society itself as a whole. The chief is the one whose purpose it is to 
keep society safe from the coercion naturally immanent in power; this he does not 
by taking it into himself but by talking it away as it were, in the sense that speech is 
the "very opposite of violence" (p. 46,154), and violence, the "essence of power" 
(p. 154). Thus for Clastres, the chief's duty to speak serves as the "guarantee that 
prevents the man of speech from becoming a man of power" (p. 154). I find it 
strange that having cogently argued that, for all their non-coercion, such societies 
are fully political, he then `concludes' that the means whereby they are kept from 
being coercive is, itself, non-political. That for him "the chief's word carries no force 
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of laW' (p. 206, Clastres' emphasis), and his speech is (but? ) a "ritualised act" (p. 
153), does not remove them from the arena of the political. It just means that the 
political may be effected through language in ways other than coercive ones. For if 
language does constitute non-violence, 26 then is it surely not, no less than the 
speaker, acting politically, and positively powerfully, when instrumentally part of 
the process for "neutralizing the virulence of political authority" (p. 45), in which 
negative power is itself negated? But then, of course, it does depend on just what 
is understood by the term "political", as Clastres himself stresses (see especially 
pp. 7-26,41-5), which brings us around in a full circle. 27 
In that among the Pa'ikwene `speaking well' is not, however, the prerogative of 
leaders alone, a vital aspect of this form of speech is its democratic political 
function. Its use permits and empowers all the members of the community equally 
to create, safeguard and maintain their common sociality. 
As stated, one particularly important feature, and factor, of `speaking well' is "to 
speak loud-and-strong". This type of speech is eminently proper behaviour and 
possesses high moral and aesthetic value, and consequently a high affective one. 
It also constitutes an element of personhood, as a signifier and embodied 
expression of men and women's social and `ethnic' identity. People refer to it in 
order to stress the distinction they make between themselves and other Indians. 
Despite the present day erosion of so much of the ancestral Pa'ikwene philosophy, 
the epistemological data I managed to collect, and have drawn on throughout this 
chapter as elsewhere in the thesis, tend to indicate that the Pa'ikwene's 
conceptions concerning the subject of `power' show certain similarities to those of 
a good many Lowland peoples. For all the deep inroads made by Christian 
notions, and coexisting with them, there is a connection in Pa'ikwene thinking 
between words, and their actions, and the pre-Christian supernatural sphere where 
spiritual power is seen to reside. As reported and will be discussed further in 
chapter 9, it is believed that power is the property of spiritual or divine entities, and 
can be solicited and introduced into the human community, for positive or negative 
26 Not an entirely unambiguous notion in Amazonia as Isacsson reveals (1993: 366) in respect of the 
Embera, for whom conversation is a metaphor for both marriage and war. 
27 For a more theoretical examination of the Clastrian claim that the chief's words are empty see 
chapter 7. 
ends. 
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Pa'ikwene leaders have neither `personal' nor physically coercive power (which 
does not exclude their being able to resort to alternative pressurising strategies in 
order to establish order). Notwithstanding this, to say that they and their words 
were bereft of political power would be incorrect. For to the extent that Pa'ikwene 
leaders have right of access to this non-personal, socially non-coercive power, 
then they too are filled with power, and not powerless as Clastres maintains. And 
through and with their words they act politically, both in regard to their society and 
in its dealings with others. 
To the extent, too, that each `ordinary' Pa'ikwene seems in the practice of everyday 
social life to assume the power of, and in, `speaking well', then I propose that all 
Pa'ikwene are as an empirical reality also acting powerfully - and (as Yvette's 
dispute settlement shows) politically - when verbally intercommunicating. 
Inasmuch as Pa'ikwene leaders do have the `formal' obligation to `speak well' in 
certain stipulated circumstances, I have said that it amounts in practice to their 
having to `speak better', or, rather, more "beautifully", than the others. This might 
perhaps help to shed further light on why Amerindian chiefs appear, unlike leaders 
elsewhere, to have the duty, rather than the unilateral right, to speak (Clastres op. 
cit.: 152-5). According to my data, the possession of a putatively exclusive right to 
words of authority by a single individual would be aberrant in a society such as the 
Pa'ikwene one. For, by virtue of acquiring the knowledge to `speak well', all its 
members seem to be assured that selfsame right on equal terms, rather than the 
monopolistic ones which Clastres claims is universally the case in respect of chiefs 
throughout South America (p. 41). In the Pa'ikwene context, any hypothetical 
attempt by one individual to transfer into a sole right what is a general one, could 
only be regarded as a behaviour which was nonsensical and antisocial in the 
extreme. 
Lastly, for all that political speaking involves codified and conventional forms of 
rhetoric, such as the homily for instance, Pa'ikwene political speaking is far from 
being `formulaic' behaviour. Personal invention and artistry within the genre are 
much in evidence. So too is the presence of innovation and imaginativeness, as 
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manifested by the purposeful appropriation of non-Pa'ikwene languages for 
atypical ends. One dying form of the orational canon, "Kiaptünka", has in reverse 
proportion to its increasing extinction become as if canonised, acquiring the status 
of a virtually `sacred object' for the Pa'ikwene. 
2. As a possible theoretical explanation of how their speech fulfilled the 
Pa'ikwene speakers' political intentions (e. g. peacemaking), I will borrow Burke's 
notion of "entitlement" (1966: 361 If. ) and Crocker's elaboration of it. For the former, 
speech does not so much designate and label things as convey the significance or 
idea of situations similarly to the title of a film or book. Instead of giving a literal 
empirical truth statement, it sums up a situation's reality and communicates its 
essence. Building on this, and the further Burkian thesis (ibid.: 361) that objects are 
the signs of words rather than the other way round, Crocker proposes (1977: 37) 
that we think of things and situations as "functions of what is said about them". 
Consequently, in the relationship between speech and social context, "rhetorical 
entitlement" is a "process whereby actions attempt to provide some linguistic truth 
about a social situation which summarises its moral essence in such ways as to 
define possible actions" (ibid., my emphasis). As a "strategy for living" in society 
(ibid. ), Crocker posits that 'entitlement' relies on three interactive sub-strategies 
relating to (i) the speaker's motivation in respect of the addressees; (ii) the 
intentions of both speaker and addressees towards the matter being spoken about; 
and (iii) the rhetorical device used by the speaker; this last constituting a "wholly 
semantic strategy... a verbal codification of meaning which is part of the society's 
repertory of semantic techniques for expressing the `truth of things"' (p. 38). 
Relating this, for example, to Yvette's settlement of the dispute [item (v)], I would say 
that her motivation vis-ä-vis the two rowing women was to get them to stop; that her 
intention toward the subject of the dispute was at odds with those of her 
addressees, for whereas she wanted to show it to be the cause of group 
disharmony, they by contrast each wished to use it as the basis of personal 
grievance and hostility; and that, finally, the compound of harangue, homily, and 
ridicule to which she resorted in order for her intention to prevail over theirs, was 
culturally typical and legitimate, each being a rhetorical device readily understood 
by every Pa'ikwene. In that for Crocker (op. cit.: 42), the underlying aim of all 
rhetoric is persuasion, then the speaker's rhetorical device "must persuade people 
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of the truth of his position", regardless of whatever ulterior goals there might be. By 
jointly engaging our intellectual attention and emotional response, the 
persuasiveness of the rhetorical device, he goes on, reveals the true 'nature' of the 
thing or situation to which it is applied. This it does not by presenting any new 
knowledge regarding them but by letting us apprehend them afresh (pp. 42-6); after 
which, it is assumed, we then act in function of this new understanding. Yvette's 
three devices each possessed the ability to act as 'titles' summing up the essential 
ulterior reality both of the fight and Yvette's intervention; and to convince her 
addressees of the 'truth' of the former (i. e., its antisocialness and destructivity) and 
of the latter (i. e., the desirability and need of a return to sociability). 
Furthermore, I suggest that such moral-political-aesthetic verbal action on the 
part of one (authoritative but not authoritarian) person managed to do this in such a 
way, too, as to hand back the responsibility for, and ultimate onus of, their own 
'proper' conduct to two others guilty of 'impropriety' and disorder. It allowed them, if 
at the cost of some mockery and public ridicule, to cease their antisocial conduct of 
their own accord. It shows us, I suggest, another facet of the viable mix of 
individualist and communal behaviours to be found in such societies wherein 
ultimately, as Overing has described (1989: 170) for the Piaroa, "one's mastery of 
sociality [is]... in inimitable Amerindian logic, also one's personal autonomy. In 
other words.... the weight of acting socially [is] placed in the hands of the individual 
and not with the corporate group or collectivity, or with a political leadership. " 
While believing all rhetorical devices possess this capacity for persuasion and 
expressing contextual truths and essences, Crocker particularly focuses on 
metaphor. And perhaps the homiletic part of Yvette's speech action can be said to 
share some of its peculiarities and powers. It, too, implicitly yet unambiguously and 
forcefully, proposed a likeness between two terms from different spheres: angry 
woman/the social and Satan/the supernatural. It entailed the interrelatedness of 
the speaker and hearer's thought and emotion, and the elements of morality and 
aesthetics. It possessed not only semantic but what Burke calls (1941: 138-67) 
`poetic' meaning. The one entails the objective observation of the actors, the other 
their subjective participation; both are mutually reinforcing and complementarily 
active in the structure of one's `perspective'. There is a case to be made, then, for 
describing homily itself as a type of language from which tropic activity is not 
absent. That is to say, homilies which, like Yvette's, have analogical and 
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allegorical components associate in a single verbal act disparate and opposing 
archetypical values (e. g. the `paragonic' and the `sinful') in order to induce, through 
the transference of the `bad' addressee into the `good' narrated archetype, a 
practical situation conforming to orthodox normative ideals, whether it be the `right' 
behaviour to adopt, action to take, attitude to manifest. 
I submit that through its own capacity for `entitlement', and the joint intellectual 
and affective engagement it solicits, homiletic action as employed by a Pa'ikwene 
as a political means of restoring `order' simultaneously expresses, like metaphor, 
the "pertinence of... cultural axioms to given social conditions... [and] provides the 
semantic conditions through which actors deal with that reality" (Crocker op. 
cit.: 46). 
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chapter six 
"TCHIMAP", "TO HEAR-LISTEN-UNDERSTAND": THE SOCIO- 
CULTURAL DYNAMICS OF PA'IKWENE AUDITION. 
(Continued) 
This chapter is a reprise of the subject of indigenous hearing initiated in chapter 4. 
In it we will see that as sociologically and cosmologically central as "Tchimap 
kabai" -"Good Hearing"- is for the Pa'ikwene, the opposite yet not always hostile 
phenomenon of "Tchimap ka kabai" - "Bad Hearing" - plays an equally important 
part in the process of community life; that is, the state of essentially friendly 
relations between people who speak together yet tend frequently not to reply (at 
least not immediately) and are thus said to "hear-listen-understand badly". 
"Tchimap ka kabai" presented me with a problem of understanding in 
several ways. For one thing, if not giving a prompt verbal response was, as noted 
in the section on the sociopragmatics of hearing, part of the proper etiquette of 
sociable speaking-listening behaviour, why was it attributed to 'bad hearing'? 
Another difficulty concerned the withholding of the verbal response itself. In regard 
to its possible significations I have noted Jaworski's argument (1993: 80-95 and 
passim. ) that silence is a component of dialogue and its meaning interpretable in 
exactly the same way as that of speech, in that both follow the same theoretical 
pragmatic rules, although the high ambiguity of silence can make exegesis that 
much more difficult. 
For simplicity's sake I have treated both forms of native aural conduct, "kabai" and 
ka kabai", as distinct actions, though not always successfully. Despite both the 
intended methodological division and the indigenous verbal differentiation, my 
separating them did not in practice always prove an easy task given that, as should 
become clear, 'good hearing' and (positive, acceptable) 'bad hearing' seem in 
practice to be morally and behaviourally overlapping phenomena which to some 
extent also form a continuum. 
It is these and other questions that I attempt to explore below, in what amounts to 
an exercise in interpretation. 
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Affect, autonomy and the social uses of 'bad hearing-listening-understanding'. 
(Or a dialogue between A. and B. )1 
On his return to Europe from the field, the anthropologist (A. ) tries to explain to 
his friend (B. ) the phenomenon of Pa'ikwene audition. The behaviour called 
"Tchimap ka kabai", 'hearing-listening-understanding badly', seems in particular 
to exercise him; disconcertingly his manner is even more intense than usual and 
his demeanour somewhat feverish -a fact which B. puts down to the effects of 
'culture shock' and malaria. A. tells B. first of all of the difficulty of obtaining 
typical and convincing examples of aural action. How, he asks, do you 
successfully set about capturing the hearing of others the way you can their 
speech? B., who is not, it must be said, immediately taken with the subject and is 
at this point possibly only listening with half an ear, mumbles, perhaps jokingly, 
about there surely existing some kind of machine capable of doing the job. "Ah, 
technology", sighs A. dismissively, then adds: 
"There's no camera or recorder invented yet - leastways that I know of - 
that can reproduce my own aural activity, let alone anyone else's. No, 
I can't hear how you hear; all I can do is observe you hearing, and 
imagine what it's like. " 
To which B. replies: 
"But why on earth would you want to in the first place? " 
But A., launched now upon his theme, is not to be put off, and continues: 
"A person speaks, another hears; yet how is it possible to know whether 
they listen or not, understand or not? " 
B.: By their attitude surely, or the words they say in return. 
A.: But can one be so certain? The Pa'ikwene, for instance often seem, at least 
to look at, unaware and uncaring of the speaker. They glance away, offer 
nothing but silence, and continue with whatever they were doing before 
being addressed. 
B.: You mean, "A man may have hearing and yet not be hearing" as whatsis 
1I borrow this subtitle from Diderot's "Supplement au voyage de Bougainville; 1992 [1796]. What 
follows was inspired by the 18th century convention of `philosophical dialogues', of which the 
aforesaid, which deals by means of a literary conversation between two friends with the moral issues 
arising from a contemporary account of Tahitian life, is a typical example. 
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face said. 2 
A.: True. On the other hand, he could also have hearing and yet only appear 
not to hear. I'll give you an example... 
A. proceeds to recount an incident he had witnessed. His Pa'ikwene host 
Karinai, having something to say to his son Wahtchit, called out to him. 
Wahtchit, at that moment engrossed in arranging his hairstyle, is well within 
earshot and can plainly (in A. 's opinion) hear his father, yet gives no indication 
of doing so other than turning his face away from him, continuing to preen the 
while. Unfazed, not in the least bit irked or impatient, Karinai addresses him 
again, twice, without raising his voice or altering his tone. Wahtchit finally 
answers with a cheerful: "Ihi! " ("Yes! "). Whereupon Karinai, equable as ever, 
reports to him an event that had just occurred on the path leading to the creek. 
Wahtchit, his face still averted, waits till he has finished, nods, says "Nah 
tchimap" ("I hear-listen-understand"), and makes a comment about what he has 
just been told. Karinai leaves. "And what d'you make of that? " asks A. of B. 
B.: But it's so banal. 
A.: Precisely. That little scene, or variations of it, was played out repeatedly 
all day long in my village. But for me its very mundaneness exemplifies 
and characterises the use of 'bad hearing' as a marker of the state of play of 
relations between individuals at any given moment, in the 'conversation 
that is social life' [Ingold 1986: 141 his stress]3 - or if you prefer, the myriad 
of everyday conversations in the plural that comprise it, as my acquaint- 
ance Rapport would have it [1987: 170-1,1997]. 
B.: What a curious, stilted language you do sometimes use, A. 
A.: Point taken. Comes of having to frequent academics, I suppose. 
B.: Another thing. That example, it shows disrespect. Just typical teenage 
behaviour if you ask me, turning a deaf ear like that. 
A.: You're quite wrong on both counts. In the first place, relations between 
2 Actually Aristotle, cited in Towey 1991: 9. 
3 Cf. inter alia Hymes 1971, Ch. Taylor 1985: 243,259-60, Hagege 1991: 312-3. 
116 
Wahtchit and his father were consistently respectful. 4 And anyway, such 
behaviour wasn't taken as a show of disrespect. Secondly, what makes you 
think Wahtchit was an adolescent, the fact he's fiddling around with his 
coiffure? Well, for one thing, your Pa'ikwene male, whatever his age, 
tends to take great pride in his hair, and is forever grooming it. For an- 
other, Wahtchit was an "Awaig", that is, an adult man. You see, this be- 
haviour was universal. It wasn't limited to any one category. Young, old, 
men, women: they all indulged in it. It occurred between husbands and 
wives, workmates, friends and siblings and in-laws... Children did it to 
grown-ups... They did it back to the children. It's like, at first glance, no- 
body pays attention to anyone else. But the thing is, though they're said in 
their language to "tchimap ka kabai"... that is: "to hear-listen-understand 
badly"... they themselves will tell you that on the contrary they "tchimap 
kabai". In other words, they claim to have heard, listened, and understood 
perfectly well. 
B.: And the people speaking to them, they agree? 
A.: Naturally I asked, and they generally did. One thing's clear, they didn't 
seem to find this behaviour insulting, or odd. 5 They told me they did it 
too, and everyone they knew did. But they said they didn't know why. 
Thinking about it, the only thing they came up with, most of them, was 
it struck them as amusing. 
B.: But what's so unique about this anyway? Isn't inattentiveness just a 
common human trait? 
A.: Yes, we're all guilty of it from time to time. But not chronically, not sys- 
tematically like the Pa'ikwene. With them it happens to excess. And 
where you or I may act this way more or less spontaneously... they do so 
with more of a... an intent behind it... though that's not quite the right 
word. Nor, as I'm trying to explain, is inattentiveness. Because whatever 
4 On the occasion described above no less than during the entire time I was in their company, their 
relationship was warm, cordial, and caring. The wider context of their intercommunication as co- 
residing kin and co-workers was one of proximity, affability and mutual respect. There seemed to be 
no native sanctions attached to disrespect; although nowadays the Fundamentalist Church holds out 
the threat to the converted Pa'ikwene of divine punishment for showing any to one's parents. Such 
want of respect, defined mainly as disobedience, is seen as tantamount to showing none to God (see 
chapter 9 part 3a). 'Traditional' Pa'ikwene respect, however, should not be thought of in terms of 
obedience to authority or parent/child or old/young hierarchies, for it exists as it were structurally, 
though of course not always practically, between all members of a social unit regardless of generation, 
gender or 'power', rather than unidirectionally from the bottom up. It seems to be linked with 'love' and 
reciprocal care, though in a less explicitly verbalised manner than that described by Gow (1991) for the 
Piro. 
5 As indicated above, given that Pa'ikwene society places such a high value on good, sociable 
interpersonal relations, I often puzzled about this reaction, hence this chapter. Nevertheless, the fact 
remains, as far as I could observe, that (a) addressors failed in the main to show irritation or frustration at 
the (apparent) non-listening of their addressees, and (b) the latter were in the main judged not to have 
acted anti-dialogically and anti-socially. Why this should be I try to explore and explain below. 
it was Wahtchit was doing, it wasn't being inattentive. 
B.: So what you're saying is, it's a formal behaviour? 
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A.: Yes. But no... if by this you've an acutely self-conscious and rigid sort of 
conduct in mind. It's more in the way of a custom, a habit, which is acqui- 
red yet at the same time appears natural. 
B.: Like shaking hands on meeting? 
A.: More like sitting down to eat perhaps. Or sleeping. 
B.: No, there I can't agree with you. What can be more natural and unlearned 
than that? 
A.: To sleep yes - but not the way one sleeps. On a bed, the floor, in the air in a 
hammock as in Amazonia, or standing up like a Masai. With a pillow for 
the head, or a little bench for the neck, or nothing at all. As Mauss shows 
[1979]... he calls them 'body techniques' by the way... these different meth- 
ods, or styles, are culturally specific. And as with slumber, so with drink- 
ing... or laughing... or what have you. 
B.: And hearing? 
A.: It follows. 
B.: Is nothing we do natural, then? 
A.: Certainly. 
B.: Hold on. You contradict yourself: human behaviour is natural, human 
behaviour is learned, so natural behaviour's learned. This, my friend, is 
pure syllogism. 
A.: That's not what I am saying. I'm merely pointing out that the Pa'ikwene 
practice of 'hearing, listening to, and understanding you badly' is jointly 
what Mauss, to return to him, calls a "physio-psycho-sociological" action, 
of which there are a multitude. 6 
B.: So it seems. But I still insist they're natural first. 
A.: That's if I may say so irrelevant, given that being human they don't 
happen in a vacuum, but inside the social environment. 
B.: And isn't that part of nature too? 
6 Mauss' point (ibid.: 120-1) is that while starting from a natural base these actions acquire a cultural 
form via a socialising process of 'technical adaptation'. 
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A.: A good... albeit for many a moot... point. And one which in passing an 
Amerindian'd be inclined to reverse, tending to see nature, rather, as an 
aspect of the wider social universe. An issue discussed elsewhere in my 
thesis. But to return to their 'hearing-listening-understanding well or 
badly'. 
B.: And mine. 
A.: It appears so. Well, all these Maussian biologico-sociological phenomena... 
B.: Eating... walking... dancing... crying... sighing... dying... 
A.: (impatient) Yes, yes!... Well, each of them's imbued, according to him, 
with "sociological causality". 
B.: And so? 
A.: And so nothing, B. I had just the one point to make: notwithstanding 
exceptions the Pa'ikwene's habit of not listening... or not seeming to... 
when spoken to is a conventionalised form of behaviour. A cultural deaf- 
ness as it were. Which I often found frustrating and disorientating. Not 
to say downright annoying. Especially in the beginning, when I thought, 
it turned out wrongly, it was only directed at me - 
B.: Cultural, shmultural -I don't care what you call it, I call it rude. 
A.: So's touching food with your left hand - to an Arab. No, the point is, for 
the Pa'ikwene, it wasn't. Rudeness I mean. Though I did say there were 
exceptions, when it was. 
A. now describes to B. a case of "Tchimap ka kabai" ('bad hearing') which had 
effectively been considered improper by the person at the receiving end. It 
involved a young girl, M., who having shinnied half way up an assai palm 
(Euterpe oleracea), called out to her cousin L., who was passing nearby, to help 
her collect the fruit. But L., like A. only a temporary member of Village 
Esperance 2, clearly did not want to know; he just said nothing and kept on 
walking. M. shouted after him, deriding him for being lazy. From her 
perspective, L. 's action was pointedly antisocial and insulting. To start with, his 
'bad hearing' did not respect the normal criteria, as no deferred verbal 
acknowledgement or reply was offered. However, as M. later explained to A., her 
anger was due neither to this nor to L. 's failure to cooperate in the gathering,? 
7 An `ungendered' task for the Pa'ikwene, whose concepts and practices in regard to the partition of 
labour, laziness, worker's autonomy and other related matters are discussed in chapter 8. 
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since the Pa'ikwene individual's autonomy - their decision whether or not to 
participate in any activity - is virtually enshrined as a customary right. Rather, 
she was reacting to L. 's manner which, for us to understand properly, has to be 
set within the context of the prior history of their interpersonal relations. These, 
without going into detail, can be summed up as tense and frosty. For M., this 
was but one more in a series of of unfriendly acts aimed by him at her. In this 
instance, and as far as she was concerned, the intention behind the 'bad hearing' 
and the silence was hostile. A. 's story is finished. B. remains silent. 
A.: You say nothing? 
B.: But I am listening. I was just wondering... talking of intention... what's 
the purpose, d'you think, of the other kind of 'bad hearing', the positive 
type? Or is there one? 
A.: I can't pretend to know for sure, but yes, I think there is. Though how to 
describe it isn't easy. I can't talk of the private intention this or that 'bad 
hearer' may possibly have had, since obviously I wasn't privy to it. But I 
do feel... somehow... that the wider intent of such behaviour... its con- 
ceivable structural ability... might be to enable individual hearers to signal 
and control their personal space... their individualism... vis a vis speakers. 
B.: What you're saying is, I think, it gives them, to use the jargon, the means 
to express their autonomy within an ongoing interpersonal relationship... 
and their agency within the web of a multiplicity of such relationships in- 
sofar as it constitutes the process of sociality? 
A.: Well summarised, for all the sarcasm of your tone. 
B.: I wish I knew what it meant. 
A.: That their 'bad hearing is as much a political device as anything else. 
B.: Only in the widest sense, surely. 
A.: You may very well be right. 8 Of course, the 'deafness' I spoke of earlier is 
just temporary. It lifts... or rather the 'bad hearer' lifts it so to say... and, as 
convention also dictates, gives his or her response in due course. Thereby 
showing me they've really been a secret 'good hearer' all along. 
B.: So their relationship with the speaker is reconfirmed not instantly but 
after an appropriate delay. 
8 The political dimension of 'hearing-listening-understanding' is explored in chapter 7. 
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A.: Couldn't put it better myself. 
B.: So basically... tell me if I got you wrong... Bad Hearing's simply a part of 
Good Hearing. If you're a Pa'ikwene person you're supposed to hold off 
speaking to someone who's speaking to you until the 'proper' time. It's 
just that with them the gaps between 'turn taking' tend to be longer than 
in our own conversations. 9 That it? 
A.: On the button. 
B.: Can't see what's so mystifying about that. Not worth all the fuss and 
bother. Now for the tricky part though. You're also saying Bad Hearing's 
possibly something more than etiquette. It could also be a mode of auto- 
nomy, a way of regulating your relations with another person. I'll be 
honest with you, A., I'm not too convinced by that one. Not enough 
evidence, I'm afraid. 
(pause. A. muses) 
A.: As for the silences connected with 'bad hearing', I suggest they're "heard- 
understood" as an intrinsic part of the process of dialogue, not a sign of its 
breakdown. Wordlessness... in other words, B.... need not be a lack of 
good relations. Merleau-Ponty proposeslO that the gaps between a speak- 
er's words are just as expressive and meaningful as the words themselves. 
I'd add to that that, where the Pa'ikwene are concerned at least, the gaps 
between the first party's utterances and the second's response to them 
9 For Jaworski (1993: 48), the hearer's silence is an action both complementary to the speaker's 
speech and integrally part of verbal turn-taking. 
10 1964. Cf. Jaworski (op. cit. passim) for whom silence is as legitimate a means of communication as 
words, and as intentional, meaningful and social. See too Henger, Hockett & Danehy 1960, Philips 
1985, Gilmore 1985, Tannen 1986, Sperber & Wilson 1986, Enninger 1987 for other linguistic, 
cognitive and sociopragmatic views; and Le Breton 1997 for a wider Western cultural perspective. 
The subject of silence is a large one and merits a chapter to itself, but there is not the space here. 
For various psychosocial and/or political aspects and implications of silence refer to Freire 1972, 
Foucault 1981, Scott 1990, Jaworski op. cit.: 105-36. See Steiner 1969: 31-76 (for a combined 
political and literary perspective), also Illich 1971. Bauman 1983, Kondo 1983, Buber 1969: 46,300- 
02 deal with notions and uses of silence in connection respectively with Quakerism, Zen Buddhism 
and Hasidic Jews; A. Huxley notes (1966: 223-6) its place in religion cross-culturally. Ethnographic 
studies of silence include K. Basso 1969,1979 (the Apache), Holy 1985 (the Berti), Lebra 1987 
(Japan), Nwoye 1985, Griffin 1991, Peek 1994 (Africa). With reference to Lowland Amerindian 
societies, see e. g. Seeger (1987: 130-1) on the political, aesthetic and affective signification for the 
Suyä of silence in an oral (singing) situation, and (pp. 68-9) on its perceived negative and antisocial 
character; Belaunde 1992: 48 on the Airo-Pai's similar view; and Levi-Strauss (1964 myths 1,9,10, 
69) on the symbolism of silence and noise/speech in Bororo, Apinaye, Timbira and Taurepan 
cosmology. 
Finally, to return to the Pa'ikwene, their attribution of a positive social role to silence is attested to, I 
believe, by their practice, reported by Nimuendaju (1971: 53) but now seemingly obsolete, of ritually 
burning a pubescent girl's lips with hot clay so that she may remain as silent as the earth, for "so highly 
do they value discretion" (my translation). 
meaningfully express not disaffection but sociability. 
B.: Not in M. and L. 's case they didn't. 
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A.: True. But for every one example like that of negative 'bad hearing' there 
were easily a hundred of the positive kind, like Karinai and Wahtchit's. 
Which brings us to another factor. Listening... 'well' or nominally but not 
actually 'badly', it's immaterial... to people you're customarily close to... 
establishes and reinforces bonds just as surely and effectively as talking. 
B.: By close are you speaking of proximity or emotion? 
A.. Both. 
B.: And these bonds - d'you mean they're social ties in the sense of duties and 
responsibilities, or have they got to do with feelings? 
A.: One needn't, as Malinowski'd say [1930: 315], preclude the other. But to get 
back to my point. What we're dealing with here's a people who've not 
only got an ethos based on the principle of a convivial11... and therefore 
beautiful... society. What they call "Bareüyo": pretty. But their actual re- 
lations tend in the main to be remarkably... not to say conspicuously... 
warm, loving, and... for the people concerned... "bareüyo" in practice. For 
them, listening's just like speaking... it's just like touching... it's one im- 
portant expression of these not just emotional... not just moral... but also 
social facts. Hearing-understanding, d'you see, B., physically marks out 
and cements the community. To quote Alfred Gell [1995: 235], "Hearing 
is intimate, concrete, tactile whereas vision promotes abstraction. " And 
as he goes on to say... and I paraphrase...: there seems to be an inherent 
link between cultures characterised by a "heightened sympathy" between 
its members... i. e., ones where the display of positive affectivity's typically 
explicit and stressed... and those that accord a high value to hearing. For 
Gell both things are the hallmark of rainforest cultures. And all three 
factors, the emotional, the ecological and, despite their apparent 'bad 
hearing', the aural, apply... I would simply say in conclusion... to the 
Pa'ikwene. 
B.: I see. At least, that is, I've heard and listened to you with the closest 
interest. 
A.: Then the chances are you've understood me. 
At this, B. smiles and grunts somewhat cryptically. Then clasps his friend A. by 
the shoulder and, being not unconscious of or unaffected by the somewhat 
studied and quaint turn of their conversation (which as has been mentioned 
11 See chapter 8 section 3. 
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owes something to Diderot's 'philosophical dialogues'), says, "Come, let us repair 
to yonder tavern. Methinks we could both do with a drink. " A. concurs; they 
both depart. 
I have proposed, basically, that "good hearing" and "bad hearing" are nor merely 
complementary actions but two sides, or even better, phases, of Pa'ikwene 
awareness and social (dis)engagement. 
Also, I have suggested among other things that for a Pa'ikwene silence is 
not necessarily a lack of or a breakdown in dialogic and social relations. While one 
type of silence can convey a negative and antisocial emotion and performatively 
indicate hostility, i. e., antisociality itself, as it does in some Lowland societies, such 
as the Airo-Pai (Belaunde 1992: 48,145), another type can incarnate their opposite. 
Unlike the Suyä (Seeger 1987: 65-9), it is not associated with the private sphere 
(and the margin and women) in contrast to oral expression and its perceived 
association with the public sphere (and the centre and men). On the contrary, in 
this most vocal and loud of societies (see chapters 3 and 4), to be mute is just as 
much a public act as speaking. 
Clastres claims (1987: 37) in connection with the premise that the relations of 
exchange constitute society, that the latter is "defined primarily by the three 
fundamental levels of the exchange of goods, women and words". I would argue, 
on the basis of their use in Pa'ikwene social life, that an important aspect of the 
last-named level is the exchange of silences along with, rather than in opposition 
to, the words. The non-words that are silence should not be seen as anti-words 
hence, in Clastrian terms, asocial objects bereft of exchange value. I have tried to 
show instead that the non-verbal responses constituting silence, observable in 
Pa'ikwene intercommunication as the result of legitimate 'bad hearing-listening- 
understanding', are both `semantically' intelligible signs and axiologically charged 
acts. For similarly to words they not only arise from, but have the ability 
instrumentally to (re)produce, interpersonal relations; they too contribute to the 
creation and maintenance of society. 
Rather than a vacuum the silence an addressee offers as part of 'bad 
hearing' may, then, be said to constitute a plenum: an act intrinsically and 
substantively filled in its own way with as much sociality as a person's utterances; 
and with as much meaning and value. As noted in chapter 3, a speaker's 
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meanings entail and encompass more than the semantic content. Beyond the 
sign-referential value of the words, a verbal performance is tied in to a culturally 
constructed spectrum of intelligibility and engagement ranging from the 
sociopragmatic to the aesthetic to the affective, and the sensory to the moral. So 
too, as I have tried to make clear throughout this thesis, is the performance of the 
hearer. This point is central to what I have attempted to convey in my bipartite 
discussion on the subject of Pa'ikwene audition. Namely, that the experiential 
process of "Tchimap", to 'hear-listen-understand', basically and expressively 
embodies, it seems to me, the concept that what one perceives with one's ears is 
not just a sound (of a voice, a word, a 'thing') but its full, multiple meaning as 
described above. And the 'proper' silence one offers in the process of discourse in 
return for the sound is itself an inherently communicative act which, I suggest, is 
meant and heard-listened-understood to be similarly polyvalent. 
To sum up, if some instances of silence will, depending on context, be perceived as 
negative by the Pa'ikwene, others are positive and in consequence eminently 
social. As Jaworski notes (op. cit. ), silence is ambiguous exegetically in that it is 
capable of doing both 'good' and 'bad' things (p. 20). While it can signal 
impoliteness and hostility (as occurred above between M. and L. ), it can also be a 
means of conflict avoidance; it can be interpreted as a sign of stupidity or, as I have 
proposed, express affective engagement (as with Karinai and Wahtchit); it can be 
used to forestall or break off communication, or serve to keep it going (p. 48). 
In short, I propose, silence is the quintessential wordless 'signified' (cf. 
Barthes' "silent morpheme", 1977: 157), and an action with as much power as the 
'perlocutionary' capacity of words to produce a desired and comprehensible effect. 
I end by restating an obvious but often, sociologically speaking, disregarded fact. 
Hearing is a fundamental and necessary component of dialogic relations, and thus 
of social ones. My own view, elaborated above from fieldwork data, is that together 
with speaking it is a creative agent in the process of sociality itself. 
Phenomenologically and socioculturally, it clearly seems to occupy an important 
place in the system of thinking and being of the Pa'ikwene. The relatively scarce 
and precious material on audition in regard to other Lowland Amerindian peoples, 
referred to throughout, suggests that this is not an isolated and atypical case. 
Given this, I believe that the subject requires more anthropological attention than 
hitherto accorded. 
124 
chapter seven 
BANANAS, SPEAKING AND LISTENING: GIFTS, 
SHARES OR DUTIES? 
Basically, this chapter aims to show that Pa'ikwene political speech, be it carried 
out by leaders or non-leaders, does not constitute Clastrian "empty talk", but the 
reverse. Concomitantly, I suggest that Pa'ikwene listening is also to be seen as 
political and full; that is, the lack of any obligation or `necessity' for the individual to 
listen to their chief (Clastres 1987: 46), or anyone else, does not mean that listening 
does not occur nor, more pertinently, that it is unheeding. On the contrary, for all 
that it may appear devoid of attention and distracted often to the point of non- 
existent, Pa'ikwene listening is in reality active and characteristically embodies the 
person's comprehension and engagement with is being said. In the process I will 
also address the issue of exchange in so far as it has a bearing on the two other 
activities, speaking and listening. 
The giving and the felt. 
The first time I went to meet Tchikoi, the chief at Kümene (Aükwa region, Amapa 
state, Brazil), Nenel, who accompanied me, presented him with a hand of bananas. 
I asked Nenel afterwards if this was an obligation. He replied that people were not 
required to but liked to offer him gifts of food as, being chief, he did not have 
sufficient time for hunting, fishing and tending his garden, and therefore his family 
ran the risk of going hungry'. It seemed to me that such donations were not a 
matter of compulsion or of a statutory quid pro quo in return for the chief's efforts on 
behalf of the community, but, rather, one of individual choice, regard, generosity 
and responsibility; people were forever insisting that if you gave a gift to someone it 
was because you wanted to not because you had to, and not because you thought 
you would get something in return. 
That reciprocity was not obligatory according to the Pa'ikwene does not, 
however, mean that none occurred, though I am chary of accepting the obligation 
1 It should be noted that the Brazilian authorities pay a stipend to chiefs and the French to both chiefs 
and "'capitaines" . 
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to return as a universal `law' as Mauss (1964) and Levi-Strauss (1969) do. For this 
both denies the existence of `pure' gifts'2 and tends to turn gifting itself into nothing 
but a social structural mechanism in which the volition and choice of both gifter and 
receiver are overlooked, dismissed, or held to be lacking. 
Service holds (1979) that reciprocity in tribal societies is neither unqualifiably 
compulsory nor inflexible but consists of several types existing in a continuum. At 
one end is "generalised' reciprocity (both relatively unidirectional and altruistic) 
and at the other, "negative" reciprocity (a `something for nothing', net gain-type 
non-exchange), with in the middle: "balanced" reciprocity (direct and equivalent 
exchange). There are different degrees of "generalised" reciprocity, the optimum 
being the Malinowskian `pure gift', the countervalue of "negative" reciprocity. 
Another extreme form is (voluntary) food sharing among close kin where, in 
Sahlins' words (1971: 52-3), "the expectation of a direct material return is unseemly, 
at the most implicit. The social side of the relation overwhelms the material, and in 
a way conceals it... [It is] not that there is no obligation to reciprocate, but the 
expectation of reciprocity is left indefinite, unspecified as to time, quantity and 
quality". Thus, for Service, a unilateral and constant flow from donor to recipient 
indicates not that there is no obligation or expectation of a return, but only that the 
donor assumes that one will be forthcoming in the fullness of time. 
While in practice the two actions were clearly distinguished, as will be seen, the 
Pa'ikwene notion of `giving a present' ("Kakahnhao") is conceptually linked with 
that of `sharing' ("Ibakah"). This could be thought to bear out Price's thesis 
(1975: 21) that gifting is a projection of the latter action, a way of extending the 
sphere of sharers to include those not normally within it, were it not for the fact that 
frequently, among the Pa'ikwene, the people whom individuals gave gifts to were 
in a lot of cases the same ones that they also shared with (e. g. co-residing 
siblings). 3 
2I use 'pure gift' in the Malinowskian sense (1922) of an altruistic one which people are not required 
to return. Nor for that matter, to give. It should thus not be confused with the 'free gift' discussed by 
Overing in regard to the Piaroa (1992: 181,194-6, Overing Kaplan 1975: 63 fn. 2): while carrying no 
obligation or expectation of future return, giving it is mandatory for certain affines and a chief's 
followers (1992: 63,1975: 135,178). 
3 As an indication of the conjoining power which the Pa'ikwene probably perceive to exist in both 
gifting and sharing is the etymologically related word "Akak" (or "Akag"), which means "And", "With", 
"Together". 
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Another feature characterising Pa'ikwene behaviour in this respect is the fact that 
gifted and shared objects are often of a different kind materially; and people made 
presents of things (e. g. weapons and ammunition) that they would not normally be 
required, or want, to share outside of the circle of their close kin. According to an 
informant, people distinguish between giving and sharing on the grounds that in 
the first action the initiative comes from the donor independently, while the second 
tends to be initiated by the receiver's demand or request and is obligatory. 
Someone else explained that gifting means giving all of a particular object, 
whereas in sharing you give part of it only, so that both parties end up with some. 
This corresponds to what Ingold calls (1986: 233) "sharing out", a distribution of 
something originally held by a single individual and divided up for use by "an 
aggregate of beneficiaries" including the original possessor, as opposed to 
"sharing in", which implies a "principle of unrestricted access whereby means of 
subsistence are enjoyed in common". 
Granted that my observation may have been deficient, but Pa'ikwene gifting 
seemed notably disinterested (contra Mauss op. cit. ). Although if there was any 
personally and materially advantageous ulterior motive on the part of donors, it was 
anyway well hidden from me. But as far as I could see gifting was not used in any 
politically strategic way; there was not for instance the least indication of it being 
manipulated in order to set up and maintain alliances, such as Descola describes 
(1996: 243-6) apropos the Achuar. Neither was it like the mutual so-called gift- 
giving of a specific item, bread, that occurs among Airo-Pai women gift partners 
which actually is a `mode of sharing out food' between households (Belaunde 
1992: 179-81). 
For Belaunde, Airo-Pai food gifting is not to be seen in terms of reciprocity as the 
stress is not on any expectation of return but on the giver's generosity, though there 
is an "expectation of mutuality" (p. 21). I cannot even claim this in respect of the 
Pa'ikwene gifting, for I do not think that it was sharing under another name, though 
without a doubt both Pa'ikwene gifting and sharing, like Airo-Pai gifting/sharing 
(and also the Piaroa practice of `free gifts' between affines, referred to in footnote 2 
above, which may be said to mimic sharing between kin), did not entail an 
expectation of return. The Pa'ikwene themselves stated this, as I have already 
mentioned; and such was my own perception. This again falls between two stools 
as far as Price is concerned (op. cit. ). For him, while sharing does not carry the 
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expectation of return (p. 6), the gifter, although free of the "pressure for returns" (p. 
21), should nevertheless reciprocate with a counter gift (p. 23). It does, though, 
undermine Sahlins' claim (1972: 185-275) that the underlying and characterising 
principle of societies with `domestic modes of production' is a "generalised 
reciprocity" which necessarily entails an expectation of return. As for the term 
"generalised reciprocity", Price points out (op. cit.: 5) that it is indiscriminate, since 
Sahlins uses it to describe actions "which [for Price] would be better considered as 
sharing... " Moreover, the Pa'ikwene's gifting without an expectation of return also 
disagrees with Mauss' contention (op. cit.: 10 and passim. ) that reciprocity is 
obligatory and his apparent conflation of reciprocity and gifting. 
To show yet further the distinction between the two actions (and concepts) for the 
Pa'ikwene: Susana, my main informant, would often sadly make the point that 
sharing was steadily being replaced outside of the immediate household unit by 
the growing tendency of people to `lend' certain items like foods even to close kin, 
and with the definite expectation of their replacement in kind or in cash by the 
borrower. 4 This last, which she put down to the increasing influence and presence 
of money, was not considered selling, that being what one theoretically only did 
with socially remote individuals and strangers. 5 Gifting on the other hand was still 
practised as much as ever, which fact gave her joy. Anomalously (? ), I came 
across one object which while not a gift, since it was given on request, 
nevertheless carried no condition of return. Families who grew medicinal plants, 
as did Susana and her husband Karinai, let anyone have some who needed it, 
with not a thought of `repayment' (cf. Seeger 1987: 34 on how among the Suyä 
herbal remedies are administered similarly without anything being given in return). 
4 Cf. von Martius' observation, cited in Levi-Strauss 1969: 57 and made some one hundred and thirty 
years ago: "Although they [the Arawak] may have the idea of individual property, what each 
possesses is so common and easy to obtain, that everyone lends and borrows without too much 
concern for restitution" (my emphasis). 
5 Collectively produced horticultural products, such as manioc, tended to be 'shared in' (Ingold op. 
cit. ) by its co-producers; some would also be 'gifted' with no obligation of a return to whoever a co- 
producer wished to present it. However, there were a number of instances when a person would sell 
it intrasocially, a recent and growing practice deplored by some in the community but defended by 
others. Some hunters, both in Esperance 2 and Aükwa, also sold game for cash to fellow villagers. 
Commercially bought 'Western' food items, such as frozen chickens or bread, would be "lent" on 
condition that a return be made in the future, although some of the purchases would invariably also be 
shared outside the immediate family with needy kin. (See Montout 1994: 32 on the effect of money 
on Pa'ikwene social relations and the traditional system of distribution). 
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Susana not only took pleasure in the idea and custom of gifting, and from receiving 
gifts. She also delighted in giving them. I do not know if the gift itself was believed 
to contain part of its giver as it is seen to do elsewhere (Mauss op. cit.: 8-10), but, 
like sharing, Pa'ikwene gift and counter-gift giving is invested with a large quota of 
emotion (cf. Price op. cit.: 5,21). Having personally been the recipient of gifts from 
Pa'ikwene, I can testify not only to the warmth but also the spontaneity and (I 
believe) uncalculating generosity on the part of givers. This again contradicts 
Mauss, for whom there is no such thing as the `pure gift' or the spontaneous and 
altruistic one (see op. cit.: 70-1 for his critique of Malinowski's analysis of 
Trobriander transactions; he judges these inspired by a "notion neither of purely 
free and gratuitous prestations, nor of purely interested and utilitarian production 
and exchange; it is a kind of hybrid. " Given, he claims, the constraining nature of 
reciprocity, the circulation of goods only has the "appearance of generosity"). 6 
Although there were no long-term female gift-giving partnerships as among the 
Airo-Pai (Belaunde op. cit. ), Pa'ikwene women went in for gifting each other. This 
could involve either kin or friends ("kagmada"); they would also give presents to 
non-Pa'ikwene women friends (this is not to say that they never gave them to men). 
The gifts tended to be objects such as ornaments or bought goods and even 
flowers rather than foods, which would fall under the rubric of things shared, 
although sometimes `treats', in the form of particularly delicious and much 
appreciated items, like the candyfloss "miou-miou" fruit, might be chosen. There 
was much mutual pleasure and satisfaction associated with a gift on the part of 
both the giver and receiver. Often it was specially created by its donor, and 
aesthetic delight as well as skill would go into its production (see chapter 8). 
According to Susana, she made some artifacts, such as necklaces and wrist bands, 
especially "pretty" specifically in order to give them as gifts. With the Pa'ikwene, 
irrespectively of gender, and similarly to the Airo-Pai female gifters, to give or not to 
give seemed to operate in function with mood: in the sense both of the emotional 
state of the giver and that of the `political' atmosphere currently prevailing between 
him or her and the receiver (cf. Belaunde's observation op. cit.: 180 that each single 
gift both indicates the "present state of the interpersonal relationship" between the 
two parties and constitutes a "means for redefining it"). 
6 Cf. McCallum (1989: 260-65,395 fn. 38) on when and whether for the Cashinahua a prestation 
constitutes a 'pure gift' or one amounting to a sale, and therefore entailing indebtedness. 
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For Levi-Strauss (1969: 12-97), the use of the gift as a "primitive form of exchange" 
(p. 61) between individuals is reworked as the "principle of reciprocity" which 
conceptually underpins the incest ban and wife exchange (in exogamic systems), 
and thus the viable survival of groups. Reading him, there seems to be a sense in 
which gifting has been transformed from an interaction between two people into a 
system of reglementary exchange for the establishment and maintenance, 
exclusively, of society as a whole: what relationships there are, that are involved 
with the giving of prestations and counter-prestations, occur between groups, or 
more precisely sub-groups; and also between groups and their leaders (pp. 43-4). 
According to Overing (1983-4: 346), on the other hand, reciprocity is not so 
much the means as a "mode of self-perpetuation, not of groups - which might entail 
the coercive control of both people and scarce resources - but of relationships, a 
perpetuation that counteracts the development of such control. " Her analysis of the 
"elementary structures of reciprocity" in Piaroa culture, and by extension those of 
the indigenous peoples of Amazonia and the Guianas generally, stresses the role 
of the autonomous, responsible, and interrelating individual in the process of 
mutual gifting. This is described as a philosophical principle which, by removing 
the threat of dangerous `difference' from society and obviating the possibility of a 
monopoly of coercive power by a single person or sub-group, and with it their 
control over the labour and products of others, works to create and maintain the 
egalitarian relations characteristic of such polities. Exploring the issue further, she 
argues (1992) that social relations are not reducible to the process of exchange as 
Levi-Strauss (op. cit. ), Clastres (op. cit. ), and Mauss (op. cit. ) all hold. Rather, 
`good' social relations are created not by exchange but productivity. The former in 
Piaroa thinking implies external relations and competitive, dangerous and 
potentially bellicose and `predatory' individuals (including possible affines). The 
latter, in which are included the crucial activities or qualities of gifting (without 
obligation or expectation of return) and sharing, is associated on the other hand 
with internal relations and co-operating, `safe' individuals (kin and actual affines 
who over time become 'of a kind' with kin through the process of producing food 
and children and eating together). 
I for my part can offer no theoretical reasons or conclusions as to the structural 
purpose of Pa'ikwene gifting (I do not even know that it has one). Among them, as 
elsewhere, it can take place between individuals within sub-groups and without; 
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and generally, but not always, reciprocity is involved, although it does not appear to 
possess, as I have already stressed and for all that I tried to find signs to the 
contrary, an explicit obligation to, and expectation of, return. The Pa'ikwene giver's 
act seemed, rather, to be accompanied by an assumption of the other's desire for 
communion. That is, it was as if the giving constituted a "poetic" (Wagner 1991: 43) 
overture or recommitment by one person to another, and the gift itself an 
expression of, a phatic state without words7: an affective and concrete condition of 
social interconnection, sociability and, ultimately, `one of a kind-ness'. 8 Like 
speech, Pa'ikwene gifting contributed to the construction of the pleasure of 
community life. 9 It was also its consequence and symptom. 10 
As noted, Overing posits (1981,1983-4) that the notion of reciprocity exists 
cross-culturally as a central plank of Lowland Amerindian metaphysics regardless 
of the dissimilarities in social structures between the different peoples. Although 
there are elements in Pa'ikwene mythology suggesting a possible cosmological 
schema of reciprocal dualities (see Appendix A story 3), nothing allows me to claim 
that their own sociopolitical thinking fitted into what she describes (1983-4) as a 
general Lowland "philosophy of social life". This premises (p. 333) as its "unitary" 
principle that the "contact and proper mixing among entities and forces that are 
different from one another" can only be practically "acted out through the 
`elementary structures of reciprocity' ", whose function is, as cited above, to 
neutralise the danger for society attaching to such `difference'. 
If such a rationalisation does exist for today's Pa'ikwene as for the other 
7Cf. Malinowski's notion (1930: 315)of "phatic communion", according to which the exchange of 
words functionalistically "serv[es] the direct aim of binding hearer to speaker by a tie of some social 
sentiment or other". 
8 Cf. Firth for whom some gift giving "is in a way an invitation to an act of social communion... " (quoted 
in Price op. cit.: 21). 
9 Cf. Ingold's thesis (1 993b: 440) that, as agents of practical action, the word and the gift (and also the 
tool) work identically to mediate a purposive and meaningful engagement between persons and their 
(natural and social)environment. See too Koestler (1964: 301) for whom the underlying motivation of 
telling a story is not only to communicate but to share with others, and "thus overcome the isolation of 
the self. " 
1OCf. Sahlins' notion (1987: xi-xiii) of "performative" and "prescriptive" social structures. In societies 
with the first kind, among which I would include the Pa'ikwene and others in Amazonia, practice takes 
priority over precept, and it is the act which performatively creates an "appropriate relation": thus, 
typically, "gifts make friends" (p. xi). In the latter type, where the stress is on "institutional forms over 
their associated practices", conduct tends rather to ensue from a preexisting social relationship (see 
too Overing 1996: 8). 
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societies, then it is most likely to be unconscious. What I did tangibly perceive, 
however, beyond the articulating features of their social organisation, was the 
explicitly recognised importance for them of reciprocity at the level of the `felt'. If I 
concentrate on one-to-one gifting in order to illustrate this, it is because it seems 
free of the intra-group prescriptions inherent in sharing, and also without its 
routineness and `expectedness'. It is precisely due to the qualities of spontaneity, 
lack of compulsion, and generosity apparently characterising it, that Pa'ikwene 
gifting stands out for me as a prototypical (and ever-renewable) manifestation not 
so much of the structural but emotional necessity of social relations. I suggest that 
for a society which sets as high a store on individualism 11 as on communality, to 
make a gift is, again somewhat similarly to speaking, an act whereby each person 
rather than the group can recommit to, and even create, a relationship with each 
`other'. 12 In so doing, he or she reaffirms, reproduces, and re-celebrates the very 
actuality of communality insofar as society is composed of a series of singular 
interpersonal relationships (see Overing 1992), mutually created by individuals on 
a one-to-one basis; and is phenomenologically experienced as such in the 
everyday living of one's social existence, whatever the structural mechanisms 
which may or may not underlie it. I believe this to be just as true of the Pa'ikwene, 
whose clan society seems more in line with those of Central Brazil and North West 
Amazon in that it possesses formal social groupings, as of the other indigenous 
peoples in its own region of the Guianas, whose societies tend generally not to 
possess them (see Riviere 1984: 4). 
Our failure to perceive sufficiently the indigenous ideology and epistemology 
relating to gifting-sharing, such as the distinction made between gifts to which there 
is attached an obligation to return and those to which there is not, might perhaps 
tend to mask the (possible) real nature of the thinking behind, and actual practical 
dynamics of, the relationship between leaders and led among the Lowland 
peoples, which could be characterised as one that was generally not only 
negotiated and freely entered into, but jointly and actively produced, by both 
11 Similarly to the Cubeo (Goldman ), Piaroa (Overing 1988,1989,1996), Pemon (Thomas 
1982) and others in the Guianas (see Riviere 1984: 4,94-100). 
12 The link between gifts and words, and indeed the idea that words are gifts, has been mooted by 
Lacan among others. He points out (1975: 35) that in Antiquity gifts "were so much part of the Word 
that they were designated by its name". Similarly, Leenhardt reports (1947: 167) that for the Houailou 
of Melanesia the discourse which accompanies the giving of gifts is itself another gift. 
parties, rather than imposed by one upon the other. 
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It seems to me that Levi-Strauss' perception (1969: 43-4) of the relationship as a 
structural opposition between a solitary and a collective unit - chief : band - fails to 
see, if I can flip the adage, the trees for the wood. That is, by designating the group 
an assembly of undifferentiated individuals, he necessarily but conveniently 
ignores each specific individual who, together with the others, including the chief, 
instrumentally helps create it in practice. But is it not just a partial truism to say that 
the relationship in respect of a chief is between him and his set of followers? For 
just as logically, at a prior and, for each party, personal level, it is between him and 
a series of single, separate others. A fact that Levi-Strauss categorically overrides 
(in connection with chiefly entitlements): 
"In exchange [for wives], he [the chief] gives a guarantee against want 
and danger, certainly not to the particular individuals whose wives or 
daughters he has married, and not even to those perhaps 
condemned for ever to celibacy by the exercise of his polygamous 
right, but to the group as a group... " (ibid.: 44) 
Thus on one side, the group; and on the other, the chief. And the thing that creates 
the dichotomy is polygyny (on which more later), which acts, according to Levi- 
Strauss, not to unite all individuals, the chief included, but all individuals bar the 
chief into a singular entity in relation, and opposition, to him: 
"... [M]onogamy and polygamy correspond to two types of 
complementary relationship. On the one hand, there are systems of 
prestations and counter-prestations which bind together the individual 
members of the group, and on the other hand, there are systems of 
prestations and counter-prestations which bind together the group as 
a whole and its chief. " (ibid. ) 
However, as noted, Pa'ikwene society may be said to be just as `individualistic' as 
others in the region despite the formal social grouping of the clan and the fact that 
membership of the current multiclan communities tends to be laid down on 
Christian sectarian lines (see chapter 9). While clan and ideological affiliation may 
`determine' the wider web of social relations, they do not also automatically 
construct the ones associated with the circle of people with whom one is on 
mutually sociable, pleasurable and intimate terms. These can only be produced 
and maintained over time on a one to one basis by autonomously thinking and 
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acting, and also gifting-sharing, individuals in a manner and with a result 
agreeable and valuable to both parties. This applies to relationships between 
affines and between friends. I suggest that it might also pertain to those between 
an individual 'follower' and his or her chief. 
But what, then, of Nenel and his own gift of bananas to Tchikoi? What was he 
giving (as it were) transubstantially with it? And what, despite the stated lack 
attaching to gifts of an obligation to return, was he counting on in exchange from 
his leader? I can but surmise; but could it not be that, at the simplest (and extra- 
structural) level, what he offered with care for, and generosity towards, Tchikoi, was 
precisely that: these selfsame qualities as not just signifiers but meaningful gestural 
expressions, as Merleau-Ponty might put it (1945), of his recommitment to their 
relationship; and thus of his continuing good-will, political support and 
endorsement, themselves metonymically represented, and incarnated, by the 
fruits? 13 
Asked by me to say what it was she thought Tchikoi did for the Pa'ikwene, a 
woman replied, "He is kind and intelligent. He "speaks well" with the Brazilians. 
He looks after us with medicines [as noted above, Tchikoi had received 
paramedical training and assisted in the small state-funded infirmary at Kümene]. 
He protects Pa'ikwene land in Aükwa. He cares about traditions. He works for us a 
lot. " 
This was just as much a summary of his mental and moral attributes as of his 
responsibilities and functions, and makes it clear that the `way he is' was felt to be 
as important as `what he does'. It was also, I believe, a succinct report of what he 
`gave' . 
According to Clastres (and contra Levi-Strauss), the exchange which occurs in the 
context of leadership is unique in regard to other exchanges among Amerindians 
in that it amounts to a negation of reciprocity. Let me explain more fully: 
13 Again I would like to stress that the fact that the lack of an obligation to return a gift does not 
necessarily mean that none takes place. In the Pa'ikwene context, it was clear that it generally did. 
That it was non-obligatory seemed to enhance the quality of the relationship between giver (follower) 
and receiver (chief) and also, I conjecture, embodied its voluntariness for the giver (which is why I have 
not defined these gifts as 'tributes'). 
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The chief's words are political: political speech is `full' speech: a theoretical view. 
Clastres argues (1987: 27-47,152-5,189-218) that the phenomenon of the chief's 
duty to speak is bound in jointly with the Amerindians' conception of power as a 
natural force which is highly dangerous for humans and their basic structural 
dynamic of reciprocal communication. Since, he says, this violent power is 
perceived as inimical to, and potentially destructive of, the tripartite `relations of 
exchange' (entailing as signs: women, goods and words) which both define society 
and constitute its political sphere (p. 37), Amerindians have accordingly devised 
the means for nullifying the negative potency of power by keeping it outside society 
and the polity. He proposes that the process relies on a particular and negative 
type of exchange which, as it is alien to "the province of communication" (p. 41) and 
without the usual reciprocity, is tantamount to a non-exchange: structurally, this 
involves on the one hand the polygynous presentation of women by the community 
to the chief; and on the other, the latter having to supply it both in goods, in the form 
of boundless generosity with his time, labour, services and possessions, and words 
in the form of his oratory used towards the specific end of peacekeeping and 
otherwise ensuring the community's well-being and survival. 
According to this thesis, and in contradiction to the Levi-Straussian one (1967, 
1969: 43-4), the exchange is asymmetric. While Riviere (1983-4,1984: 87-94) and 
Santos-Granero (1986) agree with Clastres about the inequality of the exchange, 
they refute his other contention that the Lowland society does not have a political 
economy. Overing argues (1983-4) that for Amerindians power is identified not 
with the external forces of nature but the internal forces of culture; these are seen to 
derive from supernature and the danger immanent in their potency can only be 
preempted and domesticated through the means of reciprocal - and equal - 
exchange. 
I oppose Clastres' argument, as summarised above, from another angle, 
believing it to be based on a number of disputable assumptions. The principal 
among them to my mind are that (a) despite the (he claims) universal mutually 
interdependent relationship between power and speech wherein each owes its 
existence to the other and "is the substance of the other" (p. 152, my emphasis), 
and although the chief's speech is the "means the group provides itself with to 
maintain power outside coercive violence" (p. 46), this speech paradoxically is 
itself not powerful but powerless (for while connected with an institution of power, it 
carries no authority since Amerindian chieftainship, "this institution without 
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`substance"', needs to be seen in terms of a `power that is powerless in practice') 
[p. 29]; (b) this `powerless speech' must for its survival depend on an exchange of 
the kind postulated, i. e., the supposedly unequal one of the community's women to 
the chief in return for his services to it; and (c) women are the "most essential value" 
(p. 38-9) that groups can exchange. 
This is in disagreement, however, with the following empirical facts relative to the 
Pa'ikwene. Firstly, not only do the tly6 leader's words, and words more generally, 
have authoritative power in their social life, but they hold the notion that power can 
inhabit a speaker's breath and very words, as reported in chapters 4,5 and 9. 
Certain supernatural entities, and most notably the spirit-divinity Wavitche (now 
seconded to the Pa'ikwene Christian dramatis personae to play the part of the 
Devil wielding unconditionally evil power), are seen `traditionally' to possess a 
single power whose potency is expressible in the social sphere (very often but not 
exclusively via human conductivity). In shamanic logic, it is not the human who 
speaks the words of power obtained from the spirit but the spirit who speaks its 
power through the human. The Pa'ikwene do not seek to control and domesticate 
supernatural power as the Piaroa do (Overing op. cit.: 340-1,1988). Pa'ikwene 
shamans seemed, rather, to seek to put themselves under its control, to be its 
instruments, so as to fulfil the objectives they desired and requested of it. Violence, 
coercion and destruction, then, would not be the unique characteristics of power 
inside society; depending on the intentions of the person soliciting that power, it 
can also present diametrically opposing ones for peaceful and creative ends (e. g. 
peacemaking, healing). 
The link between words and the productivity of supernaturally derived power 
would seem to be prevalent in Amazonia. Isacsson, for instance, reports 
(1993: 346-73,397) that the Embera see themselves as `words', manifestations of 
the creator god's speech. Social man is Man the Speaker, the 
"anthropomorphised structure of the divine intention" (p. 361); his speech recreates 
the divine order. Not only do the Embera chief and shaman create society 
cosmically with their speech on ritual occasions, but the household, community and 
cosmos are remade daily through the proper behaviour, which includes speaking 
as well as working and knowing, of `ordinary' people (Isacsson, in a workshop at St 
Andrews University, 31st May 1996). Thus every Embera individual `possesses' 
the divine and creative verbal power. 
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Secondly, polygyny is not practised by the Pa'ikwene (as Clastres himself points 
out, op. cit.: 33). Their chiefs do not therefore exercise the prerogative of having 
many wives since they do not possess it; and the community, it follows, does not 
donate its women. However, despite the apparent lack of such exchange, the 
chiefs nonetheless give their words to the community in order to safeguard and 
reproduce its well-being. Further, as mentioned before, the Pa'ikwene have female 
as well as male leaders, and there seemed to be not one whit of difference, where 
speaking is concerned, between their respective duties, responsibilities, and `gifts' 
to their people. As far as I could see, the only thing that chiefs got in return for 
working through their speech and other actions to maintain the group's security 
and survival was its continuing support and good will. My use of "only" does not 
imply a negative meaning. 
As is well known, Clastres' argument runs counter to that of Levi-Strauss, for 
the latter holds (op. cit. ) that the relationship between a chief and his followers is 
one based on the principle of reciprocity, and that the exchange is equal and 
comprises a "perpetual balance of prestations, privileges, services and obligations" 
(1967: 59): essentially, through granting the privilege of polygyny to the leader, the 
group members swap their individual security, which purportedly accrues from the 
`monogamy rule', for collective security. 14 However, and discounting the absence 
of institutional Pa'ikwene polygamy, the fact that their chiefs may receive certain 
goods such as food items does not necessarily indicate, I suggest, the existence of 
reciprocity if by this is meant solely the principle of obligatory return. The Piaroa 
chief, for instance, while receiving `payment' for his services to the community15 is 
also presented with a "constant flow" of gifts which, as already mentioned, are 
explicitly free of any obligation or expectation of a return (Overing Kaplan 1975: 63- 
14 Clastres and Levi-Strauss nevertheless concur in their belief that collective security is only acquired 
by the relinquishment of an individual one, the medium of exchange being women. However, the 
Pa'ikwene obtain their collective security (as we saw in chapter 5) even though the (male) individual 
does not give up his individual security (if represented by 'his' womenfolk) in return. Could it be, then, 
that polygamy provides us with a false scent in our attempts to trace a general sociological rule for the 
relations connected with Amerindian leadership? And should we not, rather, consider the situation as 
possibly an interactive one where a chief gifts his love, care, and skills to the individual follower, both 
male and female, and by extension the group; and the follower responds not with an 'item of 
exchange', which has connotations of trade, but also with a 'gift' (like Nenel's bananas) reciprocally 
embodying their 'good' feelings for him; and where, finally, both sets of 'gifts' performatively constitute 
the continuous and co-operative production by the two parties, the 'leader' and the 'led', not of 'his' 
group but their joint one conceived of as an assembly of one- to-one relationships? 
15 Its womenfolk would not seem to constitute the payment, whether in whole or in part: although 
polygyny exists among the Piaroa, it is rarely practised and no correlation is made between a man's 
status and the number of wives that he has (Overing Kaplan op. cit.: 143-4). 
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4, Overing 1992: 195). 
Thirdly, and very briefly, however highly valued Pa'ikwene women undoubtably 
are, I find no grounds for accepting as a given, let alone a universal one, that they 
are the most essentially valued of the three communicable things that Clastres 
claims them to be. The Pa'ikwene provided no indication that they were for them 
more essential or more valued than men; or for that matter, words. All three - 
women, men and words - were valued highly and, it seemed to me, equally. 
It is true that Clastres says (op. cit.: 46) that in the given context of power, when 
used for the express purposes of keeping it non-violent and uncoercive, the chief's 
words, like the group's women and like goods, do not act as communicable signs 
with an exchange value but, rather, as "pure values". This is precisely the reason 
why, for Clastres, the `language of authority' meets with such indifference on the 
part of the chief's followers. Relying on an `unconscious structure' argument (p. 
42), he theorises that since the cultural basis of the Amerindians is exchange and 
they perceive power to be its antithesis, then their rejection of it entails the very 
nullification of exchange. Given this absence, and by virtue of the non- 
communicative character of words in the process of non-exchange, it follows that 
"there is so little necessity for the chief's discourse to be listened to. " (p. 46). So, he 
has the obligation to speak; his followers on the other hand do not have the 
converse one to listen. 
For my part, however, I would argue on the basis that power is not an 
exclusively one-way process16, that the political speech of the Pa'ikwene does, on 
the contrary, involve both the communicative value of words and (non-obligatory) 
reciprocity. The latter occurs not just intra-socially but also between humans and 
the place which is seen as the natural matrix and home of power, and from where 
society takes power into itself: the so-called supernatural sphere. In this exchange, 
words do not as values relinquish their function as signs, which thus permits the 
communication. Tchikoi did not speak in order to get anything back from the group, 
whether in the form of material objects or continuing support, but, as it were, from 
power itself. The words of chiefs are offered, I suggest, with the specific intention 
and in the hope of obtaining not for themselves personally but for the group that 
16 Cf. Foucault 1979: 93 (also Sheridan 1980: 184); and Black 1977: 147 on Ojibwa concepts of 
power. 
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power's agency in the shape of its non-destructive, life-giving properties and 
effectiveness. 
For Clastres, developing his logic further, Amerindians not only do not have the 
duty to listen to their chief's speech, they also ill attend to it in practice because, 
being without authority, it is "empty"; and it "is empty precisely because it is not a 
discourse of power" (p. 154), but its opposite. Santos-Granero and Gow have both 
rebutted this. 17 The first writes (1991: 302) that the "Amuesha demand from their 
leaders words full of meaning and persuasion. An empty discourse cannot be a 
political discourse", and that the speech of their leaders is morally charged and 
"carries the weight of an order (without appearing as such)". The second holds 
(1991: 127,226-8) that the rhetoric of Piro chiefs is filled with moral and emotional, 
thus aesthetic, meaning for his people. I would similarly describe the words of 
Pa'ikwene leaders as full, and precisely because they are a discourse of 
uncoercive power. Accorded by people the description of "Kibeine" ("Good"/"Nice" 
and also the word for "thank you") and "Bareüyo" (Handsome"/"Clean"), they hold 
within them the positive moral and creative element of power; and contain 
meaningfulness, value, artistry, beauty, and affective mass (see chapter 3). 
Given that an Amerindian leader's speech can sometimes have the weight of a 
command for all that it does not seem like one, being "grounded in moral 
conditions shared by both leaders and followers " (Santos-Granero op. cit.: 302, my 
emphasis), I have argued throughout that this should be extended in respect of the 
speech of Pa'ikwene non-chiefs. The resolution of a dispute by Yvette, to which 
reference was made in chapter 5, shows that on the same grounds, and because, 
too, of the immanent presence in the words of the properties I have just listed, the 
voices of `ordinary' people can indeed be "heard-understood" to carry the same 
authority in `stateless' societies as those of chiefs in situations where sociopolitical 
action is necessary for the reproduction not so much of order as of `good relations' 
characterised by the factors of friendliness, peacefulness, and mutual pleasure and 
satisfaction. They can thus be actively instrumental in daily recreating the 
community itself as an entity at once cohesive and sociable. 
Yvette's speech, motivated by righteousness and indignation, and delivered with 
energy, humour and brio, demonstrates how the `political communication' of a 
17 See too Belaunde op. cit.: 97-8, McCallum 1989: 394 fn. 30 
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Pa'ikwene non-chief can be succinct, forceful and to the point. It also possessed 
spontaneity and effectiveness. All these features are in complete contrast with the 
customary monologic set-pieces of leaders as described by Clastres (op. cit. ), for 
whom they are (as if lifelessly) repetitive (p. 153), and impotent and 
incomprehensible because "uttered harshly so as not to be understood" (p. 46). 
Gow reports (op. cit.: 227-8) apropos the Piro that, on the contrary, the leader's talk 
is banal and platitudinous in appearance only. As for its supposed powerlessness 
and incomprehensibility, this was not an issue with the Pa'ikwene who "heard- 
understood" its meaning, and recognised its power, full well. 
As explained in chapter 5, I witnessed very little formal politics. I saw no 
`ceremonials' and heard no political rhetoric of a declamatory nature. Neither, 
apart from the instance of the aforementioned public report given by Tchikoi, can I 
give any detailed examples of how a Pa'ikwene chief's utterances were listened to 
by his followers. Unlike the leaders of some other Amerindian peoples (Gow ibid., 
Clastres op. cit.: 31), neither Tchikoi nor the two "capitaines" of Village Esperance 1 
were in the habit of giving evening or dawn harangues to the community in order 
specifically to broadcast its moral standards and exhort it to follow its traditions. But 
it is my impression that in his periodical rounds through Esperance 2, also 
described earlier, and perhaps almost by virtue of residing outside it, a "capitaine" 
appeared to act through his speech in such a way as to get the community to see 
itself objectively as a community. He did this, however, not by addressing them as 
an assembled group but by greeting and speaking to (or with, rather) each family in 
turn, mostly outside their homes, in view and within earshot of their neighbours. 
Occasionally, he would be invited inside to partake of some food. The talking 
which took place was by no means a one-way affair. Formal only insofar as it was 
more `polite' and more respectful of the demarcations of turn-taking than an 
ordinary conversation between familiars, its subject matter tended to be about the 
general well-being of the family in question and the village as a whole. (Politically 
critical issues would be dealt with in collective forum. During my stay, for instance, 
one such meeting concerned the effect of the presence of so many uninvited 
Brazilian incomers in their midst, and another the fights between the young males 
of the two villages). Despite the heightened politeness, it would be wrong to 
assume that the "capitaine's" verbal input was bland and his interest perfunctory or 
feigned. These two qualities, his words and concern, were seen as not only 
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reflecting but constituting his care and love for the people with whom he stopped to 
speak. 18 
As he moved from household to household and conversed with its members, the 
"capitaine" seemed in my mind to run like the dark fibre often woven through the 
series of spaces on a pale Pa'ikwene basket or manioc press, not with the purpose 
of binding the families tightly together but so as to highlight the pattern linking each 
different and autonomous unit. While their talk, a combination of the conventionally 
`loud-and-strong' and the informally low-key and calm, did not explicitly name the 
jointly moral and aesthetic values of community life, it nevertheless in my opinion 
referred to them implicitly. In so doing, it both reaffirmed these values in the 
listeners and performatively enabled them to recreate the community life itself. As it 
did too the beauty and pleasure of living it, similarly to the Piro (Gow op. cit. ) but 
unlike them without recourse to constantly reiterated homilies or haranguing. 
Such speech by Pa'ikwene leaders, then, was far from empty, harsh and 
unintelligible as Clastres would have it, nor was it directly didactic. It proceeded 
interactively. To the outside observer like me, it had aspects of the casual 
interpersonal chat as well as the more `formal' monologue. Eliciting and obtaining 
response, it constituted one of the threads of the unceasing dialogues of social 
relations. It was, in manner, expressive of conviviality. Its substance not only 
affirmed the values of the social, it in effect caused sociality to be; and to be seen, 
and felt, to be. 19 
This brings us to the subject of listening to political speech: 
18 Needless to say, this depended to some extent on the individual. "Capitaine" Louis, for example, 
was generally regarded as being less self-serving and having, and displaying in his words, a more 
sensitive concern for 'his' people and their well-being, than his fellow "capitaine", and rival, Auguste. 
19 Cf. Clastres' antithetical perception (op. cit.: 46-7) of the "isolation" and "solitude" of the chief's 
discourse due both to the "impotence of the political institution" itself and the lack of response from 
followers because such speech is delivered in such a way as to render it incomprehensible (and thus 
unanswerable). For Lacan (1975: 10), conversely, monologue itself is "a mirage" ; "every word calls for 
a reply" (p. 9) and only in madness is there "Language without dialectic" (p. 43; see too pp. 129-30 
note 102). 
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Full and political listening. 
"... Sounds whose reality depends on the listener. " 
(Villiers de I'Isle Adam 1992 [1885]: 112, his emphasis, my 
translation. ) 
As I have said, the Pa'ikwene "heard-understood" political speech actively. The 
process entailed not only one's capacity to listen and apprehend the semantic 
content but also one's conscious decision to do so. That is, it was not enough that 
the speaker wield persuasive power, whether in the sense intended by the 
Amuesha (described above) or Crocker (see chapter 5). The Pa'ikwene listener 
had also to consent to being persuaded: a far from passive action which involved 
interpreting, understanding and deciding about the intention `behind' the speaker's 
words. 20 
This relates directly to another factor of their social life, personal autonomy, 
and the right of the individual to possess it. As Thomas describes (1982) in respect 
of the Pemon, personal autonomy has such high value that one extends the desire 
for it to the `other'. Thus the wish to convert an individual's `wrong' conduct 
(disorder) back into `right' conduct (order) by indirect means which allow the 
wrongdoer's own autonomy to reman unviolated. And measures preventing or 
stopping conflict (such as Yvette's rebuke) are as important as those applied after 
conflict, as they may "preclude the use of sanctions... and preserve personal 
autonomy" (p. 9). In the Pa'ikwene context, `compliance' seems to be more a 
matter of free agreement than of obligation. This is consistent with what seems to 
obtain among the Lowland societies more widely, where authoritarianism is 
atypical (Riviere 1984: 73) and orders and obedience, in the sense of submissive 
behaviour, are virtually non-existent. 21 In Pa'ikwene terms, not to `behave properly' 
when exhorted to, either directly or indirectly, is not due to any failure to 'hear- 
understand' ("Tchimap") what is being said -a state of affairs covered more 
extensively in chapters 4 and 6. Rather, it may be seen as the intention, having 
'heard-understood', to continue to act unconsensually: a rightfully individualistic 
choice not to `fall into line'. It is interesting to note in this regard that Seeger reports 
20 See Sperber & Wilson's 'hearer based' theory (1986) of language processing and understanding 
utterances. Also Grice 1975, Derrida 1967, Hymes 1986 (on how in Ojibway intercommunication the 
onus for the attribution of the speaker's intention and meaning falls on the hearer). For more refer to 
my discussion on Pa'ikwene "hearing-understanding" (chapter 4). 
21 See Thomas 1982, Clastres op. cit.: 5, Goldman 1979: 253, Overing 1989: 162, and also the 
various other places in this thesis where the matter is discussed with reference to the Pa'ikwene. 
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(1981: 85) that the Suyä appear in contrast to have a notion of obedience 
somewhat more coincident with our own: when the chief speaks "everyone else in 
the village is supposed to `have heard it all' ", and those who do not act in accord 
with his words are said "to have not heard/understood/know". 22 
Pa'ikwene and Suyä behaviours tally in one respect, however. They both weaken 
Clastres' position further by indicating that his claim that political speech is not 
listened to is as fallacious as the one that such speech is empty. 
However, if listening to Pa'ikwene political speech events is not to be seen as a 
function of coercion (there being none), neither is it the mere reflexive result of non- 
coercion. It derives rather from the actors' exercise of their customary right of 
personal choice and volition, which is itself a political fact in that society. For 
Clastres (op. cit.: 41-7), it bears repeating, there is virtually no attentive listening to 
the chief in Amerindian societies because there is no obligation to do so as a 
consequence of his words (supposedly) not constituting communication and, 
therefore, falling outside the framework of reciprocal exchange. But in Pa'ikwene 
society, I submit, things do not work according to this model. On the contrary, there 
listening does happen because political speech does comprise communication, as 
I explained earlier, and precisely, also, because there is no obligation either: be it 
to listen, or to reciprocate in the exchange. (To repeat the typical Pa'ikwene 
attitude to gift-giving: "We give not because we have to but because we want to". ) 
Thus a Pa'ikwene, I propose, `hears-understands' political speech basically 
because, finding it relevant and meaningful, he or she wishes to and is in 
agreement with it morally, intellectually and emotionally. Doing so, however, does 
not demand or necessitate the actor's exclusive and unswerving concentration. 
Behaviourally, Pa'ikwene `hear-understand' in a markedly different manner to the 
ideal one conceived by the eurocentric mind, for which listening to authority seems 
to be equated with dutiful, totally focused attentiveness, and the condition of 
impotent, immobile and unthinking `captive audience' (cf. for instance Bloch 
22 The purposive and volitional nature of hearing is discussed in chapter 4. 
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1974). 23 
Clastres' depiction of the listening of Amerindians to political talk as 
desultory may be (qualifiably) correct in superficial descriptive terms (see for 
example Campbell 1995: 115-6 on the Wayapi). 24 He is however wrong as regards 
its cause, the purported absence of communication and exchange and the 
speaker's lack of coercive authority. This is because, it seems to me, he fails to 
perceive the central, and crucial, factor of audition in the process of Amerindian 
political speech, and its interrelatedness with understanding and knowing. 
As noted in chapters 4 and 6, Pa'ikwene people frequently tend not to look at each 
other when conversing but keep their eyes, or face, turned away. Along with this 
goes the sociopragmatic habit of meeting an utterance with a (sometimes 
exaggerated) temporary silence often accompanied by an apparent disinterest in 
your addressor as you continue busying yourself with whatever task you happened 
to be occupied with before being spoken to, like Wahtchit absorbed in grooming 
himself during Karinai's communication (described above). As stated earlier too, 
while I am not implying that this conduct is a hard and fast rule binding on all 
Pa'ikwene people and never deviated from, it occurred often enough to pass for 
`customary practice'. From my point of view, such `indifference' and 
`inattentiveness' often masked the addressee's actual engagement with the speech 
and their understanding of, and agreement or otherwise with, the speaker's 
meanings. 25 
The casual- and unconcerned-seeming audition, then, of the Pa'ikwene hearer- 
listener-understander, as well as the silence characteristically connected with it, is 
not, I propose, the result of the supposed non-communication assumed by 
Clastres. Rather, it is integrally and conventionally part of Pa'ikwene 
2313loch argues that the more formal the rhetoric, the more authoritarianly it acts upon the audience 
which, consequently, has less and less freedom of autonomous action in respect of it. However, his 
thesis not only dismisses the notion of the individual's free will and capacity for autonomous action, 
political or otherwise. It also ignores research in experimental psychology which demonstrates the 
"psychological and biological reality" of the listener's voluntary attention (Moray 1969b: 92), an issue 
dealt with in chapter 4 section i. 
24For a diametrically opposed portrayal see Seeger (op. cit. ) on the Suyä; and in a less specific but 
directly pertinent way, Isacsson (1993: 346-73) on the primordial importance of listening, 
cosmologically and sociopolitically, for the Embera. 
25 See footnote 15 chapter 4. 
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intercommunication, as described in chapters 4 and 6. There I have tried also to 
show the vital agency of the Pa'ikwene hearer as equal prime mover with the 
speaker in a dialogue. It is this, I propose, which acts to ensure the very existence 
of political speaking, be the `voice of authority' a chief's or a non-chief's like 
Yvette's (chapter 5 item v). For in a very real way the listening sustains the 
speaking. Without the first, the second could not continue; and since in stopping 
speaking, leaders would be made bereft of what power they had been given, it is 
not too farfetched to say that not listening to them may be said to undermine the 
existence of the community itself. 
So, while the Pa'ikwene may bear out Clastres' claim regarding the lack of 
obligation to listen, it does not follow that what listening there is, is irrelevant. Nor 
does it mean that, being characterised by a conspicuous `lack of attention', the 
listener's conduct in relation to political speech is anarchic. Rather, in its guise of 
"hearing-understanding", Pa'ikwene listening, no matter how apparently distracted 
or half-hearted to the anthropologist, and always operating in accord with the 
principles of autonomy, seemed actually to imply a thought-full and feeling-full 
engagement26 with the spoken, resulting in the listener's endorsement or non- 
acceptance of it, each actively and freely given. A Pa'ikwene who "hears- 
understands" a political communication, be it in the form of a report or a homily and 
uttered by a leader or a non-leader, may be said not only to judge but `absorb' the 
moral-intellectual-aesthetic substance embodied in it. Inasmuch as this substance 
fills the speaker's words, then it fills the listener's ears also (again something dealt 
with more fully in chapter 4). 
Theoretically, the Pa'ikwene listeners' agreement and endorsement, insofar as it is 
(voluntarily) forthcoming, could be said to form part of a vital integral component of 
the process in which political speech conceivably persuades the listener to fall in 
with the speaker's ulterior intention, namely `identification'. Crocker, basing himself 
on the work of Kenneth Burke (1969: 20-2), who in his turn draws on Aristotle, offers 
(1977: 60-4) a cogent explanation of this phenomenon. Briefly, political rhetoric 
must not be seen in terms of its semantic dimension alone. It, and indeed all 
political behaviour, should also be understood in those of its ('poetic') performative, 
contextual and moral ones. By means of their multi-faceted exegesis, and through 
26 Cf. William James' view (1966 [18901: 5) of 'distraction' as vacancy whereas its antithesis, 'attention', 
implies a conscious "withdrawal from some things" in order to focus on and deal with others. 
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the `entitling' effect (see chapter 5, Conclusion) of the speaker's words, listeners 
can be drawn to understand the `truth' of, and identify with, the common 
substantiality (of beliefs, notions, sensations and attitudes) which they share both 
with the speaker and among themselves, without for all that sustaining the loss of 
their own individual distinctiveness. There is thus a simultaneity of identity and 
difference, and with it the realisation of a purpose which Aristotle ascribed to 
rhetoric: the reconciliation of opposites (see Crocker ibid.: 62). 
Political speaking further works in such a way that, once persuaded of the moral 
essence of a context by the performance and the words, and given their 
consubstantiality, the identifying listeners perceive that it is in their joint interests to 
act together towards the same end: hence, the speaker's intended objective has in 
the process become theirs. 
While Crocker seems to concentrate on the political speaking of leaders 
(actual or aspiring), I believe his argument to be equally applicable to that of non- 
leaders such as `ordinary' Pa'ikwene villagers like Yvette. 
* 
Conclusion. 
I described above the interconnection among the Pa'ikwene of reciprocal 
exchange, political speaking and listening. In the process I examined various 
elements of the former, gifting, sharing, obligation and non-obligation to return, and 
the character and function of the latter two in social life. 
1. I argued against Clastres that political speaking does not entail a rejection of 
reciprocal exchange, but that on the contrary it is one. I strove, too, to show that 
among its other properties as a producer of sociality, speaking and talking together 
(and listening) also generate polity. For the Pa'ikwene, speech having this intrinsic 
and instrumental political function is not the meaningless or "empty" behaviour 
which Clastres would have us believe (op. cit.: 152-5), a claim already refuted by 
others, notably Santos-Granero (op. cit) and Gow (op. cit. ), as we have seen. 
Political speaking, whether by Pa'ikwene chiefs or non-chiefs, not only has a 
semantic content but also an extra-semantic one shared by speakers and listeners 
alike. The latter component, or `load', comprises moral, aesthetic and affective 
aspects which act inter-constitutively. Neither is political speech powerless despite 
Clastres' claim that the typically harsh style of the rhetoric of Amerindian leaders 
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"does not compensate for the impotence of the political institution" (ibid.: 46). 
Rather, as the potent agent of (non-coercive) power, political speaking can have 
practical effect in the social world of humans. 
2. I proposed too that Clastres' conclusion (ibid.: 31-2,46), that due to its 
'emptiness' people barely attend to it if at all, does more than misinterpret the 
reality of Amazonian 'political' rhetoric. While his premise, the lack of personal 
power and legal authority in non-coercive stateless societies, is arguably valid as 
regards the political side of Lowland life, it fails fully to take account of, and 
undervalues, the act of listening-hearing in native discourse, both in terms of social 
practice and the systems of indigenous logic in which it is embedded. Pa'ikwene 
'hearing-listening-understanding', together with the data cited in this chapter and 
earlier ones on the Amuesha (Santos-Granero op. cit. ), Suyä (Seeger 1981,1987), 
Wayapi (Campbell 1989), Achuar (A-C. Taylor 1993), Embera (Isacsson 1993), 
Yagua (Chaumeil 1993), Desana (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1981: 86-8), and Kalapalo (E. 
Basso 1985,1995), all attest that in Amazonian Amerindian cultures, hearing, 
acting in complement with speaking in its many forms, fits into a philosophy at once 
sociopolitical, moral and aesthetic. And that, like speaking, it is an explicit 
expression of the ideology. By which is meant that Pa'ikwene aural conduct 
expresses - i. e., conveys and embodies - indigenous notions about relating to, and 
communicating and living with, others. 
I contended that in the egalitarian framework of Pa'ikwene society audition 
in relation to political speaking, which encompasses much more than the speech 
events involving leaders, is not a matter of 'to hear is to obey'. But nor, on the 
(correct) premise that there is no obligation to listen and the (wrong) one that what 
is said is powerless, is it a question of not listening at all. The characteristic cultural 
trait that we tend ethnocentrically to see as a disinclination to pay attention and 
listen turns out in reality to be a sociopragmatic technique which does signify not in 
Pa'ikwene terms that 'no hearing' is happening. Rather, I have suggested, hearing 
actually and actively occurs; as does comprehension, since, as amply noted, "to 
hear" ("Tchimap") simultaneously also means "to listen and to understand". On this 
basis, `hearing-understanding' in a political context can be interpreted not as 
passive compliance but an autonomous act which entails the hearer's voluntary 
participation. 
I argued, therefore, that no matter how desultory and fitful the listening of a 
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Pa'ikwene in respect of the speech of leaders and others, it does not necessarily 
imply unconcern, disaffection or disengagement. Nor can it be regarded as 
apolitical, which is how Clastres considers (op. cit..: 31-2,46) the reportedly 
characteristic `poor listening' of the Lowland Amerindians in respect of their chiefs' 
utterances (see too Campbell 1995: 116). On the contrary, I interpret it in the light of 
my data as behaviour seemingly paradoxically acknowledging, understanding, and 
evaluating the potency and authority of the chief's words; and thereafter enabling 
individual listeners to act in line with their comprehension and evaluation. 
To sum up. In this chapter I have suggested (contra Clastres) that a genuine and 
equal exchange takes place in respect of political speaking; and that it is a non- 
obligatory one. I also proposed that notwithstanding the absence of (Weberian) 
state authority and coercion in Pa'ikwene society, and for all the seeming non- 
listening, neither the chief's speech, nor the political speech of others, nor their 
listening, is empty. The speaker's action is full of moral and practical authority; the 
listener's, of autonomy and freedom of choice to concur or not; and both, 
furthermore, carry a shared semantic, aesthetic and affective `content' understood 
and valued by the two actors alike. In this society, then, listening, in the sense of 
`hearing-understanding', has just as much an instrumental political role as 
speaking. Working in complementarity with one another, and in like manner to 
gifting, each helps to ensure the very survival of the society, and hence also that of 
the polity insofar as I believe the two to be one and the same, as discussed in 
chapter 5. 
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PART TWO 
MAKING and BELIEVING. 
"La theorie c'est bon, mais ca n'empeche pas d'exister. " 
("Theory is good, but it doesn't prevent things from existing. ") 
(Charcot cited in D. M. Thomas 1982: 142) 
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chapter eight 
"ANIVIT", THE PA'IKWENE SENSE OF PRODUCTION: WORK1, 
LANGUAGE AND THE MAKING OF CONVIVIALITY. 
"Only sleeping is not work. " 
(informant)2 
I begin with a description taken from my fieldnotes (February 1994): 
Soho[, the baby in 'my' house [she was born about a month and a half 
before my arrival], is bathed some five or six times a day in a store- 
bought plastic bowl - and each time subjected to the same mixture of 
tender, rough handling. The aim is not just to clean and cool her, but 
to mould her through a process of manipulation at once physical and 
social. To this end, the adult (her mother or father or grandfather or 
aunt) or older sibling (she has four brothers, and also a sister aged 
five) pat, pound, press and generally knead her limbs, shoulders and 
back, and gums and skull, using the water as lubricant. The purpose 
of this is to strengthen the child, straighten its legs, and, most crucially 
of all, encourage and shape the round head which for the Pa'ikwene 
represents the ideal form aesthetically and in terms of `ethnic 
identity'. 3 So intent are they on turning her into a healthy and proper 
and beautiful4 little Pa'ikwene person, the bather will pointedly 
disregard Sohol's cries of protest and pain. It's not that they treat her 
in this way despite the fact that they regard their family's newest 
member with the utmost love and devotion, but because they do so. 
Another feature of the process is that care is taken always to wash 
Sohol's face before her body; for to do the reverse would result, I was 
told, in her marrying a much older spouse in later life. 
1 By `work' I mean (and will mean throughout except when stating otherwise) more than just the labour 
involved. Rather, I use the term as a gloss to cover and signify not only productivity and production 
(including distribution and consumption), and the various elements these entail, but also very often 
the product itself. 
2 On sleep as the alternative and complement to work in native societies see Sahlins 1974: 19-20. 
3 See Clastres 1988: 15 on the similar Guayaki concept and practice. 
4 As noted, the Pa'ikwene word for "beautiful" (or "pretty"), `Bareüyo" (fem. ), also means "clean", with 
the latter being used both in the literal sense and to signify "proper". I discuss in chapter 3 the jointly 
emotional, moral and sociopolitical aspect relating to the aesthetics of the Pa'ikwene baby's round 
head. 
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This is an example of what the Pa'ikwene call "Anivit", which they themselves 
translated as `travail', that is to say, in English, `work'. As can be seen, the 
particular activity just depicted comprises elements relating to the practical and the 
social, the moral and the aesthetic, and to notions of personhood; as well as to 
nature (the water), history (plastic bowl), and gender. I wish below to consider 
some of these multiple aspects, and others, insofar as they are integral to 
Pa'ikwene `work' more generally. 
What follows does not pretend to be an economic study as such. It is more in the 
way of a descriptive and explorative piece in which so-called economic factors are 
of necessity included, but only as part of the wider process of social life. In the 
section on `good hearing' above, I described and examined some of the aspects 
connected with another "anivit", hunting (in respect especially of the dialogic 
relations between the human and non-human spheres). In the present chapter, 
apart from the aforementioned instance of childcare I will also write about the 
processing of the manioc crop, though not in any technical or purely economic 
sense, but, like Sohol's bath, as a further example of the ultimate and main product 
of Pa'ikwene `work', sociality. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first I discuss in a general way the 
native organisation and classification of work and consider some of the concepts 
and practices involved. The second, which is mainly theoretical, deals with the 
differences in the evaluation of work between the Pa'ikwene and ourselves. The 
last examines the interconnection between different but complementary forms of 
productivity (namely tool use, physical exertion and speech) and society seen as a 
set of relations at once dialogic and convivial. 
* 
1) Work(s) and working. 
On one level, and at a cursory glance, the Pa'ikwene attitude to work, or "anivit", 
could be said to be straightforwardly and uniformly negative. It comes over in short 
like a vindication of the once widespread claim, famously attacked by Sahlins 
(1974: 1-39), that the economic existence of `primitive', or as he calls them, 
`paleolithic', societies is not only precarious and minimal but one of unremitting 
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drudgery. 5 Thus, ask an informant, any informant, about "anivit", and you will 
immediately be told it is "mahiko", that is to say, "hard". You will further learn that it 
includes all and any activity requiring a sustained effort and, regardless of the 
degree of exertion and mastery of skill involved, commonly characterised as 
difficult, arduous and dirty, very often painful, and sometimes dangerous as well. 
And, moreover, and revealingly, that it pertains to tasks which we ourselves would 
not think to classify as economic - e. g. childcare, already referred to, healing, and 
exercising the function of chief or `capitaine'. 6 
"Anivit" was categorised for me into the following types: 
(table 2) 
(a) garden work. 
(b) the processing of the garden crops (and chiefly manioc) into foods. 
(c) hunting. 
(d) fishing. 
(e) gathering. 
(f) tool/implement/ornament-making and any other kind of craftwork. 
(g) building. 
(h) housework (including washing clothes). 
(i) cooking. 
(j) childcare. 
(k) curing and making plant remedies 
(1) being chief. 
(m) working in the 'market economy'. 
The first three of these, garden work, manioc processing and hunting, were spoken 
of as not just hard but "very hard work" ("anivit ka'insima mahiko"). So, 
5 Granted that Sahlins' critique concentrates on nomadic hunter-gatherers, whereas the Pa'ikwene 
are much more sedentary and engage in horticulture as well as hunting/fishing and gathering, and 
also, increasingly and in parallel, in the 'market economy", as will be briefly described below. 
6 It is highly significant that many anthropologists seem to need to stress, I believe correctly, the fact 
that outside of 'Western' culture the economic aspect tends not to be conceived as basic to and 
distinguishable (let alone separate) from the other activities and, especially, relations constituting the 
overall sphere of social life. See e. g. Malinowski 1922, Firth 1929, Radcliffe-Brown 1959: 197-8, Nash 
1967, Forde & Douglas 1967, Sahlins 1971, Schwimmer 1979, Dilley 1992 for various ways in which 
this has been expressed. Schneider points out (1974: 1-21) the difference between the "formal" 
economy of societies such as our own, whose exchanges are primarily of a materialist nature, and the 
"substantivist" one of so-called primitive societies, where they are chiefly social and moral. 
Examples of anthropologists who, taking the marxist `economic base' as a given, hold the view, 
however differently constructed, that indigenous social systems are political-economies operating 
universally under a 'mystificatory' ideological cloak, usually religious or relating to notions of kinship 
and gender, include Meillassoux 1964, Bern 1979, Terray 1984, Godelier 1984, Bloch 1984. For 
some different perceptions and interpretations, both marxian and non-marxian, with specific reference 
to Amazonia read Lizot 1973, Riviere 1983-4, Santos-Granero 1986, Descola 1986, Overing 1983-4, 
1989,1992, Viveiros de Castro 1992: 119-41, Belaunde 1992, Arhem 1996. 
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notwithstanding the Pa'ikwene's noteworthy, and typical, loving care and devotion 
for their children, and especially the infants, was childcare. Given this, and the very 
real positive value that was attached to these and the other activities listed above, 
we should perhaps try to understand the Pa'ikwene notion of hardship in relation to 
work in terms other than the ones we ourselves tend to. 
Regarding the last item on the list, working in the 'market economy': many 
Pa'ikwene I met, both male and female, were keen to find themselves a "petit job", 
to use the Creole expression they had borrowed, in the outside world. Perceived 
as distinct from "anivit", this would include a variety of activities in both the 'formal' 
and 'informal' sectors, such as labouring and construction work; serving as a 
general 'dogsbody' for shopkeepers in the nearby town; hiring oneself out as a 
guide and hunter either to tourists or to commercial or governmental concerns; 
selling surpluses (notably manioc flour), making and peddling fruit juices, and 
manufacturing craftware for non-indigenous private customers7 and, in the case of 
some items, such as woven fibre hats, for urban entrepreneurs. This last amounted 
to a veritable 'cottage industry' for a number of households in Village Esperance 2. 
A few people had received training allowing them access to more skilful and 
fulltime employment in the non-Indian world. Thus, for instance, 'Capitaine' Louis 
of Village Esperance 1 worked as a nurse in the local health centre, and a woman 
was hired in an administrative capacity in the town school. While such positions 
conferred relatively high social status in a `Western' context, in view of the skill 
entailed, they did not seem to do so in the Pa'ikwene one. That is, neither of the 
two people in question was regarded by their co-villagers as being of a superior 
`class' by virtue of these jobs. 
It is interesting, in passing, to note that while a Pa'ikwene will tell you that he 
or she has, or yearns for, "un petit job", the same sense of possession and 
reification of work does not seem to apply where "anivit" is concerned. "Anivit" is 
clearly not an object to be owned, and certainly not personally. Rather, it is an 
action which is at once individual and collective in that it is engaged in by the 
person usually, though not always, working in concert with others and towards a 
common end. In brief, though it notionally exists as a substantive noun, work for 
7 The Pa'ikwene have long enjoyed trading relations with the outside world, in particular Creole 
society, as noted in chapter 1. Recently, however, it seems that Karipün manioc flour is being 
preferred to the Pa'ikwene's. 
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the Pa'ikwene tends to be more a matter of practice and thus of verb: one works 
("Kanivwie") rather than `having', `owning' or `giving' work. 8 
An informant cited "Pa'ikwene work", with the emphasis very much on the modifier, 
as one of the three things she teaches her children in order that they should always 
remember who they were, that is to say, Pa'ikwene people. The other two were 
cooking and eating Pa'ikwene food and speaking Pa'ikwaki. A similar conceptual 
link between skills and personhood seems not uncommon in Lowland Amazonia; it 
is held, for example, by the Pemon (Thomas 1982) and the Piaroa (Overing 
personal communication). "Anivit", then, not only represented but constituted, and 
in a sense determined, Pa'ikwene-hood. "Jobs", in contrast, were patently not seen 
as being able to accord that intrinsic personal and `ethnic' identity. 9 My informant 
went on: 
"I can learn, and I can do, other [i. e., non-Pa'ikwene] ways of cooking 
and working and speaking, but I am still Pa'ikwene and will remain 
Pa'ikwene because I was born Pa'ikwene and remember the 
Pa'ikwene things my parents taught me. " 
However, as meaningful as the 'old ' ways indubitably were, the `new' ones are not 
to be thought of as having a superficial and merely utilitarian worth for the 
Pa'ikwene. I have not the space here to enter more deeply into this aspect of the 
Pa'ikwene's social existence, other than noting a parallel with what Gow has 
shown (1991: 90-115) in connection with the Piro. They, like many others, and to a 
greater degree than the Pa'ikwene, are also inserted into the `free market' 
economy, while continuing at the same time to practice their original `subsistence' 
one. Gow argues that such a condition is not necessarily posed in terms of hostility 
for those who participate in it. Instead, for all the tension between them, the two 
systems seem to operate with a large degree of harmony, each fulfilling indigenous 
needs in different but complementary ways. The societies in question may be said 
8 Cf. Illich who notes (1973: 89-90) that in Latin America "peasants say that they do" work but that 
"people who speak a nominalist language [e. g. that of Western industrial society] habitually express 
proprietary relationships to work which they have... This shift from verb to noun [experienced by 
modernised peasant societies] reflects a transformation in the idea of ownership" (his stresses). For 
more on Illich's view of commoditisation in respect of work and other things, see section 3 below. 
9 Cf. Schwimmer (1979: 294) on how 'Western artists", Amerindian hunters, and Melanesian 
cultivators also perceive the difference between 'real work' and 'jobs' in terms of (marxist) 
identification/alienation. 
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to work both systems to their advantage. Neither, stresses Gow, is the situation to 
be seen as one in which the original economy is in the process of evolving into the 
second. Rather, the two are partners in, and joint sub-systems of, a single 
combinatory economic system. This runs counter to the view that exposure to the 
alien economy leads inevitably to the wipe-out and replacement of the prior, 
indigenous one and the culture in which it is embedded (see for example Wolf 
1971). 
I now move on to describe and discuss a number of issues relating to `work', in 
terms both of concepts and practice, and also briefly to delineate the indigenous 
partition of labour. My data is based mainly on conditions existing in the family of 
Susana and Karinai Labonte and their six children with whom I lived, and to a 
lesser extent on those of the other households to which I obtained access. No 
great discrepancies were noticeable among them in respect of the work they did 
and the ideas they had about it. 
Work or labour? 
Schwimmer warns us (1979: 287-9) against applying to all cultures the specifically 
European concept of `work'. Far from being universal, he argues, this idea is a 
historical product of the `Industrial Revolution' and pertains essentially to economic 
activities alone (unlike in Pa'ikwene thinking, as already mentioned). Furthermore, 
he shows apropos the Orokaiva (Melanesia) that `work' is itself not a universal 
concept. To this end, he cites an informant as stating that his people "did not take 
up work... [until] Jesus Christ... gave them work... to take up" (p. 287). 
Although it is of course not possible to ascertain for sure, I am disinclined to 
accept that the Pa'ikwene's own notion of work, as presented to me, was borrowed 
from, let alone identical with, the Protestant one which, as converts, they had been 
taught. It too, as is well known, stresses hard work both as an ideal and a practice 
(see Weber 1971: 95-183, particularly 158-9). 10 Whereas both ideas have to do 
with difficulty, strenuousness, and indeed pain, the indigenous one posits work 
10 Be it of the mental or physical kind, work is in effect tantamount to the adoration of God, according 
to certain Christian theologies, such as those of the (Protestant) Puritans and Lutherans (Weber 
ibid: 262 note 16). This idea is not unique to Christianity. In Hebrew, for instance, the word "Avodah" 
jointly means work and worship, and in Jewish kaballistic mysticism "its use... expresses the combined 
and conscious intent that goes into every action; everything outwardly done has an inner content 
which makes the act itself sacred... " (Halevi 1995: 81). 
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very much as an activity aimed at obtaining `this world' results, both material and 
social. The alien one has also to do with laborious exertion in `this world', but as 
an ascetic practice to be directed not just toward a material end but, beyond that, at 
a spiritual one, to the point indeed of conflation. Added to which, the first 
emphasises and valorises the collective aspect of work (while not for all that 
devaluing the `individualistic' one); the second, the individualistic aspect over the 
collective. 
As I have already said, the Pa'ikwene themselves translated "Anivit" as "Travail", 
that is, "Work". However, given their description of it as something thoroughly hard 
and irksome, it could very well fit a certain ( and bleak) English definition of the term 
`Labour'. As Firth has pointed out (1979: 178) in his analysis of the Marxist `Law of 
Value', the English language, unlike German apparently, 11 possesses two terms to 
denote, more or less, what is basically one and the same activity; albeit not to 
connote an identical meaning. He writes that though the pair are semantically 
close, "work" (and "worker") tends to have a less negative significance than 
"labour" (and "labourer"), in terms of skill, status and expenditure of energy. This is 
true as far as it goes. 12 But to my mind, Firth, concerned though he is to interpret 
the sense of the German word "Arbeit" (as used by Marx), omits mention of the 
perceivably more positive notional aspects which "Labour" coevally possesses. 
Thus for example the expressions "labour of love" and "the dignity of labour", and 
the idealised aura attaching in traditionalist left-wing circles to "The Labouring 
Classes", which has not less status than, and affectively just as much value as, 
"The Working Class". Along the same lines, Parsons, in his translation of Weber's 
"The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism" (1971), renders a more 
favourable version of "Labour" than does Firth. For he uses both that word and 
"work" in a synonymous fashion, and does not demur at according it (pp. 158-9, 
262-3 notes 16,18,19,20) the same, and highest, positive signification that 
Protestant conceptualisation intends . 
11A claim not borne out by my German-English dictionary (Collins 1985: 308). 
12 Some other negative connotations, not mentioned by Firth and relating to notions of punishment, 
suffering and lack of reward, are "hard labour", "slave labour" and "labour camp". 
As regards "Travail", it too possesses a negative conceptual aspect, as Illich shows (1973: 30). 
Deriving from the Latin word, "Trepalium", meaning a specific type of instrument of torture (through 
impalement), the term came by the 12c to signify a painful experience, then some four hundred years 
later took on the sense by which we continue to understand it today (work). 
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This said, I return to my first claim: that "Anivit" smacked more of "Labour", in its 
negative sense, than "Work", in that it was, at least descriptively, an activity 
assessed by the Pa'ikwene in terms of difficulty, pain and tiredness-factor. This 
makes it somewhat like the Tikopia's `work' described by Firth (op. cit.: 192), though 
without its element of coercion (Cf. Schwimmer op. cit.: 299 and J. and J. Comaroff 
1981: 196-9 on, respectively, Orokaiva and Tswana distinctions between `work' 
[positive] and `labour' or `toil' [negative]). 
Schwimmer shows (op. cit. ) that whatever the pain associated with (gardening) 
work it was resolved for the Orokaiva by being "sacramentally transformed". That 
is, the productive process and the eating of the product (taro) were ideologically 
understood, and experienced, as religious acts, wherein the individual "feels his 
unity with the Taro goddess and also with the garden and crop" (op, cit.: 302). In 
such a schema, horticultural work is not a matter of transforming nature to human 
ends (as it is in `modern' Western thinking, see for example Freud 1928). Rather, it 
is a question of human involvement in the simultaneously natural and supernatural 
order. 
Schwimmer draws theoretically (pp. 289-94) on Vernant's investigation of 
Ancient Greek notions of Work and `technical', or practical, Thought (1965; see too 
1996). The Hellenes, it seems, used a myth of divine conflict (between Zeus and 
Prometheus) to explain hermeneutically the 'trouble and toil' of human life, the 
products which enabled, both materially and supra-materially, its existence, 
sustenance and survival, and the relationship between the two. As a growing 
literature testifies, many Amazonian peoples also understand human 'work' as an 
aspect of a wider, cosmogonic process of productivity, whereby it is similarly given 
a `religious' explanation which posits a dialectic, or a continuum of interactivity, 
between relations between people and between people and the non- or extra- 
human world (see inter alia Overing Kaplan 1982, Overing 1883-4: 337-41, 
Descola 1986, Belaunde op. cit., Viveiros de Castro 1992: 92-141, Arhem 1996, 
Ellis 1997, on the Piaroa, Achuar, Airo-Pai, Arawete, Makuna and Tsimanes 
respectively; also see chapter 4 section iii). 
Unfortunately (and I cannot stress the word enough), I for my part did not 
come across any data permitting me to claim that the Pa'ikwene also held an 
ideological agenda according to which their own work ("anivit") and working 
relations were integrated into a unitary cosmology involving not just the human but 
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the natural and supernatural worlds as well. However, while not encountering any 
such explicitly described metaphysical relations of production, I did witness the 
practical manifestation of dialogic, and thus I assume essentially `social', relations 
between humans and animals in one type of "anivit" which we would call 
`economic' (hunting), and between humans and supernatural entities in one which 
we would not (healing). 13 This leads me to suspect, albeit cautiously, that for the 
Pa'ikwene human work was in fact part of a more complex and overarching 
`religious' process of productivity involving the supra-human, and in a manner 
other than as its mere exploiter. 14 
The work of men and women. 
The widespread equality between Pa'ikwene men and women, of which I have 
given several examples in previous chapters, extended into the sphere of work 
(pace Nimuendaju's assertion that in the economic sphere, and thus the social one 
more widely, the women exercised ascendancy over the men [1971: 54-6]. This 
claim was repeated by F. and P. Grenand [1979] but is contrary to the views held by 
Fernandes [1948] and Arnaud [1968: 10-11,1984: 34-5] according to which it is the 
men who are the dominant ones. I have already treated the issue in more detail in 
chapter 5 item [vi]). 
The sexual `division of labour' existed but was not very marked. While some 
tasks were taxonomically held to be the preserve of one sex they were in practice 
engaged in by both. `Male' tasks consisted of clearing the forest in order to make 
the garden sites, basket weaving, weapon making, and fishing with arrows and 
rifles. Fishing with a line, on the other hand, was a jointly male and female activity. 
In the 1920's Nimuendaju established a table of work activities along somewhat 
more demarcated gender lines (op. cit.: 24-5). Several which he classed as 
exclusively male were nowadays also being carried out by the women in 
Esperance 2: meat roasting, house building, making feather ornaments and 
working for strangers. Manioc flour making, reported by him as `female', is today 
done by the men as well, as is manioc processing generally (see section 3 below). 
Hunting presents an interesting case in that while also classed as `men's work' by 
13 For details of the first see my discussion on 'good hearing' (chapter 4 section iii); for those of the 
second, chapter 9 part 2. 
14 See chapter 9 part 3 (c) for data on this. 
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both Nimuendaju and `male' discourse, the reality turned out to be much more 
equivocal. Although I never managed to verify it in person, I was informed by Chief 
Tchikoi in Aükwa that the women of the small community of Yakot hunted on a 
systematic basis. I wondered if this might be a recent innovation. On questioning 
Susana about it, I learned that she and her sisters, as well as other women I knew, 
had hunted when younger. That they no longer did so, she said, was not because 
of any ban but because they no longer had the time to. Elaborating, she explained 
that Pa'ikwene women had "always" actively participated with men in the killing of 
animals15 (as their slayers, that is, and not simply as helpers or beaters), but did not 
accompany them on the long hunting trips involving the use of dogs, although 
apparently the Yakot women hunters did do so. 16 While some of the men 
corroborated this, many more seemed patently reluctant to. A few openly denied it; 
especially, interestingly enough, the younger ones, who mocked the very idea. 17 
Thus a certain `male ideology' may be said to hype hunting as an exclusively male 
`thing' irrespective of what appears to be the case in actual (or reported) practice. 
The only `female' tasks would seem to be the supervision of the making of manioc 
bread, but not the actual making itself (a process in which men and boys take part 
along with the women), the manufacture of bead ornaments, cotton weaving, 
pottery and cashiri making (the last three being no longer carried out in Esperance 
2 but still engaged in by women in other settlements). 
Most tasks were ungendered. This included gathering, healing, and being chief 
(as noted above Pa'ikwene women can become shamans and leaders). Apart 
from clearing the sites (male activity), all other horticultural work was done by men 
15 For the native classification of prey refer to Appendix B. 
16 See Montout 1994: 63-4 for data on Pa'ikwene hunting dogs. 
17 This turned out to be virtually the only time I encountered male bias in respect of anything female. 
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and women jointly. 18 Domestic chores were done in the overwhelming majority of 
the families I saw by both women and men, and girls and boys: cooking, babycare, 
cleaning, and clothes-washing. Apparently in the past, that is, one to two 
generations ago, the domestic sphere was more 'female' than `male' but, one 
woman informant told me, the women got the men to change their ways. Childcare, 
though, has customarily always been jointly male-female, then as now. 
As is clear, Pa'ikwene women are not confined to the `domestic sphere', a claim 
made by Montout who describes it (1994: 62) as one of the three comprising the 
"traditional Palikur universe". The others are the "abattis [i. e. horticultural] sphere" 
and the "forest sphere". As I have shown, the women not only actively but 
instrumentally participate as productive, autonomous and co-operating agents in 
these last two; as do the men in the first one. 19 
Unlike the men's involvement in the `domestic sphere', however, the extra- 
domestic one on the part of the women should not be considered a modern 
innovation. The fact that they not only hunted but were said to have hunted in the 
past, and that, too, they fulfil the tasks of healing and being chief, suggests 
otherwise. 
Informants, both male and female, were not only conscious of the development of 
the organisation of labour, from the relatively more gender demarcated system 
which existed in the recent past to the minimal one that it now is. They were fully 
aware also of their own instrumentality in bringing it about. Someone commented 
18 Esperance 2 households cultivated garden plots called "wass" or "bati" (Creole term from the 
French "abattis" meaning cleared land). The sites were situated on forest land acquired from the 
government, initially freely for a period and then subject to rent. Of inferior quality to those in Aükwa, 
they were located some distance from the village and reaching them involved a long trek, itself part of 
the "anivit", with the result that one was already tired before getting down to the day's main task 
proper. Originally given to Susana's father, she and Karinai considered their "bati" to be communally 
owned by the whole family. As mentioned, their main produce was (bitter) manioc ("Kaneg"). They 
also grew pineapples ("Kwawü"), bananas ("Pilatnü"), oranges ("Üwass"), ajvocados ("Avük") and 
small crops of sweet potato ("Kaig") and pumpkin ("Yü'üm"). 
19 For similar examples in respect of other Lowland women, see Belaunde (1992) and Viveiros de 
Castro (1992: 43-7) on the Airo-Pai and Arawete respectively. Moore offers (1988) a thorough critique 
of the Eurocentric contention, but recently prevalent in anthropology, that (a) women are universally 
tied to the 'domestic sphere' and (b) the activities they carry out there are not 'work'; of. Strathern 
1987: 1-32, Sacks 1979: 66-95. 
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that the only really woman's work left was that of giving birth. 20 
Taxonomically, however, giving birth was not considered to be "anivit"; and 
the "pain and suffering" associated with it was likened to that connected with illness 
("Kagait") rather than work. People did not accept the analogy, when I tried it out on 
them, between manioc growing in the ground and a baby growing in the womb. 21 
It is only in regard to the stage when, the child being born, the process of raising it 
begins that there was any acknowledgement of a similarity, and indeed equality, 
with that of raising a crop, and with all the other activities seen and classified as 
"anivit". 
A woman possesses the right of decision over the destination of her own personal 
products, and also about what she wants in exchange for them, even, as was noted 
by Arnaud (1984: 35), when the actual transacting is done by the husband. 
According to him (ibid., also 1968: 10-11), it is the men who dispose of the 
household's products, i. e, those that are collectively produced, in the manner which 
he thinks best. My own observations disagree with this, for whether it was the 
husband who did the trading or not, the wife's decision making in their connection 
was certainly as great as his; in sum, in most cases it was a truly joint-decision. 
Furthermore, since the wife had a control over the distribution22 of some products, 
including those produced by her husband (e. g. game), and also took charge of the 
money he earned from `jobs' in the 'market economy', a case might even be made 
for arguing that she in effect had a greater economic 'say' than he did. I would not, 
20 Said as a 'joke', this revealed the widespread cross-cultural connection made notionally between 
work and giving birth, both activities of course being by definition productive ones. The English 
expression 'going into labour' conveys a not dissimilar linkage. In the Ancient Greek world, according 
to Hesiod, fecundity and work constituted opposing if complementary functions (see Vernant 
1965: 188, Schwimmer 1979: 288). Testart puts things slightly differently again, postulating (1985, 
1986) that universally in hunter-gatherer societies, through an ideology based on the symbolism of 
blood, the woman's ability to give birth is, in terms both of 'power' and economics, necessarily different 
from but equal and complementary to that of the man to produce game through hunting. On the 
way(s) in which 'work' seems to be productive for the Pa'ikwene, see below. 
As for giving birth itself, it might be said to be a joint female and male activity for the Pa'ikwene 
anyway, notionally speaking, in that according to Arnaud (1984: 47) Pa'ikwene men practised 
couvade. The custom seems to have died out now, at least I neither came across it nor heard tell of it. 
21 1 was 'inspired' by Belaunde's data (1992: 155 ff. )on the Airo-Pai for whom sexuality, parenting and 
horticultural cultivation are not just interrelated processes but conceptually parts of the same process. 
Thus the perceived correspondence and interaction between the human parent's relationship with 
their child and the one between the 'supernatural' master/parent of the vegetable world with a plant 
(pp. 162-4). 
22 Regarding the impact of the 'market economy' on the Pa'ikwene's traditional practices of 
distribution, sharing and gifting, see chapter 7. 
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though, go so far as to equate that with greater economic power than the man, and 
even less so with social ascendancy over him (as F. and P. Grenand do [op. cit. ]). 
The work of children and adults. 
The Pa'ikwene are patently unfamiliar with the concept of `not sending a boy to do 
a man's job'. For it seemed as if there was virtually no `economic' task undertaken 
by a male adult that a male child did not also do, from hunting to tree felling, and 
from craftwork to cooking to making manioc flour. As mentioned above, the latter, 
in contrast to what seems to obtain in most other Lowland groups, was not 
`woman's work', though it used to be (Nimuendaju 1971: 24). The same may be 
said of women and girls, and indeed, in view of the above-mentioned gender 
equality in this area, of men and girls in many, though not all, of the above 
examples. There appeared, then, to be no categorisation of "anivit" in terms of 
`adult work' and `children's work'. 
Pa'ikwene children ("Bakimni") were regarded from their earliest age as fully 
fledged co-members of the domestic production unit. This also applied in respect 
of the larger cross-family `teams' which, sometimes spontaneously and sometimes 
not, formed either on a one-off basis (in order, for example, to go gathering or build 
a house) or on a periodic or seasonal one (to harvest and process the manioc crop, 
say). Acquiring the various skills involved in a task through emulation and practice, 
children started to engage in the above-listed forms of "anivit", barring being chief, 
around the age of four or five. His or her labour was valued on the same level as 
an adult's for all that the quality of the former's product may be held to be less in 
view of their relatively inferior skill. Skill, however, was judged on a individual 
rather than a class basis, and in my village the ability of one particular thirteen year 
old boy, whom I will call Tchüri, to make and use tridents was openly admired by 
many of the men as superior to their own. With both children and adults, skill was 
considered of more worth than productivity in terms of hours or effort spent, and 
certainly not commensurate with a greater amount of hours of someone else's 
unskilled labour, as Marx would have it (see in Firth op. cit.: 184-5). Furthermore, as 
with the Cubeo (Goldman 197$: 52-67) and Piaroa (Overing 1989), no matter how 
satisfying and appreciated the amount of products an individual or a group 
produced, such as, say, a rich haul of forest fruits, the material abundance was not 
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counted a greater value than the well-being, measured in sociability and good 
humour, which was intrinsic to their production. It was as if the payoff to `good' 
productivity lay not so much in the end result (products obtained) as in the very 
process itself. 
If disposed of outside the family, the price for, and income from, a child's 
collective as opposed to personal product would not be set lower than that of an 
adult producer and co-worker, whether it took the form of reciprocal services, goods 
exchanged, or cash. 
Here though I am running slightly ahead of myself, and will curtail further talk 
about `value' until later. 
As a member of the household production unit, the productivity furnished by a child 
whether on his or her own or in company with others characteristically results, like 
that of an adult, in the production of a collective product, be it in the form of a caught 
fish, a cared for younger sibling, or a cooked meal. This does not exclude anyone, 
whether adult or children, from also producing and owning personal objects, like 
arrows for fishing, nor from having control over their disposal. 
The autonomous worker. 
Although parents will, though by no means always or systematically, 'direct' a child 
to get going on some task, and an older sibling somewhat authoritarianly delegate 
one, the ultimate decision to work or not, and for how long and with how much 
exertion, remained with the individual non-adult in question. A Pa'ikwene will 
typically stop or lay aside work as the mood takes them. Children were no 
exception to this 'rule' and frequently walked away from a directed task, no less 
than from a self-chosen one, if and when they felt like it; on occasion a child would 
even decide not to begin a directed task at all. In both cases the idea of constraint 
or enforcement was uncountenancable. While it was not unknown for Pa'ikwene 
children to be hit, I never saw this happen in connection with work. As with the 
Cashinahua (McCallum 1989: 240), corporal punishment was used as a corrective, 
but only by the parent and in a controlled manner. I have already noted in chapter 
5 item [v] how a mother was prevented by her siblings from beating her daughter 
excessively. 
In short, regardless of their age, the Pa'ikwene producer's productive input 
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was very much subject to their own personal autonomy. It is true that the significant 
charge of laziness, of being "mabip", was often levelled, usually more in a teasing 
or mocking way than a directly accusatory one, at those people who exempted 
themselves from work. Moreover, it was sometimes resorted to as a means of 
compulsion in respect of someone whom we in our terms might judge to be a 
chronic malingerer or `lead swinger'. This did not seem to be an effective tactic 
however, for I never saw a single individual ever giving in to it and setting to work 
when they did not want to. 
There was a subtle line between not working and being called "mabip" and not 
working and avoiding being thus labelled. That is, not everyone, be they child or 
adult, who was disinclined to take up a task, or who stopped in the midst of one in 
order to go and do something more attractive, was necessarily accused of being 
lazy, since it was appreciated and tolerated that individuals had the freedom and 
right so to behave. Furthermore, the indigenous perception (i. e., minus the 
Evangelical-Pentecostalist overlay described in chapter 9) was that laziness was 
not so much a moral fault as a behavioural and affective symptom of bad social 
relations, a sign of a state of unsociability or disaffection existing between the `lazy' 
person and the others comprising his or her environment. 23 
Being lazy, therefore, was not itself seen as being unproductive economically 
but being unhappy, which could be more correctly interpreted as being 
unproductive socially (for more on `social productivity' see below). In essence, 
what underlay your choice to work or not, and coloured your fellows' acceptance or 
non-acceptance of that choice, was a question of mood (On the one hand: `Do I feel 
like working?... Is this task boring or do I like it and, at this particular moment in 
time, these people I'm doing it with? ' And on the other hand: `Do I mind that this 
person does not want to work with me? Am I insulted and aggrieved or 
sympathetic and understanding? '). 24 
Basically, then, in this area, and like the Cubeo, Piaroa and others, Pa'ikwene 
`work practice' seemed to bear out Overing's point (1993b) that a fundamental 
principle of the economically autonomous household unit is the personal autonomy 
of each of its constituent parts, and the respect of all parties for such autonomy. 
23 Cf. Goldman 197P: 53 on 'lazy' Cubeo women being viewed primarily as ones who have bad marital 
relations with their husbands. 
24 Again see Goldman ibid.: 52-67, Overing 1989. 
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have digressed somewhat from my main concern which is at this juncture to 
examine further the idea of "anivit" itself. It has been established thus far that the 
actual activity of work was thought of by a Pa'ikwene as something necessary but 
particularly onerous and ungratifying. Confusingly, but I also believe significantly, 
this was notwithstanding the very real pleasure often observable in it. I think 
especially of the joy most Pa'ikwene seemed, most of the time, to take in fishing, 
and also of the fun characteristically experienced and expressed when out 
gathering - and here I do not distinguish between enjoyment and satisfaction 
associated with and ensuing from the physical, mental, and technical side of the 
activity (the keenness of eye, manual dexterity, and interpreting and gauging of 
signs, the knowing, the `tool use') and that deriving from the social one (the 
companionship, joking, laughter, reliance and interdependence, and also friendly 
rivalry). While we frequently tend to separate the two aspects, or regard the `social' 
dimension as but a minor factor of working, it is in Pa'ikwene terms just as much an 
active and constituent part of the process as, and I suspect maybe even a greater 
one than, muscular power, sharp vision or prowess with a weapon or tool. It is this 
very issue of the `social-ness' of work that I intend to deal with in section 3. 
I have tried to indicate that a Pa'ikwene's characteristic way of seeing 'work' in 
negative terms was but a partial one; and also, though real, a somewhat superficial 
one. For the same Pa'ikwene, while complaining daily about the irksomeness of 
"anivit", also at the same time valued it $' positively, and not just for the material 
things obtainable through it and their uses. 
But just what is it that I- or a Pa'ikwene - mean by `value'? 
* 
2) The value of the value of work. 
"Things may just perhaps be signs, but their value is more than mere 
appearance" (Franz Werfel quoted in Lanners 1975: 5, my translation). 
With regard both to the indigenous understanding of work and more generally, the 
issue of `value', and indeed its own value in the dictionary sense of constituting a 
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"precise meaning or signification"25, is a complex one. Where theory is concerned, 
it is also a potentially thorny one. 
That the Pa'ikwene have a concept of `value' is certain. It was never explicitly 
formulated to me however, and what the term for it is I am unable to say. Nor do I 
know if there is one. 
Nevertheless, I do `know' that there is a value given by the Pa'ikwene to their 
own products. I pointed out in the foregoing section that it was not gauged in terms 
of the productivity that went into creating an item if we calculate this solely in terms 
of the amount of hours or effort spent. One definite yardstick was the skill which 
went into the production of something; I cited a trident as an example. Another was 
the quality of the article which the skilful worker achieved relative to that attained by 
a less skilful one. (Very important, too, as a measure of value, was what I choose to 
call the conviviality factor involved, of which more later). 
It might be thought I would be better advised to employ less subjective and more 
empirical, and sociologically rigorous, criteria, such as `use value' and 'exchange' 
value. 
However, these concepts, commonly and even automatically applied in 
anthropology to economic studies, which the present chapter does not in any 
serious technical sense aspire to be, are not ones I feel overly comfortable with. 
For one thing, I am sceptical that they would be totally apt in relation to the 
Pa'ikwene, at least not in the marxist guise which they have acquired. 26 As is well 
known, Marx bracketed these preexisting terms with a third of his own devising, 
`surplus value', to form the basis of his `theory of value' which, incorporating the key 
postulates of `exploitation' and `alienation', relates specifically to capitalism, seen 
as a system of `commoditisation' (Marx 1978, Section IV: 343-522). Although not 
25 Collins Dictionary of the English Language 1989: 1674 ("Value", 4th definition). 
26 I do not intend to suggest it is the only one. Marx in fact borrowed the terms from the 'bourgeois' 
economic theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, whom he criticises (1978: 343-522, particularly 
393-414). But, as the financier George Soros points out in his own, and non-marxist, critique of 
capitalism (in the Guardian 18.1.1997), it is not the terms as such which are the problem but people's 
view of them in the light of historical change. Thus it is, he writes, that as the 'market economy' has 
spread so non-market (i. e., moral) values have proportionately vanished, till now the only one left is 
the economic one, incarnated by money, for "what used to be a medium of exchange has usurped 
the place of fundamental values, reversing the relationship postulated by [laissez- faire] economic 
theory. " 
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the only version of `use-value', a notion which predated capitalism, or `exchange- 
value', his one (and the subsequent resort to it by people concerned to analyse 
non-capitalist societies27) has, as it were, locked the terms into a particular pre- 
defined orbit which I am not equipped to pursue. Nor do I want to, for finding and 
presenting `proof' of indigenous, as opposed to imported, socioeconomic 
exploitation and alienation in `Pa'ikwene-land' is not my intention. Assuming, that 
is, that these exist in the first place, which, in my view, they do not. 
It is incumbent upon me however to present the marxian understanding of use 
value and exchange value, if only in order to eliminate it from the Pa'ikwene's own 
interpretation of these same concepts. For Marx (ibid.: 421-35), the first of these 
values constitutes the utility which a product, that is, "commodity", is judged to 
possess by (and this is the crucial point) the consumer. He does not say that a 
useful article has a use value but that it "is... so far as it is a material thing, a use- 
value... " (p. 421, my emphasis, his hyphen). Thus, a useful article and a `use-value' 
are one and the same. Value, then, at least in the context of actual or potential 
usefulness, is, as I read it, not a quality but a palpably reified `thing'; it does not 
represent so much as present itself as a material substance, so to speak. The 
second value, the exchange-value, is simply the price which a commodity, that is, 
any product destined for exchange, will realise in the market (ibid.: 421-35). 
The part reifying, part `metaphorising' tendency, present in Marx's writings on 
the economic system he himself charges with objectifying the human being, finds 
further expression in his qualification of `independent' value. That is to say, value 
as it exists outside of use- and exchange-value and which attaches to their "one 
[and only] common property... that of being products of labour" (1978: 422-3). This 
value is perceived as, and I paraphrase though the words are his, the `embodiment 
of the homogenised crystals of the social substance which is human labour power' 
(p. 423), which labour, he stresses, is itself measurable in terms of time (pp. 423-4); 
that is, the number of hours "socially necessary" to produce an article (p. 424). 
Thus, essentially, the `values' of products are for him "only [the] definite masses of 
27 For examples of anthropological writing where this is the case refer to the marxist anthropologists 
listed in footnote 6. Some others (not all necessarily marxist) would include Riviere 1983-4 and 
Josephides 1985 (on the 'exploitation' practised by men over women in Amazonia and Melanesia 
respectively) and Schwimmer op. cit. (on how, contra marxist dogma, there can be 'alienation' in 
regard to use-value but not necessarily in all its forms in regard to exchange-value). Note too Firth's 
view (1979: 201-2) that while fertile as a theoretical model for anthropology, Marx's 'law of value' is 
ultimately inadequate . 
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congealed labour time" that are embodied in them (ibid. ). 
Another theoretical aspect of `value' in its relationship with European 
conceptualisations of `work', and highlighted by Weber this time (op. cit. ), is the 
religious/moral one, which I touched on earlier. According to this, work is seen as a 
worshipful, god-orientated activity, or even as a godly act per se; and as such is 
held to be a virtue, spiritually, personally and socially. For Marx, of course, such a 
value is part of the `ideology' used by the ruling class to keep the working one in its 
place. 
Yet a further point of interest for the present discussion concerns the relationship 
between mental and physical work, and the typological distinctions pertaining to 
each. To take the last aspect first: Vernant's material (op. cit. ) suggests that it was 
the Ancient Greeks' prioritising of `abstract intelligence' (the property of the 
commissioning rich customer) over `technical intelligence' (the property of the 
commissioned artisan) which is the source of the still active overvaluing of the 
former and undervaluing of the latter found in present day `Western' culture (see in 
Schwimmer op. cit.: 292-3). 
Again in our own culture, there exists a hierarchical evaluation of `work' 
premised on a slew of other dichotomies, mostly relating to status. Two common 
ones are: `skilled' as opposed to `unskilled', (which broadly means 'technical' 
versus `manual') and `male' as opposed to `female' (with the latter still often 
considered not to be work at all). 28 While, as shown above, the Pa'ikwene 
recognise, if now somewhat feebly, the notion of gendered work, they do not do so 
on grounds either of social status or any other kind of hierarchy. Skill is greatly 
prized, as was noted above, but again not in terms of social status. 
Regarding the issue of physical and (or in contradistinction to) mental work, Marx 
criticised `bourgeois' materialist culture for abstracting abstract and theoretical 
thought from the exercise of "practical, human-sensuous activity" (1968: 29, his 
28 To cite a few others: 'scientific work : artistic work'; 'manufacturing work : 'service' trade'; 'factory 
work : office work'; 'formal sector : informal sector'; 'salaried : waged'; 'boss : employee'. I would also 
include 'wealth : lack of wealth' on the grounds that, as Soros argues (see footnote 26), money has 
historically transcended its function as a medium of exchange to become, in the 'market economy', 
not only a value in its own right but indeed the only one. 
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stress). 29 He proposes (1978.: 568) that in that value inheres in all labour (-time), 
then there is as such no distinction between one kind of labour and the other. 30 He 
himself avoids overvaluing (or undervaluing) mental labour in relation to physical 
labour. Yet it is arguable that he does tend overall to idealise the latter kind, 
though not so much at the expense of the former, but in such a fashion that it, 
mental labour, seems to become subsumed in the physical, rather than each being 
interconstitutive of the other. The question is, do Amerindians also conceptually 
prioritise one over the other? As I intend discussing below, my belief is that they do, 
and in a way which is opposite both to his and `Western bourgeois' thinking. 
Essentially and briefly, the Amerindians' evaluation of `mental capacity', and 
especially that aspect of it we call knowledge, often contains a perception of it as 
something not human in origin at all but deriving from a supra-human source. Thus 
it is not a natural personal property; rather it is a gift bestowed by the supernatural 
entities. The Pa'ikwene say that intelligence/knowledge/wisdom, "Hiyakimniye" 
("Hiyak" = "to know"), is given to you by "Ohokri" (God); a Piaroa person obtains his 
or her various knowledges from the creator gods who alone, as owners of the 
productive but dangerous 'forces of culture', can bestow them (Overing 1982, 
1988). Such high stress and value are placed in some of these societies on the 
mental aspect of existence (including in the area of work) that, conceptually 
speaking, it may tend to overshadow the physical one. Thus, again among the 
Piaroa, a person's physical `life of the senses' has to be mastered in proportion to, 
and as a condition of, getting a `life of thoughts', thanks to which the human can be 
29 He for his part amply demonstrates the use of what he would qualify as `unabstracted' abstract 
thinking in relation to certain aspects of that selfsame praxis: notably, for instance, the pertinent one of 
value in its relationship with labour. See his explanation (1978: 423) of how in order to understand 
'value' we must "make abstraction from" a product's use-value, by "put[ting] out of sight" both the 
usefulness of the product (in terms of the materiality and the specific type of labour embodied in it) 
and the concreteness of that labour, and consider the latter, rather, in the abstract. (For, he 
concludes, it is as an abstraction that human labour is materialised in a product, which fact alone gives 
it value). 
30 However, though he recognises (ibid. ) that a person may be physically or mentally superior to 
another, and so furnish more labour either in the same time as or for a longer time than someone else 
(and thus, and I extrapolate for he does not say so, command more value), this poses something of a 
problem for him. For he considers that what he characterises as this 'bourgeois equal right' is in reality 
an unequal one; and in a just, i. e. communistic, society, the physically or mentally superior worker 
must not receive more recompense for their labour than any other, and the inequality of the "equal 
right" will have to be rectified. He does not explain how in this passage, but only goes on to add (pp. 
568-9) that in the ultimate phase of communism, the antithesis existing in capitalist society between 
physical and mental labour will be resolved. 
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productive in society - and without which there can in fact be no society (Overing 
ibid. ) 
Another similarity with the Piaroa is that, while, as has been noted, `individualism' 
is an intrinsic factor rather than a contradictive aspect of Pa'ikwene social life, it is 
not considered proper to use one's intelligence/knowledge/wisdom for self-seeking 
ends. It is seen, rather, as an attribute whose function, essentially, is to serve the 
common good. (This may be why someone perceived as having much 
"hiyakimniye" in certain fields, such as speaking or hunting, gets elected chief; see 
item [i] chapter 5). 
As mentioned, the Pa'ikwene's ideology in connection with `work', and also 
in the non-marxian sense of the term, would appear to be no longer extant. It is not 
possible therefore for me either to trace with any certainty the same lines between 
their notions and practices as Overing has done in respect of Piaroa `productivity', 
or to draw the same cogent conclusions. I would nevertheless suggest that a 
certain well-known indigenous tendency to place a low value, though not I stress in 
social status terms, on the physical aspect of work, 31 and a higher one on 
knowledge in respect of `productivity', might be the key to understanding the 
Pa'ikwene's own apprehension of "anivit" as something so negative (dirty, tiring 
and painful being the most common epithets employed). 
I said above that a Pa'ikwene does not prioritise skill over lack of skill on grounds of 
social status. However, in that it is an aspect, a manifestation, of knowledge, the 
skill exercised in work could be said to be valued over the `purely' physical input. 
Thisra X delicate matter to explain, for it must first be understood that unlike the 
situation in `Western' culture, the opposition between mental and physical labour 
does not seem to be posed by the Pa'ikwene in terms of moral and/or social 
superiority-inferiority. In one sense, what we term `abstract thought' does not exist 
for them, since intelligence/knowledge/wisdom, while `supernaturally' derived, is 
fundamentally a practical quality given that it is by and large associated with, and 
used in, pragmatic activities, be it raising a child, harvesting a crop, healing an 
affliction, or being leader. In that, as I report elsewhere, the native term for `to think', 
"Ivegmin", is formed by adding the morpheme `-min', meaning `beyond', to the verb 
31 See e. g. Clastres 1987: 193-4 on how it was noted by Europeans from the earliest moments of 
contact. 
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`iveg', 'to look', then thought itself is literally not regarded32 as something detached 
from practice, or to be more precise, social and moral practice. Thus one in which 
regard for others, in the sense of care and concern for them, is critical both 
ethically and, again, pragmatically, for it is only by virtue of each person's 
uncoerced and autonomous thought-action that the society is constantly recreated 
(again see next section). 33 
Secondly, if our understanding of practical work precludes intellectuality, not to 
mention artistry, ritual and sociability, then to describe the knowledge possessed 
and wielded in the context of Pa'ikwene production as (merely) `technical 
intelligence' is insufficient. For it is that, but more than that too (for a deeper 
consideration of `technical' see next section). All this, I hasten to add, is not to say 
that the Pa'ikwene are `savages' who just practice the `science of the concrete' and 
ignore 'abstract thought' (Levi-Strauss 1962b). On the contrary, and for all that they 
are not as intellectualist as the Piaroa seem to be, it is highly developed among 
them, as their mathematical and geometrical conceptualisations, such as, for 
example, the recognition of a fourth physical dimension, demonstrate. 34 
Skill, then, was for the Pa'ikwene, a definite measure of the value of a product, and 
also of the whole process of production implicated in it.. It was assessed in terms of 
quality of work, which entailed mental, moral, technical, aesthetic and, above all, 
social considerations, rather than of quantity of hours. 35 The material and utilitarian 
worth (for others) of products was understood, and its criterion taken into account, 
32 A further association between sight and thought could exist in that, as proposed in chapter 4, 'to 
know', "hiyak", might be related to `to see', "hiyap". 
33 Cf. Santos-Granero 1991 and Belaunde 1992 on respectively the Amuesha and Airo-Pai, for whom 
cosmologically the social model is one of 'parenting', also McCallum 1989 on the Cashinahua and Gow 
1991 on the Piro. 
34 See D. Green's appreciative exposition (1995) of the Pa'ikwene's abstract analytical skills in these 
fields. As stated elsewhere in this thesis, `Püküh", their word for 'to count' also means 'to understand' 
(and is virtually synonymous with "tchimap", 'to hear-listen-understand'). I suggest a link with the word 
for 'to blow', "püh", which may point to a perceived, and not so abstract, interrelatedness between 
cerebral and somatic activities, and also between these and the 'supernatural' sphere, insofar as one's 
breath is held to derive from a godly source. 
35 Cf. Weber op. cit.: 59-60 on the phenomenon of piece-rate work as opposed to that measured in 
hourly rates, and how (like the Amazonians) "traditionalist" European peasantry preferred the former. 
This was because it allowed them to decrease rather than increase the amount of their work since in 
practice "[t]he opportunity of earning more was less attractive than that of working less. " 
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when applied to items earmarked for 'exchange' in the 'market economy', such as 
certain foods surplus to the producer's (i. e. the household's) requirements, or 
`goods' produced specifically to that end, either by the domestic unit collectively or 
by a single individual independently; and also in respect of a person's labour when 
sold (as an exchange value in its own right) for cash in the accomplishment of a 
"petit job". The Pa'ikwene had to that extent assimilated the notion of the 
commoditisation of both the self and one's creations. 
As regards another kind of product destined for others, namely prestations, 
they may be said to possess more than one value for both donor and recipient. For 
typically, as I discuss in chapter 7, you not only made a gift to a person, you also 
very often made it for them; and the latter `making' simultaneously involved your 
greatest mental-aesthetic-technical-manual artistry and emotion. This combined 
input was matched by that attributed to the item by the recipient in respect of its 
practical, affective, and aesthetic worth for them. But it was not only gifts which were 
perceived as more than merely utilitarian in design and purpose. The humblest 
handmade broom or bowlful of manioc flour seemed possessed of the same 
multiple value for their makers and consumers. 36 
Finally, the notion of `use value' needs careful reappraisal in connection with the 
Pa'ikwene (and Amerindians more generally). It is important first of all to reclaim 
the value of the usefulness of things produced as distinct from things simply 
considered as material (and as) commodities. We need, too, not merely to show 
the protagonistic importance of the consumer in the process, as characteristically 
happens in the `market economy', but to bring that of the producer more into relief 
also. 
We saw earlier that in the pervasive but culturally and historically specific 
sense described by Marx and others, a `use-value' is, virtually axiomatically, held to 
reside in any item deemed to possess a usefulness by the consumer (as purchaser 
who agrees to its attached `exchange-value') as distinct from its producer. This 
presupposes a radical separation between the two parties not just at the level of 
economic relations but also social ones. However, use value itself is not a 
condition unique to our system, and can exist in those where the relationship 
between maker and user is of quite another order. Where, to be more specific, in 
36 See e. g. Rubin 1989: 49 on how the multi-functionality of indigenous articles confutes the Euro- 
American division of material culture into art or craft, and 'high' or'low' art. 
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the first place no transaction involving an exchange value occurs between them, 
whether in the form of money or goods or services; and where, secondly, they are 
very often likely in any case to be one and the same person. Both of these 
circumstances apply to societies which practice, as the Pa'ikwene still do to a 
significant extent, the `domestic mode of production' (Sahlins 1974). That is, one in 
which, among other things, the actor's relationship to a product is simultaneously 
one of co-production, co-ownership and co-consumption. As regards certain 
products which are the result not of collective but personal production, such as, 
say, an individual's weapons, ego is not only their sole owner, but also their prime 
rather than exclusive user, for a Pa'ikwene will sometimes lend them to others, as 
opposed to share them. (It should be pointed out, however, that the products 
attained through the use of personally made and owned instruments tend 
themselves more often than not to end up in the `collective' fold. For instance, 
while it was your right unilaterally to sell or exchange the fish caught with your own 
spear and keep the accruing proceeds for yourself, it was more common either for 
the catch to be given to and consumed by the family, yourself included, or for the 
proceeds to become the household's. ) 
The crux of the issue, then, that which underlies, and underlines, the social 
relational division present in our society, is not that any item constitutes a product 
per se. Rather, that it is one which serves as a commodity: that it is, in other words, 
exchangeable in the market. While an article does not have to be a commodity in 
order to have/be a use value, in order to be a commodity it must as a product, to the 
extent that it is a material thing, have/be a `use-value' (Marx 1978: 421). 37 
The essential difference therefore between Pa'ikwene society and our own, where 
use value is concerned, is the lack of distinction in the former between product 
makers and users. Another and equally crucial one, following from this, is that the 
very thing which converts an article into a use value, i. e., its utility, is not a matter of 
37 Consider the 'problem' in 'Western' culture about the nature of art insofar as it is a product (Does it 
or not have a 'use'? ), and also its commoditisation and the way its sale is 'market-led'. For some 
implications of this product's relationship with the market, which considers it to have no 'use-value' yet 
to be a strong 'exchange-value', see Schwimmer 1979: 294. 
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the consumer's assessment only38; it is also the producer's. Indeed the latter's 
predates the former's. As self-evident as it might be, in Pa'ikwene society, where, 
as we have seen, producers and consumers are typically one and the same 
people, the perceived need for a `traditional' utilitarian object, be it a basket or bow, 
can still now only be fulfilled by actually making, or co-making, the thing first before 
getting to partake of its usefulness (which one has in effect also produced in the 
creating of the object, along, it must be said, with its other attributes, such as beauty 
or exchangeability). 
In Ancient Greece, it was the aspiring consumer (that is, the craftsman's 
commissioning client) who was, so Vernant tells us (1965), the main actor in the 
production process (see in Schwimmer op. cit.: 292). In contemporary39 Village 
Esperance 2, in contrast, the user of objects did not get star billing so much as 
share an equal one with their maker - or more precisely even, play both lead parts. 
While we can readily understand that the maker of a spear, such as the above- 
mentioned Tchüri, can also be its user; and the co-producers of the manioc crop 
equally be the consumers of its various by-products; and while we can, too, accept 
a non-"market economy" notion of use value in their regard, how are we to 
respond to other products of Pa'ikwene "anivit" (work) which are not seen to be 
possessed of a materialistically or mechanically functional use either by their 
producers or anyone else? An example would be the `cared for' child, such as 
Sohol, of whom I spoke earlier. 40 Another would be the `product' achieved by the 
"anivit" of a chief, like Tchikoi in Aükwa. 
When one considers the subject of work/production in connection with many of the 
peoples of Amazonia and the Guianas, a different aspect and understanding of 
value tends to emerge than the non-indigenous ones described above. Goldman 
(1979), Overing (1983-4,1989,1992,1993b, 1996), Belaunde (1992), and Gow 
38 See for example Collins Dictionary of the English Language (1989: 1674) where the third definition 
of the word "value", unconsciously focusing on the perceived primacy of the consumer-customer, 
reads: "Reasonable or equivalent return; satisfaction: [as in] value for money. " 
39 1993-5. 
40 Some might like to argue that like the market economy"s view of works of art (see footnote 37) she 
possibly constitutes an 'exchange-value' (convertible in the future). 
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(1991) have each posited, in respect of the societies they have studied, the 
existence of a `moral economy'41, which prioritises production above exchange, be 
it in the economic sense or the structuralist one intended by proponents of the 
`symbolic economy', such as Viveiros de Castro (1992) and Descola (1986). While 
each type of `economy' works to resolve the problematic issue of alterity, the former 
stresses the creation and maintenance of the peaceful intrasocial ('domestic') life, 
seen in terms of practical mutual caring and intimacy. 
The chief substantive products of a `moral economy' are not the functional, 
material articles and edibles of life but the yet more vital, and no less concrete, 
ones of social persons and relations; and also the conditions of sociability (and, as 
Overing stresses, safety) which do not so much ensue from this sociality as enable 
its creation. 42 For example, Belaunde describes (op. cit.: 108-211) the manner in 
which an Airo-Pai community's 'food production' effectively produces not only food 
but people, and in the process constructs the individual's person-, gender-, and 
parent-hood. Overing shows (op. cit. ) that for the Piaroa the daily acts of working, 
eating, and sharing/gifting, and also producing children, together result over time in 
the conversion of affine/difference/danger into kin/identity/safety, and thus in the 
generation of society itself. 
These societies, and also, I propose, the Pa'ikwene's, may be said to share a 
similar understanding of `work'. As I have tried to relate, it is one in which `work' 
has, and is, a value in terms significantly broader than those relating to numbers of 
41 From E. P. Thompson 1971. Goldman, Overing, Belaunde and Gow also perceive these societies 
to be political rather than (as Clastres posits 1987) apolitical, yet not for all that to constitute 'political 
economies' (as Riviere 1983-4 and Santos-Granero 1986 argue). They are especially not so in the 
marxist sense: i. e., a 'class' structure consisting of an 'infrastructural' economic base and a 
'superstructure' and possessing, as an aspect of the latter [or so it is more commonly claimed], an 
'ideology', the function of which is to mask and legitimate the 'exploitation' and 'alienation' of the 
dominated class by the dominant one. 'Values', it should be noted, figure for Marx in respect of the 
'ideology', too, in that they form one of its two components, the other being 'morality'. 
42 Santos-Granero is often also considered a member of the 'moral economy' school in view of his 
work on the Amuesha's sociocultural stressing of Love (1991). I exclude him here however as, 
although their ethos is constructed in terms of parental caring like that of the Airo-Pai and Piro, the 
Amuesha, as a `priestdom', have notions of institutionalised hierarchy and also a certain formality 
strikingly absent from the much more egalitarian, informal and intimate lifestyles of the other peoples 
listed. Also, unlike the Pa'ikwene and Piaroa, they may be said to possess the concept of self-serving 
thought in that shamans typically seek communication with the sacred beings in order to obtain 
knowledge and mystical powers for personal purposes. This is in opposition to the priest/leaders who 
employ their own similarly acquired knowledge-power expressly for the benefit of the community. For 
a leader to exploit such knowledge-power to his own political ends is considered immoral and 
illegitimate (pp. 126-9,300-303). 
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`labour time' hours alone43, in that it conjoins the practical, the social, the aesthetic, 
the affective and the moral. 
A final and hitherto unaddressed aspect of value, which has to do directly with the 
creation of sociality and conviviality, is the psychological one. 
Marx, to return to him, berated (1978: 368-70) Adam Smith for merely 
considering work from the personal psychological viewpoint of the individual in 
relation to the pleasure it might or might not give one. But work, elaborates Marx, is 
something else too (and it is clear that the something else is more important for 
him): it is relationship with others (and also with the object one makes and one's 
talents for making it, for "work is a positive, creative activity"). 
While Marx's point is valid (and shows that he recognised the role of the subjective 
in the process of production), that of Smith, who apparently considered work to be 
a curse inflicted by God on sinning mankind, should not be written off altogether. 
For although arising from another world-view and couched in a different rhetoric, 
the thoughts, and feelings, of many Amerindians in regard to labour seem if not to 
echo his then to chime in to a degree with them. I have already described how a 
Pa'ikwene will characteristically portray "anivit" (work) as something physically 
hard, irksome and unpleasant. The Cubeo, according to Goldman (1979), will 
cease working at any task the instant they become bored with it or tired (p. 87). 
They will also autonomously decide not to work if they are unhappy (so too, as 
noted in section 1 will a Pa'ikwene). There being no coercion in respect of work, it 
is the individual's mood, operating in function of the quality of his or her relations 
with others, which determines whether he or she will work or not. Thus, productivity 
depends vitally on the healthy morale of a group's members, which morale is 
enhanced not by workers working, but by workers working happily. The Cubeo 
assess (and value) production in terms not of material plenitude and expansion but 
of the producer's affective well-being (pp. 52-67). 
The Pa'ikwene's `mood' should not, however, be seen only in terms of work. Being 
happy and affable appeared not so much a goal as a constituent feature of their 
social life more generally, something they shared with the Cubeo and others in 
Amazonia (see e. g. Huxley 1963, Overing 1989 and Viveiros de Castro 1992 on 
43 On the dubiousness of computing indigenous work in terms of time and other `Western' 
measurements, see Schwimmer op. cit.: 228-9 (cf. Firth op. cit.: 202 note 1). 
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respectively the Kaapore, Piaroa and Arawete). While not immune to bouts of 
seriousness and even sullenness, most Pa'ikwene people are definitely `into' 
sociability in its various forms, including notably joking, laughing and having fun 
together, though perhaps not as `deliriously' as the Arawete (Viveiros de Castro op. 
cit..: 9). Like them though (ibid.: 335 note 6), the Pa'ikwene disliked and condemned 
the characteristic `moodiness' of whites (yet overall reacted courteously and even 
sympathetically to my own `down' periods. These they mostly attributed to my 
being "kadni" - sad - because away from my family. ) 
What is at issue here, then, is not just a person's psychological feelings 
about work per se (a Ia Smith) but, more significantly, about people: your co- 
workers and, it follows, fellow community members. 
Overing reports (op. cit. ) a similar philosophy of work in connection with the Piaroa. 
Building on Goldman's insight that personal emotion and autonomy are constitutive 
of indigenous economic behaviour, she stresses the two properties, good mood 
and autonomy, as the key elements of an Amerindian "Aesthetics of production". 
This itself relates to the native "sense of community", which, underlying their 
practice and notions of work, is to be seen as a Vicoesque `aesthetics and 
metaphysics of action at once moral and political' (p. 159). Production, insofar as it 
is an expression of morally good and aesthetically beautiful, and affectively 
pleasing, behaviour, is "conducive to the creation of community" (ibid. ). Morally 
bad, aesthetically ugly, and displeasing, behaviour, on the other hand, is not. 
Demonstrating how such an emotionalist and independentist ethos underpins the 
very act of self-creation and self-maintenance of the group, Overing argues against 
Sahlins (1974) that it is neither the cause of these societies' `under-production' nor 
proof of their supposed anarchy, if by this is meant (Eurocentrically) anti-society, 
the state of being asocial. Rather, it is for the people concerned the very 
embodiment of sociality itself: the community as an egalitarian, tranquil, good 
humoured and productive entity; and thus a truly beautiful and desirable one. 
This brings me to my next, and last, section, in which I discuss the production of 
Pa'ikwene sociality, the part played in it by technology and language, and the 
nature of the product. 
* 
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3) Conviviality: living-working-speaking together: making a sociable sociality. 
According to Goldman (op. cit.: 66), a defining principle of Cubeo production is that 
work is a group activity and, as such, a pleasurable and recreational one. It was 
my observation that the Pa'ikwene, for all their constant complaint about the 
unpleasantness of its physical aspect (and notwithstanding my prior stressing of 
this fact), did in fact largely hold the same view. For they too greatly prized 
sociability as a vital component of the productive process. This they did primarily in 
terms of the cheerfulness and agreeableness of the people involved. The more 
one could interrelate in a friendly manner with one's co-workers, and chat, joke, 
laugh and, thus, relax while working (no contradiction in terms intended), then the 
more the experience was enjoyed and valued. And the more, too, one's physical 
productivity increased rather than the reverse - or so, because I was not of a mind 
to measure it objectively, it seemed to me. The more cheerful one was, the more 
companionable the atmosphere; and the more literally dialogic the event, the 
greater one's zest for work itself seemed to grow, and the longer one kept at it. 44 
However, while it was work ("anivit") it was more than `just' work. For, as is clear, it 
was social living as well. As noted earlier, work and social life were not held to be 
distinct and opposed `things' for the Pa'ikwene as they are for us; and in this 
intrinsically social act, which was constituted by sociable working, their production 
did not only turn out `economic' products. In a very concrete way, it seemed to me 
and, I believe, to the Pa'ikwene themselves, society itself was being produced at 
the same time, and performatively so, through the process of "anivit'. Ultimately, it 
was not only recreational in Goldman's paradoxical sense of virtually amounting to 
a `leisure activity'. It is also to be seen as having the ability directly to re-create, 
through its very sociableness, the sense and state of sociality itself. To clarify what 
I mean, I turn to an incident from my fieldwork involving the processing of the 
manioc crop. 
44 This is in strict opposition to a certain 'Western' (Protestant Puritan) ethic which enjoins one to work 
in silence and in, or as if in, isolation. It views such congeniality as both immoral and inimical to work 
insofar as that it is equated with 'time wasting' (and thus not working), which is held a great sin, as 
Weber shows (1971: 157-8): "Loss of time through sociability [and] idle talk... is worthy of absolute 
moral condemnation... [since] every hour lost [in this way] is lost to labour for the glory of God" (see 
too pp. 260-1 notes 10,14). 
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Tools, talk, and the construction of society. 
The Pa'ikwene, like a good many other Lowland Amerindians, accord great 
symbolic value to manioc, its production, and the principal by-products: `flour', 
"Püveye" but more frequently called "Kwak", the common name for it in Guyane; 
bread, "Bügüt"; and beer, "Wonska" (despite the ban imposed by conversion to 
Protestant fundamentalism, a situation described in chapter 9). Much affective 
meaning and power are invested in manioc, "Kaneg", which along with their 
language is reckoned a mark of their culture and identity both as a people and as 
"Indians" (cf. Campbell 1995: 50). The "anivit" connected with the processing of the 
plant necessitated a more than average commitment in terms of effort, time and 
multiple skills, from harvesting to washing to grating to toasting, from all the 
members, male and female, of the several households involved: the one which 
owned the manioc crop and those which, collaborating in its `manufacture', were 
entitled to part of the finished product. 
Although the Pa'ikwene once categorised this elaborate technical and social 
procedure as `woman's work' (as mentioned in section 1, Nimuendaju listed it as 
such during his visit in the mid 1920's), it seems nowadays to have deviated in this 
respect from the apparent norm applying to most of the other indigenous peoples of 
the Guianas (see, for instance, Overing Kaplan 1975: 37 on the Piaroa, Campbell 
op. cit.: 49-57 on the Wayapi, and Riviere 1984: 92-4 and, especially, 1983-4 on the 
Trio and more generally). According to the last named authority, the phenomenon, 
and in particular one aspect of it, the beer making, supposedly constitutes a means 
in these otherwise highly egalitarian societies of female economic and political 
alienation and male hegemony. For Campbell, too, the "complicated [Wayapi] 
arrangements for the processing of manioc reinforced a status quo where any 
imbalance of gender status is weighted in favour of men" because the biggest 
share of the "drudgery" involved falls to the women (op. cit.: 50). 
I was present one day when the Brazilian (Assembleia de Deus) pastor visited the 
Labonte family as, together with a group of relatives and neighbours, they were 
hard at work processing their own manioc crop. He proposed that Karinai invest in 
a machine which could turn the raw product into "farinha" (flour) in a single day 
instead of the four or so back-breaking, labour-intensive ones the operation now 
took. Karinai and the others with him flatly turned down the suggestion. I was 
surprised, given what I knew of their, and most other Pa'ikwene's, appreciation of 
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and appetite for labour saving devices like rifles, outboard motors and chainsaws. 
It seemed to concur with Julio Cortazar's observation (1967: 105) about the 
encounter between the `common man' and technology: "Exactly where one would 
imagine a cultural shock, there is, on the contrary, a violent assimilation and 
enjoyment of the progress". Why, then, I asked, given both this predilection and 
indeed passion for other Western technology and the constant grumbles about the 
drudgery of "anivit", did they regard the idea of a manioc-machine so 
unfavourably? Karinai explained that although it could certainly do the work faster 
than the Pa'ikwene, it did not do it as well. However, what he really did not want to 
lose, it transpired, was the communality characteristic of, and inherent in, the 
indigenous way of manioc processing: the singing, joking, laughing, talking, eating 
and drinking together which were an integral and defining aspect of work. I suggest 
that for Karinai, and his people in general, work was seen not so much as an 
economic and technical activity as, primarily, dialogue and sociality itself in action; 
and was valued as such. 
Campbell, speculating (op. cit.: 50) about the more than probable negative 
impact of the hypothetical introduction of a "futuristic manioc-processing 
machine"45 on Wayapi life, concludes similarly that it would entail the 
disappearance of "all sorts of aspects and nuances of art, ceremony, technological 
knowledge, role activity and daily rhythms". 
There are two issues I wish to explore more closely here: the link between working 
and speaking, and the perception that productivity results in more than just tangible 
material products; that it can itself, in short, essentially constitute self-realising 
society. 
Firstly, the above case bears out something which I constantly observed with the 
Pa'ikwene, but about which I was unfortunately never able to get an explicit 
statement from them. Namely, that work and dialogic situations did not merely 
coincide or provide actors with the opportunity for an alternative and 'secondary' 
activity between getting on with the 'main' one, whichever it happened to be. For in 
everyday Pa'ikwene life, work and intercommunication do not seem to constitute 
two separate and distinct modes of behaviour. Rather, they form a unitary process 
45 i do not know for sure whether such a machine as the pastor described actually exists. But since 
manioc 'flour' is now being produced industrially for the Brazilian and Creole market, I imagine the 
appropriate gadgetry has been devised. 
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in terms of the interconstitutive and social nature of 'economic' and 
communicational productivity. (And one also, as the section on 'Good Hearing' 
shows, in which people's listening plays as intrinsic, important and creative a role 
as their speaking, and their muscle power, manual dexterity or good humour). 
The particular interrelationship between work, or tool use, and language as 
the distinctive way by which humanity historically attained and continues to 
maintain social relations has been studied by others. The conventional wisdom, as 
proposed by Western Darwinian thinking, seems to be that speech is the 
evolutionary outcome of prehistoric hominids banding together to pool their labour, 
developing directly from the process of collective tool making and use, and as as 
consequence of the need to communicate within that process. Over time, it is 
believed, the inarticulate vocalisations accompanying such activity transformed into 
syllables, words, language (Montagu 1976, Isaac 1976, Hewes 1993, Toth and 
Schick 1993). This view is quintessentially the one proffered by Engels (1968: 358- 
68): "First labour, after it and then with it, speech. " (p. 361). These are, he asserts, 
the two stimuli by which the ape mutated into the human being and human society 
evolved. 
Reynolds' `complementary theory of language and tool use' (1993) does not so 
much consider speaking a function of tool use as suggest a co-evolutionary cor- 
respondence between them. He argues that the latter activity entails "heterotechnic 
cooperation", that is, the contemporaneous use of different tools and skills by 
different people, making for a complementarity of social roles. Such heterotechnic 
activity is universally manifested by a distinct form of social organisation, "defined 
by the shared intention to transform matter and energy through the cooperative and 
complementary use of tools and tool-using skills by a group of people in face to 
face contact " (p. 413, his stress). Pa'ikwene manioc processing, where each 
participating individual and sub-group does a specific task together with the other 
individuals and sub-groups forming the co-operating work group, would constitute 
a typical example of this social structuring. Such a base, continues Reynolds, 
parallels linguistic exchange, wherein each interlocutor's action is complementary 
to, and supportive of, the other's. In this way language and heterotechnical co- 
operation are co-evolutionary phenomena, and human tool use, like speaking, is 
an "intrinsically social process" (p. 426). 
But, while noting the equivalence between and complementarity of speaking 
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and technical activity, Reynolds, it seems to me, overlooks their interconstitutivity. 
Ingold has stressed both the instrumentality of speech in the making of social life 
(1986: 144ff., 202-3,244-92) and the "embeddedness of technical relations in 
social relations" (1993b: 439). Outside of the latter relations, tools are devoid of use 
value and words of their meaning (p. 440). (On the affinity between speech and 
tool use in understanding, knowing, and making the world, see ibid.: 431 ff. ). Ingold 
argues against Durkheim that technical action (tool use) is neither non-social nor 
merely practical. Nor is it as a purposive and physical action predetermined by an 
anterior act of cognition. Rather, in the same way as speaking, it should be seen as 
an autonomous and intelligent act of personal agency which is simultaneously an 
engagement with nature and an act of sociality: both actions, tool making/use and 
speech, being instrumental not only in the perception but the creation of the 
environment, including the social one. Moreover, he posits (p. 442), in opposition 
to the Western conception of tools as the means enabling mankind to achieve 
mastery over nature in the purported struggle of the social world of persons against 
the material world of things, the hunter-gatherers' use of technology aims at 
"drawing nature into the nexus of social relations" as in a "dialogue" with it. 46 
Regarding the notion of `technical' itself, it seems still to be in need of reclaiming 
from that of the `merely practical'. The use of technology, its very nature, clearly 
possesses more than a banausic, i. e., mechanical and utilitarian, purpose alone. 
As is well known, Leach's work on the Kachin revealed (1986: 10-16) how the most 
mundane economic and functional technical act may simultaneously contain a 
ritual-aesthetic-ethical component. Technical action should also be seen as a form 
of intelligence and knowledge. According to Heidegger (1975: 15-87), the Ancient 
Greeks did not distinguish between craftsman and artist, using one and the same 
word, "Techne", for both craft and art. Originally, however, "Techne" signifies 
neither, nor is it `technical' in the modern sense in that it 
"never means a kind of practical performance. The word... denotes 
rather a mode of knowing. To know means to have seen, in the 
widest sense of seeing, which means to apprehend what is present... 
For Greek thought, the nature of knowing consists in the uncovering of 
beings... `Techne'... is a bringing forth of beings... [it] never signifies 
the action of making... " (p. 59. Cf. Vernant 1965). 
46 For the Pa'ikwene's own dialogue with nature, and more on Ingold's and other theories in this 
respect, see chapter 4iii. 
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In this, then, tool use may be said to be akin, for Heidegger, to that of language, 
which is to be seen as more than merely a means or expression of what `intends' to 
be communicated. Rather, 
"Language, by naming things for the first time, brings beings to word 
and to appearance. Only this naming nominates beings to their being 
from out of their being" (ibid.: 73-4, his stress). 
The Pa'ikwene's use both of their own technology in the manioc processing (or in 
any other activity) and speech leads to my second concern. This is the indigenous 
understanding of how such use within the social field of "anivit" effectively 
generates both the necessary products for the maintenance and well-being of 
society and, just as substantively, the society itself. Is it not possible that, in a 
Heideggerian sense, one of the `beings' Pa'ikwene tool usage and speaking jointly 
`brought forth' was the state of being of social-ness? And a social existence of a 
particular, and characteristically Lowland Amazonian, kind it was at that; that is to 
say, as Overing has already pointed out (1996: 6) with regard to the Piaroa, one 
defined by conviviality. The rest of this section will be devoted to developing this 
claim in more depth. 
About conviviality: manioc and the making of a meaningful life together. 
What at the deeper level, both structural an existential, is the connection between 
the good humoured and joyously felt experiencing by a Pa'ikwene person of what 
is physically the very demanding, laborious, and tiring operation of processing the 
manioc crop, and the elements which I have just raised: tools, language, and the 
quality of the social relations deriving from their use? 
Picture, to start with, the `collective effervescence', the truly party atmosphere, of the 
event itself; the participants high, as it were, on themselves, on their being together, 
on the united release of their energies; their ceaseless comings and goings; the 
picnicking `on the job'; the laughter and banter, good natured gossip, grousing and 
teasing, the recounting of past times and swapping of tales: work as play. The 
`organised chaos', in short, of a dozen or so men and women and assorted 
children gathering together for the best part of a week to engage in jointly 
preparing several months' supply of "kwak" (flour), and a smaller one of "kayüt" 
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(tapioca), "bügüt" (bread), and other gastronomic delights such as various 
"matchit", that is, mashes, purees and creams, from a vast mound of manioc tubers 
which first had had to be picked then toted back home the considerable distance 
from the `garden'. All have to be washed and detoxified, peeled, grated, ground, 
sifted, pounded, pressed, and then toasted or baked according to what is required. 
Each of these stages requires a specific implement and technique, and people's 
skill in them. A crucial aspect of the process seemed to be that while the tools, with 
but very few exceptions, were not privately owned but the property of the 
household, the control over their use and the technical knowledge entailed 
remained the individual user's at the same time as they were deployed toward a 
collective end, and for the `common good'. The tool, be it machete, grater or oven, 
and one's use of it were not only the instruments of a set of social relationships; 
they in practice, by their very use, continuously brought that state into existence. 
Likewise with the speech one (loudly in typical Pa'ikwene style) engaged in during 
the work event -- the jokes and repartee, the exchange of news and views, the story 
telling, singing, instructing, and plain general chatter... 
I believe it reasonable to propose that, for the Labonte family and their 
helpers, working together contributed to a Malinowskian state of `phatic 
communion' (1930: 315) in the very same way as, he considers, speaking together 
can do, where there occurs between people a bond of "social sentiment" which is 
"created by the exchange of words, [and through that] by the specific feelings which 
form convivial gregariousness, by the give and take of utterances which make up 
ordinary gossip. " 47 
As Karinai's reaction to the suggestion of a modern and apparently `better' 
machine illustrates, both of these acts, the (traditional) tool use no less than the 
talking, were seen to counterweigh and in a real sense nullify the indisputable 
drudgery and sheer hard slog involved in many `economic' tasks. They were, 
rather, determining and interactive factors of the condition of shared enjoyment, 
amicability, excitement and indeed fun, which comprises Pa'ikwene manioc 
processing, 48 and for which I use the gloss of 'conviviality'. That is, a distinct 
4" This in no way implies that I accept Malinowski's other claim (ibid.: 311-12), that since it "functions as 
a link of concerted human activity", language in 'primitive societies' is solely "a mode of [emotive] 
action, not at an instrument of reflection". 
48 Another likely and enhancing factor of the positive mood and value attaching to this work is the 
above-mentioned intense symbolic and emotional power of the plant and its by-products. 
manner of, etymologically speaking, living together. 
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For Illich, in his trenchant analysis of the industrial mode of production (1973), the 
construction of a `convivial' society depends, necessarily and fundamentally, on a 
person's rightful and free access to, and autonomous, creative manipulation of, the 
community's tools. And "everyday language", the interlocution of ordinary people 
within and as part of that process, can itself amount to one of the tools in question 
inasmuch as it, too, essentially has a "convivial function" (p. 91). His interpretation 
of "conviviality", and of tools, being quite specific, I will allow myself to present it in 
some detail, for I believe it to be more than pertinent to the subject under 
discussion. It also serves as an appropriate description both of the `traditional' 
Pa'ikwene reality (as I encountered it) in respect of technology and their own 
society, and of the threat to the latter perceived to be posed by the introduction of 
an alien technology beyond a certain practically - and ethically - acceptable level. 
Notionally, Illich draws (ibid.: xii-xiii) on the Aristotelian and Thomist understanding 
of `austerity' to attach to `conviviality', a virtue nowadays considered its opposite, 
the very qualities of "friendship", "joyfulness", and "creative playfulness" in personal 
relations which I have tried to describe with regard to Pa'ikwene working life in 
general, and, most representatively, the informal celebration which is the manioc 
processing. He uses the term emblematically in his critical portrayal of the 
`unconvivial' modern industrial universe as one where people, historically 
dispossessed of and alienated from their `tools for conviviality', are likened to 
prisoners, lacking either control over their environment or creative input into its 
construction: "[D]egraded to the status of mere consumers" (p. 11), they have no 
effective say in the various 'commoditised' areas of their own lives (education, 
health, communication, transport, food production and so on). He contrasts this 
with, and urges a return to, the `convivial society', "in which... technologies serve 
politically interrelated individuals rather than managers... " (p. xii). He elaborates: 
"I intend it [the term `conviviality'] to mean autonomous and creative 
intercourse among persons; and the intercourse of persons with their 
environment... I consider conviviality to be individual freedom realised 
in personal interdependence and, as such, an intrinsic ethical value... " 
(p. 11) 
"[A convivial society entails] the protection, maximum use, and the 
enjoyment of the one resource that is almost equally distributed 
among all people: personal energy under personal control (pp. 11- 
2)... A convivial society would be the result of social arrangements 
that guarantee for each member the most ample and free access to 
the tools of the community and limit this freedom only in favour of 
another member's equal freedom... " (p. 12) 
"A convivial society... allow[s] all its members the most autonomous 
action by means of tools least controlled by others. People feel joy, as 
opposed to mere pleasure, to the extent that their activities are 
creative; while the growth of tools beyond a certain point increases 
regimentation, dependence, exploitation, and impotence. " (p. 20, my 
stress) 
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In Illich's view (pp. 88-91), language does not so much accompany economic and 
technical, and therefore social, activity as reflect and normalise it. He argues that 
the transition from process to reification, subsistence to commoditisation, attendant 
on the industrial mode of production produces a conceptual and linguistic shift in 
our relations with the world and, necessarily, one another. This change basically 
expresses a "transformation in the idea of ownership" (p. 89), in which the 
individualist control over tools has usurped the collective one. By 'tools' he means: 
"not only simple hardware such as drills, pots, syringes, brooms... or 
motors, and not just large machines... [but] also... productive 
institutions such as factories that produce tangible commodities like 
corn flakes or electric current, and productive systems for intangible 
commodities such as those which produce `education', `health', 
`knowledge or `decisions' " (p. 20). 
He goes on: 
"Tools are intrinsic to social relationships. An individual relates 
himself in action to his society through the use of tools that he actively 
masters, or by which he is passively acted upon. To the degree that 
he masters his tools, he can invest the world with his meaning... 
Convivial tools are those that give each person who uses them the 
greatest opportunity to enrich the environment with the fruits of his or 
her vision. Industrial tools deny this possibility to those who use them 
and they allow their designers to determine the meaning and 
expectation of others. " (p. 21) 
"Tools foster conviviality to the extent to which they can be easily 
used, by anybody... for the accomplishment of a purpose chosen by 
the user. The use of such tools by one person does not restrain 
another from using them equally... Their existence does not impose 
any obligation to use them. They allow the user to express his 
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meaning in action. " (p. 22) 
So once again we see the special resemblance and rapport, within the creation of 
their society by its members, between the use of `technology' and language, 
"which is used by people jointly claiming and asserting each person's 
right to share in the shaping of the [convivial] community" (p. 91). 
As noted earlier, both Riviere (1983-4,1984: 92-4) and Campbell (op. cit.: 50) 
charge manioc processing with possessing a function beyond that of the purely 
technical and nutritional, namely the sociopolitical one of instilling unequal gender 
relations. Insofar as the Pa'ikwene are concerned, I would for my part describe this 
type of "Anivit" as a medium, rather, for the playing out of equal gender relations; 
and more than that, for the creation and sustainment of community relations pure 
and simple. In and through the work entailed in the collective process of turning 
the manioc into tangible and valued foods, and by virtue of the labour, skills and 
speech the co-producers deploy, sociability and sociality are both expressed and 
made; possibly, I like to think, the most vital, if non-edible, of that plant's by- 
products, and for the people concerned as equally meaningful and conducive to 
well-being as the "kwak" (flour), the "bügüt" (bread), and the "chibe" (porridge). 
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chapter nine 
THE PA'IKWENE AND RELIGION 
the ambiguity of `simple' belief 
"Almost without effort, the new worlds were co-opted [in the 16th and 
17th centuries] into a style of thinking as if they had been part of the 
argument from the beginning. The easy comparability of heathen gods, 
and by extension heathen customs, was possible in part because they all 
came from a common source - the devil... His role in the assimilation of 
new peoples should never be underestimated" (Ryan 1981: 530, my 
stress) 
A) 
INFORMANT: We don't go to the ihamwi (shaman) now. 
ME: Why not? 
INFORMANT: Because he deals with Wavitche (the Devil). 
ME: Does the ihamwi use magic? 
INFORMANT: Yes. 
ME: Is it good magic? 
INFORMANT: No, it's bad magic because it comes from Wavitche. 
ME: If the ihamwi cures you when you are ill, is that magic? 
INFORMANT: Yes. 
ME: Is it bad magic? 
INFORMANT: No, good magic. 
ME: Where does that magic come from? 
INFORMANT: Wavitche as well. 
ME: The Devil? 
INFORMANT: (laughs) Yes. 
ME: But I thought only God did good things and Wavitche bad ones. 
INFORMANT: Oh no, he can do good ones also! 
B) 
Pa'ikwene history, in the view of the Pa'ikwene Evangelicals with whom I lived, is a 
four-tier structure: 
The time of ignorance and sin, when there was no religion and Ohokri 
(God) was not known. 
Catholic time. During this period, the Pa'ikwene were revealed God but 
there was worship of idols, dancing, drinking and other licentiousness, 
fighting and schism. 
Evangelical time, which began in 1966 and continues to the present: the 
Pa'ikwene are granted "the word of God" and lead their lives in respect 
of it. All things associated with the sinfulness of the two earlier times 
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are prohibited and forsworn. There is concord where before there was 
division. 
The time of heaven on earth, which will be installed by Jesus Christ 
(probably and hopefully in the year 2000) and will in effect be a timeless 
and sinless utopia without hardship, illness or want for all Evangeli- 
cals. 
Basically, this chapter deals with Pa'ikwene religion. In this I include their old and 
new belief systems and ritual practices; the spiritual, the supernatural (so called) 
and the magical. Contra Mauss (1972: 18-24) and Malinowski (1954), I do not 
distinguish between magic and religion any more than the Pa'ikwene seem to do. 
The chapter is divided into the following sections: (1) Introduction situating the 
religion of Village Esperance Deux within a broad historical and sociopolitical 
context; (2) the pre-Christian base of present day religious ideology and behaviour; 
(3) their Christian aspect in terms, mainly, of the native epistemology and exegesis, 
and (4) my conclusion. Although I shall not concentrate particularly on the theme, 
attention will be given to the interrelationship of language and Pa'ikwene religious 
philosophy, which runs like a thread through the entire subject . 
As should become apparent, the religious dimension of the Pa'ikwene's 
contemporary social, cultural, intellectual and affective life is fundamentally and 
intrinsically ambiguous. Essentially, my objective is to isolate, examine and, 
insofar as I am able, unravel two paradoxes. The first consists in this, that while 
shamanism, as a practical religious system, seems in terminal decline due to the 
adoption of a new, and Christian, religion, it nevertheless remains very much alive, 
in the form of certain notions and beliefs, in the discourse and, to an extent, 
behaviour of the very people who claim no longer to follow it. The second, and 
connected, paradox is that while at one level the two belief systems are mutually 
exclusive, they are, at another, very much intertwined. 
Lastly, while one may in the abstract, in academic as well as Christian 
thinking, suppose a clear dividing line between the two, as will be seen below my 
own approach to the subject manages no similar neat cleavage, anymore than 
there existed one in the actual day to day life of the Pa'ikwene converts. 
The community I stayed with in Guyane was by its own account, and with but very 
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few exceptions in reality, an "Evangelical" one, and attended on a near daily basis 
the fundamentalist, and technically Pentecostal, Assembleia de Deus church, 
which was located in the village (together with a sizable Brazilian contingent 
consisting of a `live in' Pastor, his wife, children, sundry other relatives, and a 
retinue of aides and adherents). Rather than struggle with the minutiae of the 
doctrinal and other differences between the two sects, I will from here on in use the 
gloss `Evangelical-Pentecostalist' to refer to the villagers of Esperance 2 and the 
non-traditional component of their religious faith. My residing among them was not 
preplanned but a sort of facilitated serendipity; ' had things turned out but slightly 
differently I might have made my base instead in the neighbouring community, who 
were converts to Seventh Day Adventism. Equally, I could have ended up 
elsewhere, among Pa'ikwene Catholics, or those who follow a hybridised form of 
Catholic and Afro-Brazilian influenced religious rites such as the small group of 
Pa'ikwene half-castes reported by Montout (1994 Annex 4), 2 or even among the 
few, like those I met in Aükwa, who have chosen to reject alien religious 
encroachments and steadfastly continue to practice their ancestral faith. 
I must at this point admit to encountering some difficulty, philosophically, 
practically and emotionally, in regard to the (intense) nature of the adopted beliefs 
and ways of many of the members of my host community, which resulted in a 
certain (often acute) friction between me and the aforementioned Brazilian 
presence in their midst; though not, I am glad to say, with my Pa'ikwene fellow 
villagers themselves. 3 They, while experiencing sadness at my resolutely 
unrepentant non-Evangelic state, and never quite desisting from exerting pressure 
on me to see the light, so to speak, were always much too courteous, diplomatic, 
wise, and, I suppose, culturally conditioned to recognise and respect a person's 
right to personal autonomy, to allow any serious rifts or bad blood to develop 
among us on this score. 
By chance more than actual design I had, just prior to going into the field, made contact with Diana 
and Harold Green of the Summer Institute of Linguistics, who had lived for some fifteen years with the 
Pa'ikwene in Aükwa and, as I eventually came to learn, converted many of them to their brand of 
Protestantism. Now based in Belem, it was they who suggested, and made possible, my staying with 
Susana and Karinai Labonte, who lived in the region I had intended as the main centre of my research 
anyway. 
2 At La Chaumiere, near Cayenne. 
31 shall leave it to the reader to judge to what extent, if any, this factor impinges on the present work. 
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THE PA'IKWENE AND RELIGION 
1. Introduction. 
Susana and Karinai, in whose house I lived in Deuxieme Village Esperance, and 
who along with four others founded the community in 1980 (see chapter 5), had 
prior to their `emigration' to Guyane participated in the large-scale conversion to 
Evangelicalism which occurred among the Pa'ikwene some fifteen years earlier in 
Aükwa (Brazil). It was carried out by North American missionaries, chief among 
whom were the Greens referred to above. Due to a concatenation of internal 
circumstances and external influences then in play in Pa'ikwene society, the details 
of which need not concern us here, many of the inhabitants in the homeland region 
were caught up in, and responded positively to, the determined missionary 
campaign waged by the fundamentalist Protestant groups. After an initial and 
unsuccessful attempt in 1954,4 the (SIL-backed) Evangelicals gained a foothold in 
Aükwa in 1965. They subsequently made deep inroads before being followed, 
eleven years later, by the Pentecostalists in the shape of the Brazilian branch of the 
Assembly of God movement acting, unlike the SIL venture, with the authorisation of 
FUNAI, the National Indian Agency (Ricardo 1983: 28). In contrast, conversion to 
Adventism occurred outside the homeland, in Guyane; the community of 
Esperance 1 adopting it more or less collectively in the late 1960's. 5 
In either case, the adoption of the new religion resulted in a fundamental 
restructuring of Pa'ikwene life in more ways than one. Historically, the clans 
possessed separate territories. But while the present and now customary 
phenomenon of living in multi-clan communities was reported by Nimuendaju in 
1925 (op. cit.: 17), the size of these increased after the conversions described 
above, as people who shared a new faith founded and collected together in 
relatively greater settlements distinguished, and in a significant sense separated, 
4 The same year as a devastating measles epidemic caused many fatalities. 
5 See Dreyfus 1981: 308; also Montout 1994: 95-8, Arnaud 1984, and Ricardo op. cit. for a fuller 
account of the historical roots of Pa'ikwene-Protestant Fundamentalist interaction; and Othilly 1979 
on the implantation and activity of the Protestant sects in Guyane. 
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by Christian denominational factors (Dreyfus op. cit. ). 6 The sectarian differences 
between the Adventists and Evangelical-Pentecostalists of the neighbouring 
communities of Esperance 1 and 2, and similarly the two adjacent settlements at 
Macouria, have made for some tension which on occasion translates itself into 
actual physical confrontation. Thus, for instance, the fights at Macouria in late 1994 
between the two groups over the possession of their (in principle) jointly owned 
communal hall; the Adventists having accused the Evangelical-Pentecostalists of 
appropriating it for their exclusive use as an Assembleia de Deus place of worship 
(Emmanuel Montout, personal communication). 
Converts to Evangelical-Pentecostalism did not, it seems, merely, or even primarily, 
apprehend their new faith in terms of religious salvation per se. According to the 
people themselves, it was seen and welcomed as the answer to the deep seated 
sociopolitical divisiveness rife among the community at Aükwa at that time: a 
situation which to hear it described constituted a virtual anomie, in which there was, 
in the words of an informant, "much fighting and killing... even between brothers... 
much drinking... " This theme was stressed repeatedly. Chief Tchikoi, for example, 
spoke of life before Evangelicalism as hard and unhappy and full of internecine 
strife and endless fissioning, and also wars with other tribes; after though, 
everything apparently - and quasi mythically - became all harmony and peace.? 
What Evangelical-Pentecostalism did, then, I was told, was to put paid to this anti- 
socialness, the cause of which people directly ascribed to their previous "sinful", 
6 E. g. by my own count (February 1994) Village Esperance 2 had 163 inhabitants, excluding Brazilian 
residents. But this figure is unsafe, and not only thanks to my probable shortcomings as a census 
taker. For the population fluctuated daily because of temporary (both short stay and long stay) 
incomers and absentees. Thus a fraction of the 163 were visitors from other communities. There was 
much coming and going of this kind, and especially a ceaseless two-way flow between Esperance 2 
and Aükwa, involving people from one village taking up co-residence with kin in another for various 
lengths of time. Sometimes, too, families had more than one 'address'. I know of one woman who 
preferred ("Because my sisters, brothers and father are here") to live for most of the time in Esperance 
2 together with her three children, while her husband, from whom she was not estranged in any other 
way, spent most of his in Macouria (for work reasons). This family owned two houses and each spouse 
would periodically go and stay with the other. Needless to say, each had numerous kin in both places. 
7 In the early 1960's the community in Aükwa was in fact riven by events involving the hostility 
between two shamans. It culminated in the murder of one (Ti Boug Narcissio) by the aggrieved 
brother-in-law and father-in-law of the other (Payüyü), for the death of whose wife the first was held 
responsible. Payüyü and several others fled to Guyane (see Arnaud 1970: 14-5,1984: 46; Dreyfus 
op. cit.: 306-8; Ricardo op. cit: 23). Hostility and actual warring between shamans seems to have also 
been prevalent at other times in Pa'ikwene history (Arnaud 1984: 45-6; P. Grenand 1987: 78) 
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i. e., non-Protestant, lifestyle. For my Esperance 2 informants, it was not Christianity 
as such that was correct and proper and godly, but specifically Evangelical- 
Pentecostalism itself; for while their pre-Christian existence is characterised in 
negative terms, so too is Catholicism, which not a few of them followed previously. 
Thus you will hear a Catholic typically described as "someone who drinks [alcohol] 
and dances", both of which are proscribed behaviours for the Protestant 
fundamentalists. 8 Central to the movement's philosophy in regard to native 
peoples seems to be the concept that the prior belief system is by definition 
immoral and godless. This satanisation, which underpins a puritanical ethos, 
logically extends to all cultural behaviours and features associated with it, such as, 
for instance, cashiri, tobacco, and ritual song and dance events. 9 
In practice, however, the old customs and concepts were not that neatly and 
comprehensively done away with, even among the staunchest Evangelical- 
Pentecostalist Pa'ikwene. I found a lot of individuals, especially those of the 
younger generation, to be extremely disparaging of many traditional beliefs and 
customs, yet at the same time was more than once the recipient of confidences in 
which I learnt from X that he had enjoyed himself last night on manioc beer, from Y 
that she yearned to dance, and from Z that he consulted a "blower"10 for a snake 
bite. People tended not to admit to these things too openly, for they ran the risk of 
being condemned publicly both in the community and in church. Yet neither did 
they speak of them with guilt but with an attitude which, while admitting that these 
activities and thoughts were `heretical' according to the standards of their Christian 
faith and modern lifestyle, also expressed that they were nevertheless still 
meaningful and valuable, and worth retaining if in a somewhat covert (perhaps 
8 For an account of Catholic missionary efforts among the Pa'ikwene in Amapa state on the part of 
Portuguese then French Jesuits, an activity first undertaken in the 1680s and sporadically continuing 
for the next hundred or so years, see Nimuendaju 1971: 5-10, P. Grenand 1987: 75-6. Renewed 
Catholic proselytisation in the late 19c and early 20c finally led to some success, and in the process 
"repulsed shamanism to some extent without really changing it" (Montout op. cit.: 95; see too Arnaud 
1970: 20, Ricardo op. cit.: 28. 
9 See Townsend 1963 and Slocum & Holmes 1963 for the Fundamentalists', and specifically SIL's, 
own explanation and justification of this policy; and the apologia by the anthropologist Merrifield 
(1976). From an opposing anthropological perspective, an investigation and cogent critique of the 
impact of SIL on indigenous peoples in Latin America is provided in Hvalkof & Aaby (1981). 
10 A magical `specialist', called "aviri" in Pa'ikwaki and distinct from the shaman ("ihamwi" - healer), and 
whose technique likewise consists in part in blowing tobacco smoke. See part 2 below for more on 
both types of practitioner of the curative-spiritual arts. 
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partly protective, partly embarrassed) way. 
Thus the new sociomoral order did not so much replace as repress the old 
one. Nor was it just imposed from without; to a very large extent it had to be, and in 
the event was, readily accepted and absorbed from within. An important 
ideological plank of Evangelical-Pentecostalism is the concept of `Brotherhood'. 
This principle was one of the main messages of the Pa'ikwene pastor-chief Paulo 
Orlando, who led a large community of Assembleia de Deus followers in Kümene 
(Aükwa) for several years in the late 1970's. 11 Many of my informants considered 
it the theme that spoke to them loudest and the most powerfully; the element that 
clinched their conversion for them, as it were. It is my feeling that this idea of 
communitas possibly chimed, and overlapped, with a certain prior indigenous 
notion of sociality as both a highly valued and desirable state. As Heelas writes 
(1984: 9): "New religions... are held [by converts] to appeal because they reflect and 
so tune in with socioculturally acquired expectations, values, interests, and 
rationalised emotions or needs. " More specifically, S. Hugh-Jones also considers 
(1994: 73) that the switch to Evangelicalism by (Arawakan) converts is in significant 
measure due to the new religion's promotion of a return to traditional moral values 
within the imported cultural framework. 
P. Grenand (op. cit., and also with F. Grenand 1990: 32-3) pronounces the effects of 
the new religion on Pa'ikwene culture and society to have been radically and 
unqualifiably devastating. Thus, in direct opposition to the emic explanation that 
Evangelical-Pentecostalism was subscribed to as a means of ending a socially 
negative situation, he cites (op. cit.: 76) Protestant fundamentalism specifically as 
the cause of the deep intra-social crises, schisms and murders which befell the 
Pa'ikwene during this period, and holds it responsible for their "casting doubt on 
[their own] traditional values" which had thus far managed to survive previous 
indigenous adaptations to external influences. 
By contrast, Arnaud judges (1984: 42-3) the influence of Catholicism to be 
comparatively much less invasive and far-reaching, and considers that despite the 
introduction of features such as baptism, it allowed the Pa'ikwene to `continue to 
regulate their lives on the basis of their old, shamanic religion'. 
11 For further facts about this charismatic and autocratic religious and political leader, who destroyed 
the pre-Christian religious artifacts and 'idols', and preached brotherly love and respect for authority; 
his being toppled from power and replaced by another; his reverting to the old religion then back 
again to the new one, and his eventual leadership of a new group of followers and their settlement in 
Guyane, see Montout op. cit.: 96; also Arnaud op. cit. 
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Montout, establishing a decade later the fact of the widespread entropy of that 
ancestral religion, views things from yet another perspective. The correlation 
between the implantation of the new belief system and the entropy of the previous 
one seems to be drawn not in terms of a historical, and indeed political, process of 
cause and effect, but in those of a natural progression: "[T]he vacuum left by the 
absence of shamanism has been filled to the benefit of the new Western [i. e., 
Protestant] religions" (op. cit.: 103, my translation). He focuses on the latter as the 
means tactically resorted to by the Pa'ikwene for dealing with the problems brought 
about by their induction into the new and alien social, cultural and economic 
universe resulting from increased contact (p. 97); rather than as a contributory 
factor to the problems and an integral part of that universe. 
My own belief is that for both all the indisputable destructive consequences of the 
new (Protestant) religion and its purposive use, the old one, or, more precisely, 
aspects of it, still survives `under the surface' of daily life, perceptible in the 
discourse and behaviours of converted Pa'ikwene. P. Grenand is of the opinion 
(op. cit.: 76) that there is an "operculation [or shuttering off] of certain rituals 
surviving in the [Pa'ikwene] memory, as if people wanted to keep them in reserve 
for better days" (my translation). During my stay with them, the shutters would 
occasionally fall open and one could get a glimpse of what lay behind. It was as 
though a certain 'old' religious behaviour, or belief, allowed itself to be seen: 
sometimes clearly, sometimes in a more shadowy, and mysterious, way. This 
could occur as the result of an individual intending it to; or else by accident as it 
were: as if happening by surprise and catching the person unawares, so that the 
action or the spoken idea popped out into the daylight before he or she was fully 
conscious of its existence. This may account for the often startlingly paradoxical, 
and seemingly schizophrenic, statements of people who in the same conversation 
simultaneously denied and affirmed the existence of witchcraft, say, or repudiated 
then averred a belief in the benign power of spirits (when according to Evangelical- 
Pentecostalism it could only be malign), as illustrated in the dialogue prefacing this 
chapter. 
This contradiction is not, I suggest, an index of irrationality and confusion on the 
part of Pa'ikwene followers of Evangelical-Pentecostalism. Yet neither should it be 
thought that the presence of such alternative, or, rather, parallel, thinking, which 
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involves two co-existing belief systems, one of which explicitly and emphatically 
excludes the other, constitutes the basis of a syncretic approach to their faith. That 
Jesus Christ is referred to as the "greatest shaman", and Pa'ikwene spirits replaced 
by Christian entities in songs (Montout op. cit.: 97), 12 is not really evidence of an 
integrated and coherent unitary system. 13 
If there are ancestral religious elements in the Pa'ikwene's practice of their 
Christian faith, then they are both a residue and a reminder to them that their past 
not only existed but lives on; and must continue to do so. Responses to this are, 
once again, ambivalent. On the one hand, there was a definite spurning of, and 
embarrassment at, old religious beliefs and ways. On the other, numerous 
informants told me of their sadness at the destruction of the traditional culture, their 
apprehension about its complete loss for the young and the generations to come, 
and their desire to remember and rescue, and in some cases resurrect, some of its 
features. Thus while shamanism, and resort to it, were no longer sanctioned 
behaviours on the grounds of its perceived satanic nature, many in Esperance 2 
expressed not only a fear of, but beyond that a deep interest in, its practical 
workings. 
This was not mere uninformed curiosity or attraction to the forbidden. The 
pragmatic effects of shamanic practice were known and valued, and continued to 
be believed in and held in respect. The spiritual cosmos associated with them, 
while condemned, was not dismissed but regarded with awe and, as I have said, a 
continuing if often uncomfortable attachment. The middle-aged and Evangelical 
son of Waptchi and Ovayan, the shamans in Village Esperance 1, seemed to sum it 
up when he informed me that though he would never become a shaman himself, 
because it was ungodly, he was heartsick that the songs and dances and skills 
would disappear with his parents; 14 and that he will never forget the songs and 
dances and will teach them to his own children (towards which end he requested a 
taped recording of his parents' singing from me, which I gave him). 
12 On the appropriation of indigenous sacred beings by SIL and their use under Christian guises in 
the transition from a pre-Christian to a Christian mode of thinking, see Smith 1981. 
13 1 would similarly describe as non-syncretic the performance, in Aükwa and Macouria though not in 
Esperance 2, of traditional ritual dances during Christian festivals such as Easter. 
14 Waptchi and Ovayan, on whom more later (see too in chapter 4 section iii and chapter 5) were both 
elderly and on the point of retiring. The former was chronically ill with a lung disease, which affected 
his use of tobacco and thus his healing powers and the capacity to pursue his shamanic calling. This 
factor was yet one more nail in the coffin of the practice of the indigenous religion. 
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In a sense, this could be described as an attempt at sanitisation: to extract the 
practices from their spiritual and cosmological matrix in order sentimentally to 
preserve them. I prefer, though, to see it as part of a continuing, inevitable process 
of change and synthesis: a rational and historical compromise by an individual 
who, finding himself astraddle between two worlds and, to a very real degree, 
psychologically and sociologically torn between them, finds a way of committing 
himself to the old one while at the same time choosing to embrace the new one. 
This is a situation experienced by all of today's converted Pa'ikwene who on a 
daily basis have, both as individuals and as a group, to continue existentially and 
culturally to `resolve' it . 
In the following section I look at the religion of the first era, the ungodly and godless 
"time of ignorance and sin" (according to the Pa'ikwene Evangelical-Pentecostalist 
`calendar'), elements of which continue, as I have already stated, to underlie the 
actual perceptions and practices of these same fundamentalist Christian Pa'ikwene 
who, in their own words, have heard and follow the "Word of God". 
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THE PA'IKWENE AND RELIGION 
2. The non-Christian religion. 
Cosmology. 
I once asked Kamavi, a noted story teller, 15 to tell me about the origin of the 
Pa'ikwene. He promptly set about recounting the story of Adam and Eve. Although 
I did eventually get a non-biblical tale from him (which is presented in Appendix A 
[story 2] and had in the event less to do with creation than Pa'ikwene perception of 
their own impotent power), this incident, like their view of the four phases of history, 
reveals the extent to which the indigenous thought and speech of Protestant 
converts have been infused with an alien world-view in the space of several 
decades. But does the process just work in a single direction, or is it not, rather, a 
dialectical one? 
Nimuendaju writes (1971: 61-74) that the Pa'ikwene's indigenous religion was still 
going strong when he visited them in Aükwa in 1925. Dubbing it a "sorcerer's 
religion" (p. 61), he gives many interesting details relating to shamanism and to 
rites and ceremonies which have now all virtually disappeared (see too Arnaud 
1970, Montout 1994: 59-93). But he (no more than the other two) does not provide 
any idea of the underpinning ideology as system, presumably because, like me, he 
failed to work it out. He found that aside from the Pa'ikwene's adoption of two 
features introduced by Catholic missionaries, namely the Christian form of burial 
and baptism, 
"their Christianity goes no further than that.... they've not the 
slightest notion of the Christian doctrine... [and] God's name is 
used as [no more than] a rhetorical ornament... " (1971: 61). 
15 And indeed perhaps the last one, so far has the once customary practice of story and myth telling 
fallen into disuse. My own shopping around for stories caused something of a revival, with many 
people expressing regret at the passing of the habit and pleasure and excitement at hearing the old 
tales again (or in the case of many children, for the first time). As for Kamavi himself, or Leon Orlando 
to give him his Western name, he was a pastor at Kümene and half Brazilian. Possessing the face of a 
Japanese woodcut, he had by his own account just turned eighty when I first met him in January 1994 
and was the oldest living Pa'ikwene, and also the only bald one I remember ever seeing. 
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However, Nimuendaju goes on to state that they also held God to be responsible 
for the flood whose traces were still to be seen on the slopes of a local mountain 
where the survivors (ancestors? ) found refuge, and believed he dwelt on "Inolliku", 
the lowest sky in the native cosmos. This to my mind clearly indicates that no 
matter how marginal his influence in their lives then, as opposed to his centrality 
now, the Pa'ikwene had already actively knitted "Ohokri" (the Christian God) into 
the fabric of their own pre-Christian universe, in terms of both the cosmological and 
topographical environment; and thus, I suggest, their sociocultural one. 
According to Nimuendaju (ibid. 62-3), Inolliku was one of three skies; the other two 
being Mikene and Ena. There are also several nether worlds, two of which are 
called Minika and Wainpi. Between the sky worlds and underworlds is our own, 
which is also peopled by spirits (whom Nimuendaju calls demons in accord with 
the Pa'ikwene's own Creole, and Christianised, translation). The first kind, 
"Yumawali", 16 of whom there are specific types, inhabit the mountains and are 
considered malign and harmful to humans. Against them are arrayed the 
undifferentiated benign spirits, "Wilaulä", who reside in lakes and rivers and whose 
aid and protection can be procured through shamanic action, as can the powers of 
the evil spirits. Both the Wilaulä and the various Yumawali typically take the form of 
certain birds (e. g. the macaw and hawk respectively); the latter can also incarnate 
themselves as other creatures, such as the alligator (the spirit Ulupli) or a snake 
(Mahipokli). There are also other supernatural entities, among whom there is 
Maipoko; a "powerful demon called Kamubalu" (p. 62); Tukusmaka, the 
bird(hawk? )-spirit whose form is `adopted' by dead shamans, and Kalumaira. The 
last lived in a "little secondary sky" called Yinoklin, which lies beneath the first sky; 
deciding to come to earth, he had himself born of a woman and was in his 
terrestrial existence a powerful and famous shaman. 
Today, much if not most is missing of the Pa'ikwene's pre-Christian system of 
beliefs and rituals (which seems broadly similar to those of other indigenous 
groups in the Guianas, see Roth 1915). And, regrettably, the above can be but a 
superficial - and tantalising - glimpse of what must be both an exciting cosmology 
and an impressive intellectual construct. However, apart from fragments, it seems 
16 The cosmology of the Akawaio, a Carib people, possesses a (forest) spirit called by the similar 
sounding name of "Imawali" (Butt 1962: 29). It is not possible that either the Pa'ikwene borrowed a 
Carib word or the Akawaio an Arawakan one? The first hypothesis is more likely to be correct as 
informants told me it was not a Pa'ikwene word but a Galibi one (thus Carib). 
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fated to remain largely unknown to the non-Pa'ikwene world. Can one say the 
same in regard to the present day Pa'ikwene themselves? Montout, who carried 
out research in 199417, notes (op. cit.: 59-60) a continuing traditional belief in the 
presence of good spirits ("Anamapti") and bad ones (Atimpekevunim"), who live in 
the natural elements of water, sky and forest and assume different animal forms. 
The bad spirits are said to metamorphose into humans in order to deceive men and 
women and eat them; the good ones watch over humans and are benevolent. Life, 
he reports, is seen as a state both of rivalry and complicity between the 
supernatural and human realms, and nature and "man's space", and that there is 
no boundary between the spheres, the spirits are present among humans and the 
latter can enter the domain of the former. He also describes a belief in 
metempsychosis, wherein dead people are reincarnated mostly in the form of birds. 
Apart from Nimuendaju's claim that the `good' spirits are undifferentiated, and his 
view of a particular being called "Wavitche", to whom I devote the next section, my 
own research data (given below) more or less coincides with Nimuendaju's 
original findings. However, observation of, and talks with, the shamans Waptchi 
and Ovayan, provided further details about the spirit world. So too did stories and 
myths collected from various individuals, and, most of all, perhaps, the ordinary 
everyday utterances and actions of Christian Pa'ikwene people behind which there 
often seemed to lurk, and linger, the shadowy presence of `old' ways of thinking 
and being. To all of which I shall refer in due course. 
"Wavitche": the unqualifiably satanic... or not? 
It is not inconceivable that the division into good and bad, as represented above 
(and as presented by Nimuendaju), might not be a purely indigenous concept. It 
could, rather, be an amalgam, the consequence of a certain Christian influence 
predating that of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, not merely through prior 
contact with the Jesuits (as tenuous as it was, it must still have produced, I propose, 
I/ Indeed our paths crossed several times, and it is through him that I found out about the existence 
of the shamans Ovayan and Waptchi, for which information I record my thanks. (My fellow villagers in 
Esperance 2 had till then sidestepped my questions about shamans and denied all knowledge of their 
whereabouts, insisting that since the coming of God's word, there were none left. In the event 
Ovayan and Waptchi turned out to be living literally next door: the house I resided in was the first one 
in Esperance 2; the shamans', certainly no more than two hundred metres away, was virtually the last 
one in Esperance 1; the only thing dividing us was a little stream, and a significant measure of fear and 
protectiveness. ) 
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some cultural impact), but also with the Creole world. 18 As Montout "venture[s] to 
suggest without too much risk" (1994: 61), but a touch too simplistically perhaps, the 
Pa'ikwene's continuing `traditional' and Manichean-like belief in the existence of 
good spirits and bad spirits at a time when their ancestral magico-religious system 
seems to be in decay, could be the result of Christian influence effectively 
stretching back many centuries. 
On the other hand, the case of the supernatural entity known as "Wavitche" might 
indicate that endogenous Pa'ikwene conceptualisation not only was not, but 
indeed still is not, necessarily split along the irreconcilable lines of Judeo-Christian 
'good versus evil' morality -- which does not mean that it does not have its own 
dyadic notions of, and attach its own particular values to, good and bad, negative 
and positive, as Rosengren has shown (1996) for the equally Arawakan 
Matsigenka. 19 
Nimuendaju classifies (op. cit. 61) "Wavitche", which the Pa'ikwene translate in 
Creole as the Devil (`Ie Diab'), as a thoroughgoing Christian construct and the 
opponent of the equally completely Christian "Ohokri"/God (see too Arnaud 1970). 
A number of Pa'ikwene converts presented it as a spirit existing in polar opposition 
to "Ohokri Gitchip" (The Holy Ghost, literally "God's Spirit" and on whom more 
below) rather than to "Ohokri" per se. However, in contrast to this, both shamanic 
discourse and the speech and ideas of ordinary Pa'ikwene, including converts, 
reveal "Wavitche" to be a more ambiguous entity with links to, and probably its 
provenance in, the pre-Christian cosmology, a matter already discussed in chapter 
5. As reported above, the shamans Waptchi and Ovayan described `him'20 not in 
terms of an antithetical God-Satan principle but as a superspirit whose great power 
can be invoked, and used, by humans alternatively for good or bad ends. 
It seems, then, more likely that it was co-opted into the Christian Pa'ikwene 
18 With which, as noted, the Pa'ikwene have long maintained commercial, and wider, relations (see 
Arnaud 1984: 42, Nimuendaju op. cit.: 9,80-82, P. Grenand 1987: 75-6, Ricardo op. cit.: 22-3). 
19 I do not wish it to be thought that I am arguing that 'Christian' and 'pre- or non-Christian', `contact' 
and 'pre-contact', `indigenous' and 'alien', can coexist inside the individual's mind, and also the 
collective culture, as if in discrete and separate compartments with impermeable boundaries. Of 
course a mutual flow exists between them, and they have to an extent coalesced. 
20 The suffix `e' in the word "Wavitche" denotes the masculine gender, spirits being categorised by 
the Pa'ikwene as belonging to the class of items held to be male. 
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cosmos from the ranks, both demonic and non-demonic, of their preexisting spirits, 
each of whore possesses and embodies some form of power. 
In regard specifically to the notion of `good' and `bad', Rosengren points out (op. 
cit.: 19) that the ways in which Western and Amerindian conceptualisations both 
organise the world in terms of a duality2l are only (apparently) similar at the 
structural level of form. We should beware, he says, of assuming, or concluding, 
that the same holds true for their content (cf. Ryan 1981: 530-1). Thus, for instance, 
among the Matsigenka, while each of the two creator gods created all that is `good' 
and `not good' respectively, they themselves are not thought of as moral 
personages or archetypes. Rather, it is their knowledge/power which is good or 
bad; as is, crucially, the intention behind the human being's invocation and use of 
it, and the purpose to which he or she puts it (pp. 5-7). 
Similarly, while there is a group of `good' spirits and a group of `bad' ones, 
they are not seen to constitute or represent moral standards as such. For in that it 
is the person's agency in resorting to either set which in effect both practically and 
morally triggers the spirits' capacity for good or evil, then the responsibility for, and 
enactment of, moral behaviour is not the supernatural entity's but the human social 
actor's (pp. 9-11). 22 
Very much like those of the Matsigenka, the Pa'ikwene's own conceptions of good 
and bad seem to be more pragmatically based than metaphysically constructed. 
They arise in other words from active sociological praxis rather than derive from 
cosmological example and legitimation. There does not appear to exist any pre- 
Christian mythology serving specifically as a blueprint or Malinowskian `charter' for 
formal norms and actual standards of sociomoral conduct. Unlike their Judeo- 
Christian counterparts, actions and thoughts which are "kabai" (good, right, nice, 
fine, well etc. ), and also "bareüye" (beautiful, clean, proper, pleasing), are not 
reflections and projections of an intrinsically divine nature. On the contrary, they 
are primordially human states. Thus, moral behaviour is grounded in, reproduced 
by, and, essentially, an embodiment of, the practical everyday process of social 
21 On the widespread governing principle of duality in the philosophy and social organisation of the 
indigenous (so-called) "dialectical societies" of South America see inter alia Maybury-Lewis 1979, 
Crocker 1985, Levi-Strauss 1945, Overing Kaplan 1975. 
22 Cf. Overing 1985b. 
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relationships as experienced and engendered by humans living together not 
merely interactively, which should go without saying, but above all convivially. 23 
The indigenous morality, then, should, to quote Rosengren (op. cit.: 16), "sooner be 
seen in terms of an innate quality of human relations than as god given rules of 
behaviour". 
"Wavitche" - its presence and potency - was constantly in the background of life in 
Esperance 2. People thought of it, and feared it, as Satan, holding it to be the 
motivational force behind an individual's anti-social and immoral acts, such as 
fighting or getting drunk, and the instigator of negative emotions. 24 Reference to 
"Wavitche" tended to make people nervous. It could even sometimes provoke you 
to laughter at someone else's expense, for it not only perpetrated evil acts but 
mischievous, mysterious ones like causing a needed tool to go missing or parking 
an object in an unfamiliar place. 
Yet, conversely, "Wavitche", it was seen and admitted, also had the ability to 
do good: it could, above all, not only bring illness and affliction but remove them. 
Its power, then, was not uniquely malign and harmful. Rather, its unique power 
was, when mediated through its proper agent, the "ihamwi" (shaman), morally and 
practically capable of double, or alternative, effects (cf. S. Hugh-Jones op. cit.: 35-6 
on the ambivalence of the shaman's use of spiritually derived powers for either 
good or bad ends). 
However, in contrast to either this view or the one reported by Nimuendaju 
(namely that "Wavitche" is unilaterally a bad spirit), other informants had yet a third 
interpretation. It was their understanding that "Wavitche" was not a singular spirit at 
all but the name of a certain supernatural genus of which there were two species, 
one benign and the other not. 
* 
23 By which I mean well/sociably/peacefully/satisfyingly and also productively (See chapter 8, also 
Overing 1989,1996). 
24 Those quoted to me were anger, irritation, jealousy, envy, and "nastiness". I was also told that 
sadness ("kadni"], which comes from both the head and the heart, is like intelligence and volition in 
that it can be either good or bad. The former kind is "put into" a person by "Ohokri" (God), the latter by 
"Wavitche". 
A supernatural typology. 
"... [A]n extensive taxonomy of the spiritual world (not easily reducible to 
homogeneous principles), an active presence of that world in daily life... " 
(Viveiros de Castro 1992: 2) 
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(a) Different spirit entities. 
Like the Arawete (Viveiros de Castro ibid. ) and others, but with the extra factor of 
their present adherence to the new and superimposed belief system, the 
Pa'ikwene possess a large taxonomy relating to the spirit world. That world is not 
so much contiguous with their everyday one as `as if' permanently inserted within it. 
It was less a matter of the supernatural sphere being potentially and at times 
actually in `this world', than of its being invisibly or visibly (and aurally) so; and its 
presence, whether unseen and unheard or seen and heard, was as equally, 
though differently, active within this one as that of the Arawete's spirit world in their 
own daily life25 (See Goldman's observation [1975: 8] that in Amerindian societies 
there is "no demarcation between the natural and the supernatural... [and] no 
oppositional vocabulary to separate religious from non-religious". Cf. Soyinka 
[1978: 1-36] apropos the `Western' Platonic-Christian splitting of the "cosmic 
totality"). 
Apart from "Ohokri" and Jesus Christ (and also "Ohokri Gitchip", `The Holy 
Spirit [or Ghost]', of whom more later in section 3 below), "Wavitche" was, as we 
have just seen, the spirit entity most often in the Evangelical-Pentecostalist 
Pa'ikwene's thoughts and on his or her lips. Yet there also existed a number of 
others, both autochtonous and imported, to whom reference was made (with 
varying frequency). 
Pa'ikwene Spirit Entities: 
Imaowi (possibly Nimuendaju's Yumawali, which he says are mountain 
spirits). According to numerous informants these entities live in the forests, 
are very beautiful and "not bad but very kind". One specified that an Imaowi 
"is not a `Wavitche' (evil spirit) but a `Ohokri' (god)". 26 They are said to lure 
and seduce young men and women, assuming the guise of a pretty young 
25 While Pa'ikwene cosmology, for instance, gives some evidence of the common Amazonian theme 
of cannibalism, it does not make such a meal of it, as it were, as the Arawete's more systematic 
conceptual schema. The `Yumawali' were believed, as mentioned above, to catch and eat the odd 
unfortunate human, yet that is the inescapable fate of all Arawete who at death are devoured by the 
"Mai hete" gods in order to be turned into gods themselves (Viveiros de Castro op. cit.: 58-91). 
26 See Viveiros de Castro (op. cit: 343 n. 17) on whether or not the term 'god' is applicable to the 
spiritual entities of Amazonian peoples. 
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woman or a handsome young man in either case, and to take them off to live in 
the forest with them. They use Imaowi language between themselves but can 
also speak in all other languages. The Imaowi do not eat fish but only birds 
and animals (There is a `correspondence' here with the "ihamwi", for he or 
she is not allowed to eat fish when in a shamanic session "because the spirits 
don't like them to and would be upset and angry if they did"). There are 
several types of Imaowi, such as: 
Marivoka (or Maripoka; possibly Nimuendaju's Maipoko). According to 
Waptchi the shaman and others, it is the Master and Mother of water. A 
myth, collected by Nimuendaju in the twenties (op. cit.: 78) and still recounted 
today (see Appendix A story 5), tells of how, as a water snake spirit who 
transforms into a handsome young man and impregnates a Pa'ikwene 
woman, Marivoka is also the father of their traditional enemy, the Galibi 
people. 
Panamik, another forest spirit, but a bad, anthropophagic one. It has the 
ability to change its appearance not only into human or animal form but also 
into an object, e. g. a spear. It is further distinguished by the lack of an anus. 
Abes are a type of forest spirits, both male and female, which, again, are "very 
kind". They look and dress like Indians and are normally invisible. If caught 
sight of they will then appear as "little people", though in their natural state 
they are said to be taller in fact than humans. While they usually disappear 
when approached by a person who does see one, contact can occasionally be 
established. Male ones sometimes seduce Pa'ikwene women. It is said that 
the child born of such a union is more likely than not to have a twisted foot. 
Avakni (also known in Creole as Pagani): the harpy eagle-spirit: "It's a devil... 
he can fly... it's a very bad spirit with seven heads. " For all his malignity and 
hostility to the Pa'ikwene he was also said to act at times on their behalf. I was 
told a story in which he in effect proved to be their saviour by fighting, killing 
and eating a certain nameless White chief who was stealing gold from their 
land. He was once killed himself but later resurrected. 
Masitwak, a "foreign devil-spirit" and guardian-master of the forest where he 
lives with his wife and son. Very strong and tall. He wears iron clothes and 
as well as a bow and arrows has a rifle "like a White man"; his "teeth are like a 
White man's" too. Indeed I was told that the Whiteman and Masitwak were 
brothers and enemies. (cf. Overing 1995 on the Piaroa's `conquistador Master 
of the Jungle'). He is able to metamorphose into a human being of any race or 
nationality; speaks all languages; "never ever eats jaguar" but attacks and 
devours humans who venture into the forest without first obtaining his 
permission and protection; and never goes near to villages: "he is in 
disagreement with humans". There exist several stories of Pa'ikwene 
confronting, outsmarting and defeating Masitwak, e. g. the hero Maniga. As 
one informant said, "Before, Maniga beat Masitwak so the Pa'ikwene were 
stronger that the Whites, but now they are stronger than us. " In view of 
Masitwak's many post-contact features, I tried to discover if there was another 
(and perhaps pre-Masitwak) master of the forest, and was given the name 
Yadris. Other than this, however, no one seemed to know anything about him. 
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Süyen and Kaü : two bird-spirit brothers (the first a species of small parrot; the 
second possibly the blue macaw or else a small black bird), born of separate 
spirit mothers and a Pa'ikwene father. Totem-like27 creatures for the 
Pa'ikwene who once went to war against the Maraön people who had dared to 
poach them (see Appendix A story 3). 
Wamwi, a water-snake spirit, and Wanese, his water-snake spirit wife (who in 
one story attacks the Pa'ikwene in order to avenge his death at their hands and 
is killed herself. Their son is helped by Mainai, a Pa'ikwene man whom 
Wamwi had once captured (Appendix A story 4). 
The following are all spirits28 resorted to and communicated with by the shaman 
Waptchi: 
Kamüyone, the sun spirit and perhaps the greatest spirit of them all (cf. 
Montout's Kamouyounim [op. cit.: 71], and possibly Nimuendaju's Kamubalu); 
Kaigevinie, the moon spirit: "Very powerful"; Taowene, spirit of the "taoni" 
tree (? Brosimum acutifolium) from which the "ihamwi" gets the hallucinogen 
used for establishing communication with the spirit world. Also "very 
powerful"; it has the jaguar spirit incorporated in it as well as that of other 
natural species); Kaümalye, the ancestor/creator spirit of the Pa'ikwene (see 
Appendix A story 1); Haokine, the master and mother of the air; Atiüwine, the 
spirit of Creoles; Kaia, a spirit of hunting and fishing (According to Montout 
[ibid. ], the Pa'ikwene say that it is sometimes white and sometimes black, and 
travels through the air in a big canoe accompanied by a horde of subaltern 
spirits which are called `Doctors' in Creole because they intercede for the good 
of humans; Iwiv(r)ayene, the bamboo spirit; Arawyene (Kiaptünka word), the 
wild pig spirit; Konopo, a lake spirit; Waükma, a star spirit; Issüvinye, the 
crow spirit; Kamiki, a bird spirit (I known not what kind); Warayene (or ? 
Wakayene), the flamingo spirit. This is also the name given by Arnaud's 
informants to a powerful shaman of the past remembered for his many 
malign deeds (1970: 9,1984: 45. Also possibly P. Grenand's Wepkune [1987: 791); 
?, the colibri spirit; ?, the crab spirit. 
27 Mattioni proposes (1975: 75) that the Pa'ikwene's ancestral `naturist' religion was in all likelihood 
originally totemic as well. Nimuendaju, who found evidence of it in the clan names, concluded that it 
could only be "totemism in the most primitive sense of the word" (op. cit.: 17). Montout states (op. 
cit.: 53-4) that though the clans may once have been totemically linked with the natural species 
designating them, no belief in totemism exists among the Pa'ikwene today. This coincides with my 
own findings in respect of conscious totemic conceptualisation. 
For different theoretical approaches to totemism see principally Durkheim 1971: 102-239, Radcliffe- 
Brown 1959: 117-32, Malinowski 1954: 44-7, Levi-Strauss 1962a. Viveiros de Castro's rejects 
(1992: 3 and throughout) the universal application of the structuralist 'totemic model' to all Amazonian 
societies. The postulation that Amerindian society socialises nature and is thus `animic' rather than 
'totemic, which would conversely infer a naturalisation of society, is made by Descola (1986). Arhem 
however argues (1996) regarding the Makuna that the relationship between humans and nature is 
conceived not in unidirectional but reciprocal terms, and Amerindian society is consequently both 
`animic' and 'totemic'. 
28 I was given to understand that the word "Wavitche" can itself also mean spirit in the generic sense. 
Another word used is "gitchip" (as in "Ohokri Gitchip", the Christian Holy Spirit [see section 3 (b) 
below; "gi" being the masculine prefix "his"). Two further terms are "anmaptchi", somewhat 
incompletely translatable as soul and ghost or spectre, and "aonparinen", again signifying soul. 
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(Spirit) birds are a core aspect of the shamanic religion, as Nimuendaju noted, and 
the "ihamwi" seeks frequently possession by, and a trance communication with, 
them. According to Waptchi, not only birds but all fish and animals are spirits, we 
just see their ('natural') terrestrial forms. Sometimes, like the aforementioned 
Imaowi and Abes, they present themselves to us in human guise; at others in that of 
plants. Some further spirits (provided this time by Montout's research [op. 
cit. ibid.: 71]) are: 
Miko, a spirit specialising in problems relating to love; Wache-anakig, the 
death spirit; Kousouvi, the master of the stars; Yaoüweni, a spirit resorted to 
in conflicts between shamans. 
There is another entity who possesses a mythological status (like the 
aforementioned hero Maniga) and a near supernatural one; and also a species of 
beings who possess a fully supernatural one. Namely: 
Tchalbe, a powerful Pa'ikwene chief who abandons them to become the "chief 
of foreigners" (including White people). 
Both Tchalbe and Pagani, the alternative name for Avakni (the harpy eagle-spirit), 
seem to have a Creole connection or, possibly, origin. A Pa'ikwene story about 
Tchalbe slaying Avakni in order to win the hand of a king's daughter is apparently 
identical to, if not based on, a Creole one (personal communication from Franck 
Compper). 29 
Ügükü (from the verb "ügüh", to light or set fire to), a being lamely translatable 
as 'werewolf', which equivalent Creole term (Loup garoup) is used by the 
Pa'ikwene themselves. It most typically metamorphoses into a will o' the 
wisp. Other distinguishing marks are its jaguar teeth and the ability to fly. Ügükü are said to change at night into animals and birds and even into 
airborne canoes. Of a necrophiliac disposition, they frequent cemeteries, and 
also attack living humans and eat them. They can be killed, and will stay dead 
once shot. There are a number of techniques for combating them (e. g. 
trapping them inside the sheath-like woven fibre manioc press; either sticking 
an upended blade into the ground, or concealing an upturned hat under its 
flight path, while uttering the "right" incantations, will block the Ügükü's 
nocturnal journeying: rendered immobile, it cannot escape and dies at 
daybreak. In the daytime the Ügükü can pass for an ordinary human being. I 
was told of the presence of one in my village, though informants said they were 
29 A Creole primary school teacher in St. Georges de L' Oyapock who, when I recounted several 
Pa'ikwene stories to him, commented on their similarity to the traditional oral tales told in his own 
community. For him there was no doubt that Tchalbe was originally the Creole folklore hero Ti Albe' 
(Petit Albert). 
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too afraid to reveal which of our fellow villagers it actually was. You can tell if 
someone is really an Ügükü "if they are always in disagreement with other 
people". Also, anyone who refuses to shake your hand after you have secretly 
made the sign of the cross in your palm with a red pepper, is (purportedly) an Ügükü for sure. 
According to one informant, the Ügükü possesses inhamwi-like abilities 
in that he also can both send afflictions and cure you of those imposed by 
another ügükü (cf. P. Grenand [ibid. ] on the Ügükü's manipulation of magical 
plants and strong tobacco-y breath; and Fernandes [1950] who says they send 
illnesses. He seems to conflate them with sorcerers whereas I found that they 
were in fact said to act like them. 
Arnaud claims (1970: 17-18,1984: 47) that the "Ügükü" is a Western cultural import 
("according to the Palikur themselves"), a notion rebutted by P. Grenand (1987: 79). 
He suggests instead that it is of joint Creole and pre-contact indigenous origin and 
thus a "syncretic phenomenon". My own informants dismissed both ideas, insisting 
on the `ethnic' purity of the "Ügükü". Although they acknowledged the existence of 
the aforementioned Creole "Loup garoup", and another (? ) species called "Baclou", 
defined as an "Atiwi (Creole) spirit", they nevertheless distinguished between their 
own and the other two. The only difference I found in their descriptions of them was 
that, unlike the "Ügükü", the "Baclou" have a tendency to change into dwarfs. 
Other than that and the "Ügükü's" pharmaco-medical skills, all three entities, the 
Pa'ikwene and the non-Pa'ikwene, seem to possess identical attributes and 
powers. 
(b) Different human agents of the spirit world. 
Ihamwi (masc. ), Ihamwü (fem. ), the "healer". Essentially a shaman. Also 
known in Pa'ikwaki as "Hiyepwene", a term reserved for shamans of the past 
says Nimuendaju (op. cit.: 65), who translates it as sorcerer, and Arnaud 
(1984: 44), but now fallen into disuse according to my informants. The latter 
sometimes also employed the word "Paje" (a regional appellation of Tupi or 
Carib origin, see Metraux 1967: 81) and "Gado" (Creole). Both Nimuendaju and 
Arnaud also refer (ibid. ) to a third term, "Akümnairi" (or "Akümari"), and its 
likely association with the word "airi", which they say means tobacco. I think 
it possible there is a misapprehension or a confusion here. My own data 
revealed that the tobacco aspect related to "Aküm" which means to smoke, and 
that probably the suffix "-airi"" or "-ari" is, rather, "aviri", the name given by 
the Pa'ikwene to a specific practitioner of the wizardly arts (see below) and 
distinct from the "ihamwi". ("Akümnairi" or "Akümari" was not recognised 
by my informants as a word let alone as an alternative title for a shaman). 
Now held to be an agent of the Devil ("Wavitche") and therefore, according to the 
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new orthodoxy, a perpetrator of evil, sinful acts, the "ihamwi" and his or her craft 
continue to maintain an important place in the minds and discourse of the 
Evangelical-Pentecostalist Pa'ikwene (as well as in the thinking and actual life 
experience of many non-Evangelical-Pentecostal ones). I will deal in fuller detail 
both with the "ihamwi" and the shamanic religion he or she is part of, and also their 
meaning and relevance to others, in the next two sections. 
Aviri (or avi'i), a sort of WzArd. (While I did not come across or hear about a 
female one, there have been some). Called a"o. e rer" and a "blower" by 
Arnaud (1984: 46), the last term because of the Aviri's technique of blowing 
tobacco smoke (and with it spells and imprecations). A Christian convert 
explained that the aviri "sings magical words [which are] like prayers in order 
to send illness or kill someone" ("avi", which was translated for me as prayer, 
seems linked to "avat" [= song] ). They are, however, also capable of good and 
benign acts (as already noted by Arnaud ibid.: 47), and "suck out" certain types 
of pain and illness, which may partly be why Arnaud defines them as 
`specialists' (ibid. ). Likewise, they remove the danger which may, as the result 
of a curse, be present in foods (see Montout op. cit.: 64-5). 
Outside observers (Fernandes, Arnaud) have tended to accord the "aviri" a lower 
status than the "ihamwi". The Pa'ikwene I spoke to appeared to apply no such 
grading. Rather, the distinction they drew was one of a degree of function. The two 
roles or `jobs' would seem to serve a complementary purpose, and to act in 
complementary ways. For Arnaud, their association is not always a positive and 
peaceful one, and he gives both an example of murderous rivalry between them 
(ibid.: 45) and one of alliance and co-operation (p. 47). An informant (Alphonse Y. ) 
said that the "aviri" could also cure you like the "ihamwi" did, but only of certain 
things which the "ihamwi" does not (or is perhaps not allowed to) handle, such as 
afflictions non-ascribable to witchcraft (see Montout op. cit.: 64-5); and that the two 
were basically the same: "only the name is different". Both worked through the 
medium of tobacco and words: the "ihamwi" with songs, chants, and dialogues in 
Kiaptünka with the spirits, and the "aviri" with sung magical words; both types of 
communication being unintelligible to ordinary people. For Alphonse, the "aviri" 
was but a type of alternative healer to the "ihamwi" and, no more than him or her, 
was not just a doer of malign deeds (see Arnaud ibid. ). For while each could act 
malefically through the use of `bad spirits', both also used `good spirits' for opposite 
ends. His daughter (S. ) disagreed in terms of the new and Christian doxa: even if it 
cures you, the healing by both parties is evil because it comes from a satanic 
source. 
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She and many of the other villagers I spoke to expressed at times a 
paranoia-like fear that, as Evangelicals, they were targeted by the shamans who 
were (supposedly) out to kill them all through black magical means. It was only 
thanks, they said, to the eternal vigilance of God and his love and care for 
Evangelicals that they were protected. S. reminded her father that he had once 
survived a death curse put on him by an "ihamwi" only because he prayed to God 
and was saved. If a cursed person is not an Evangelical-Pentecostalist (the 
thinking goes) then they are not under God's eternal protection and will surely 
perish. And yet (and thus), as ever, the two discourses and belief systems existed 
and expressed themselves coevally, neither quite ever submerging the other. 30 
Pa'ikwene shamanism: the world and work of the "ihamwi". 
Having placed Pa'ikwene religion in its contemporary and broad context, I turn now 
to look at shamanism. First, some givens, assumptions and surmises: 
(i) There has not only been an impairment to belief in shamanism, as discussed 
above, but, as a probable consequence, a fall in the actual numbers of shamans. 
P. Grenand notes (op. cit.: 78 fn. 2) that (in the mid 1980's) there were four shamans 
"still practising openly", which implies there were others doing so in secret. I have 
no way of telling whether there were `clandestine' "ihamwi" during my time in the 
field (1993-5), but it was more than once stressed that Ovayan and Waptchi were 
the "last two shamans". Overlooking Ovayan, Montout describes (op. cit.: 70) her 
husband and religious co-worker as the "last Palikur shaman on French territory". It 
is true however that Ovayan professed to no longer be practising her skills, 
because of her old age. As for Waptchi, who, as reported in footnote 14, is an ill 
man, he was doing so less and less. (By contrast, the "aviri" are not only surviving 
but numerically flourishing; they are to be found in both the French and Brazilian 
sectors of the Pa'ikwene world, at Village Esperance 1, Macouria, Regina, 
Kümene, and several of the other settlements in Aükwa. ) 
(ii) As mentioned, there are female as well as male Pa'ikwene shamans (see 
3u Montout mentions (op. cit.: 69) further human agents of the Pa'ikwene's supernatural world. These 
are "Pirekevumin" and "Caveyavouwie", two types of sorcerers (or perhaps two names for the same 
type) not encountered by me. They are said to deal with evil spirits and cast spells but not to have 
access to the full range of powers at the disposal of the "ihamwi". 
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Arnaud 1984: 44, and also Nimuendaju op. cit.: 64 who reports that there were not 
any when he went to Aükwa [1925] though they had existed in the past). It is worth 
noting that while Waptchi was known and feared by everyone as the "ihamwi", his 
skills were rated less favourably than those of his wife, Ovayan; she was said to be 
more powerful than him. Women shamans are by no means unique to the 
Pa'ikwene. Metraux's study of shamanism in the Guianas and Amazonia (1967) 
reveals that their existence is quite widespread. It concludes however that, overall, 
the practice is male dominated: "[Though] the profession is virtually masculine in 
essence, it is not closed to women, who, however, play an important role in 
shamanism in but a very small number of tribes" (p. 81, my translation). One other 
Guiana Lowland society where women do occupy that role is the Piaroa, who have 
joint male and female political-religious leaders (Overing Kaplan 1975: 51). 
Viveiros de Castro reports (op. cit.: 237,369 note 16) the existence of the conjugal 
"shamanic unit" in eastern Amazonia, among the Arawete and other Tupi-Guarani 
peoples. 31 
(iii) Pa'ikwene shamans are categorised into three classes: "Born" ones: those 
seen innately to have certain `mystical' powers and a disposition for shamanism, as 
if having been selected by the spiritual forces themselves; "Called" ones: those 
who have been called by a given spirit or combination of spirits; "Formed" ones 
who learn the practices from either of the other two, who transmit `their' powers to 
him or her (see Montout op. cit.: 72-3). Waptchi was an "ihamwi" of the last type, 
and was trained by Ovayan, who apparently learnt the shamanic rituals and 
formulae, both verbal and medicinal, from her own parents (who were, I was told, 
not Pa'ikwene but Küma-Hümac, i. e. ?A jra). 
(iv) As well as his or her curative role, the "ihamwi" (invariably translated in Creole 
as `healer' by the Pa'ikwene) has divining skills and, it is said, the power to control 
31 However, unlike in Pa'ikwene shamanism, the Arawete woman's function is seen as inferior to the 
man's. Notwithstanding which, "Even if Arawete shamanism is an exclusively masculine attribute - the 
woman being a mere assistant or a patient - such a position... is relatively feminine... due to... the very 
nature of the relationship of the shaman to the gods. " (Viveiros de Castro ibid.: 237). And even 
despite odd cases of women shamans, the function is an "eminently masculine" one among the 
Guarani in general (p. 260). 
Overing shows (1986: 148-9,1988) that for the Piaroa, too, the granting of productive knowledge 
from the spirit gods to the shaman is seen in terms akin to the process of (female) fertility, itself held to 
be a knowledge obtained by women from the same divine source. See also, as yet further evidence 
of this connection, Belaunde's data (1992: 119-20) on how Airo-Pai men protect both their manly 
health and capacity for being good shamans by `acting like a woman' in taking over the cooking duties 
from their wives when the latter are menstruating. 
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the natural elements, such as the rain and storms (Arnaud 1984: 45). The "ihamwi" 
also mediates with the spirit world in order to obtain success in the hunt (not in 
terms of charming game but, rather, of establishing communicative contact with 
them via the spirit guardian-masters and securing safe-conduct from the "protector 
animals", the jaguar and [I believe though am not certain] anaconda). Payment for 
their services (traditionally) took the form of cashiri. 
(v) Lastly, many observers talk of Amerindian shamanism and shamans in terms of 
`specialisation' (see e. g. Riviere 1984: 12, Fernandes op. cit., Arnaud op. cit. ) and 
even `profession' (Metraux op. cit.: 81). 32 It is ultimately more helpful, however, to 
view the "ihamwi", and the subject generally, more as a process and an existential 
condition which are not limited to certain named experts. I suggest that, for the 
Pa'ikwene, to be shamanic is primarily, to use Campbell's words (1989: 106), a 
"quality or attribute rather than a role or an office'. That not only are the "ihamwi", or 
the "aviri", able to attain to that quality, but others, for all that they do not fill the 
`official' post, may too, if in varying degrees. And that, furthermore, the quality 
exists in the spiritual-material environment about one, and, for example, still finds 
expression in the nowadays "ihamwi"-less activity of hunting (see chapter 4 section 
iii) and also in the sphere of pharmacology and medicine, as I intend showing 
below. To that extent, then, Pa'ikwene shamanism could perhaps be said to 
belong to the "democratic" or "horizontal" type common to egalitarian societies in 
Amazonia, as opposed to the "vertical" one associated with ranked societies, 
according to the classification established by S. Hugh-Jones (op. cit. ). 
The spirit breathes, the spirit sings, the spirit speaks: an encounter with (possibly) 
the last Pa'ikwene shamans. Waptchi and Ovayan. 33 
This encounter, already briefly referred to in chapter 4, effectively amounted to an 
interview-cum-staged seance. 34 While contrived, it was also nevertheless genuine 
to the extent that Waptchi went into a possession trance; but whether out of reflex 
32 Cf. Mauss who, though stating (1972: 26) that "as a general rule, magical practices are the 
prerogative of specialists", also says (p. 25) that he uses the term `magician' "to apply to any 
practitioner of magic, whether or not he considers himself a professional. In effect, we maintain that 
there are magical rites which can be performed by others besides specialists". 
33 See Montout op. cit.: 71-2 for the account of his own meeting with Waptchi. 
34 For a description of an actual one see Nimuendaju op. cit: 65-6. 
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and long habit, or because he had hallucinogenically primed himself to some 
extent beforehand, I could not say. It took place in public in Esperance 1, on the 
platform of the shamans' house amid the usual disparate, mix-and-(mis)match 
effects and trappings, the usual part `Western', part indigenous decor, of the 
modern Pa'ikwene household: a radio-cassette player, a zoomorphic (macaw) 
stool, and a Brazilian political poster, calabashes, aluminium pots and Chinese 
enamel mugs... In a corner, as if nonchalantly secreted behind the domestic clutter 
until they were eventually pulled out and explained and, some of them, put to use, 
were the paraphernalia of the "ihamwi's" calling: magical arrows, feather head- 
dresses, dance neck- and breast-plates, little pouches of cloth, several long, 
plumed, long thin wooden wands topped with gourd rattles, a monkeyskin drum, 
and bamboo and bone flutes (see Montout op. cit.: 90-1 on Pa'ikwene shamanic 
implements and musical instruments). Waptchi at that time (March 1994) was sixty 
seven years old, frail and tuberculosis-ridden, subdued and without any discernible 
aura. Ovayan, bent and gnarled and amuleted, and with piercing yet guarded 
eyes, was, by contrast, a woman of palpable charisma. Their middle-aged son 
Tchig, not a shaman himself but an Evangelical-Pentecostalist convert, warded off 
my more awkward questions, attempted to clarify my multiple moments of 
confusion, and oversaw my efforts at translation. I was also helped, as so often, by 
Karinai, in whose house I lived and who had accompanied me out of a very real 
interest, for all his professed Christian disapproval. 
At the age of about forty five Waptchi became an "ihamwi" under Ovayan's 
supervision, for, as mentioned above, she already was one. When, hoping for 
details of the "difficult and dangerous [shamanic] apprenticeship" (Riviere op. 
cit.: 12), I asked if the training had been long and arduous, he replied, "No, it took 
just one week! "35 He told me that his ability to heal is not his but belongs to the 
spirits. He calls them up through songs, playing the musical instruments, and the 
inhalation of the smoke from tobacco and the bark of the "taoni" tree (see above). 
Then, in his own words, "My memory engages with the moon, sun, forest, sea, river, 
all the places where the spirits live. They enter into me, come into the house in my 
head. " While mostly the spirits come to him, he is also able at times to `journey' to 
their various realms and visit with them, as well as with the spirits of dead people. 
35 On the in reality more complex subject of the initiation of Pa'ikwene shamans, see Arnaud 1984: 44, 
1970: 4; Montout op. cit.: 72-5. Karinai, whose own late father had been a shaman, also supplied me 
with data showing initiation to be a gruelling and testing process. However, I do not have the space for 
it here. 
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These are not all Pa'ikwene; there are Brazilian, French and Creole ones too, and 
also Portuguese, from when Brazil was a colony. The most powerful spirits are the 
masters and mothers of the air, water, sun, and moon. There are numerous other 
ones too (see list above). 
Describing all this to me, Waptchi started physically to enact it and in the process 
gradually became more and more immersed in the actual performance. Shortly, 
having been called, "Maripoka", the master-mother of water in his-her guise of 
watersnake spirit caused a song to "rise" in the "ihamwi", who, after singing it, 
explained that it is the spirits who sing and talk through him, who "breathe" in his 
voice and in his breathing and the musical instruments. For instance, it is 
"lwiv(r)ayene", the bamboo-spirit, who inhabits the flute and breathes itself out 
through the instrument's sound. The summoned spirit also fills the other sacred 
objects, such as his zoomorphic stool and the items used in curing. The spirit it is, 
too, who, having filled the "ihamwi", effects the healing through the medium or 
conductivity of the human being in a state of shamanic receptivity. Thus, I was told, 
it is not the healer's own suction which directly draws out an ill person's affliction, 
but the spirit sucking with and through the healer's mouth. 
Many of the songs and chants which Waptchi and Ovayan, who had now decided 
to participate, performed were not in Pa'ikwene but Kiaptünka, the special "speech 
of respect" (see chapter 5 item iv). I was told that this was not the spirits' language 
as such, but that of the "old ones", which the spirits knew and generally preferred to 
communicate in. Partly because of the present widespread unfamiliarity with this 
tongue, and partly due to the way in which a lot of the singing and chant- 
conversations tended to be mumbled and hard to hear, most of the onlookers 
deemed it unintelligible yet not for all that without a significance. Waptchi and 
Ovayan also said that they themselves could not always understand it fully, but that 
the spirits could. 36 
At another level of comprehension, whatever reservations they might have felt as 
36See Tambiah 1968: 177-88 for whom 'unintelligible' sacred languages constitute a system of 
communication (between the human and the supernatural spheres) which is qualitatively the same as 
that of intelligible 'ordinary' languages, and are both powerful and (contra Malinowski 1965: 235) 
rational. Rothenberg believes (1968: i-xxiv, 385-519 passim) that 'meaningless' archaic language, as 
well as all the other types of magical and religious language, such as invented sounds, distorted 
everyday syntax and sounds, and borrowed syntax, are aspects universally of a sacred "poetry". 
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Christian converts all present `heard-understood' that the "ihamwi's" words 
possessed the ability to heal or to afflict and destroy, to have, in short, magical 
power. More than that, they seemed in some sense to consider the words 
themselves to be that power. As already reported, they were thought not to be 
Waptchi's own ones, but those of the spirit inside him - yet they were not the spirit's 
words so much as the spirit itself, its concrete living form. To explain, I would 
suggest that when "lwiv(r)ayene" or "Maripoka" or any of the other summoned 
entities spoke `out of' Waptchi, their words were not just hypostatically correlated to 
the substance of the things spoken about. 37 The speech was also perceived and 
experienced as its speaker, the latter's embodiment: the word-thing is the sayer, 
the sayer is the word-thing. 38 Waptchi and the others would not, I feel, endorse 
Tambiah's view (op. cit.: 176-85) that the power attaching to magico-religious 
utterances lies in their being the "most realistic representations of a [human] 
concept of force which is... not directly observable" (p. 184), and acting as the 
signs, reminders, and re-enactors of the authority of an original powerful and 
empowering Word, be it the ancestors' or a god's. Rather, the Pa'ikwene's thinking 
appeared in line with Stoller's notion (1984: 569) about the magical power of 
words: that they intrinsically "are power, energy... action" (my stress). 
Whether in arcane Kiaptünka or demotic Pa'ikwaki, the songs often had sequences 
of dialogue, either interwoven throughout or occurring as a sort of coda, between 
spirit and shaman. These were sometimes conducted by the tranced Waptchi with 
his spirit-possessed self (like a ventriloquist's act without a visible dummy), and at 
other times occurred between himself and Ovayan as the spirit's mouthpiece. On 
one occasion, for example, a bird spirit asked if "this man" (that is, me) had come to 
ask the "ihamwi" to sing. When the "ihamwi" answered that this was indeed so, the 
spirit commented, "There were many songs once, but no longer. " When it was its 
turn, "Waükma" (star spirit) stated, "Someone has come, I'll make a song for him". 
"Kamiki" (a game bird [? ]-spirit), on the other hand, told Waptchi it had come to hear 
him sing (on the aural aspects of the "ihamwi's" world chapter 4 section iii). 
In a number of other such conversations, different spirits (flamingo spirit, lake 
37 The word is the thing, the thing is the word', Cassirer 1953. A "theory which appeals [says Tambiah 
op. cit.: 187] to shaky ethnography. " 
38 Cf. Leenhardt's description (1947: 164-97) of the Melanesian Houailou's understanding of 'Parole' 
as the "manifestation of a being... an existent... of the human in all its aspects, from the life of the 
psyche to manual work to the expression of thought... [The conception reveals that] little 
differentiation is made between being and thing [i. e., word]" (p. 172, my translation). 
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spirit, wild pig spirit), asked him how he was, if his family were well, and what could 
they do for him. In the prelude to a healing song, "Issüvinye" (crow spirit) 
announced: "I have come because you call me to help this sick person". I do not 
know what it made of being called out on false pretences as it were. 
The "ihamwi's" songs were not always the creation of a spirit acting singly. 
He performed a cashiri-drinking dance and song in which many spirits joined 
together to give multiple voice. "All the spirits are friends, " said Waptchi. But then 
later added: "Some spirits fight each other. Some are good and some bad. " 
For Metraux (op. cit.: 100-1), a shaman's influence and power is quantifiable, being 
determined by the number of spirits he 'controls'. Regarding Pa'ikwene 
shamanism, and the "ihamwi" in particular, Waptchi and Ovayan seemed 
themselves to have no power as such. Neither were they said to have any: if they 
were an object of fear for my fellow villagers ( and I have already indicated they 
were seen as more than just such figures), it was not only as a result of their 
satanisation according to Protestant fundamentalist ideology; nor indeed because 
of any supposed possession of evil powers. Rather, I propose, it was because the 
powers of the spirits, both good and bad, with which an "ihamwi" deals, and with 
which he or she is therefore by extension filled, are (held to be) intrinsically, 
`naturally' dangerous. What power pertains to Pa'ikwene shamanism, then, is not 
human but numinously extra-human. It belongs to, inheres in, and derives from, 
the spirit entities which enter into the human being and, from that temporary base, 
continue to wield it. Thus, it is not the "ihamwi" who controls the spirits so much as 
they who are in control of him (which fact effectively confers his dangerousness, 
and `causes' the fear others have of him). What the "ihamwi" seeks is not power 
over these entities but contact and communication with them, and their 
incorporation (and thus logically that of their power) into his or her self in order to 
become the instruments and transmitters of the spirits' effective physical and oral 
acts in the human social sphere. Essentially, the "ihamwi's" function is conductive. 
He or she serves as the channel between humans and spirits. It is through him or 
her that the latter's always dangerous (now destructive and harmful, now 
productive and helpful) potency, and the former's needs and dependency, are 
conveyed. 
Waptchi appeared resigned to the fact that after him "there are no more ihamwi to 
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draw the illnesses out of people" and that the "spirits will have no more [human] 
head houses to go into". As I have already said, tuberculosis is forcing him to call it 
a day; that and the increasing fall in numbers of people actually resorting to him. 
This is only partly due to Evangelical-Pentecostalist condemnation. While, unlike 
them, the Adventists, who form the overwhelming bulk of the population in 
Waptchi's own village, impose no prohibition in regard to shamanism, many now 
preferred to attend a non-Pa'ikwene shamaness, a Galibi called Cecile, living in 
Oiapoque, the Brazilian town on the other side of the river. Also, the younger ones 
tended increasingly to no longer consult the "ihamwi" as it did not fit in with their 
adopted modernist lifestyle. 
When I asked Waptchi what he thought about the Evangelical-Pentecostal 
church's role in the destruction of his way of life, he closed off his face, averting it 
from me in the common Amerindian way, and impassively replied, "I think nothing. " 
Perhaps I should have asked him instead what he felt. 
Finally, a word concerning the tobacco which figures so centrally and 
instrumentally in the native religion of the Pa'ikwene and others throughout the 
Guianas and Amazonia39, and which neither Waptchi nor Ovayan used during our 
session. Judging from his state, though, it is not inconceivable that he may have 
taken some just beforehand. The traditional `cigars' which the Pa'ikwene "ihamwi" 
and "aviri" confect are not made from Nicotiana but Brosimum acutifolium (the 
"taoni"), and also the bark of the "wachak" (? ) tree (Montout op. cit.: 71). It is in the 
"taoni" especially that the "very powerful" Taowene spirit is believed to be located, 
an entity which, as stated above, incorporates the jaguar spirit and that of other 
animals. In a sense, this plant is the spiritual being(s)'s corporeal form, and its 
smoke is not only the means whereby the human makes contact with the spirit. In 
like manner to the `possessed' ihamwi's words, as described above, it is also, 
substantively, the spirit itself. As Gow, writing (1994: 95) about the use of herbal 
drugs for healing purposes in Western Amazonia, has explained, "these plants are 
themselves [seen to be] spirits, and by ingesting them, the shaman... becomes like 
a spirit [himself]... and the spirits reveal themselves to him". 
Inhaling the "taoni" smoke, then, is the way for the "ihamwi" to take a spirit into 
his or her own body (and thus its power: a concept existing elsewhere in the 
region, Metraux op. cit.: 90). In expelling it onto objects or an ailing person's body, 
39 See Wilbert 1987, Metraux op. cit.: 86. 
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or into food and drink, the "ihamwi" communicates the spirit's power and (as it 
were) touch. The juice is similarly believed to contain the spirit's power, which 
could explain the "aviri's" use of saliva reported by Arnaud (1984: 46). 
"Akümna-iri", the alternative name collected by Nimuendaju (op. cit.: 65) for 
the "ihamwi", may shed some light on the Pa'ikwene's perception between the link 
between blowing tobacco and uttering magical words, for while the root "Aküm" 
means to smoke (as already described), the word "Akümvina" means the voice. 
A key instrumental component, then, of Pa'ikwene religious conceptualisation and 
practice is that of orality as a spiritual expression, with human speech and song, 
and also breath and spit, 40 being seen as manifest concrete aspects of the spirits' 
power, and of themselves capable of effective action, be it deadly or healing. 
This in effect now brings us by way of introduction to the next matter I wish to 
consider. 
Healing. 
Despite the fall in the numbers of "healers" ("ihamwi"), traditional Pa'ikwene 
medicine, which enjoys a widespread reputation regionally, is a feature of the `old' 
lifestyle which may be said to have not only successfully weathered but also 
resisted the great revolutionary changes brought about by the adoption of 
Protestant fundamentalism. We should not, however, ascribe this survival solely to 
the "aviri's" own. Although we have seen that the latter customarily handles 
afflictions deemed to be outside the "ihamwi's" province and, unlike them, 
continues just as much as ever to be resorted to by patients, knowledge of and 
expertise in pharmacological and therapeutic matters are not limited to these two 
practitioners. For there also exist many `ordinary' people, so-called laypersons, 
who possess the necessary science and skills; and collect and process the various 
vegetal substances, and who on a daily basis diagnose, prescribe for and treat a 
wide range of ailments in the family and wider community. 
This `lay' knowledge is highly valued and passed on from adults to children. There 
were to my knowledge two individuals who cultivated medicinal plants in 
40 See, for example, Malinowski 1965: 215-6,260 on the magical agency of breath, and Luna 
1986: 110-14 on Amazonian ideas about the magical nature and potency of phlegm. 
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Esperance Deux. The growers (one of whom was Karinai) did not regard 
themselves as the products' exclusive owners. Rather, these seemed to be viewed 
as a communal property to which was attached the right of usufruct, and I would 
often see the other villagers helping themselves to them at will as and when they 
were needed. People were exceedingly health conscious, which is not surprising 
given the notorious insalubrity of the Oyapock region (see Nimuendaju op. cit.: 10, 
19) and the fact that the community members seemed permanently afflicted by 
some "ka[ga]'it" ("illness") or the other. The Pa'ikwene had a tendency to lung 
diseases and chest infection like all the Amerindian societies in Guyane (Fribourg- 
Blanc and Bois 1988), as well as sundry marsh and river fevers, malaria, influenza 
and some diabetes41. They were particularly prone to "müktchi", i. e., colds. In 
effect, what with their own system of health care and the treatment available in the 
excellent government dispensary at St Georges, the Esperance 2 villagers enjoyed 
double protection. 
"White" medical knowledge, products and skill are greatly respected and admired 
(As noted above, Chief Tchikoi and Capitaine Louis both trained as Western-style 
nurses). But they are not seen as superior to those pertaining to traditional folk 
medicine. Whereas Arnaud reports [1970: 20] that the Pa'ikwene prefer the 
modern, imported kind, I found they placed a greater affective value on their own 
system. As regards the pragmatic side of things, the two systems are held to be 
equally powerful and, by and large, efficacious (in some afflictions a treatment from 
one system may be preferred to that from the other since it is seen ultimately as 
being that much "stronger"), and they tend to be used together in a complementary 
way on the premise, so I was informed, of a doubling of potency and effect. Thus, 
for instance, when a young boy broke his arm and had it set in a cast at the clinic in 
the nearby town, his mother and aunt applied their own cataplasm of leaves and 
grasses over it for curative reinforcement. 
Conversely, the Pa'ikwene placed great faith in the power of aspirin and I was 
frequently asked for a gift of a pill or two by people who swallowed them 
irrespective of whether they had an ailment or not. Likewise, trips to Oiapoque, on 
the Brazilian side of the river, were often considered incomplete without a call on 
the pharmacist by the men for an injection which, they claimed, was "good for their 
muscles". Pa'ikwene people also sometimes adapted Western non-medical goods 
to their own healing ends: toothpaste was recommended as a salve for burns, and 
41 Re. the latter see Arnaud 1984: 29 fn. 17 
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Coca-cola deemed good for cleaning and staunching wounds and teeth 
extractions, but not as good, ultimately, as the traditional remedy ("eveitchi") of 
boiled and macerated red bark from the trunk of the mahogany ("mehetwi'). 
Lastly, the Pa'ikwene also prized Creole traditional remedies and 
commercially available Chinese ones. 
For P. Grenand (op. cit. ), the Pa'ikwene's continuing adherence to, and reliance on, 
their native medicine, for all that it is increasingly practised without benefit of 
shamans, can be put down to the following: 
(a) the fact that the indigenous notions of causality do not ascribe all deaths 
and illnesses to supernature as Fernandes (1950) and Arnaud (1984: 39-40) 
wrongly claim. 42 Some are categorised as "Normal" in contrast to those that are 
"Sent". The first, which includes phenomena like stings, certain bites, fractures and 
malaria, are held to be the result either of the patient's `wrong behaviour' or an 
accident; the second, of negative spirit action induced by witchcraft, which 
generally and typically targets the innocent family members and co-villagers of 
warring shamans. (There is too a third class of illnesses, called "Imported", which 
derive from contact with Whites, e. g. measles, whooping cough, influenza); 
(b) the continuing daily, influential interaction with Creole society whose own 
phytotherapy (system of herbal medicine) is rich and culturally valued; 
(c) the probability that the indigenous pharmacology and phytotherapeutic 
process has managed to co-habit smoothly with Western medical inputs since the 
former was not seen by Whites to present any threat to their economic and religious 
objectives; and 
(d) "Lastly, and very subtly, " writes Grenand (ibid.: 85), "it is through the use 
of medicinal plants that the Palikur have been able to maintain a host of domestic 
rituals which link them in spite of everything [i. e., radical Westernisation] to the 
civilisation of their ancestors" (my translation and stress). 
For my part, this last statement (unfortunately Grenand does not develop it further) 
42 Cf. Metraux 's warning (op. cit.: 93) against assuming that the Indians in the Guianas attribute all 
death and illness to malign witchcraft and supernature; also Campbell's critique (1989: 94-101) of 
anthropological writings that do. 
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not only confirms that today's Christianised Pa'ikwene manage still to keep one 
foot very much in their pre-Christian past. It also suggests that, at the level of 
therapy, even in respect of the so-called "normal" afflictions, for all that these are 
considered etiologically to be of non-supernatural origin, they (continue to) 
conceive of a certain 'spiritual' dimension to medicine. Let me explain. I showed 
above that my Evangelical-Pentecostalist co-villagers' desertion of the shamans 
(and the latter's corresponding decline) has not resulted in a complete loss of belief 
in the concepts and principles underlying shamanism itself, no matter how 
ambiguously (and at times guardedly) expressed. This being so, I would suggest 
that, for them, medicine has not become a totally secularised process. Their 
therapy and pharmacology are based on a principle of natural identity and 
difference. 43 Many people informed me of their conviction that spirits inhere in the 
plants grown and used for remedies. And their practical preparation and 
application are not distinctly and solely 'profane' actions but contain an element of 
the 'sacred' in that, following Leach's thesis (1986: 13), they may be said to belong 
to the "great majority of social actions which partake of the one sphere and partly of 
the other". They are acts, in other words, which while technical and materially 
functional nevertheless also have other aspects which he chooses to "describe as 
ritual whether or not they involve directly any conceptualisation of the supernatural 
or the metaphysical" (ibid. ). It seemed to me that as far as the Pa'ikwene medical 
layperson's and patient's actions, and their understanding of them, were 
concerned, this `involvement' still existed in a direct, if mostly implicit, way, and was 
ritualistically enacted and embodied. It shows too how in Pa'ikwene society not 
only shamans but `ordinary' people shamanise (see Campbell op. cit: 3). 
In this respect it is worth noting that for the Pa'ikwene curing is less related to 
physical and pathological conditions as such than to the psychosocial, moral 
person, and can cover `non-medical' states. An "eveitchi" (remedy) for laziness, for 
instance, consists of having it beaten out of one with vines. Another treatment, for 
lethargy and dispiritedness, entails the subject being scratched with a thorn on the 
forearms and lower legs, after which he or she is bled then has salt and chilli 
peppers rubbed into the cuts. It would seem that some sort of magical contagion is 
seen to be at work here. Moreover, although remedies are typically plant based in 
practice, and also etymologically (the word "eveitchi" deriving from "aveia", a small 
43 All vegetable elements are deemed to have their animal counterparts; and each element its 
antithesis both in its own sphere and the complementary opposite one (see Montout op. cit.: 64-5). 
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plant), the term has been extended to non-herbal treatments for some problems 
which, again, we would consider to fall outside the strictly medical sphere. Thus, 
both preventively and curatively, the "eveitchi" against fear is to consume the heart 
of a fearless and strong animal, such as a wild pig or a jaguar (normally a 
proscriptively non-edible item, as stated elsewhere). 
I now move on to describe the character of Christian (Protestant fundamentalist) 
thought and action in contemporary Pa'ikwene life. 
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THE PA'IKWENE AND RELIGION 
3. The Christian religion. 
(a) The `Word of God' in the words of its Pa'ikwene followers. 
Some beliefs, tenets, rules and practices: The Christian Pa'ikwene of Esperance 2 
live in the third and penultimate phase of their four-tier calendar: Evangelical- 
Pentecostal time. The Assembleia de Deus church which they attend is 
prominently situated in the village and, as noted earlier, under the pastorship of a 
Brazilian, a fact resented by most people in the community who would rather that a 
Pa'ikwene were in charge. Among other things, the language of public worship 
would then be Pa'ikwaki rather than Portuguese as it mainly is at present. In 
accord with Protestant Fundamentalist principles there was no religious 
iconography in the church itself, the sole ornamentation being a wall clock and a 
handpainted slogan "Jesus Vem Breve" (Jesus will be coming soon). "Ohokri" 
(God) did not want idolatry44, I was told, as it was satanic. So too was shamanism 
and other aspects of their sinful pre-Christian past like drinking and dancing, both 
of which were now a metaphor for, and synonymous with, Catholicism (see above). 
The other great radical sin was "talking bad against Ohokri" (blasphemy), which is 
believed to be literally pardonless. Other sins were adultery, homosexuality (which 
informants denied ever existing in Pa'ikwene society), and disobedience. Heavy 
stress in particular was placed on children's obedience to parents, for "to obey your 
father and mother is to obey Ohokri". The same rationale applied in regard to 
obedience to the chief and the state authorities, and to the wife's obedience to her 
husband. Not unnaturally, there was a yawning gulf here between practice and 
ideology, for it rumcounter to the traditional core Pa'ikwene ethos of personal 
autonomy and egalitarianism, already referred to above, in which respect is not 
predicated on obedience but care, concern and love. As a woman put it, 
Pa'ikwene spouses have always been obedient to each other, for if such a mutual 
arrangement did not exist then marriages would be unviable; however if a 
husband's conduct makes the relationship unworkable, the wife can always 
divorce as a last resort. Such a relationship was described as one, for instance, 
44 As reported in Appendix C, religious visual imagery was replaced by a vocal one. 
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where a parent, be it the father or the mother, did not love the children, i. e., did not 
work enough to feed them and thereby realise proper caring-loving. The reason 
she gave for such a situation was the failure of one spouse to obey the other. The 
customary right to divorce, then, was still exercised by female Pa'ikwene 
Evangelical-Pentecostalists for all that it, too, was contrary to the church's rules. 
The `Protestant work ethic', instilled jointly by the church and the state school 
system, was interpreted in terms, essentially, of "Ohokri does not want you to be 
"lazy". Working for money was, the villagers were taught, a "better kind of work". 
This was utterly in opposition to the traditional communal `domestic production' 
ethic which the Pa'ikwene still largely engaged in and socially and affectively 
valued over the new one (see previous chapter). Although people hired 
themselves out as waged labour whenever the opportunity arose, it was for 
pragmatic, economic reasons rather than moral ones. If wage earning, one must 
pay a tithe to the church. The only communal work the church enjoined was the 
collective construction of a place of worship. 
Evangelicalism and nature: The church's view is the classical Judeo-Christian one 
of God made nature and the species therein, then man whom he placed above it 
with the right if not the duty to kill and feed on it in order to live (see Willis 1994: 6). 
Pa'ikwene hunters were now supposed to dispatch their prey along the lines laid 
down in Leviticus, to slit its throat and bleed it; although I never saw or heard of one 
who did. This is hardly practical in the forest for obvious reasons. Also, as Karinai 
told me, even if one were to slaughter it in this way, the job of carrying back the 
catch would be a very messy one. While the Evangelical-Pentecostalists 
Pa'ikwene do not class any animal as inedible, unlike the Adventists whose dietary 
laws are Jewish based, they still to some extent, and depending on the individual, 
follow the traditional proscriptions in regard to food. Thus, for instance, the jaguar 
is `non food' (see Appendix B), and an expectant mother will not eat "red fish" 
(deemed bad for pregnancy as it "gives too much energy") or macaw (causes 
"sickness of the blood") or sloth (the baby will become lazy, prolong its mother's 
labour and increase her pain). 
(b) The Evangelical-Pentecostal Pa'ikwene cosmos. 
"Ohokri" lives in the sky with Jesus Christ and "Ohokri Gitchip" (the Holy Ghost, 
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literally "God [his] spirit"): the Pa'ikwene Evangelical-Pentecostal converts' third 
fundamental Christian spirit. According to my informants this was a virtually 
embodied, incarnate divine force which was described thus: "It is God's father, just 
like God is Jesus Christ's father". All three are seen to form a unitary and 
omnipotent whole. "Ohokri" can see us all, and everything we do, but only protects 
Evangelical-Pentecostalists. All who live on earth live in sin since we are all guilty 
of having killed Jesus. It is only through prayers and talking with God that one's 
sinfulness departs; and one can only talk with him by becoming an Evangelical- 
Pentecostalist. Jesus's blood bought, and continues to buy, the sins of mankind, 
and that is why we owe it to him to love, worship and obey him, and always beg his 
forgiveness. He will only grant you this personally if you live "in his way" which, 
again, only Evangelical-Pentecostalists can do. If you do so, he will grant you 
Eternal Life when he returns to earth. If you don't then he won't. At death45 all 
good Evangelical-Pentecostalists go "in the sky", to Paradise ("Inügik"), and all 
sinners (bad Evangelical-Pentecostalists and everyone else) to hell where they die 
a second and final time and then burn. They will remain in hellfire until Jesus 
returns to earth and reverses time. At this point, he will destroy the earth as it is 
now, with fire. (In spite of this millenarian tendency, the majority of Pa'ikwene 
Evangelical-Pentecostalists to whom I talked did not seem to pin their hopes on the 
`second coming' occurring literally in what was then five years time; leastways, very 
few of them did so explicitly to me. ) After Armageddon, when evil and sinning will 
be defeated, everything will be as at the pristine beginning when "Ohokri" first 
created the earth, but only for those reborn to God in Evangelical-Pentecostalism. 
They will inhabit this remade, rejuvenated and purged sky-earth in peace, 
harmony, joy and freedom from want and illness. Until such time, however, dead 
Evangelical-Pentecostalists will live in sky-heaven, the place where absolved 
sinners (i. e., Evangelical-Pentecostalists) live in eternal happiness: that is, with lots 
of food and drink and you will be reunited with those of your family who before 
dying had also accepted Evangelical-Pentecostalism. "It will be like living in a rich 
and beautiful city, like in America and France, with beautiful streets and buildings... 
Not like here [Village Esperance 2]". Non-Evangelical-Pentecostalists, however, 
will not be granted any of this, even if they believe in "Ohokri", but shall go straight 
into hellfire. In the chronological and cosmological restructuring brought about by 
45As noted, the Pa'ikwene have adopted Christian funerary practices. I managed to collect some data 
on the material aspects of their pre-Christian ones, which agrees with Nimuendaju's (op. cit.: 60; see 
too Arnaud 1984: 40, F. & P. Grenand 1987: 49-50), but unfortunately none on their pre-Christian 
eschatology. 
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Christ's second coming, the dead sinners already in hell and the living ones on 
earth will be relegated materially and as it were geographically to nothingness. 
There will be no more hell and no more burning of sinners since Christ's return will 
have uncreated sin and its perpetrators. 
(c) "Inügik", paradoxical paradise. 
At death, then, and until Jesus realises his second coming and earth and sky 
become as one, the sinless (Evangelical-Pentecostalist) elect will ascend to the 
heavenly afterworld, "Inügik" described as akin to the one presently enjoyed by the 
living rich White `Other'. The following is an itemised breakdown of that celestial 
utopian existence made at my request by a group of informants: 
Clothes will be "White" clothes and food, "White" food. E., a great eater, said 
he would not be sorry about this because in heaven he will not be able to 
remember Pa'ikwene food so will not miss it. Both the White clothes and food will 
be provided by "Ohokri" and were said to be "better" than their own. So good is this 
food indeed that "Ohokri eats it himself, and so do the angels". Since it will all be 
laid on for free, there will be no need to hunt, fish, or do garden work in heaven. 
There will thus be no more work, no more `hard slog'; as mentioned in the previous 
chapter the Pa'ikwene were always very vocal about the backbreaking effort 
entailed in food production. Houses, furniture and household objects: "Ohokri 
gives you a beautiful house like White people have, all filled with White things"; 
informants were referring here to the houses and accoutrements they have seen on 
their travels to Cayenne and Belem and also on television. Language: "Ohokri" 
speaks all languages, including Pa'ikwaki and White languages, since it's he who 
made them and gave them to people. On earth, him and Jesus speak Pa'ikwaki to 
Pa'ikwene people, but in heaven he'll speak to us in the `language of the angels', 
and that's the one we will use among ourselves too. " Age: Everyone will be young 
in heaven. Old people will become young and beautiful "like angels". Kin: You will 
meet up again with "good" dead kin (i. e., Evangelical-Pentecostalist ones). But you 
will not see the "bad" ones because they have been sent to hell. S. expressed her 
regret that one of her brothers will not make it to heaven because he drinks and is 
"bitter with Ohokri", she will not therefore see him in heaven unless he changes his 
ways before he dies. Another informant was sad that his mother will not be in 
heaven when he gets there for she had died before the conversions hence "without 
knowing God". 
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For all of the virtual monopoly of White things in heaven, the Pa'ikwene do not 
equate God as such with the Whites: "The Whites are stronger than the Pa'ikwene, 
but "Ohokri" is stronger than the Whites". In parallel with this there seems to be a 
rationale whereby Pa'ikwene things (food, clothes, speech etc. ), as well as those 
belonging to all the other races, are seen to be of `this world'. As they do not apply 
to the `other world', they will be discarded there. Then how come, I asked, that the 
Pa'ikwene will receive White food, clothes, houses and so on? This is because 
they were perceived to be the "best"; yet informants told me time after time that they 
preferred Pa'ikwene food to White. Clearly, affective attachment was not the 
criterion for an object's attaining heavenly status. 
Although I will not attempt an in-depth interpretation of the Pa'ikwene's 
perception and construction of this `White' heaven, I think it would miss the point to 
analyse it solely in terms of `acculturation' or `dominant culture theory'. I would 
suggest that, on at least one level, `White' should not be read as indicating racial 
supremacy and moral superiority. It could, rather, symbolise the existence and 
maximisation of the `spiritual' as seen from within an indigenous cosmogony. Thus 
two of the key heavenly conditions cited above, the receiving of free (White) food 
and the absence of the need for human productivity, might reflect more than a 
simple phenomenon of cause-and-effect or a native interpretation of an essentially 
alien (Christian and utopian) afterlife. As Viveiros de Castro notes (1992: 201-18) 
regarding Arawete ideas on death, the idea that the acceptance of food from spirits 
marks the "definite entrance of the soul into the beyond" (p. 213) is common to 
many Amazonian eschatologies (if not the Arawete's own, wherein death itself is a 
production process in which it is the human being who is turned into a godlike and 
immortal `product' through being consumed by the cannibal gods). According to 
Overing (1993a), the concept is associated with a belief in the loss of a person's 
powers of productivity/fertility at death (see too Carneiro da Cunha 1978 in respect 
of the Krahö). To this extent, then, the Pa'ikwene were perhaps expressing 
something similar to what may be found in the world-views of the other Amerindian 
peoples mentioned above. 
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THE PA'IKWENE AND RELIGION 
4. Conclusion. 
The issue of simultaneously parallel and contradictory discourses: 
The way Alphonse Y. and others spoke about the shamans and shamanism is 
indicative, I believe, of the way in which the new religion, and the native 
epistemology about it, has not totally usurped and supplanted the old. Very evident 
in Pa'ikwene discourse were the dual and contradictory positions and 
conversations vis ä vis each (and indeed the double valuing of both, even if the 
value put on the older, earlier system seems counterbalanced at times by a 
measure of fear). Without a doubt, in Esperance 2 Evangelicalism is the new faith, 
and its world-view, creed and pronouncements firmly believed in. And yet, the old 
cosmological and theological vision and beliefs, while at one level explicitly 
condemned, disparaged and refuted, are not for all that utterly repressed in, and 
by, the individual Evangelical-Pentecostal Pa'ikwene. Thus he or she will speak of 
the functions and abilities of the "lhamwi" and "Aviri", and of the powers and 
character of "Wavitche", the "Ügükü" and "Imaowi" in the present tense; will specify 
that good magic exists as well as bad, that while it is true the spirits and their 
human agents can act with evil intent, they also are capable of the opposite, benign 
behaviour; and then in the very next sentence inform you that God, Jesus and the 
church has uncreated and replaced them, that they are now non-persons and non- 
spirits, and their powers are just evil and at the same time relegated to the past. 
My encounter with the two "ihamwi" (shamans) should be seen as an event 
occurring outside of its natural context, though not entirely so. It was a display, in 
part didactic lecture with props and in part show for tourist (which, for all that I was 
an anthropologist, is what I felt like), of a feature which was once an integral, vital, 
meaningful part of the cultural and social process, and indeed constitutive of it. But 
which is now increasingly on the way to being an atrophying relic; an offering of 
fragments and glimpses, of bits of form with much of the substance removed, and in 
which the spiritual essence has all but congealed... That, at least, is what I 
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concluded immediately afterwards. However, my subsequent fieldwork led me to 
revise this initial reaction. While it is true that Waptchi and Ovayan were `out of it' 
for the reasons given above, and that there may be no more Pa'ikwene shamans, 
either in Guyane or perhaps even Aükwa, my research shows that belief in the 
philosophical, cosmological underpinnings of shamanism, and the following of 
certain practices associated with it, definitely still existed. Not even the 
Evangelical-Pentecostalist Pa'ikwene's collective (and declared) apostasy in its 
regard was in reality as complete or firm as people often tried to make me, and 
themselves, believe. 
Such `double speak' as was evinced by the religious discourse of the Pa'ikwene 
may appear muddled, schizoid, even at times almost duplicitous; or suggestive of 
an informant's own confusion and inconsistency (and, supposedly therefore, 
unreliability). However, Rapport argues (1997), and indeed demonstrates, that a 
less negative stance is called for. Rather than insisting on the (fictional) single 
coherent, and generally reductionist, explanation of society and culture from either 
the outside observer or the observed subject, we should admit to and embrace 
interpretational and epistemic plurality and contradictiveness, given, he says, the 
complexity and diversity (and, I would add, `ever changing-ness') of social life itself. 
Thus, to hold as my Pa'ikwene co-villagers did two or more views on one subject at 
the same time, and to express now the same and now a different epistemic reality 
than one's fellows in our running conversation with them, is intrinsically human 
and, it follows, an inescapable factor in the creation of the social milieu as 
something rooted in cognitive and exegetic ambiguity and contrariety (Fernandez 
1985: 750). 
Having adopted Evangelical-Pentecostalism, the Pa'ikwene of Village Esperance 2 
did not appropriate or assimilate it unconditionally. Rather, their approach seemed 
pragmatic, self-benefiting and sometimes even sceptical. Above all, it was a 
considered one, like the initial conversion three decades ago, reported in the first 
section. As Heelas points out (1984), whatever the reasons people may have for 
taking up a new religion, they are not to be seen as either irrational or prompted by 
emotion alone. The same applies, I suggest, to what they do not embrace in the 
new religion: those aspects and features which are sifted out and otherwise found 
wanting and inappropriate by, or only partially acceptable to, the new followers. 
Thus it was that the Evangelical-Pentecostalists endorsed some (e. g. the notion of 
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`Brotherhood') but not others (e. g. the anti-divorce rule). 
What is salient, then, and worthy of our deeper attention, is not so much the 
(obvious) divergences between the ideologies, principles and practices of the new, 
imported order and old, native one, as the retention of a number of features 
belonging to the latter that were judged and valued as worthwhile: that is, more 
meaningful, practicable, efficient and suited to the community's actual historical 
and sociocultural circumstances. Whatever fundamentalist Protestant orthodoxy 
may teach or impose, it is clear that its Pa'ikwene converts took from, and 
processed and adapted, it in an active manner advantageous to themselves, both 
on a group and individual level. The overwhelming majority of the community were 
strongly committed believers in the new faith, yet concepts, attitudes and 
behaviours in respect of certain important structural and cultural features remained 
fundamentally, even steadfastly, indigenous and pre-Christian. The examples I 
have given were the egalitarian relations between the sexes and generations; 
relations between humans, supernature and nature (and as part of this, diet and 
medicine), and the communal work `ethic'. 46 These were thus not only outside the 
Christian system but also incommensurate with the socioeconomic framework in 
which it is set, and in which the Pa'ikwene were also to an increasing extent 
incorporated. 
At this juncture, a word needs to be said about the latter aspect. For the 
Protestantism which the Pa'ikwene converts embraced operated in tandem with 
(and in its ancestral form arguably was, as Weber claims 1971, the ideological 
germ of) the type of market economy which impinges more and more on their 
existence (cf. Arcand 1981 on the `hidden' economical and political agenda of SIL 
in respect of the Cuiva). 
Historically, as noted above, the Pa'ikwene have for several centuries been 
active in relations of trade with the non-Indian world, and mainly with Creole 
society, as both buyers and sellers (of certain surpluses, most notably manioc 
`flour'). It would appear that it is only in the last thirty or so years, however, that their 
systems of distribution and consumption have undergone radical and deleterious 
changes, as a consequence of the introduction and spread of fundamental 
Protestantism and, too, the increasing adoption by many of them of a proto- or peri- 
urban and `consumerist' lifestyle. Remarkably, though, notwithstanding the 
increased and (presently) ideologically legitimated selling of their labour and, in 
46 Another example, not dealt with by me, would be the kinship system (Arnaud 1968). 
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Guyane, the erosion to and alienation from their traditional ecological and 
`economic' habitat (see P. and F. Grenand 1988: 27-31, Dreyfus 1988: 22, Montout 
op. cit: 30,102), the Pa'ikwene of Village Esperance 2 still maintained to a markedly 
high degree the old system of production. I showed earlier that this was basically 
due to the fact that those who engaged in the `subsistence economy' did not want it 
to change, and consciously chose to remain in it, while sometimes also choosing 
to work in parallel as it were in the new system of production when the opportunity 
arose (and specifically for the purpose of earning money and thus being able to 
buy `Western' goods). For as arduous as the former type of economy was said to 
be, and no doubt was, it constituted not so much a way of working as one of 
continuing to live collectively in a sociable, pleasing, sharing and more meaningful 
manner. However, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, Gow has argued 
(1991: 90-115) a propos the Piro, who similarly resort to both the old and new 
economies, that from the perspective of those who live it such a condition can be 
seen in terms not of hostility but complementarity. 
That the villagers of Esperance 2 clung to and valued a number of their ancestral 
pre-Christian ways of thinking and behaving, including some magico-religious 
ones, does not imply that the adoption of new and Christian ones was superficial, 
nor that these had but a weak purchase on the `heart and mind' of their indigenous 
adopter. I have striven throughout to describe how the opposite was true. Thus a 
claim such as the one made by Montout (op. cit.: 61) that despite the importation of 
the alien morality, the efforts of Christianisation have shown themselves to be 
"without deep results", seems to me invalid, or at the very least partial, given the 
undeniably strong hold of Protestant fundamentalism on, and its very real and 
radical consequences for, a large section of the contemporary Pa'ikwene 
population. It does serve, however, to help us focus in on an important point. For, I 
propose, what is noteworthy is not so much that the new belief system and the 
traditional one (for all that certain aspects of its practice might or might not be k on 
the wane) co-exist, but that the latter, at some profound level of their Pa'ikwene 
psyche, ethos, culture, and social life, more than holds its own with the former. 
Noll, writing (1985) on the cross-cultural phenomenon of shamanic visions, has 
ascribed a functional role to the shaman by proposing (pp. 449-50) that his mental 
imagery and journeys to the spirit realms, and his recounting of these to his 
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audience, serve a crucial didactic and mnemonic purpose. They provide a means 
whereby a non-literate society remembers, transmits and reproduces its cultural 
belief system. If we accept that each of the shaman's trips constitutes a "collective 
rehearsal of cultural memories" (p. 450), then logically the demise of the Pa'ikwene 
"ihamwi" should not only have resulted in a corresponding decrease of these 
rehearsals, which is what has occurred. There should have also been a forgetting 
of the very things, namely "mythological beliefs and other cultural relevant 
materials" (ibid. ), being reenacted, remembered and reproduced; leading, one 
would infer, to their eventual disappearance. For the moment, though, and for all 
that it might be `illogical', this has not happened. Despite the decline of the 
shamans and the traditional `collective rehearsals', and the corresponding spread 
of the new mythology and the participation in new `collective rehearsals', such as 
church services and the reproduction thereby of the new belief system, elements of 
the old one continue vigorously to live on, as I have reported. 
One of the other important customary means by which that prior system 
manages to persist in such societies is `oral tradition'. Yet the issue of this cultural 
feature and of its maintenance in present day Pa'ikwene life is itself an ambiguous 
one. F. and P Grenand (1987) and Petitjean-Roget (1993) assert that their rich oral 
tradition is thriving. For my part, I found it generally the case in Esperance 2 and 
Kümene that while the tradition was in a healthy condition among the older and 
middle generations in terms of their knowledge of the stories and their protagonists, 
things were less rosy with regard to their recounting of them. The demise of the 
story teller seemed to echo that of the shaman. The `old tales' tended no longer to 
be communicated in any great extent to the young, who seemed to know more 
about Jesus Christ, King David and the Devil, and also (through television) 
Superman and Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtle, than their own historical heroes, 
mythical figures, and spirit beings. 47 Thus I would maintain that though these 
stories continued to figure in the lives of the people of Esperance 2, their 
4f Of course there were exceptions: both of parents who determinedly made a point of recounting 
the `traditional' stories and children who had heard them. What was not in evidence, however, was the 
once widespread and endemic custom of public story telling, or the presence within the community of 
a new generation of narrators and, therefore, listeners (or in Pa'ikwene terms: 'hearer-understanders'). 
Which is not to say that the young did not know of the existence of (some of) the old heroes and other 
beings. They invariably responded with pleasure and interest on the few occasions these were given 
an oral airing (mostly at my request but sometimes, too, in an unsolicited and impromptu fashion). 
They also relished the humorous aspect of the old tales, finding some elements very funny indeed, 
e. g. the fact that the forest spirit Panamik is bereft of an anus (see above). Above all, they enjoyed the 
adventures of the trickster Turtle (Ong) and his endless tangling with, and besting of, his hapless 
tormentor, Jaguar (Kaokwine). 
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transcendent cultural significance, as opposed to the purely anecdotal one, was 
growing progressively less and less. Their presence, certainly at the level of public 
life and performance, and conceivably as part of the mental baggage of the young 
(impossible though it is to judge for certain), was no longer very visible or strong, 
and increasingly threatened. 
The traditional oral literature, then, still had a powerful affective value for the 
Pa'ikwene of my community, but possibly a decreasing moral and didactic role. 
However, although the old myths and stories were a once vital repository and 
transmitter of the collective conceptions, norms, attitudes, and all the other 
intangible, indescribable qualities underlying and, effectively, constituting 
Pa'ikwene-hood, they were not the only means whereby that culture is stored and 
passed on. And despite the loss of this and other customs, such as dancing, the 
daily process of practical living continued still to reproduce those traditional 
structural and cultural features that the Pa'ikwene insisted on, and actively worked 
at, maintaining, such as, for example, egalitarian social relations, a communal work 
ethic, and the other elements listed above. Thus here too, as with shamanism, the 
old ways actively survived without the need for `specialists'. 
Lastly, I have described and stressed the paradox of the relationship between the 
Pa'ikwene's old and new religions. I do not believe that the issue is to do with its 
(ir)reconcilability but very existence. The Evangelical-Pentecostalist Pa'ikwene 
themselves were not unaware of the ambiguity and, for all that it caused them to be 
pulled in two directions in their daily existence at the level of religious beliefs and 
lifestyle ('progressist' versus `traditional'), it seems to me that they accommodated it 
in the smoothest possible manner cognitively, to the extent of taking it untroublingly 
for granted most of the time. It is we, the outsiders, who have a problem in its 
regard, and who need to acquire, in the words of Campbell (1989: 121 on Western 
academic interpretations of shamanism): 
"a tolerance for ambiguity and vagueness where we will learn 
not to force an either-or question... and to appreciate a `both is 
and is not' answer. " 
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chapter ten 
CONCLUSION 
Considering just over a decade ago the research undertaken this century on the 
Pa'ikwene by a relatively small number of investigators, himself included, P. 
Grenand attributed (1987: 76-7) a certain perceived vagueness in their accounts' 
to, above all, the `difficulty of establishing with any precision the vital leads linking 
the old society to today's one since whole panels of it remain obscure. ' This, 
according to him, impeded the task of building up a comprehensive picture. But is 
not such incompleteness unavoidable, given not only this lack of available details 
but the selectivity of observers? As in the story of the blind persons and the 
elephant, each palpates a different piece, the ears, trunk, tusk, tail, pronouncing it 
the essence of the beast. Me, I felt the Pa'ikwene, and the parts I was drawn to can 
of course neither objectively encompass nor fully represent that people; but they 
are, from my perspective, expressive of their intrinsic, unique being. So I offer my 
own findings, as submitted in the present work, in the hope of contributing, however 
slightly, towards shedding further light on, and increasing our understanding of, this 
still largely unknown entity. I must though stress again that they constitute but a 
personal and, of necessity, inherently subjective view. 
* 
As will have been noted, a number of chapters have their own separate 
conclusions. With reference to my main theme of interpersonal communication, the 
fifth, which looks at different types, informal and demotic as well as formal and 
rhetorical, of communication in various political situations, proposes that in a 
Pa'ikwene context, and perhaps, I would suggest, among Lowland Amerindians 
more generally, the speech and through it agency of `ordinary' people is as 
sociopolitically vital and `powerful' as that of leaders in that it can carry as much 
moral and aesthetic weight. 
1 To re-cite the major ones: Nimuendaju 1971 (1926); Fernandes 1950,1963; Arnaud 1968,1970, 
1984; Dreyfus 1981; P. Grenand 1987; F. & P. Grenand 1979,1987. Since 1987 they include 
Dreyfus 1988, Montout 1994. 
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In chapter 6, a deferred extension of chapter 4 where the process of 
"Tchimap, `to hear-listen-understand' is explored, I concluded that the Pa'ikwene's 
culturally specific and customary style of listening, and the silence characteristically 
associated with it, possess a defining instrumentality in social relations, 
epistemologically, ethically, affectively and pragmatically. This was developed 
further in chapter 7, which posited a correspondence between intercommunication 
and gifting as building blocks of sociality. From this base, arguing against Clastres' 
contention (1987) that among Amerindians virtually no one listens to a chief's 
speech on the supposed grounds that it is `empty', I declared the individual's 
audition to be no less `full', i. e., in its own way as politically and morally 
authoritative, than the speech in fact is. 
In summation, both facets of the Pa'ikwene's dialogical relations, speaking 
and hearing, are, and are seen by them to be, equally active, meaningful and 
socially regenerative aspects of the continuing creation and maintenance of the 
viable, which is to say sociable, peaceful and productive, community and, I further 
indicated, of its relationship with nature. 
The crucial complementarity of 'good' speaking and hearing for the well-being of 
Pa'ikwene social life is also the subject of chapter 3 which, among other things, 
tentatively addressed the phenomenological and performative dimensions of the 
indigenous language and speaking together. One of the issues raised concerns 
the combined emotivity and aesthetics inherent in intercommunication and, as part 
of this, in the process of hearing-understanding. 
As stated, the interpretation of what a Pa'ikwene speaker says is not only 
tied in to the sign-referential value of his or her words but also to a wide spectrum 
of intelligibility and engagement on the part of the Pa'ikwene hearer, ranging from 
the pragmatic to the aesthetic to the affective, the sensory to the moral. This point is 
central to our comprehension of the experiential process of "Tchimap", for to 'hear- 
listen-understand', basically expresses, it seems to me, the concept that what one 
perceives is not just a sound (of a voice, a word, a 'thing') but the full, multiple 
significance of the event and its context. Beyond, then, the processing of the 
semantic meanings and the wider cultural "implicatures" (Grice 1975), there occurs 
a psycho-phenomenological making of sense which, both objectively and 
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subjectively, 2 socioculturally and biologically, simultaneously entails sensations, 
feelings3 and thoughts4, and involves axiological values. 
The cultural phenomenon of "Tchimap" is more than just an interesting addition to 
the data on South American native discourse; it is also relevant to the debate on 
'individualism-collectivism'. The supposed incompatibility for the 'Western' mind of 
the individual and the group (see e. g. Durkheim 1947,1951; Weber 1978; L. 
Dumont 1985), seems not to exist in Lowland Amazonian thinking, and living. 
Goldman (1963) and Overing (1988,1989,1996) show that the Cubeo and Piaroa 
prize personal self-autonomy and sociality equally and see no tension between 
them. There would appear to be space in the one for the full and successful 
realisation of the other, and collective behaviour, far from being imposed on the 
individual by the group, is, instead, a matter of personal choice. As is its opposite. 
Possessing the freedom and right to act independently, ego acquires the power, 
and the responsibility, to decide to act collectively. Thus, to requote Overing's 
words (1989: 170), is "one's mastery of sociality... in inimitable Amerindian logic, 
also one's personal autonomy. In other words.... the weight of acting socially [is] 
placed in the hands of the individual and not with the corporate group or 
collectivity. " 
In essence, among these peoples, among whom, for reasons provided 
above, I include the Pa'ikwene, individualism is as social a form of conduct as 
collectivism. The two seem to be regarded not as hostile states but alternately 
friendly ones; alternate, that is, in the chronological rather than an ideological 
2 As Volosinov convincingly argues (1986: 85), subjectivity and objectivity are necessarily, 
simultaneously, and equally at work in the speaking and hearing social actor (cf. Freire 1977: 26-9). 
3 Cf. Merleau-Ponty's thesis (1945) that meaning is perceptible from the emotional essence of words, 
and that it in effect reveals itself to us: "Language unveils its secrets itself" (1964: 43). 
While recognising the cultural construction of emotion (see e. g. Harre 1986; Scherer, Wallbott & 
Summerfield 1986; Lutz & Abu-Lughod 1990), I see no need here to particularise Pa'ikwene emotion 
but choose instead to see it in terms of a general human given. 
In respect of the difference between sensation, feeling and emotion, Eitchinger Ferro-Luzzi notes 
(1995) that such a distinction is not made universally. 
4 See Leavitt's critique (1996) of the 'Western' tendency to dichotomise meaning and feeling and, in 
anthropological studies of emotion, the sociocultural and the biological. Also, as noted above, Burke 
argues (1941: 138-67) that meaning is itself divisible into the "semantic" (designative) and the "poetic" 
(emotional), both aspects being mutually reinforcing and complementary rather than oppositional. Cf. 
Condillac's assumption (1754) that sensation constitutes the sole source of mental activity, so 
thoughts are basically senses anyway. 
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sense. For the Piaroa, the power referred to above is obtainable from an extra- 
social source; and both their autonomous and collective conducts are ideologically 
validated, as Overing reports (ibid). Unlike her, however, I was not able to find the 
ontological templet of, and (assuming it ever existed) mythic 'charter' for, the joint 
Pa'ikwene behaviours of individualism and communalism which, in practice, they 
observably share with the Piaroa, Cubeo and others. The failure was due less to a 
want of seeking on my part than to the radically attenuated state of the Pa'ikwene 
ancestral cosmology, and today's generation's impaired and incomprehensive 
knowledge of it. Nevertheless, a philosophy or ethic of mutually reconcilable 
individualism and collectivism is inferable from their complementary - and valued - 
presence and usage in contemporary, pragmatic daily life. With each equally 
highly esteemed and both esteemed equally, their (largely frictionless) co- 
existence is manifest in the different spheres of the social process, particularly, as 
we saw, in the domain of work -- and in one activity common and integral to all: 
namely, speaking. Or to be absolutely correct, speaking-hearing, since among the 
Pa'ikwene, choosing to hear or not - and thus to speak or to be silent - can 
respectively be (though not in all cases) both an autonomous and a social act, 
which I have sought to show. 
** 
I end this conclusion with the knowledge, one of the surest acquired through living 
with the Pa'ikwene, of the impossibility of ever fully encapsulating their society and 
culture in a neat, tidy packet. That these defy any lifeless reductionist model, no 
matter how bright, seductive and reassuring, is proof not only of their natural 
human complexity but their richness and ultimately ineffable vitality, and is thus, as 
far as I am concerned, a cause for celebration. However, my inability to see let 
alone provide a more comprehensive picture may be put down by some to 
inadequate scholarship. They may well be right. For my part, it is due more to a 
shortfall of imagination. 
"Sixteen thousand leagues from my birth... 
And my eyes lit up ancient paths... 
Yet I was so poor a poet 
I didn't know how to go to the very end... " 
(Blaise Cendrars 1913, my translation) 
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A. "Minikwak" ("A long time ago") 
The once customary practice of story and myth telling had fallen somewhat into 
disuse among the Pa'ikwene of Village Esperance Deux. Most of my examples 
were obtained in the village next door from the shamans Waptchi and Ovayan, and, 
as reported above, from Kamavi, an old man living in Kümene (Aükwa). In both 
cases the tales were recounted in contrived and unnatural circumstances, though 
not strictly speaking in private, for the performances always drew an appreciative 
and active audience. Nonetheless, it is worth heeding F. Grenand's warning 
(1982: 25) to beware the myth told privately to the anthropologist, for though it may 
have all its elements structurally, it will be but a poor, thin thing as "in terms of the 
richness of language, literature and life, all will have been lost" (my translation). 
If today the old tales are told less and less, it is not just that the tellers are 
dying out but that there are increasingly fewer `hearer-listener-understanders' like 
Karinai, "Capitaine" Louis and Tchig the shamans' son seeking actively to keep 
them alive for the next generations. 
(1) Pa'ikwene creation myth 
In the beginning there was one Pa'ikwene. 
A man. 
His name was Kaümaiye. 
He was also a spirit. 
He was the only Pa'ikwene. 
There were no others. 
One day he started to play his flute, to dance, and to sing. 
He played his flute and danced and sang for two days. 
After two days by his playing and dancing and singing he had created 
all the other Pa'ikwene. 
(as told by Waptchi, Premier Village Esperance, 19-3-1994, translated from Pa'ikwaki into French by 
Edison Labonte, and collected by me). 
2nd Creation Story 
A long time ago, God made a man who was a little bit white and very strong and the 
king (sic) of all the Pa'ikwene. Next God made a chief of the whites, of the French. 
He was strong but not as strong as the chief of the Pa'ikwene. Then God made 
another chief, of the Americans. Then another, the chief of the English. Lastly he 
made the chief of the Brazilians. These kings were strong too but not as strong as 
the French one and even less strong than the Pa'ikwene. All these chiefs told 
chief's stories. Then God wanted to test the French chief's strength, he asked him 
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to cut a rock with his knife. He did the same with the chiefs of the Americans, the 
English and the Brazilians. They all cut the rock, but only a little bit. Then he got 
the chief of the Pa'ikwene to test his strength too. The Pa'ikwene chief exerted his 
strength... not all of it, just a little bit of it... and cut the rock in two. Then God said to 
the Pa'ikwene chief, "You're the strongest chief but I can't have you staying here for 
you'd take command of all the other nations. " So God sent him away, far from all 
the others, to Aükwa. 
(Told by Kamavi [Leon Orlando] at Kümene, Aükwa, 26-1-1994, translated into Creole by Alfred 
Norino, collected and adapted by me). 1 
(3) "2x2x2" Story 
A long time ago Avakni, the evil harpy eagle-spirit had two sons. Their mother was 
also a spirit bird (type unknown). One day, while hunting in the forest, two 
Pa'ikwene brothers encountered Avakni's two sons. The older Pa'ikwene brother 
said he was going to stay in the forest and live with the older, and more beautiful, 
bird-spirit brother. The younger Pa'ikwene brother was angry, he wanted the older 
handsome spirit brother for himself. He went back to his village, taking the younger 
spirit brother with him to raise as an Indian. Hearing of this, Avakni flew into a 
terrible rage. He invited all the birds of the forest and all the animals, even the 
jaguar, to a feast where they would devour all the Pa'ikwene in revenge for taking 
his younger son. 
Avakni's mother wanted to eat the older Pa'ikwene brother who had stayed 
behind in the forest to live with her grandson. But he gave her the slip and went 
back to his village. Three months had gone by from when he went to live in the 
forest with Avakni's older son until his return. During this time the Pa'ikwene had 
been hunting two particular "kohivra" ('game birds', see section on natural 
taxonomy below). One was Süyen (a type of small parrot), the other Kaü (? blue 
macaw). These two birds were half spirit, half human, and brothers. Each had a 
different spirit-bird mother and shared the same father, a Pa'ikwene man. Now, 
when they learned about Avakni's feast and his intention to kill and eat all the 
Pa'ikwene, they were very concerned. 
"What are we going to do about our father? " asked Kaü. Süyen said, "Let us 
tell him about Avakni's plan, and escort him and guard him when he comes into the 
forest. " And so they saved their father, and Avakni's bid to kill him and eat him and 
all the other Pa'ikwene was foiled. 
Now in their land were many "kohivra" for the Pa'ikwene to hunt, a lot of 
birds to eat. And they held feasts and sang songs to them. But the Maraön people 
came and killed and ate Kaü and Süyen. The Pa'ikwene were angry and left that 
land and went to another one where there was a lot of "Puigne" (animals) to catch, 
and they stayed there. This place was called Maperepkit. It is not here... it is far 
from here (Aükwa)... in the south. The Pa'ikwene built a village there and called it 
Wainli. But Kaü and Süyen's father did not stay in this new country because there 
1 Cf. F. & P. Grenand 1987: 18 with reference to a similar account in which an old Pa'ikwene clan chief 
states "I can't go to war, I'm so powerful I would win and then there'd be no other nations [i. e. clans] but 
mine" (my translation). 
240 
weren't many "kohivra" there, though there was much fish. And he went back to 
live in the old country, the name of which was Ümeyoni. It is even farther away 
from here than Maperepkit... a long way away... far, far in the south (Cf. F. and P. 
Grenand 1987: 23)... And the time that had gone by from when Kaü and Süyen's 
father came to the second country until he went back to the first was three months. 
(Told by Kamavi at Kümene 26-1-1994, translated into French by Edison Labonte, collected and 
arranged by me). 
(4) The Stork of Wamwi the water-snake spirit. Wanese and Mainal 
When it's full moon Wamwi seeks out men to eat. He calls his wife, Wanese, and 
tells her, "stay here while I go catch us some meat". He waits till men and boys go 
to wash in the river then changes into a large water-snake and goes looking for 
them, to kill them. He takes his rifle and shoots three, four men and hauls them 
back home. The Pa'ikwene are disturbed. "Why are we being killed like this? " they 
ask themselves They don't know it's Wamwi who's the culprit, they think it's some 
other water-snake. 
One day, a Pa'ikwene man, his name was Mainai, falls very ill and goes to 
bathe at the river, and Wamwi attacks him. There are many people there who see 
it. Wamwi seizes Mainai and drags him off to his home in the forest. Wanese asks, 
"What's this you've brought me? " Wamwi answered, "I only found one man today, 
but he's no good to eat, he's too ill. " Then Wamwi goes into the forest to find a 
remedy for Mainai who is really very ill indeed, he gives it to him and nurses him 
back to health. Then one day he tells him, "I'm going on a journey with my wife, 
you shall stay here with our son. " And he warns Mainai: "While I'm away you're not 
to go down the path which lies on the right but you may use one on the left. " For if 
he were to take the right-hand one he'd end up back in his village and Wamwi 
doesn't want Mainai to go back and tell people where he lives. Wamwi scatters 
sand on the path to see if Mainai disobeys, for if he does he will leave tracks. 
Wamwi and Wanese set off on their journey. They go to the sea. They fish 
for a week. They fish for two weeks... After three days, Mainai tells Wamwi's son 
he's going out to pick some flowers for him. The son replies, "Don't forget what my 
father told you, don't go down the right-hand path. " Mainai says "Don't worry, I'm 
just going to look for some flowers for you, that's all. " And he leaves and picks 
some flowers and brings them back for Wamwi's son. A little while later, the son 
says he needs a rest and goes to sleep. Seeing him thus, Mainai says to himself, 
"I'm going to take that right-hand path, I want to see why Wamwi's forbidden it me", 
and he sets off along the right-hand path. He walks and walks till eventually he 
reaches the end and finds he's at the outskirts of his village. There's a woman 
there, working in her garden. When she sees him the woman is very afraid and 
screams: "Mainai! But aren't you dead, Mainar? " "No", says Mainar, "I'm not", and 
he tells her all that's happened to him and that she's to go and let everybody know 
that Wamwi's away on a journey and that he, Maina'i, has come to warn them. 
They're to build seven dams to bar Wamwi's way and lay in a stock of arrows to 
attack and destroy him because he is very bad. "But now", says Mainai finally, "I'm 
off back to Wamwi's house before his son wakes up and realises I'm missing. " 
The woman goes and tells everyone what Mainai said. They held a meeting 
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and decided to do as he asked. They built seven dams and prepared lots of arrows 
to kill Wamwi. For one whole month they worked on this task. 
Wamwi and Wanese return. Wamwi asks Mainai if he used the right-hand 
path, and Mainai says no, he only stayed at home. Wamwi goes to check if he's 
telling the truth. There's no sign of Mainars footprints for he's just as clever as 
Wamwi and he covered them up with sand again on his way back from the village. 
One month later, Wamwi absents himself again and Mainar returns to the village to 
see how work is progressing on the dams. They are ready. They are very big, very 
solid dams. People ask him about the best time to attack Wamwi. He tells them to 
lay a bait of some game to lure him. Then he goes back to Wamwi's house again. 
Although attracted by the bait, Wamwi realises the Indians are out to kill him. 
He returns home and asks Mainar, "Is it you who's been inciting them to kill me? " 
Maina'i says it isn't. Wamwi tells his wife, "I'm going to take a closer look. If you 
hear thunder on the left, it will mean that I have won; if you hear thunder on the 
right, that I've lost and will already be dead. " Then he leaves. The Pa'ikwene 
attack him with their arrows. Wamwi breaks through the first dam.... He breaks 
through the second dam... He breaks through the third dam... and then Wamwi 
dies. Wanese hears thunder on the right and cries, "My husband is already dead, 
I"m going to go and avenge him. " She changes herself into a large water-snake 
and swims off to attack the village. The Indians fight back. Wanese breaks through 
the fourth dam... She breaks through the fifth dam... She breaks through the sixth 
dam... and then Wanese is killed too. 
Mainai goes to see Wamwi and Wanese's son because he fears he will try to 
get revenge. One dam remains standing and the son has already transformed 
himself into a water-snake and is just about to set off. Mainai stops him and says, 
"If you attack the Indians they will kill you as they killed your father and your mother. 
On top of that, you're too young and not strong or intelligent enough to defeat them. 
I will help you get away from here and reach the sea. " And he does so. 
(Told by Kamavi at Kümene, Aükwa, 25-1-1994, translated by Alfred Norino, arranged by me). 
(5) Story telling of the connection between the Pa'ikwene and the Galibi 
The first Pa'ikwene all had spirits in them, men, women, even children. This was in 
Aükwa, that's where the Pa'ikwene started. 2 A long time ago, in the beginning, the 
Pa'ikwene and Galibi were one. Then they split. The Galibi are spirits. Their 
mother was a Pa'ikwene woman, their father Maripoka, the guardian of water3, who 
seduced her. What happened was: one day her brother went fishing, leaving her to 
work in the garden. On his return he found her with a man, it was Maripoka in 
human form. Her brother was jealous and angry. When he saw she had become 
pregnant he decided to kill his sister's lover. He prepared some arrows and next 
time the two were together he shot one at Maripoka. But Maripoka deflected the 
arrow then vanished into thin air, and the arrow hit the sister and killed her. A lot of 
2 As noted, many Pa'ikwene believe that they actually originated much further south, a claim 
seemingly borne out by ethnohistorical research (see chapter 1). 
3 In a version of this story told to Nimuendaju (1971: 78) the father is Yumawali, the mountain-spirit. 
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blood gushed from the sister's body. After three days her brother went to look and 
found there were many worms and flies in the blood. He boiled up some water to 
throw on the blood, to wash the worms and flies away. After three days more he 
returned for another look. The blood was still there and there were even more 
worms and flies and he saw they were bigger. So he prepared more water and 
threw it on the blood to wash them away. After another three days he went to look 
again and saw that the flies and worms were still there and had grown even bigger. 
Sitting among them, in the middle of the pool of blood, was a little boy, who called 
out to him: "Uncle, Uncle, do not kill us, Uncle, let my brothers and sisters be! " 
Then all the worms and flies turned into children. And a week later, when the 
brother came, there was a host of children there, boys and girls, with little bows and 
arrows and living in little houses. When they grew up, these children, who were the 
Galibi, made war on their uncle. And since that time they and the Pa'ikwaki have 
always fought. In the beginning they spoke the same language, but not any more. 4 
(Told by Waptchi, Premier Village Esperance, 19-3-1994, translated from Pa'ikwaki into French by 
Karinai [Felisberto] and Edison Labonte, and collected and arranged by me). 
4 Traditional enemies, the Galibi and Pa'ikwene are "now friends" according to informants (cf. 
Nimuendaju ibid.: 78-9). However, some said they were suspicious of the Galibi and uncomfortable in 
their presence. Linguistically, the Galibi are not Arawakan like the Pa'ikwene but Karib-speaking. 
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B. The PA'IKWENE TAXONOMY of FAUNA 
The Pa'ikwene arrange the animal world into three main classes, one important 
factor of which is (in)edibility. The first, "Puigne", essentially comprises land-based 
animals, including tree-dwellers. "Puigne" is translated in Creole as "animal" and 
also as "chair", i. e., `flesh'. This is distinguished from "viande" - `meat' - as denoted 
by a further term, "Intchi", used in respect of the (dead and cooked) species one 
may eat. So while all animals are "puigne", proscriptively inedible ones like the 
jaguar (on which more below), dog and cat are not "intchi". 
The second class is "Kohivra" and relates to birds, both edible and non- 
edible. It is translated in Creole as "gibier", i. e., `game [birds]', but contains 
members such as the domestic chicken which do not fit a Western definition of the 
term. Bats also belong to this class. Predators such as crows and eagles are not 
eaten. 
The third class, known as "Ihm", means `fish' and incorporates shellfish and 
some other aquatic creatures as subclasses. A small number of species are 
assigned simultaneously to this class and "Puigne", e. g. caiman, turtle, frog. 
Notwithstanding Douglas (1988: 41-57), such `anomalousness' did not prevent 
them from being considered edible. "Ihm" has acquired the virtually generic 
meaning of "food" per se. It was common for any comestible item of whatever 
nature (a fistful of tapioca, a fruit, a chocolate bar, or a strip of tapir crackling) to be 
referred to as "ihm". 
Poisonous snakes (non-edible) belong to the "Kaibüne" class; non- 
poisonous water-snakes to that of "Datka", and non-poisonous grass snakes are 
"Datka washüne". There is no general class for insects; they are not eaten. 
Some examples (table 3): 
Puigne: 
tapir: 
peccary: 
deer: 
armadillo: 
agouti: 
iguana: 
sloth: 
tortoise: 
caiman: 
macaque: 
squirrel monkey 
frog: 
aodik ('intchi', i. e., edible) 
kavine ('intchi') 
karikü ('intchi') 
tatü (Portuguese, 'intchi') 
bügütrü ('intchi') 
yüan ('intchi') 
waikwi ('intchi') 
meoka ('intchi') 
pünumna ('intchi') 
wakükwa ('intchi') 
akama (intchi') 
shahnk ('intchi') 
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Puigne (cont'd): 
jaguar: kaokwin (non-'intchi', i. e., non-edible) 
cat: küsküs (non-'intchi') 
dog: peü (non-'intchi') 
Kohivra: 
duck: ovayan (edible) 
parrot: jako (Creole, edible) 
toucan: yaok (edible) 
macaw: a'ara (edible) 
blue macaw: ka(r)ü? (edible) 
colibri: tüküs (edible) 
chicken: taka'ahk (edible) 
crow: issü (non-edible) 
harpy eagle: avakni (non-edible) 
owl: shüwet (from Creole, non-edible) 
bat: missibiü (non-edible) 
Ihm: 
bass: künan (edible) 
piranha: omaien (some types edible) 
ray: hüb (edible) 
eel: waptchi (edible) 
crab: küa (edible) 
shrimp: takes (edible) 
The reason usually given for the jaguar being a prohibited food was that it is "ka 
kabai", i. e., "not good". This I interpreted as having a similarly ambiguous meaning 
as in English and French: either it tasted bad or else consuming it was wrong. The 
(mainly) Protestant Pa'ikwene of my village denied the latter case applied. 
However, my interview with the shamans Waptchi and Ovayan, described above, 
revealed that in common with many other Amerindians, the Pa'ikwene hold the 
jaguar an exceedingly powerful spirit being. This concurs with Montout (1994: 63) 
who further tells me in a personal communication that outside of a shamanic 
context the eating of this animal is indeed forbidden (and dangerous) on magico- 
religious grounds. According to informants raw jaguar heart was an efficacious 
cure for fear and used to be given to people before going into battle; and some 
hunters kill it for its coat and fangs, objects thought to possess mana, to borrow a 
Polynesian term, and which also fetch a good market price for all its being a legally 
protected species in Guyane. Shamanic initiation and practice seem also to 
involve the consumption of at least two more prescribed species, colibri and 
anaconda. 
Whether due to a taboo or not, the disinclination to eat jaguar was shared by 
Christian and non-Christian Pa'ikwene alike. Other than this one instance, the 
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native system of zoological categorisation gave little sign of having a moral basis 
(or of necessarily being part of a comprehensive symbolic classificatory structure ä 
la Levi-Strauss 1962b; cf. Morris' critique 1976). Overall, rather, discounting the 
Adventist Pa'ikwene in the next village who had their own biblically sanctioned 
dietary ethics, the division of animalkind seemed eminently practical - and 
gustatory. Species were thought and known either to be nice to eat or not nice to 
eat, and people would decline certain fare simply because they did not like the 
taste. For instance, whereas everyone I met relished tapir, deer and crab, the same 
was not true of sloth or lizard. Also, for no reason I could discover apart from that 
they said they found them delicious, women seemed particularly to enjoy monkey 
heads. 
By and large, then, animal killing and food were a matter of personal choice, 
preference and opportunity, not doctrine (cf. Nimuendaju 1971: 49-51 on Pa'ikwene 
hunting and fishing). Even for items proscribed in connection with menstruation, 
the rationale tended to be explained in pragmatic and even 'medical' terms, though 
a possible covert religious motive cannot be ruled out. Thus at her first period, a 
girl must avoid "red fish" and only eat "a special white fish called waiyabra (? )" as at 
this time her body "is soft" and the latter food will "firm it up". For the same reason, 
menstruating women refrain from grilled red fish and meat and eat boiled white 
ones instead. As noted in the section on healing (chapter 9), "red fish" is also 
considered bad for pregnancy and women who are breast feeding on the grounds 
that it gives too much energy. I mentioned also that expectant mothers should not 
partake of macaw or sloth, the first being said to induce a sickness of the blood, the 
second to cause a long and painful labour by making the child lazy in the womb. 
Likewise it will have trouble exiting if its mother eats tapir, which "makes the baby 
grow too big inside her", or monkey, "because it clings on by the tail" (Montout op. 
cit.: 62). Lastly, the old pubescent rites for boys entailed their having to show their 
bravery by killing a particularly dangerous type of wild pig, which was then 
communally eaten. 
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C. MOUTH MAGIC 
a) From my fieldnotes, 19th December 1993. 
"It's noteworthy that the pastor and other Assemblefa de Deus 
officiants constantly use a microphone - in a church building whose 
size permits the voice to be distinctly heard unaided. What power, 
what transcendence, the microphone is supposed to effect is not 
difficult to imagine. The voice of authority - of "Ohokri" (God) - is 
simultaneously, by its use, at one remove and that much more 
present. The microphone is more than a voice amplifier, it's a sacred 
object in a cult without it seems any others (apart from books: the 
bible, prayer books and hymnals). It's the spoken Word made not 
merely loud but tangible. It has become a metonymic object, not 
merely the conveyor of the voice but the divine VOICE, concretised 
and visible to the believer, and thus the divinity itself. Also, the 
physiological and affective symptoms of the speaker, his sighs, 
groans, warbles, tremors and other vocal and respiratory effects, are 
translated through, and because of, the microphone from the natural 
expression of the religious experience into the signs, the stigmata, of 
its source. Thus enhanced, they symbolise and in essence actually 
manifest godhood. They both represent and present to the 
participants, the hearers, the presence of the deity they have invoked 
in their prayers and songs and by their own individual and joint 
presence. In this sense, the microphone is also mask: though the 
speaker's face is perceptible behind it, he is at the same time 
occluded by its use; for behind, and immanent in, his face, and filling 
more fully the space where his is, is another, the godhead itself. And 
the energy concentrating in his face and issuing from his mouth, and 
making a force-pump out of his phonemes, reveals the power in the 
holy sound which is emitted by that godly and as if more present 
Other. Like a mask, too, the microphone imposes an order, 
separating wearer from non-wearers and thus the sacred from the 
profane. It also binds them to him. At one level, this assembly, the 
congregation, the officiants and god, is exclusive and hierarchical; at 
another, and through the medium of the voice-tool, VOICE-mask, it is 
inclusive and egalitarian, in that all the humans present are equal in 
the sight - and within the vocal range - of the deity. " 
b) The Protestant fundamentalist emphasis on the voice and sound referred to in a 
number of chapters was not just a compensation for the absence of visual 
iconography (which is associated with idolatry and Catholicism, regarded as one 
and the same). 5 It was ideologically legitimated; literally, as it were, theologically 
decreed. As noted in chapter 4 (section i), a certain Christian teleological view 
5A lack, it must be said, more virtual than complete, as some households displayed images of Biblical 
scenes. 'My' family for instance had a large framed picture of the Parting of the Red Sea. 
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categorises hearing together with sight as one of the superior moral senses proper 
to humans in that our eyes and ears are made, it is written, in the image of God. 
And as an instrument of the soul, the body (and as part of it the sense organs) is 
designed by a divine intelligence (an idea shared with the Ancient Greeks) whose 
'vocal' manifestation is perceptible to us: thus it is that `God speaks to man, and 
man through his ears hears His Word' (Sears 1991). Given this divine validation, it 
is not surprising that the Voice plays such a significant role in the religious life of 
the Pa'ikwene converts who customarily, as noted, greatly value "loud-and-strong 
speaking" in their everyday one anyway. 
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GLOSSARY (some key terms) 
anivit, work. 
ash, to eat. 
Aükwa, Pa'ikwene homeland on the river of the same name (Urucauä in Brazilian) 
in Amapa State. 
auna, to speak. 
Atiwi, Black man, Creole. 
awaig, man. 
bareüyo (fem. ), -ye (masc. ), pretty, beautiful, handsome, clean, proper. 
batek, to like, love, be pleased/happy 
eveitchi, remedy. 
hiyak, to know. 
hiyap, to see. 
hiyaptihi, chief. 
ihamwi, healer, shaman. 
ihm, fish (class); food generally. 
intchi, meat (edible). 
kabai, good/well. 
ka kabai, not good, bad, wrong. 
kanivwie, to work. 
Kiaptdnka, literally "the speech of respect", moribund ceremonial language. 
kohivra, bird (class). 
kwak, (Creole) manioc flour. 
mativwe, to be hungry. 
mabip, to be tired/lazy. 
mwaka, to want. 
Ohokri, God. 
Pa'asi, the French, Whites. 
Pa'ikwene, Palikur self-appellation, literally "People of the middle". 
Pa'ikwaki, the Pa'ikwene language. 
Palikur, term most often used by outsiders to designate the Pa'ikwene. 
Parana, Brazilians. 
puigne, animal (class); flesh (not necessarily edible). 
tchimap, to hear-listen-understand. 
tchino, woman. 
Wavitche, Pa'ikwene superspirit, diabolised since conversion to Christianity. 
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